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CASE STUDIES OF COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES: AN INTRODUCTION

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1 INTRODUCTION

Each year, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, thousands of people died from war and genocide and millions became refugees. Major wars erupted in all parts of the world—in Asia (Cambodia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka), Latin America (in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador), Sub-Saharan Africa (in numerous countries), and Europe (in the Balkans and the South Caucasus). The prevalence of complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs)—profound social crises in which a large number of people suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement (Väyrynen, Volume I)—did not diminish with the end of the cold war. Some conflicts ended, but new ones erupted, and CHEs continued to be an important source of human distress. These catastrophes involve substantial human costs—not only deaths from violence, but also from accompanying hunger, disease, and displacement. Moreover, emergencies normally disrupt production and investment, often destroying crops, animals, and infrastructure, thus resulting in economic stagnation or collapse, while undermining development prospects.[1]

There is thus an urgent imperative to prevent such events by identifying the underlying causes and proposing policies to reduce emergencies, the fundamental aims of this two-volume study. This research undertaken by the United Nations University/World Institute of Development Economics Research in Helsinki and Queen Elizabeth House at Oxford University is devoted to exploring the root causes of emergencies, with emphases on economic, social and political causes and their interaction.[2]

The first volume of the study presented some general analyses, including investigation of economic, political, and environmental sources of emergencies, as well as ethnic dimensions.[3] This volume includes twelve case studies, and a general chapter by Raimo Väyrynen on the political and economic causes of several humanitarian emergencies not covered by the case studies. In Chapter 1 of the first volume, Frances Stewart presented an overview of the study, covering the general analyses in Volume I and the case studies in Volume II. To provide background to this volume, this chapter will present a brief summary of the first volume, explain how the cases were selected, sketch summaries of each of the case studies, and reflect on general findings from the case studies.

2 FINDINGS OF THE ANALYSES IN VOLUME I

The analysis in Volume I showed multiple causes of the human suffering in emergencies. Economic, political, and cultural sources are intertwined; economic stagnation or collapse, especially when coupled with large disparities among groups (horizontal inequality) and individuals (vertical inequality), spur political discontent, which leaders use to mobilize people to support their struggles for power, thus deepening and exploiting perceived

cultural differences.[4] Group differences, based on differences in ethnicity, race, religion, caste or class, are reinforced, and sometimes created, by the conflict. While these differences are not the primary cause, they acquire an independent force that makes peace-making difficult. Moreover, in war, collective action is the consequence of individual decisions. Individuals' political and economic aims may be served by war. Such motivation fuels and may even cause conflict.

Väyrynen, in Chapter 2, defines and operationalizes the concept of a humanitarian emergency. Despite some underlying economic causes, complex humanitarian emergencies are essentially political or intergroup struggles for political power and the economic and social gains this confers. Using Väyrynen's definition, the chapter views CHEs globally; while emergencies mostly occur because of intra-country disputes, there are political and economic links to the rest of the world, which may partially cause and magnify the disputes. Humanitarian disasters are viewed as an intrinsic part of the global political economy, the downside of otherwise positive trends of globalization.

Chapter 3 explores the economic causes of conflicts, using both evidence from historical cases and econometric techniques applied to the period 1980-95. Nafziger and Auvinen show that low per capita incomes and low or negative growth in incomes and stagnation in agricultural production are important factors leading to conflict. They also find that high rates of inequality are associated with a propensity to conflict, especially if it reflects or contributes to high inequality among regional, ethnic, or class groups. Also inflation and low levels of International Monetary Fund (IMF) funding are associated with emergencies, although the direction of causation may be the opposite—that is, high inflation may be a consequence of an emergency and CHE countries may not receive IMF funds because they

are too unstable to agree on the required programmes. Two non-economic factors—the level of military spending and a past history of conflict—are also associated with high current levels of conflict.

International terms of trade shocks are not related to the incidence of complex emergencies. Nafziger and Auvinen find that with some variables the direction of causality works in both ways—for example, emergencies are known to cause economic stagnation, while military expenditures are liable to rise with CHEs. However, while there seems to be a two-way causal relationship between growth and humanitarian emergencies, the relationship is stronger from growth to emergencies than vice versa. Together all the variables in the cross-country regressions accounted for 16-19 per cent of the total variance, indicating that much remains unexplained. Other factors which might explain the statistically 'unexplained' are treated in some of the other chapters in Volume I.

One hypothesis that has wide adherence is that environmental factors may cause emergencies. The environmental issue is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5 of Volume I. In Chapter 4, Fairhead examines the hypothesis, which links environmental scarcity to the incidence of war. Using African cases, the chapter provides support for the opposite hypothesis: *viz*. that environmental riches rather than poverty are a major source of conflict, as groups struggle to attain control over wealth-giving resources, such as minerals. Fairhead argues that the 'environmental scarcity' argument is sometimes used to obscure the political economy origins of conflict. Indeed, it is the combination of poverty and riches which creates a particularly polarized and volatile situation conducive to violence. As Fairhead's analysis shows, society becomes divided between those groups who struggle for the control of riches and the destitute, who often become the foot soldiers

of the struggles. Moreover, the time period varies; the effects of poverty and environmental degradation are usually indirect and longstanding, while the struggle for riches is more immediate, and thus more visible.

Swain considers whether the scarcity of water has been a source of emergencies. Attempts to deal with water scarcity through large projects, such as dam construction, often involve major displacements of people, potentially provoking resistance. The struggle to control scarce water resources has been a source of disputes, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, but has not yet escalated into physical conflicts on any scale. However, Swain shows that water, which is becoming increasingly scarce, is likely to worsen conflict in the future. As the water problem grows, water disputes may become more frequent and violent but Swain's study suggests they are unlikely to bring about violence on the scale of a CHE.

In Chapter 6, Morrisson examines the relationship between IMF programmes and the incidence of emergencies. His detailed investigations support the view that IMF programmes do not cause CHEs. He distinguishes between 'soft' repression (involving, for example, strikes and demonstrations, and moderate political instability, which when repressed may lead to deaths) and 'hard' repression with major episodes of violence. The history of adjustment in Africa and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s shows that adjustment policies often involved social costs, but not humanitarian emergencies. In a large number of cases, the social costs led to 'soft' repression, but hard repression was infrequent and of short duration. From this, Morrisson develops the idea of 'limited humanitarian emergencies', which can be intense, but cover only a small population for a short period of time. The possibility of IMF programmes contributing to soft repression or

a limited humanitarian emergency should be considered when designing adjustment programmes.

Chapter 7 by Holsti turns to political causes of CHEs, indicating that the risk of an emergency is likely to increase with two or more distinct ethnic, language, or religious communities; among countries which acquired independence after 1945; where there is government exclusion and persecution of distinct social groups; where there is rule by kleptocrats or entrenched minorities; and where there is weak government legitimacy. These are all predisposing factors (some of which overlap, while some contradict each other). The study examines 17 cases that tend to endorse the risk model put forward. Contrary to the frequent assertion that 'ethnic' conflict is a major source of emergencies, the cases show that, in the main, governments, rather than spontaneous ethnic hatred, launch political violence. While external agents often become involved, in only two of the 17 cases was foreign intervention a causal factor. In one other case, withdrawal of foreign aid when the cold war ended precipitated an economic crisis that led to the collapse of political authority and subsequent killings and refugee flows. Holsti finds that organized politicides by government have resulted in far greater casualties than other types of civil war, including rebellions. The presence of early warning indicators has not helped the international community to prevent such emergencies.

In Chapter 8, David Keen views wars from a different perspective—not so much as a political but as a criminal activity. Keen conceptualizes war as an 'accumulation of crimes' which have a private economic motive for the participants. Some groups come to be 'above the law' (that is, immune from prosecution and punishment by national and international law) while others come to be 'below the law' (that is unprotected by the law).

Groups below the law are often those deemed to be associated with a rebel movement, and thus subject to extreme violence and exploitation, frequently serving to increase the profit of those who are above the law and immune from punishment, since such violence is deemed 'legitimate' during war.

In Chapter 9, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger address the critical question of ethnicity. Scholars often describe conflict in Africa as 'ethnic', and resulting from 'collapsed' states. The authors review work on ethnicity in colonial and post-colonial Africa and argue that wars in the late twentieth century cannot be explained as a consequence of the inevitable resurgence of ancient ethnic tensions, but that ideas about ethnicity are contingent and political. Ethnic identifications and historical memories are constantly and selectively reworked by a range of political actors, and are manipulated by politicians and used at a local level as a moral critique of national politics; notions of ethnic identities as fluid, inclusive, and mutually compatible may be salient in some contexts, while opposition and rivalry may be emphasized in others. The bounded, mutually exclusive ethnic units that were promoted by colonial authorities left an unpredictable legacy. The chapter includes a case study of conflict in Matabeleland which illustrates these points. This conflict was produced by the excesses of a strong state, with an authoritarian modernizing programme, not by state collapse. Although the conflict has been described as 'ethnic', it was in fact political, with the state using indiscriminate violence against a small number of dissidents in an attempt to repress the regionally based opposition. Ideas about generations-old tribal antagonism were used by the ruling party and the military during the conflict, and civilians came to see the war as both political and ethnic. Popular understandings of the conflict as being tribal were an outcome rather than a cause of political conflict.

The twelve case studies in this volume provide an in-depth analysis of particular cases, illustrating and challenging the ideas presented in Volume I. We shall consider some of the ways in which they do so in the final section of this chapter after discussing why the particular case studies were selected and briefly summarizing their findings.

3 SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT: SELECTION OF THE CASE STUDIES

Countries subject to emergencies exhibit a variety of characteristics, ranging, for example, from the genocidal state suppression of a minority group (as in Rwanda) to a fluctuating but chronic conflict among alternative clans (as in Somalia). All CHEs contain elements of *organized* conflict among groups. But the way in which group membership is defined varies, is usually fluid and changes in response to the pressures of politics, including conflict. One way of classifying emergencies is by source of group differences—that is, how group membership is perceived and defined. However, humanitarian emergencies also differ in other dimensions: for example, by 'political' dimensions such as the degree of foreign involvement and the nature of the state; and by 'economic' dimensions such as resource base and the extent of integration into the global economy. CHEs also differ according to the nature of the fighting, whether consisting mainly of small chronic skirmishes, of systematic state-sponsored terrorism, or of 'set piece' battles. Most conflicts, in fact, develop over time, so that while they may start with one set of characteristics, these change—for example, a strong state may start by suppressing a minority and be so weakened by the conflict that the situation turns into a 'post-nation state'[5] conflict.

Conflicts may thus be categorized according to difference in a variety of dimensions:

3.1 Classification according to principles of group differentiation

Groups are mobilized for conflict according to perceived differences, which are created or sharpened by leaders or orchestrators of violence so as to make them more effective as a source of mobilization. Sources of perceived group differences in conflict include: religion (Northern Ireland, the English Civil War), class (Cambodia, El Salvador, the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, Nicaragua), ethnicity (Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe), clans (Somalia, to some extent Afghanistan), and factions organized by 'strongmen' (Sierra Leone, Liberia).

3.2 External involvement

Almost all conflicts in recent history involve external interaction with domestic groups, with foreigners helping finance the conflict, providing arms, and sometimes lending personnel. But the balance of foreign and local involvement varies. One important source of political difference is the extent of foreign involvement. At one extreme, the initial impetus for the conflict arises from foreign invasion (for example, Afghanistan). Other conflicts involve heavy foreign support for local groups, the foreigners providing finance, arms and organization for the rebels (for example, in Mozambique, Angola, and Nicaragua, and in subsequent stages of the Afghan war). A third type of conflict, from a political perspective, is where a strong state instigates the conflict by attacking potential opposition groups (Rwanda, Uganda under Amin, the Zimbabwe government's attack on Matabeleland). As noted above, Holsti finds that this is the most common type. A fourth

type is where a rebel group starts violent opposition, either seeking political rights or, where geographically localized, possibly secession. A fifth political type occurs where the state is (or becomes, through conflict) so weak that conflicts erupt between non-state groups, seeking to extend their power. In some of these situations, identity politics combine with power seeking; in others, economic motivation and fear are the main elements cementing groups together. In those situations where there is a virtual absence of authoritative government, international interest groups—companies and criminal groups—may ally with domestic forces to secure their interests. Mark Duffield has described these conflicts as 'post-nation state conflicts', and Mary Kaldor has called them 'new wars'. Duffield, who is mainly analysing African wars, emphasizes the global economic links and motivations in such wars as those in Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, while Kaldor, who is concerned with the Balkans, gives more emphasis to the role of identity politics.[6]

Another type of external relationship results from the break-up of multinational empires or federations, as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In such multinational units, the constituent parts developed administrative and economic interdependencies which increased their vulnerability to external forces. This is especially the case in a highly centralized empire, such as the Soviet Union, in which important decisions were made in the centre and the peripheries were vulnerable not only to these decisions, but also to their absence. The break-up of the Soviet Union gave a chance for nationalist mobilization from below which led to the hardening of political and ethnic divisions and ensuing warfare, as in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In the former Yugoslavia, the abolition of the federal framework uncovered disputes between different ethnic communities that started a mutual struggle for the control over resources and political recognition. The wars in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Balkans have been 'new', but not necessarily

'post-nation state'. Rather they have been 'pre-nation state' wars whose purpose is to establish national territory, resource base, and identity and start a slow process towards developing a nation state.

In the Great Lakes region, like the Soviet and Yugoslav cases, the imperial superstructure also broke down, leading to regional reorganization through political struggle for control of resources and a search for ethnic nationalism focused on divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. The ultimate result may be more cohesive national-territorial communities. The tragedy, however, is that in these cases, whether European, Central Asian or Central African, a greater degree of ethnic homogeneity has been achieved by 'cleansing' the other communities from the 'national' territory.

3.3 Wars classified by economic resource base

Some wars occur in primarily rural societies where there is an acute land scarcity, as indicated by the land/labour ratio. In such instances, land scarcity is an underlying source of tension, which is likely to be exacerbated where different groups find themselves living in the same area, as in Rwanda and Kosovo. In such cases, the communities have been physically interspersed with each other, but have been socially segregated. Other examples of acute land scarcity in emergencies are Burundi, Haiti, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

Mineral riches form another type of resource base that can give rise to conflict: numerous examples include Sierra Leone, Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria and Tajikistan. These countries are all integrated into the world economy via commodity exports (in some cases through arms and drug trafficking).

But complex emergencies can also occur in relatively economically isolated economies, such as Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar. In most of these countries, political and social structures are rooted in their agricultural past and have not gone through the test of economic integration. This test tends to divide countries into two broad categories; those that progress towards participatory and inclusive polities become resistant to humanitarian emergencies, while others develop autocratic and predatory governments whose main goal is to exploit society's resources for the benefit of the few.

From an economic perspective, an alternative way of classifying complex humanitarian emergencies is by income and economic growth. As noted above, a general finding of much economic analysis is that emergencies are more likely to erupt in low-income economies with slow or negative growth. Examples abound, including Ethiopia and Afghanistan, although in these cases, the growth failure was partly due to the prolonged conflict. There are also middle-income economies associated with emergencies, such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Colombia, while in Africa, Rwanda was a growing lower-middle-income economy before the 1994 crisis.

3.4 Wars classified by nature of fighting and source of deaths

The physical nature of wars has evolved historically with changes in technology, finance, and the politics of wars. The physical characteristics of war tend to vary with differences in other dimensions; wars which are strongly foreign-supported may involve high technology, with air bombing of targets, extensive mining, and so on, while local wars, mainly locally financed, may largely rely on handguns, and in the Rwanda case, *pangas*.

The warring parties are militias or other loosely organized units, and are usually poorly trained. Set piece battles occur in inter-state wars (Iran versus Iraq, for example) but are unusual in civil wars, where skirmishes are more typical. Major battles occur only between well-armed parties as, for instance, in the Angolan or Sri Lankan civil wars. State-inspired violence can be specific in time and place (as in Rwanda), or may erupt irregularly over a long time and in different places (for example, in Algeria and East Timor).

In selecting our sample of case studies, we have aimed to find examples of each of the dimensions discussed above, as indicated in the matrix below—of course, every case represents an example along several of the dimensions. Moreover, in many cases an exact classification is not possible as the conflict shares characteristics in more than one cell in the columns. Moreover, conflicts develop over time, moving from one category to another—this was particularly true of those conflicts which began as cold war inspired ones, but then became self-perpetuating as the state was weakened by the war, new identities were formed or reinforced, and local groups sought to gain or sustain political power.

Two of the twelve cases—Haiti and Kenya—are examples of countries which were *not* suffering complex humanitarian emergencies, but appeared as potential candidates so that we might learn from their stories about why, in similar circumstances, some countries did and others did not erupt into conflict. In Haiti, the murderous violence was more limited than in the pervasive cases of emergencies. However, the extent of refugee flows, due to repressive state policies, entrenched poverty and political instability, justify its analysis as a humanitarian crisis. Kenya remains relatively peaceful.

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4 A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES

This section will present a brief overview of the case studies, devoting a paragraph to each.

4.1 Afghanistan

The case study on Afghanistan by Barnett Rubin is named 'The Last Cold War Conflict: The First Post-Cold War Conflict' to indicate the way in which the struggles in Afghanistan, after starting as part of the cold war, with the Russian-supported government being attacked by US-supported opposition, subsequently became much more of a 'post-nation state' war with the virtual collapse of the state and chronic struggles for power among competing factions. These factions used identity (Pakstun versus non-Pakstun) and religion (Islam versus communism) as mobilizing elements. Initially the war was largely financed by official funds from outside; later official support was greatly reduced, but drug finance provided continued resources for the competing factions.

4.2 Burundi

Patrick D. Gaffney shows that, like Rwanda, Burundi inherited deep structural divisions between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi from the Belgian colonial power. A third group, Twa, play little political role. The post-independence government used the inherited divisions to enable a small Tutsi elite, with control over the army, to maintain a

political monopoly. State sponsored violence against the Hutu occurred in the early 1970s and again in the early 1990s. The events in Rwanda in 1994 were understood by both Tutsi and Hutu as a portent of what might happen in Burundi, accentuating distrust. A close examination of the social and political dynamics of the crisis, as well as a review of the economic profile of Burundi, reveals that the current breakdown of order can be seen as a continuation of the systematic oppression and ethnic discrimination that were long a feature of this society. A review of the take-over of the presidency by Pierre Buyoya in July 1996 and the subsequent failure of a number of initiatives seeking national reconciliation suggests that the political enmity and ideological differences among rival groups make a peaceful solution unlikely in the short term.

4.3 Cambodia

The study by Philippe Le Billon and Karen Bakker, which covers 1970 to 1993, examines the political and economic factors that account for Cambodia's vulnerability to conflict. Sharp divisions between the poor deprived peasantry and a small educated and privileged elite gave rise to support for the egalitarian philosophy of the Khmer Rouge. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge instituted massive killings of the educated urban population. Soviet and Vietnamese support for the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge was successful in 1979, but there followed a continuous low-level civil war as factions competed for power, each with foreign support.

4.4 Central America, with a focus on El Salvador

Manuel Pastor and James Boyce argue that slow growth (below expectations) and pre-existing class and ethnic inequalities contributed to an emergency. These conditions were present throughout Central America, with sharp class differences (coinciding with ethnic ones) in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Although each country experienced growth in the 1960s and 1970s, it was not high. Problems were exacerbated by external intervention—with the US supporting the government in El Salvador and Guatemala and opposition forces in Nicaragua. Once conflict started, its economic consequences (a slowdown in growth and investment) further exacerbated the situation.

4.5 Congo

As Kisangani Emizet emphasizes, ethnic divisions in Congo were identified and accentuated by the colonial power. Moreover, long-term economic stagnation, an extremely predatory government, and the potential riches to be gained from the abundance of mineral resources would seem to make Congo a candidate for a continuing CHE. In the midst of pervasive state violence, for many years Mobutu kept a fragile peace through a repressive state and an institutionalized patronage system which extended to the main ethnic elements in the country. The study does not cover the post-Mobutu period in detail, during which time it appears that there has been a weakening of the state repressive potential and a failure to follow the ethnically inclusive patronage system that Mobutu had adopted. In 1998-99, the relatively peaceful situation broke down and fighting between government forces and opposition groups erupted, each supported by various countries in the region.

4.6 Haiti

As Mats Lundahl shows, the protracted, low-key emergency in Haiti has both economic and political causes. The major economic causes were poor economic performance, combined with unequal income distribution. An interaction between population growth and land erosion led to falling rural incomes; import-substituting industrialization was not successful and export assembly, initially successful, suffered greatly from economic sanctions from 1991-94. Unequal access to land, education, and other economic opportunities persisted, so that a few were enriched and the masses remained poor. A kleptocratic government dating back to the nineteenth century monopolized rents for an elite surrounding the president. The replacement of Duvalier by the populist Aristide, who attacked privilege and corruption, provoked a military coup. Although the international community supported the corrupt regime of Duvalier for many years, after Aristide was deposed a UN sponsored force invaded the island to restore democracy. Current problems include a fragile judicial system, a weak economy, and a lack of political consensus. These problems make the prevailing peace a brittle one.

4.7 Iraq

This is a rather different case from the others since the main elements in the CHE were two international wars (first with Iran, then the invasion of Kuwait, and the world reaction to this) and international economic sanctions. As analysed by Abbas Alnasrawi, each episode has had devastating consequences for the economy of Iraq, leading to huge hardship for the people. The Iran/Iraq war led to excessive militarization of the economy, substantial contraction in non-military public spending, severe inflation, sharp reductions

in exports and imports, and a significant decline in household income and welfare. The Kuwait invasion and subsequent reaction resulted in massive destruction of Iraq's economic and social infrastructure and a general disintegration of the economy. The international sanctions that followed have made recovery almost impossible, and have further eaten into basic living standards causing a humanitarian emergency.

4.8 Kenya

Jeni Klugman's is a study of a country that appears to have some of the conditions which might make it develop into a CHE, but so far Kenya has managed to avoid more than minor violence. The study aims to explore why this is so. Growing socio-economic cleavages, along with general economic stagnation, form a potent source of mass discontent. Growing pressure on resources is a further factor, arising from the rapid population growth that has meant a near-tripling of population in three decades. Moreover, there are sufficient ethnic divisions to permit identity politics to provide a source of mobilization for ambitious politicians. Minor outbreaks of ethnic violence (with the apparent complicit support of government) have preceded each election. In the 1960s and 1970s, political stability was ensured by growth which was fairly widely shared, as health, education and water services were extended to most parts of the country. Moreover, the Kikuyu, the most advanced tribe economically, continued to profit from the economy even when barred from political participation. But with economic stagnation, these conditions are no longer present. Relative peace (accompanied by very high rates of crime) is partly due to an authoritarian government, partly to the fact that the president feels somewhat secure because of the divisions among the opposition and hence does not need to resort to

the most extreme forms of ethnic politics, and partly to the fact that most people still have more to lose from violence than they gain from peace.

4.9 Liberia and Sierra Leone

These two cases are dealt with together in Chapter 8 by William Reno. The emphasis of the study is on how humanitarian emergencies resulted from the political economy of two 'failing' states. In each country, cold war rulers acquired personal power through their influence over economic exchange, in both the public and private sectors. The political shock of the end of the cold war, coupled with the growth of clandestine markets, often outside the leaders' control, reduced government control. This created opportunities for rivals, including regional strongmen, to assert their own control and to challenge the existing political authorities. The consequence of these struggles was near complete institutional collapse—which was furthered by reduced financial aid, which had helped prop up the political authority of the rulers, as cold war motives for giving aid diminished—giving way to chronic warfare among strongmen seeking political control. The struggle led to widespread impoverishment among the majority, but enrichment for some of those leading or carrying out the fighting. The warfare led to massive migration, destabilizing neighbouring communities. Liberia, for example, lost 90 per cent of its rural population in the early 1990s. The two wars illustrate the international contagion of post-nation state wars, where the struggle among strongmen for resources and controls does not respect recognized legal boundaries and incorporates local political and economic entrepreneurs into wider conflict.

4.10 Rwanda

As Peter Uvin shows, Rwanda's genocide, similar to emergencies in other Belgian colonies, has its roots in the deep political and economic discrimination between different groups practised by the colonial power and carried forward in the post-colonial era. The minority Tutsis were favoured in every respect in the colonial era. In the post-colonial era, the majority Hutu acquired power, and sought to reverse the discrimination by policies favouring the Tutsi in most areas (employment, the army, education, etc.). Despite sustained economic growth from 1965 to 1988, supported by generous flows of aid, few of the benefits reached the masses and the majority of the Hutu remained poor and illiterate. The Hutu government therefore used ethnic politics to maintain support, with active propaganda against the Tutsi, culminating in the genocide of 1994. Rwanda's genocide is the result of long-term economic and social processes: extreme pauperization for the majority; corruption and abuse of power; deeply-felt cynicism among many of the poor; rapidly growing regional and ethnic inequality; lack of education among the peasants and a tradition of obedience to authoritarian government; a history of institutionalized and state-sponsored violence; and political strategies used by the elite to bolster their support against discontent and democratic pressures. The invasion by the Tutsi supported Front Patriotique Rwandais and the subsequent civil war were the events which triggered the devastating violence. While racism was encouraged by the government as a mechanism to strengthen their position, racist prejudice for ordinary people, such as poor Hutu who were subject to structural violence and humiliation, helped make sense of their predicament and to explain their misery through projection and scape-goating.

4.11 Somalia

The study by Juha Auvinen and Timo Kivimäki describes the historical developments leading to the civil war and the defeat of the long-term ruler, Siad Barre, at the beginning of 1991, to be followed by a prolonged period of sporadic fighting among clans for political dominance. The study contrasts three interpretations of the struggle, an 'objectivist', a 'primordialist' and an 'instrumentalist' one. The objectivist sees the struggle as the consequence of relative deprivation produced by the collapse of the Somalian economy and discriminating political and economic structures; according to the primordialist view, historical structures of production gave rise to a cultural clash with the modern structures demanded by the global political economy; the instrumentalist view argues that conflict resulted from political action, in which both culture and deprivation were used by leaders to help them mobilize supporters and gain power. Somali politicians, aiming to further their personal ambition, created and strengthened identities and belligerent discursive structures. International aid contributed to conflict, by providing a resource which was controlled by those in power, thereby increasing the incentive to acquire political control by ambitious individuals. Moreover, international aid failed to address the underlying 'objectivist' features of economic stagnation and relative deprivation and discrimination which facilitated mobilization for violent conflict. While humanitarian aid agencies provided important emergency relief, their resources also became a source of fighting between rival factions. The US-lead 'Operation Restore Hope', launched in December 1992, arrived too late to alleviate famine, and failed to promote peace.

4.12 The South Caucasus

In their article, Raimo Väyrynen and Leila Alieva trace the humanitarian emergency in the South Caucasus to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the collapse of production, in hyperinflation, and reduced the authority of the state and its ability to suppress opposition. The effects of the disintegration of the Soviet Union were compounded by the establishment of new sovereign states, with minimal economic contacts. The new élites that came to power encouraged nationalistic and ethnic politics, leading to demands for ethnic self-determination and to considerable inter-state tensions with a variety of territorial claims of one state (or minority) against another. For example, Azerbaijani and Armenian troops fought over Nagorno Karabakh, Chechnya struggled for independence from Russia, the North Caucasus was destabilized, and Georgia became *de facto* divided. A part of the region is rich in natural resources (oil in Azerbaijan and Chechnya, agricultural land in Georgia) which shaped both the internal power struggles and attracted foreign interventions. The South Caucasus is located at the cross-roads of the geo-political strategies of Iran, Turkey, Russia, and major Western powers. Economic woes increased the salience of ethnic and territorial disputes, which, compounded by external influences, sparked and escalated deadly conflicts, leading to large-scale violence and displacement. Neither local actors nor international organizations have been able to develop effective strategies to stop the suffering, although most of the conflicts have been frozen.

4.13 The former Yugoslavia

In the former Yugoslavia, the reactions of élites and interest groups to liberalization and adjustment contributed to the eruption of an ongoing humanitarian emergency. The roots of the Yugoslavian crisis arise from the disintegration of government authority with a breakdown of political and civil order during the transformation from a socialist self-managed economy and an authoritarian government to a market economy and democracy. Historic ethnic hostilities were not, as widely suggested, at the roots of the conflict, but were used by political leaders as a means of securing power during this difficult transition. Yugoslavia's rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled by foreign borrowing, was reversed during a debt crisis that lasted more than a decade. The debt crisis, as elsewhere, was the consequence of high borrowing, followed by declining terms of trade and tightening international credit. Moreover, there was a decline in aid from the west with the lessening of the cold war. Worsening living standards accompanied an austere IMF adjustment programme. The economic deterioration, which affected most people, led to conditions encouraging identity politics and violence. The economic basis of stable democratic government was severely weakened by rising income concentration, the government fiscal crisis, deindustrialization, and worsening prospects for investment in poorer regions, as well as growing economic uncertainty among all groups including the professional classes, sharply rising unemployment especially among young people and unskilled workers. Political conflicts arose over the distribution of the falling economic resources, the allocation of debt obligations between central and regional governments and the nature of economic and political reform.

Chapter 14 of Volume II discusses the role of the state in engendering humanitarian crises through rent-seeking and predatory policies. In addition to theoretical arguments, Raimo Väyrynen presents five brief case studies to show how the egoistic policies of the élites undermine economic progress and political stability. Of the five case studies, Angola, Colombia, and Tajikistan especially add new information to the chapters on individual countries published in this volume. In Angola, the parties to the civil war, the MPLA and the UNITA, are divided primarily by politics, even though there are ethnic differences as well. Initially, the civil war was instigated by Portuguese colonialism to which the local forces responded by demanding independence. By the end of the twentieth century, the war assumed a dynamic of its own, fuelled by the mineral riches of Angola, occasionally leading to set piece battles (for instance, in Huambo). In the Colombian civil war, the original dividing lines were social and followed patterns of unequal land ownership. While violence was instigated primarily by leftist guerrillas, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the state and the rightist paramilitaries are at least equally violent. Drugs have become a source for funding the war, as also in Tajikistan. The war in Colombia is mostly low-level, with kidnappings a common way of extorting money. In Tajikistan, the conflict has been between clans divided between those preferring a close connection with the Soviet/Russian nomenclature and those fighting for greater independence and respect for Islam. Resources and water are scarce in the region and access to them is intertwined with the fighting which is now sporadic, but was extensive and damaging at the height of the war. Russia is actively involved in the political and military control of Tajikistan.

5 SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The case studies enable us to test, to illuminate and to extend the more general findings contained in the analysis in Volume I and summarized above. While in Volume I we separated economic, political, environmental, and ethnic factors, the case studies show the importance of integrating these factors in explaining emergencies. In particular, while political ambitions explain mobilization and conflict, often creating and making use of ethnic politics, these developments occur in the context of certain economic factors.

Two economic features particularly predispose to this type of politics: economic failure and horizontal inequalities, the latter coinciding with perceived group identities (of ethnicity, clan, race, class or religion). For example, we find that in the former Yugoslavia, prolonged economic failure combined with regional inequalities; in Cambodia, Haiti, or El Salvador, the poor economic performance was combined with discrimination along class lines, and in the case of Rwanda and Burundi, mass impoverishment went along with long-standing economic and social discrimination along ethnic lines. In contrast, Kenya was able to avoid large-scale violence despite ethnic differences because for many years prosperity was widely shared, while latterly, an authoritarian government has survived, partly because a divided and weak opposition meant that it had no compulsion fully to exploit ethnic politics. In Iraq, economic failure was due to the heavy militarization and other costs of external wars and subsequent international economic sanctions.

The finding in Volume I that environmental riches rather than poverty is a predisposing condition was illustrated by the battles for control of diamonds in Sierra Leone, oil and diamonds in Angola, and mineral resources generally in Congo. In the South Caucasus the

oil resources of the Caspian Sea rim was a motivating factor for external intervention and local power struggles. Nevertheless, environmental poverty—in the form of land pressure—was a predisposing condition in Burundi, Central America, Haiti, and Rwanda. The IMF did not generally play much of a role—as concluded in Volume I—although its austerity budgets were a major element in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

All the case studies agree that ethnic divisions are *not* the cause of modern conflicts, as popularly supposed. Instead ethnicity (or other cultural differences) was created or enhanced by politicians in crisis situations as a tool for further mobilization behind them. However, in situations where ethnic differences are already recognized or entrenched (perhaps because of prior colonial policy, or because of past conflicts), the situation may be potentially explosive as competitive politics may use such differences in the struggle for power. The South Caucasus and the former Yugoslavia show that centralized multinational federations can suppress ethnic identities, but not with impunity; when the political framework collapses, the ethnic argument becomes a political instrument by which populist élites generate support in the power struggles.

It is popularly supposed that democracies are safe from emergencies. Our studies both support and oppose this view. On the one hand, where democracy is absent, discontent is more likely to express itself in violence. Democratic political and judicial institutions provide mechanisms for settling disagreements and preventing their escalation into violence. Free media contribute to the transparency of society, thus helping to dispel uncertainty and suspicion which can otherwise be mobilized for nasty political purposes. On the other hand, democratic forms are not enough to prevent humanitarian emergencies. For instance, elections in a divided and conflict-ridden society may exacerbate tensions

rather than cool down passions and easily lead to the abuses of ethnic politics. Strongly authoritarian regimes may suppress violence, as in Kenya, or maintain peace, as in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, in the former Yugoslavia, it was the effort to make a transition to democracy which was in part responsible for the wars that followed. Yet authoritarian regimes can themselves be the cause of violence, by striking at potential opposition and using violence as a way of securing support from the potentially disaffected or simply keeping a highly unpopular regime in power. Iraq, Rwanda, and Serbia provide clear and tragic examples.

The case studies show that very often external influences play a large role in promoting or fuelling conflict, by supplying economic and military resources to parties to the conflict, and sometimes by overt intervention. External governments were largely responsible for the early Afghanistan crisis, and contributed greatly to the Central American conflicts among others. The extent of the crisis in the South Caucasus cannot be comprehended without considering Russia's role, especially in Chechnya. External private interests also played a role in most crises, including particularly Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Congo. Peace-making interventions have been much fewer, and only effective in a few cases, though Cambodia and Haiti provide some positive evidence. The timidity of the international response was a major cause for the human suffering in Bosnia and Rwanda,

Countries subject to CHEs follow a dynamic trajectory which tends to prolong conflict. Whatever the initial causes, the history of conflict and the interests it generates change the situation so that simply addressing the initial causes may not be enough to create a strong peace. Each trajectory is unique but the following patterns are common: first, the conflict further weakens the economy thus accentuating the economic causes; and second, the

process of conflict often (not always) severely weakens the state both fiscally and administratively, so that adherence to the state can neither be secured by the economic and social benefits it confers nor by repression. The conflict itself may bring about a post-nation state, where lack of authority becomes a potent reason for prolonged struggle. Often in such a state, the government loses the monopoly of coercive power and competing centres are established to fight for the spoils. Somalia is one such case; Congo potentially another. Third, the conflict enhances perceptions of ethnic differences and provides new sources of social 'memory' which can be drawn on to entrench differences and justify further conflict.

Chapter 1 of Volume I summarized some policy conclusions towards preventing conflict, derived from the analysis and case studies. A basic conclusion is that policies need to be *inclusive* both politically and economically, with respect to all the major groups within a society so as to reduce horizontal inequalities. Every group needs to have fair access to political power at all levels (government, civil services, army, police), economic assets and income, and social access. In addition, conflict is less likely to erupt in a growing economy—but growth without fair distribution will not be sufficient as shown by Rwanda and, to a lesser degree, Colombia and Sri Lanka.

The major problem with this set of recommendations, which are spelt out in much more detail in Volume I, is that governments in power in conflict-prone countries are themselves usually the main source of discrimination. Strong outside pressure will be needed to reverse this, and may often not be effective. However, at present such institutions as the IMF and World Bank are not applying any such pressure, since their mandates are to promote efficiency and they do not take into account horizontal equity.

Politically, donor pressures have been in support of multiparty democracy, but this is not sufficient to ensure an inclusive government, and may indeed produce the reverse. Hence both economic and political conditionality needs to be changed so as to take into account the need for inclusive government and policies, which enhance horizontal equity. But any long lasting effective solutions, of course, depend primarily on local actors.

Preventative policies need to be applied to all countries vulnerable to conflict, which includes all countries exhibiting sharp horizontal inequality, all low-income countries, all countries with negative economic growth and countries which have had serious conflict over the previous quarter of a century. Preventive action needs also to be concerned with countries in which the state is fragmenting and cannot govern the society in a legitimate manner. There are also cases in which the predatory nature of government is the chief obstacle to any meaningful improvement of the human condition. Preventive policies of the sort discussed above are also recommended for post-conflict countries, but in addition specific policies need to be devised to provide incentives to those who have been gaining from conflict to resume peaceful activities—including incorporation in government for leaders and financial incentives and employment for the soldiers. The international financial community needs to be especially generous to post-conflict countries—for example, with respect to debt—so that economic recovery can be rapid.

NOTES

[1] Stewart and FitzGerald (eds.) (forthcoming) estimate the economic costs of recent conflicts, estimating, for example, 'that the cumulated lost income associated with the wars amounted to nearly six times the 1995

national income in El Salvador, four times the 1995 national income in Ethiopia and perhaps as much as thirteen times in Nicaragua.' Another recent effort to assess the costs of violent conflicts and the opportunity costs of their prevention is Brown and Rosecrance (1999).

[2] The project has also produced a third volume focusing on the prevention of humanitarian emergencies; see Nafziger and Väyrynen (eds.) (forthcoming).

[3] Nafziger, Stewart and Väyrynen (eds.) (Volume I).

[4] Also see Turton (1996) and Stavenhagen (1996).

[5] This is a term devised by Duffield (1999), which will be discussed further below.

[6] See Kaldor (1999) and Duffield (1999).

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