

# **WIDER WORKING PAPERS**

**Gender and Restructuring:  
Perestroika, the 1989 Revolutions,  
and Women**

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**Introduction**

It has long been known that societal transformation entails shifts in political power and property rights, resulting in changes in class structure and social hierarchies. Political sociology and the sociology of development have revealed the centrality of the state and class coalitions in processes of modernization, economic development, and political change, including revolutions (Skocpol 1979; Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol 1985). More recently, cultural studies and discourse analysis have directed attention to the power of language, the efficacy of discourses, and the role of values, symbols, myths, and similar constructs in motivating action and in mobilizing social actors (Anderson 1983; Laitin 1987). What women-in-development (WID) research and feminist scholarship have contributed is the growing consensus that neither development analysis nor political studies can be divorced from gender categories and sex-specific observations.

WID and feminist research both seek to elaborate the role of *gender* -- the cultural construct of sex roles and the disadvantaged position of women -- in the economy, polity, and society. Increasingly this scholarship is illuminating the place gender occupies in development, legal structures, political institutions, social movements, and discourses. To cite just a few examples from this rich literature, there is research on gender and state formation (Gailey 1987), gender and power relations (Scott 1987), gender and stratification (Crompton and Mann 1986), the systematic reproduction of gender inequality (Epstein 1988; Chafetz 1990), the role of the state and political institutions in constructions of gender and in women's status (Charrad 1980; Acklesberg and Diamond 1987; Piven 1985; Enloe 1987;

Agarwal 1988), the gendered nature of social policy and macroeconomic policy (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Joekes 1989; Moghadam 1990a).

As part of this intellectual trend, and in order to pursue an under-researched aspect of the momentous changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, I wish to underscore the impact on women of the shift from socialist forms of organization to market-directed ones. The transition from central planning to the free market, from socialist ideology to liberal capitalist ideology, from Communist Party hegemony to political democratization will without a doubt have specific effects upon various social groups: certainly labor will be most immediately and profoundly affected (Wiener 1990).<sup>1</sup> This essay is not concerned with the causes of restructuring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> Rather, the focus is on consequences: the gender

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1 One consequence of restructuring seems to be immiseration and a decrease in the social power of labor. This is particularly poignant in the case of Poland, where a mass workers' movement preceded the political revolution and decline of the Communist Party, and where the current government is ostensibly Solidarity-led. And yet in November 1990 Poland's coal miners held a two-hour warning strike to protest pay rates and the effects of economic restructuring of the industry. (See *International Herald Tribune* 6 Nov. 1990, p. 2.) Social inequalities have been on the rise since Hungary's reforms began, and this is expected for the Soviet Union as well. In the place of the shortages of the past, high prices now prevail.

2 In a recent paper, Bunce and Chong (1990) suggest three preconditions of the revolts in Eastern Europe: (1) an informal redistribution of power from state to civil society; (2) an economic and "governability" crisis; and (3) the Party's introduction of formal measures to liberalize. They conclude that "the structure of these systems, combined with Gorbachev's reforms, produced the conditions necessary for Poles, Hungarians, East Germans and Czechoslovaks to mount large and successful protests against Communist Party rule".

Boswell and Peters (1990) situate the "Stalinist party/states" in terms of world historical development to explain both their past strength and eventual weakness. The growing and innovative economic sector in the core is changing from low skill mass assembly run by military type bureaucracies to more flexible, high skill batch production with decentralized control. This ongoing "industrial divide" in the world-economy, they explain, is forcing all developed countries to either match the innovations in accumulation or to fall into the periphery and be satisfied with the low technology cast off by the core. This "long wave approach" explains why a "Stalinist" bureaucratic organization of mass production was successful at industrial development in the past and why it is now being deconstructed.

It should be noted that what was decisive in the case of Eastern Europe was the *capacity of people* to organize themselves and mobilize resources for

dimension of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and the gender-specific effects of privatization and democratization in Eastern Europe.

Throughout Eastern Europe, the political revolutions of 1989 have been followed by concerted efforts to transform economic structures, political institutions, laws, and even values and attitudes. In most East European countries, a new ideology is forming in explicit opposition to the previous dominant ideology (socialism/Marxism/communism), borrowing heavily from neoclassical economics and from liberal and conservative political thought (Kornai 1990; Sachs and Lipton 1990). As R. W. Davies (1990) has pointed out, the socialist discourse of common ownership, workers' management, and equality are no longer present. A result -- and a reflection -- of these economic, political and ideological changes is that domestic stratification systems (class, gender, ethnicity) and the region's position within the world-system are in flux and likely to be radically altered. In such a context, both restorationist and transformative tendencies may be observed (Barnard 1990; Frank 1990; Petras 1990).

An examination of changes in gender roles and the position of women is therefore salient. How will restructuring affect women's roles and status? What will be the impact of privatization on female employment? Will the new democratization stress equality and empowerment of women, or "liberation from work" and a return to the joys of domesticity? In light of what we know about the impact of economic development and political change on gender and on women (Moghadam 1990a, 1990b), these questions are pertinent. But what one finds in the vast amount of information on *perestroika*, the literature on the 1989 revolutions, and pronouncements by politicians and policy-makers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is extensive discussion of private enterprise and unemployment; of female emancipation, there is very purposes of effective opposition, and the incapacity of the state or its unwillingness to utilize force. This is the contrast with China.

little. The Woman Question does not figure in the new governments' lists of political priorities. And yet, on closer examination of the trends and policies, we see that gender is very much inscribed in the social policies, discourses, and economic strategies. Certainly the various policies and programs have specific consequences for women. In order to better appreciate these effects, we begin in an historical and comparative background.

### **Marxism, Socialism and The Woman Question**

Gender relations and the position of women under socialism have been broadly shaped by: 1) the Marxist view of labor and the nature of the socialist economy, and 2) Marxism's contradictory view of the family and women's role within in.

Labor and the work process is a fundamental component of Marxist theory:

The work process resolved ... into its simple elementary factors, is human action with a view to the production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchanges of matter between man and nature; it is the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase. (Cited in Lane 1986: 3).

For Marx, the maintenance and reproduction of material life is the prime human need. In Marxist thought it is labor that creates value; that is, it is the labour power that is embodied in a good or service that gives it social value. Work has two social aspects. First, it fulfills a social need on the part of the worker – it uses humanity's creative power (i.e., the antidote to alienation). The second aspect of such activity is that goods and services are produced which are consumed. Thus human activity and work fulfill human

needs: creativity, and the consumption of goods and services. As a result, Marxists in socialist states have always adopted a more positive attitude toward the necessity for people to work. Indeed, David Lane has dubbed Soviet Marxism with regard to labor the "Protestant ethic of socialism" (Lane 1986: 7). Lenin's analysis of work recognized its prime necessity for the building of socialist society. For Lenin work was not only conceived of as the fulfillment of humanity's "species being" but was bound up with the development of the productive forces. Lenin stressed the economic and social advance of wage labor over serfdom. Under Stalin work as human need and creativity was subordinated to an emphasis on the duty to labor. The 1936 Constitution declared that "work in the USSR is a duty, a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen -- He who does not work shall not eat" (cited in Lane 1986: 9). In the 1977 Constitution citizens were not only given the right to work but also the choice of a trade or profession.

The specific character of the socialist economy (or centrally planned economy) also shaped women's status and women's lives. Full employment has been an integral aspect of socialist economies. Other salient characteristics are state ownership of the means of production, the role of the central plan and a centralized direction of all the factors of production, macro- and micro-investment decisions, the allocation of resources, foreign trade, and the distribution of the surplus. In a centrally planned economy, quantitative targets are established for each enterprise, and production is measured in volume. Administered prices are stable and separated from those in the world market; they serve essentially an accounting function rather than as "signals" like those alleged to operate in a market economy (Kolko 1988). High rates of investment, centrally-established wages, and limits on income inequality are other features. In theory labor in a centrally planned economy is comparatively immobile, although Turgeon and MacIntyre (1990) argue that "the very high mobility rates since the Second World War indicate that there

has been a seller's market for labor." In any event, state employees enjoy a considered measure of job security. An unintended consequence is that the central planners could not raise productivity without undermining the commitment to full employment. This suggests a trade-off between a full-employment, low-wage economy and a high-wage system with job insecurity (see Lane 1987).

The Marxist attitude toward work, the commitment to equity, and the developmentalist nature of the socialist state underpinned the full employment policies implemented in all socialist countries. The result is that right through the 1980s the socialist countries not only had the highest rates of female labor force participation, but the most equitable male-female ratios in paid employment (see Table 1).

The second crucial factor affecting women's social positions in socialist societies are the Marxist and socialist views on the family. Joan Landes (1989) notes two versions of the relationship between capitalism and family life in the writings of Marx, Engels, and other early socialists. On the one hand, the family (without qualification, e.g., all family life) is depicted as a negative *institution*, a product of class society that will disappear in the socialist future. On the other hand, the family, working class or bourgeois, exists as a negative *effect* of the operation of the laws of capital. It is not family life as such, but its particular capitalist form that is condemnable. In this regard, Engels' scathing attack in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* was a passionate outcry against the industrial conditions that produced dissolution in family life among the workers. Similarly, the substitution of female for male labor is treated as emblematic of the absolute degradation of human labor by capital. In *Capital*, Marx commented upon capital's ability to depress wages by employing women and children. In this view, the working class family, adversely affected by capitalism, should flourish instead. These two views on

the family help explain the contradictory trends in women and the family in socialist countries.

The Marxist and socialist position on women and work followed from the critique of capitalism, but recognized the specificity of women's oppression within patriarchy and the family. Marx and Engels certainly never believed that capitalism emancipates women, but they argued that the sexual division of labor in agricultural, preindustrial societies gives way to a capitalist form of the social division of labor. Patriarchy, like "all fixed, fast frozen relations, with the[ir] train of ancient prejudices and opinions [is] swept away" to be supplanted in the socialist future by new forms of human association. Modern industry overturns the economic foundation of the traditional family and its corresponding form of female labor, thereby "loosen[ing] all traditional ties." Family life will be supplanted by new forms of human association in the socialist future. For the present, women's entry into the public workforce was deemed to be a necessary condition for the emancipation of women, and the working class as a whole. (All quotes from Landes, 1989: 18-19.)

In the first socialist experiment, Russia, principle and practicality combined to shape gender roles and women's status. Wendy Goldman (1989: 59) describes how in 1927, precisely ten years after the October revolution, working-class and peasant women from every corner of the USSR "bundled up clothing and provisions and began the long journey to Moscow. Leaving remote peasant huts, crowded working-class dormitories, communal apartments, and eastern tents, they travelled by train, in carts, and on foot, to gather more than one thousand strong, at the All-Union Congress of Working and Peasant Women to discuss women's liberation." Many of the delegates were uneducated, some were illiterate, and most had never before ventured beyond their local areas. But they spoke passionately of the problems of child care, poverty, family disintegration, and male chauvinism.



The Bolsheviks' first Family Code, established in 1918, was the most audacious and comprehensive legal instrument for gender equality. It abolished the inferior legal status of women and created equality under the law. It set up local bureaus of statistics for the registration of marriage, divorce, birth, and death; and it gave legal status to civil marriage only. Divorce was permitted at the request of either spouse (no grounds were necessary) and an unlimited term of alimony in cases of need and disability entitled men and women to the same guarantees of support. Family Code provisions also abolished illegitimacy and entitled all children to parental support. The establishment of familial obligations independent of the marriage contract thus severed the concept of family from marriage (Goldman 1989: 62). Marriage did not create community of property between spouses: a woman retained full control of her property and earnings after marriage and neither spouse had any claim on the property of the other. This provision was later modified to permit the housewife a share in the property acquired in the course of marriage with her husband's earnings. In a remarkable ruling, the Supreme Court acknowledged that housework, as well as waged work, constituted a form of socially necessary labor.

The Soviet Land Code, ratified in 1922, combined peasant customary law with a new, revolutionary insistence on gender equality which undermined patriarchal authority in the countryside. It abolished private ownership and granted all citizens, "regardless of sex, religion, or nationality," rights to the land. Women had the right to full participation in the commune. Unlike customary law, in which a woman's rights depended on the presence of her husband or sons, the Land Code ensured that a woman entering a household by marriage had the right to an equal share. If the household split, land and property were divided among all household members, not only the adult males. Goldman describes the opposition and resistance from many sectors of the population to the new laws. She concludes that the Bolshevik

commitment to women's liberation throughout the 1920s was not only genuine, "it was doggedly persistent in the face of huge obstacles" (Goldman 1989: 75).

The final blow to rural patriarchal authority came in the 1930s under Stalin's leadership, as a result of the massive drive to collectivize agriculture and industrialize the economy, carried out in a ruthless manner.

What did socialism accomplish in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? In many of the countries, economies were greatly modernized. The modernization took place as a result of the mobilization of previously underutilized resources, especially in agriculture and among women generally. Large numbers of relatively unproductive ex-peasants and women were transformed into productive contributors to a modern industrial base. As a result of generous expenditures for education and public health, there was the growth of an educated and well-informed population. In Eastern Europe, the gains from industrialization were distributed in a manner whereby the former "have-nots" gained relative to the former "haves" in what had been a nascent bourgeois society. Among those gaining most were women and children generally. In many places, government-sponsored child care liberated women from child-rearing tasks, allowing them to take employment in the state or cooperative sector. Residents of agricultural areas, particularly women, gained relative to industrial workers as large economies of scale in collectivized agriculture (similar to those achieved in the West through corporate farming) replaced labor-intensive small family farms. According to Lynn Turgeon (1990), the status and income of miners was upgraded in Eastern European as in the USSR. Slovaks were subject to affirmative action within postwar Czechoslovakia, and even East European Gypsies upgraded their lives in exchange for giving up much of their traditional mobility.

Relative losers over the past forty years were intellectuals generally. The legal profession lost status -- partly due to the decline in crime rates -- as did doctors who became entitled to only average pay in a socialized medical system. There was some loss of power by religious organizations in the first part of the postwar period, but during the second half, religion has recovered somewhat resulting in the construction of new churches in some of the Eastern European countries, especially Poland, Hungary, and the GDR (Turgeon 1990).

Rapid economic development and the acceleration of social change toward a centralized, secular, more egalitarian society have been fundamental aims of socialist countries, achieved by an active, interventionist and welfarist state and the mobilization of an adequate supply of labor. Within this context, as Maxine Molyneux (1982) has pointed out, the emancipation of women can be seen to play a double role. First, it is a principle to which socialist states are committed as part of their overall support for a more egalitarian social order; and second, it is an integral part of the wider developmental goals of socialist states. In this regard, socialist legal systems, the discourse of equality, mass education, and full female integration into paid employment served to break down patriarchal systems in Russia (and in China), and to diminish (but by no means eliminate) gender inequality in Eastern Europe.

### **Women, Work, Fertility Under Socialism**

According to Richard Anker (1985): "Socialist countries have a deep-rooted ideological commitment to equality of the sexes and they consider social and economic activity as a necessary precondition for women's equal status with men" (Anker 1985: 1). At the same time, a number of socialist countries were interested in raising fertility rates in a context of labor shortage. Still, throughout the 1980s, female labor force participation rates in the socialist countries were extremely high by world standards, with women

making up nearly half the labour force. This was a function both of the strong ideological commitment of governments to equal economic and social rights for men and women, *and* the high demand for labor in the economy.

The number of women in the economically active population in the USSR and in the socialist countries of Europe grew very rapidly in the post-World War II period. Data from censuses carried out in these countries indicate an increase of 83 percent in the economically active female population; for example, in Hungary between 1949 and 1980, 47 percent; in Poland between 1950 and 1978, 78 percent; in Czechoslovakia between 1947 and 1980, 21 percent; and 19 percent in the USSR between 1959 and 1979 (ILO/INSTRAW 1985: 136). According to ILO estimates, in 1980 "the highest female participation rates for ages 15 and 24 are found in the USSR (about 60 percent), and in other European centrally planned economies (about 57 percent)" (cited in ILO/INSTRAW 1985: 136). The proportion of women of working age (women aged 16 to 54) carrying out an economic activity ranged from 70 to 90 percent.

The most important factor in female employment was the increase in the number of women working in the socialist sector of the national economy. Taking into account the fact that 100 percent of workers and employees in the national economy work in the socialist sector in Bulgaria, Romania and in the USSR, 99.9 percent in Czechoslovakia, 99 percent in Hungary, 97 percent in the German Democratic Republic, and 94 percent in Poland, it is apparent that the growth in general of female employment was the result of the growth of the socialist economy. Indeed, the female labor force grew faster than the male labor force engaged in the socialist sector. The proportion of women in the total of workers and employees also increased (ILO/INSTRAW 1985: 138).

In a study conducted for the ILO (Bodrova and Anker 1985), socialist countries were examined to establish a linkage between fertility/family size and female employment. The study provides evidence that fertility and labor

force participation are negatively related. Economically inactive women tend to have on average slightly more children than those who are economically active. In general, policy measures influence fertility and female employment. In the socialist countries, when labor policies were formulated, policy-makers often considered explicitly the family constraints faced by women workers and the need of many women to combine motherhood with working outside the home. The experiences of the socialist countries, therefore, were regarded as instructive and relevant for all countries, developing and industrialized countries as well as socialist and market economy countries.

In his comparative survey, Anker notes that along with the nearly complete integration of women into socialist economies, women were found in virtually all occupations and industries except mining and heavy transport. In addition, the sexual division of labor in the workplace in socialist countries was significantly more equal than in market economy countries in similar stages of development (Anker 1985: 6). A global survey of working women noted that in 1983, for Eastern Europe as a whole, 30 percent of all women workers were in industry, with large percentages in the engineering field. In the USSR, 40 percent of all industrial engineers and 43 percent of engineers and architects employed in construction were women. In 1982 in the USSR, the number of women with specialized training accounted for half of all workers engaged in agriculture. Around 30 percent of agronomists, 55 percent of experts in animal husbandry and 37.5 percent of veterinary surgeons working in State farms and kolkhozes were women (ILO/INSTRAW 1985: 140-145). More women were concentrated in industry than in agriculture. (For more information, see Tables at the end of this essay.)

Anker notes male-female income differentials and speculates that one reason may be that women are not as committed to the labor force as men in that women frequently see themselves as secondary earners, often withdrawing from the labor force for extended periods of time in order to

raise their children. He adds that this applied to a significantly lesser degree to professional married women.

According to Anker, "the social and population programmes in the socialist countries considered here are in many ways extraordinary -- and many are specifically designed to reduce the conflict for women between their roles as mother and worker. Thus, over 2.5 percent of national income is given in the form of family allowances for children in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In these same countries, cumulative family allowances for the second child amount to approximately 12, 18, and 21 percent, respectively, of the average wage in manufacturing, and to 34, 53 and 37 percent, respectively, for the third child" (Anker 1985: 16).

Policy measures for working mothers include paid maternity leave which can range from two months in the Uzbek SSR to six months in Czechoslovakia. Mothers are allowed to take extended periods of unpaid child-care leave when their child is young, as well as sick leave to help care for a sick child; allowances paid to mothers on extended unpaid child-care leave are substantial in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. While on extended unpaid child-care leave, women usually continue to accumulate their rights to social benefits (such as pensions) as well as additional years of seniority. Virtually all mothers make use of these provisions (Anker 1985: 18).

Variations existed within the socialist countries in terms of gender relations generally and the nature and availability of support services for women and mothers more specifically. The GDR seems to have been far in advance of other socialist countries (and of many capitalist countries; see below).

### Poland

By the 1970s Polish women enjoyed a network of social benefits. All Polish working mothers (48 percent of the Polish workforce were women) had

16 weeks of leave, 26 weeks if they had twins. They were entitled either to a creche for the child, or three years unpaid leave with their job guaranteed when they returned. A working mother was automatically given time off when her child was sick -- two weeks for chickenpox, one week for tonsillitis (Boyes 1990). At the same time, Poland, like all socialist states but Romania, had liberal abortion rules. Abortions were permitted in Poland up to 8 1/2 weeks, but pregnancies were also terminated after the fifth month when ultrasonic tests reveal possible birth defects.

In a study of educational policy and attainment in postwar Poland, Barbara Heyns and Ireneusz Bialecki (1990) discovered that "the major egalitarian trend that appears to be a consequence of socialist educational policies is diminished gender inequality. The expansion of vocationally-oriented educational programs at both the secondary and post-secondary level was intended to provide a new Communist man with technical skills for productive labor; their major effect seems to have been the displacement of men by women in the conventional academic tracks."

Heynes and Bialecki explain that the egalitarian ethos of the Communist state implied that traditionally disadvantaged groups -- primarily the proletariat -- should be given every opportunity to acquire education. A parallel institution to the highly selective system of lyceum secondary schools that channel the children of the intelligentsia directly into the university was therefore designed. This was the "technecum", technical and vocational secondary schools whose graduates could compete for university places with the graduates of the lyceum. Increasingly, however, this competition was unsuccessful; most technical school graduates sought employment rather than a university education. This development seems to have favored women rather than the male working class. "For men, vocational and technical schools presented an attractive alternative to prolonged training, and many opted for quickly gaining a rewarding skill and foregoing the more prestigious but less

secure track leading to a university degree. The composition of the lyceum became increasingly feminized; educational mobility among women, as measured by access to the university, increased substantially... [T]he net impact of educational expansion led not to reduced social class inequalities, but to greater opportunities for women" (Heyns and Bialecki 1990).

On other issues, however, the Polish state was less generous than other socialist states. For example, childcare facilities were less adequate in Poland than in the GDR; social policies for working mothers tended to fluctuate with the economy's demand for labor. There was also variability in the availability of contraceptives as well as abortion (Einhorn 1990).

### Hungary

Turgeon (1989) reports that in Hungary in 1975, female labor force participation rates were lower than those for the Scandinavian countries, excluding Norway; ten years later they were below all four Scandinavian countries, as well as the United States. Otherwise they are above those of other advanced capitalist countries, including Austria, West Germany, and Switzerland.

It is believed that the Hungarian special maternity allowances (SMA) have had a significant impact on Hungarian female labor force participation rates. Hungary was the pioneer country paying women to stay at home taking care of their infants and small children under three beginning in 1967, and until 1989 was still the most generous country in this respect, even though it has been emulated to a certain extent in Scandinavian and in most other noncapitalist countries. Turgeon (1989) suggests that the main reason for this generosity was the precipitous decline in the Hungarian fertility rates following the legalization of abortion in 1956. Hungarian abortions were exceeding live births and the net reproduction rate was less than that required to reproduce the Hungarian population. The second important factor



mentioned by Turgeon is the uncertainty of what would happen when centralized planning would be replaced by the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968. The Yugoslav experience with decentralized planning was already producing significantly more unemployment domestically and pressure to export "guest workers" to West Germany and elsewhere. A further complication for Hungarian manpower planners was the fact that the baby boomers of the early 1950s – the so-called Ratko babies – were about to enter the labor force. (Ms. Ratko, the Minister of Health during the Rakosi era, strictly opposed abortion, thereby producing a baby boom before 1956.)

As of 1981, Hungarian mothers who use up their 6 months full salary maternity pay may remain home until the child reaches the age of 3, while their employment status and all social insurance rights remain uninterrupted. Beginning in 1985, mothers are receiving 75 percent of their former earnings or the equivalence of sick pay until the child reaches the age of 18 months (as of 1986). This SMA calls for a minimum of 2500 forints per month and a maximum of 4500 forints per month, compared to an average wage of 5800 forints monthly (Turgeon 1989).

While these child-bearing years have an adverse effect on women's lifetime earnings, they are counterbalanced to some extent by the fact that Hungarian men are required to submit to the draft -- earlier in their life-cycle so careers are not disturbed -- where they receive very low wages for 1 1/2 years. Women are also eligible for pensions five years earlier than men.

Turgeon (1989) estimates that Hungarian women's wages are between 70 and 75 percent of men's with a slight tendency for the discrimination gap to close. Likewise, in agriculture, women's wages seem to approximate 70 percent of men's wages on average. (Gail Lapidus (1985) estimates that Soviet women make 65-70 percent of male earnings.) In comparison with advanced capitalist countries, this discrimination gap is smaller than is the case with Japan, the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. It is about the same as the

gap in Austria, Belgium, West Germany, France, and Holland. And the gap is larger than in Australia and in the Scandinavian countries (Turgeon 1989). But since the Hungarian labor force participation rates are higher than those in most of the countries listed above, it is quite impressive.

One reason for the earnings gap is that as in the USSR, Hungarian women are excluded from underground coal mining, the highest paid occupation in both countries (Turgeon 1989). In Hungary, mining (principally coal mining) average wages in 1984 were 8096 forints per month, or 44 percent higher than the average wage generally (Turgeon 1989).

The divorce rate in Hungary (2.7 divorces per 1,000 population in 1982) was higher than that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria; but lower than that of the GDR, Cuba, USSR. Another controversial indicator was the abortion rate per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 and 49. In 1984, it was 3.3, up from 3.1 in 1980, but down significantly from 7.2 as recently as 1970, before there was a tightening of legalized abortion legislation. The percentage of Hungarian women (17-49) taking contraceptive pills has risen from 6.7 percent in 1970 to 32.4 percent in 1984 (Turgeon 1989). In contrast to this liberalization of abortion and birth control, abortion was illegal in Romania beginning in 1967, and a 4-child family was considered to be the ideal. In Bulgaria, abortion was until 1986 restricted to women already having two children.

The developing of a thriving second economy during the 1980s may have meant more income for many Hungarian families, but the share of housework done by women has probably risen since risk-preferring men are predominantly the participants in the second economy. The reduction of the official Hungarian work week to 5 days and 40-42 hours has led more second economy activity on the part of Hungarian males and may have led to a greater share of housework for Hungarian women (Turgeon 1989).

Turgeon reports that Hungarian sociologists have recently studied two generations of women -- the current generation and their mothers, who were young during the Rakosi or Stalinist years. They found that the earlier generation of young women felt that there were many more opportunities for advancement than is the case with their daughters.

### The GDR

Barbara Einhorn's study reveals that the German Democratic Republic had a policy of combating sex discrimination, indeed, of positive discrimination toward women, since its foundation in 1949. The economic, legal, and social status of women in the GDR as workers, as mothers, and as individuals was undeniably far in advance of that enjoyed by their sisters in West Germany and many other Western capitalist countries and even that in the other countries of "socialism as it actually exists" (Einhorn 1989: 283-284). In his comparative study of women in East and West Germany, Harry Shaffer (1981) came to the same conclusion. Redhead, Shaffer and Turgeon (1989) note that GDR women had the highest labor force participation rates in the world (with Sweden as a close second). In 1989, 80 percent of all women of working age in the GDR were employed outside the home, as compared with 32 percent of West German women (Einhorn 1989: 285). Female membership in the trade unions as a whole accounts for 53 percent of the total, as compared with only 23 percent in West Germany, and 48 percent of shop stewards were women. Women were well represented in positions of public responsibility. Einhorn reports that in 1989, women comprised 25 percent of local mayors; 47 percent of residential area arbitration commissions; 40 percent of county, district and borough councils. At the national level, there were 161 women in the GDR parliament, holding 32.2 percent of the total 500 seats. (As Einhorn notes, this compares with 5 percent in the U.S. House of Representatives and 2 percent in the U.S. Senate.) The ruling party, the SED

had a 35 percent female membership. At the highest levels there was less female participation: 13 percent representation on the Central Committee and no full members on the Politburo.

Women made substantial advances in formerly male-dominated professions, accounting in 1977-79 for 45 percent of judges, 30 percent of lawyers, and in 1983, for 57 percent of dentists and 52 percent of doctors (Einhorn 1989: 289). The comparison with OECD countries is pertinent: According to 1987 statistics, only 4 percent of lawyers and 16 percent of doctors were women in the United Kingdom; 15 percent of judges and 14 percent of lawyers were women in West Germany, as were 23 percent of doctors and 20 percent of dentists; and only 8 percent of lawyers, 6 percent of dentists, and 17 percent of doctors were women in the United States (Einhorn 1989: 289-290).

Benefits for working mothers connected with pregnancy and childbirth include 6 weeks maternity leave before childbirth and 20 weeks thereafter. During these 26 week periods, women's maternity allowances matched their latest average net earnings. After the termination of maternity leave, women were entitled to an additional leave up to the child's first birthday. During that period they receive monthly child care allowances (SMAs) equivalent to sick pay, or 60-90 percent of their salary. The minimum child care allowance is 250 marks for one child and 300 marks for two children. In certain cases, father or grandmothers could take advantage of the SMA, a practice that was pioneered in Bulgaria (Redhead et al, 1989b: 10).

In 1987, 84 percent of GDR children between 1 and 3 were looked after in 760 creches. After 1979, all children between 3 and 6 were able to attend kindergarten. In 1981, places became available in after-school centers for all children in grades 1 to 4, or until they were at least ten years old. Attendance was free, with only token payments covering the cost of meals.

Beginning in 1984, families with three or more children received preferential housing, special health care, preferential allocation of creche places, preferential allocation of holiday trips and financial support to pay for meals in pre-school facilities. They also had slightly shorter work weeks -- 40 hours rather than the standard 43.75 hours.

In this intensely pronatalist environment one might expect an increase in discrimination against homosexuals, as was the case in the Hitler years or in the Soviet Union after 1934. On the contrary, homosexuality was legalized in the late 1960s and "there is comparatively benign treatment of same-sex relations, in contrast to the USSR" (Redhead et al., 1989: 12). According to a 1987 GDR booklet: "Homosexual relations are perfectly legal in the GDR. There is no discrimination against homosexuals in either their personal lives or at work. Progress has been made over the past few years in the social acceptance of homosexuals. This is the result of a broad campaign in the mass media and of the growing self-confidence of homosexuals themselves" (cited in Redhead et al., 1989: 12). Einhorn, however, cites a 1986 article in a GDR magazine which stated that discrimination with regard to employment opportunities remained (Einhorn 1989: 294).

### The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union produced the first woman ambassador (Alexandra Kollantai) and the first woman in space (Valentina Tereshkova). It contains the largest number of women professionals and specialists on the globe, and close to 90 percent of its female population is in the work force. Early Soviet legislation sought to secure full economic and social equality for women. They were to be employed in the public sector as a condition of complete equality, and the responsibility for housework and child care was to shift from the individual household to the collective. But the disruptions of war, large-scale unemployment, rampant inflation Stalin's conservative social

policies meant that few resources were devoted to social programs. Although opportunities for women in the labor force expanded, the socialization of housework never took place. Gail Lapidus (1985) notes that in 1977, Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev admitted in a speech to the Trade Union Congress: "We men ... have thus far done far from all we could to ease the dual burden that [women] bear both at home and in production."

Katrina Vanden Heuvel (1990) reports that as a result, many Soviet women express yearning for a traditional female role centered around the family and the home. They are exhausted by decades of paper equality and a double burden made more difficult by consumer shortages. Yet recent national polls show that only 20 percent of Soviet women would quit their jobs even if they could afford to.

The only area in the Soviet Union with an underutilized female labor force is found in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics where female participation rates outside agriculture -- particularly among the local nationalities -- are much lower than the national average. Since the recruitment of native women into industry has encountered great difficulties in these regions, a high proportion of women workers and employees in Central Asia are Russian and Ukrainian (Lapidus 1985: 16).

The Soviet experience clearly demonstrates the degree to which women's movement into industrial employment can be accelerated and channelled through the deliberate use of public policy, which also provided special benefits to working mothers. As recently as 1986, the Communist Party program included a statement that "favorable conditions will be created that will enable women to combine motherhood with active participation in work and social activities." However, Gail Lapidus reports that in recent years, a growing array of studies by Soviet scholars, as well as numerous Soviet novels and films, document at length the conflicting demands of women's dual roles, the constraints they place on occupational mobility, and

their harmful effects on the health of women workers and the well-being of their families (Lapidus 1989: 89). Lapidus has focused on the interaction of female work and family roles and the major sources of strains between them.

Lapidus notes that Gorbachev's effort to promote more rapid economic growth and increased technological innovation by stimulating greater competition within the workplace, the release of surplus workers, and increased wage differentiation, could operate to the disadvantage of women workers. "Coupled with his call for the expansion of the service sector, including individual and cooperative enterprises, it may well foreshadow a long-term shift in female labor force participation from industrial to service employment, as well as expansion of part-time work" (Lapidus 1989:115).

### **Restructuring and Its Effects**

As Lane (1987) has pointed out, the USSR achieved full employment; this can be ascribed to systemic factors, reinforced by ideology. However, an ever present contradiction in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was severe shortages accompanied by over-production of unwanted goods. Since the late 1970s, some of the socialist economies, notably the USSR, seem to have entered a period of stagnation. The perception of lagging labor productivity and the attempt to increase productivity led to *perestroika* in the Soviet Union and "reforms" in Hungary and Poland. The "1989 revolutions" in Eastern Europe and subsequent elections brought about radical political changes and concerted efforts to replace centralization with privatization and the plan with the market. Jacek Kuron's notion of a "self-limiting revolution" has been refuted by events in 1989 and 1990, which are far more comprehensive and ambitious. And now even the Soviet Union is turning toward capitalist measures.

But *perestroika* and the new democratization are proving to be not quite the panacea initial enthusiasts thought. The changes are also bringing about

disruptions and a host of social problems. Even the CIA predicts high unemployment and lasting consumer shortages "for years to come" (*International Herald Tribune*, 17/05/90, p.1). The report predicted that unemployment could climb as high as 15 to 20 percent in East Germany and Yugoslavia.

The consequences for women seem to be adverse, in terms of both employment and political participation. There also exist cultural and ideological pressures on women to retreat to domesticity. The 1989 revolutions have opened the way for more resolute lobbying by religious groups (such as the Catholic lobby in Poland and Hungary), endangering women's reproductive rights. And in the context of mass unemployment caused by privatization, women will be encouraged to leave the labor market.

Robert McIntyre (1990) argues that reunification of Germany will be a major setback for women of the GDR. In the GDR women benefited from a strong, interconnected web of social welfare, education, housing, and labor market support programs. Not so in West Germany, where such programs are either nonexistent or much weaker, and where the social-welfare structure encourages new mothers to leave the labor force. There is a strong likelihood that existing programs will disappear altogether upon reunification, leading to mass female unemployment.

East German women workers are already finding quite distinct employment patterns and labor policies in West Germany. In recent years the number of female part-time workers has arisen, since many women regard part-time employment as a way of combining family responsibilities and work. But in West Germany statutory social security schemes do not cover part-time workers whose total number of hours worked per week is below a given minimum level. For many years now the level of unemployment among women has been two percentage points higher than that of men. Another difference is that in West Germany women have been prohibited from



entering the construction industry; this raises problems for East Germany women whose occupational background was in the construction industry (CEDAW 1990).

In the Soviet Union, the conventional wisdom was that rising educational and occupational attainments among women would lead to greater sexual equality within the family, a more democratic pattern of family relationships, and a higher degree of family stability. In recent years, however, rising levels of female education and labor force participation in the urban industrial regions of the USSR have been accompanied by lower rates of marriage, later marriage age, rising rates of divorce, and declining birthrates. Lapidus (1985, 1989) reports that these trends have become the focus of anxious discussion. For the first time since the 1920s, Soviet writers are compelled to confront the prospect that *female liberation* and family stability may be incompatible. It should be noted, however, that with 3.5 divorces per thousand population, the Soviet divorce rate is still lower than that of the United States, which has proportionately fewer women in full-time paid employment.

#### Democratization With a Male Face?

It appears that during periods of social change, transition, and political upheaval, when questions of political and cultural identity come to the fore, there tends to be a high premium placed on the family. Questions of personal life are also fiercely contested, and gender roles can become politicized (Yuval-Davis and Anthias and Contributors 1989). Errant women (young, unmarried women, prostitutes, and, in some societies widows) can become scapegoats. As a rule, religious revitalization proceeds in tandem with restrictions on fertility control and sex education, exhortations of domesticity, and an end to publicly-financed child care. Such at any rate is what occurred in the context of Islamization in Iran, Pakistan, and Algeria. Can it happen in

the context of economic restructuring and the resurgence of conservative and restorationist forces in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

The dispute over the possible loss of East Germany's liberal abortion rights after unification was an indicator that for many East European women, the removal of communist regimes does not necessarily mean a better and more equal life. In most countries, attempts by policy-makers to dissociate themselves completely from the previous order is tending to operate against gender equality. In Poland, where child care provision was always inadequate, the removal of subsidies has forced many women to give up their jobs as a result of the exorbitant rates. Before 1989, women held a third of all Romanian parliamentary seats; they now hold 3.5 percent. Similar drops were registered in Czechoslovakia (from 29.5 to 6 percent), and in Hungary (from 20 to 7 percent). East German women, who gained 20 percent of seats, fared best (Eyal 1990).

In February 1990, Barbel Bohley, a leader of the GDR New Forum mass opposition movement, wrote in *Fur Dich*, an East German women's magazine: "None of us has felt discrimination as a single mother. None of us has had to worry about having a roof over our heads. We could study, be married and bring up children. It wasn't always easy but we ourselves made the choice if we wanted to have a child or not. Pornography was not a concern. Everyone has something to lose and women are always among the first losers. The new-won freedom cannot cost our independence" (Flanders 1990). Bohley and other East German women who saw the left social-democratic opposition movement undermined and then totally eclipsed by the conservatives, feel that in the near future, "we'll wake up from this vote with a real hangover. Particularly the women."

Polish Solidarity is putting pressure on its parliamentary deputies to outlaw abortion, a move that is proving as divisive as the privatization of industry and unemployment. In April 1990, the Solidarity Congress in

Gdansk slipped through a motion in a late-night session that urged "legal protection for human life from the time of conception." It should be noted that only about 10 percent of the delegates were women (Boyes 1990). Some 37 Solidarity senators had already proposed a law that would delegalize abortion. Anti-abortion legislation is being presented not only as a moral imperative by Roman Catholics, but also as a way of decisively dismantling a pillar of communist philosophy. A first draft in May 1989 -- prior to the June elections -- actually proposed prison sentences of three years for abortionists and up to two years for the woman. At the fourth International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, held at Hunter College in New York City in June 1990, Polish activist Jolanta Plakwicz described the closed-door session of parliament (from which she and other activists had been barred) and the militant demonstration against the anti-abortion legislation by women who went on to form the Polish Feminist Association.

Anna Titkow, a sociologist at the Academy of Sciences, believes there is a strong conservative trend in Poland. "What I'm worried about is the visible retrogression to the past in customs, symbols, morals, in publications. The hatred of communism plus the influence of the Catholic church brought to the surface conservative values that are gathering momentum. The church is today in this country treated as a political party. In fact, it is." (Quoted in Drakulic, 1990).

In 1983, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, then Prime Minister, had the idea of building the country's biggest maternity hospital outside Lodz, which has the largest concentration of female workers in Poland. It was supposed to be ready in four years. But although it was officially opened in May 1988, the hospital was still unfinished. In April 1990 an investigation showed that some of the 100 incubators sent from Holland had not even been picked up from customs, television sets for patients had been sold and thousands of dollars in

donations had simply evaporated (Boyes 1990). Let us hope that this does not portend the fate of Poland's women.

An interview with a senior aide to the Czech Finance Minister mentioned "overemployment" of women (R. Waters 1990). The official said: "The Ministry of Social Affairs is preparing a program for young women so they can afford to stay home with small children, and we will aid them with social support. This policy in the end will save money because when women work, they need [state-supported day care] (R. Waters 1990). When the official was asked whether this meant some decline in the role of women, the answer was: "No, no. Women, especially, don't consider it a decline in their role. Their role is in the family and in the education of children. This is their natural and primary role." Rita Klimova, Czech ambassador to the United States, was asked whether she would describe herself as a social democrat. Her answer: "No, I would not vote for the social democrats unless they very clearly said they were not going to nationalize industry or tamper with the market. I also find that social democrats too easily embrace environmental issues" (R. Waters 1990).

Over 70 years after the Russian Revolution and the bold policies of the Bolsheviks, Soviet women are confronting a powerful backlash against its emancipation of women. *Glasnost* is allowing Soviet citizens to voice patriarchal prejudices once banned as bourgeois or counterrevolutionary. The news media, for example, frequently blame "over-emancipated, masculinized women" for social ills from juvenile delinquency to divorce (vanden Heuvel 1990). And Mikhail Gorbachev's ambivalent positions on the role of women in political and economic life, along with the social policies proposed by the Communist Party and the Congress of People's Deputies in early 1990, further strengthen the view that only women are responsible for children and housework. (However, in April 1990 the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution

which for the first time allows "fathers, grandfathers or other family members" the right to take unpaid child care leave.)

Multi-candidate elections in 1989, the freest since 1917, produced a Congress of People's Deputies in which fewer than 15 percent of the deputies are women, as compared with 33 percent under previous governments. And in the local elections to the Russian Republic's Parliament (Spring 1990), the proportion of women elected dropped from 35.3 percent before the quotas were removed to 5.4 percent afterward. Vanden Heuvel (1990) reports that a pre-election poll in *Argumenti i Fakti* in 1989 showed that voters considered "being a man" one of the most important qualities in a candidate. This decline in female political representation has sparked a debate among women about developing affirmative action programs during the transitional period to help more women get into the grassroots soviets, which are so important to the new political life of the country.

Vanden Heuvel notes that the much-acclaimed book by Francine du Plessix Gray, *Soviet Women: Walking the Tightrope* (Doubleday, 1990) presented women from the intelligentsia who were understandably optimistic that private enterprise and cooperatives will offer better conditions for women, such as flexible hours and improved health care. But for millions of women, the implications of the market-style reforms are less appealing. Vanden Heuvel spoke to many women who worry that reforms like radical cuts in the 18-million-member bureaucracy will mean layoffs of support staffs -- which consist almost entirely of women. They worry that cooperatives, which are more like profit-making limited partnerships than communal enterprises, are requiring workers to put in twelve hours a day, thereby excluding mothers unless they are able to work at home. Other reforms, such as work brigades, which were introduced as an incentive to make workers more productive, are leaving the disabled, older workers and women, who traditionally take more sick leaves because of responsibility for children, on the sidelines. In addition,

when women try to take advantage of their legal rights to work fewer hours or on a part-time schedule, employers are reluctant to accommodate their requests, and women then often find themselves under pressure to quit. Since almost all benefits in Soviet society (housing, health care and pensions) revolve around one's job, women are worried that they may well become more dependent on their husbands or families as a result of the reforms. Vanden Heuvel ends her essay by stating that the only perceptible -- but significant -- benefit Gorbachev's reforms have brought to women is the freedom to organize, to address the inequalities in the system, or, as a Soviet friend of hers put it, "to let off steam."

Demographic trends in the Soviet Union have been the subject of commentary for some time. Lower fertility rates in the European parts of the country relative to the higher fertility rates in the Central Asian republics could trigger a pronatalist mood putting pressure on women to withdraw from the labor force or refrain from entering it.

Cultural images of women seem to be changing, too. Liberalization and an almost automatic imitation of anything Western (see Garton Ash 1990), is transforming the image of the woman into a sex object (Eyal 1990). Engaged in a fierce battle for survival, most newspapers adorn their articles with nudity. Poland's news stands are full of badly printed pornographic material, and the American Playboy monthly sold out its first Hungarian language edition within days. "Beauty contests" are held in every country (Eyal 1990).

Freedom of travel and the opening of state frontiers gave a great impetus to prostitution. Officially forbidden, prostitutes continue to operate in a legal void, and are therefore easy victims. Not only do they have to bribe receptionists and doormen at hotels, but police officers and pimps also demand their cut. "Sex tourism" is a growing industry. Now that the puritanical Communists no longer rule, authorities in East Berlin have received numerous applications to open sex shops (Waldrop 1990).

In a 1985 essay (reprinted in Mamonova 1989), Tatyana Mamonova complained about the "misogynistic sexual profanity" of Soviet emigre ("enlightened") literature. Mamonova, a Soviet feminist who resides in the United States, is part of the anti-pornography feminist trend, and is alarmed by the proliferation of pornography in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. What has also proliferated in the Soviet Union is prostitution and greater media preoccupation with it (Waters 1989).

Zsuzsa Berés, 38, a Hungarian translator and editor, a single mother of two children, and a founding member of the Hungarian Green Party, is quoted as saying: "Ours is the only newly emerged party that addresses women's needs. The Democratic Forum, the Christian Democratic People's Party, the peasants party, and the Alliance of Free Democrats -- all speak only of family. I am afraid our political situation is very much reminiscent of the period before World War II -- open anti-Semitism, racism, no job security, an economy in ruins, pornography flooding our streets. I ask myself, what did the past two years of democracy bring us?" (Drakulic 1990).

It has not brought many women members of parliament: 28 out of 386, the lowest ratio of women for the last four decades (*Women's Forum*, no. 1, 1990).<sup>3</sup>

### Questions for Further Research

How are women faring in the formal labor market? What changes have occurred or are likely to occur in participation rates, sectoral distribution, income, and benefits? What has happened to the women employees of firms which have been privatized?

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<sup>3</sup> In Poland's and Hungary's first free elections in more than 40 years, the rate of abstention was staggeringly high: nearly 40 percent in Poland's parliamentary elections in 1989, nearly 60 percent in the local elections in May 1990, 35 percent in the first round of Hungary's parliamentary elections, 55 percent in the second (Garton Ash 1990).

What changes are occurring in the field of education? What changes have occurred in the curriculum? How might the shift from secular to religious schooling (for example, in Poland) affect gender role socialization?

What is the state of reproductive rights? What control do women have over their own fertility? What is the availability of sex education, contraception, abortion, medical care for mothers and infants? What are the restrictions? How are women, or feminists, responding to these developments?

What has happened to the social policies designed for women? What is the situation with childcare facilities? Maternity allowances? Maternity and childcare leave?

How are women involved in formal politics? What are the voting patterns? Representation in parliament? Membership and leadership in political organizations and parties? How vocal and visible are the women? Does "The Woman Question" enter into political discourses? What other patterns of political activity on the part of women exist? Social movements? Feminist groups?

In public discourse and cultural expression, what images of women and their "place" are prevalent, and how far do these reflect or determine the reality? What are women doing in the cultural field?<sup>4</sup>


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4 This essay was written as a preliminary paper in preparation for the research conference on Perestroika, the 1989 Revolutions, and Women, scheduled for September 1991. It is part of the UNU/WIDER project "National Development, Identity Politics, and Concepts of Feminism" designed and coordinated by the present author. The project is concerned with the gender dimension of economic development and political change, and the impact of economic and political processes on women's status, women's lives, and feminist strategies for equity and empowerment.



FIGURE 1

WOMEN AS A PERCENT OF MEN IN THE PAID LABOR  
FORCE, BY REGION 1980  
(AGES 15-64)



Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, Women ... A World Survey. Wash. DC: World Priorities, 1985, p. 13.

Table 1

**Women as a Percentage of University Students in Hungary,  
the German Democratic Republic, and the USSR, 1980s**

<i>Discipline</i>	<i>Percentage of female graduate students in Hungary, 1987</i>	<i>Percentage of female students in the GDR, 1982</i>	<i>Percentage of female students in the USSR, 1985-86</i>
Technical science	19.1	26.5	44.0
Agricultural science	34.9	50.1	36.0
Economics	64.9	62.3	71.0
Medicine	52.4	55.2	60.0
Pharmacy	80.4	n.a.	n.a.
Other health	95.0	n.a.	n.a.
Veterinarian	19.1	n.a.	n.a.
Philosophy, history, and philology	64.7	35.0	n.a.
Law	57.2	n.a.	n.a.
Natural science	48.1	54.8	n.a.
Pedagogy	74.1	74.5	74.0
Teachers college	89.6	n.a.	n.a.
Kindergarten teaching	99.6	n.a.	n.a.
Physical education	34.0	35.8	n.a.
Art	53.4	43.5	n.a.

*Sources of data:*

Hungary: *Statistical Pocketbook of Hungary, 1987*, p. 70.

German Democratic Republic: G. E. Edwards, *GDR Society and Social Institutions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

USSR: *Vestnik Statistiki* 1 (1987), 58.

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From Lynn Turgeon, *State and Discrimination*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, p. 77.

Table 2

**The Economic Role of Women in the ECE Region and in  
North America, 1975 to 1985**

Country	<i>Labor force participation rates for females (labor force as percentage of population, ages 15 to 64)</i>		<i>Changes in female labor force partic- ipation rates: 1985 as % of 1975</i>
	1975	1985	
Austria	53.6	53.1	99.1
Belgium	43.9	49.3	112.3
Denmark	63.5	73.6	115.9
Finland	65.5	73.8	112.7
France	49.9	51.7	103.6
West Germany	49.6	45.1	90.9
Ireland	33.4	36.5	109.3
Italy	34.6	42.3	122.2
Netherlands	33.1	42.9	129.6
Norway	53.3	68.5	128.5
Sweden	67.6	77.3	114.3
Switzerland	49.6	48.3	97.4
United Kingdom	55.4	59.9	108.1
Canada	50.0	60.9	121.8
United States	53.2	64.8	121.8
Czechoslovakia	66.6	68.0	102.1
East Germany	71.5	77.5	108.4
Hungary	61.9	63.0	101.8
USSR	68.6	70.0	102.0

Source: United Nations, *The Economic Role of Women in the ECE Region, Developments, 1975/85* (New York, 1985), 14.

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From: Lynn Turgeon, *State and Discrimination* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1989), p. 57

Table 3  
Population in the european socialist countries  
(1983)

	Total population (thousands)	Of which		Female populations as a percentage of total population
		Males	Females	
Bulgaria	8 350	4 449	4 501	50.3
Czechoslovakia	15 437	7 518	7 919	51.3
GDR	16 702	7 877	8 825	52.8
Hungary	10 679	5 164	5 515	51.6
Poland	36 745	17 914	18 831	51.2
Romania	22 553	11 129	11 424	50.7
USSR	273 841	128 308	145 533	53.1
Yugoslavia (1981)*	21 550	10 568	10 982	50.6

**Sources:** *Statistical Year Book of the Member States of the CMEA, Council of Mundial Association, (Moscow 1984);*  
*ILO Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1984 (Geneva).*

- \*] According to ILO classification Yugoslavia has been included into this group of countries notwithstanding its system of social self-management and its affiliation to the group of developing countries.

From: ILO/INSTRAW, Women in the World Economy: A Global Statistical Survey 1950-2000 (Geneva: ILO and Santo Domingo: INSTRAW, 1985), p. 135.

Table 4  
Economically active population and participation rates  
(1971-80) (in '000)

Country (year)	Male			Female		
	Total population	Active population	Particip. rates	Total population	Active population	Partic. rates
Bulgaria (1975)	4 358	2 366	54.3	4 370	2,082	47.6
Czechoslovakia (1980)	7 441	4 184	56.2	7 842	3 664	46.7
German Democratic Republic (1971)	7 865	4 413	56.1	9 203	3 801	41.3
Hungary (1980)	5 189	2 867	55.3	5 521	2 202	39.9
Poland (1978)	17 080	9 806	57.4	17 982	8 156	45.4
Romania (1977)	10 626	5 867	55.2	10 934	4 927	45.1
USSR (1979)	121 868	67 919	55.7	140 217	67 505	48.1
Yugoslavia (1981)	10 568	5 741	54.3	10 982	3 618	33.0

Source: ILO: *Year Book of Labour Statistics* (Geneva), 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1984, table 1.

From: ILO/INSTRAW, 1985, p. 136.

Table 5  
Economically active population by sex and age group  
(1975-81) (in '000)

Country (year)	Age	Male			Female			
		Total population	Active population	Activity rates	Total population	Active population	Activity rates	
Bulgaria	(1975)	15-24	658	305	46.4	636	361	56.8
		25-54	1 863	1 785	95.8	1 850	1 642	88.7
		55+	843	275	32.6	945	78	8.3
Czechoslovakia	(1980)	15-24	1 139	663	58.2	1 087	620	57.0
		25-54	2 995	2 910	97.1	3 028	2 708	89.4
		55+	1 408	612	43.5	1 912	336	17.6
Hungary	(1980)	15-24	750	534	71.2	714	367	51.4
		25-54	2 167	2 063	95.2	2 233	1 719	77.0
		55+	1 066	269	25.2	1 438	114	8.0
Poland	(1978)	15-24	3 260	1 885	57.8	3 102	1 451	46.8
		25-54	6 929	6 530	94.2	7 086	5 522	77.9
		55+	2 611	1 391	53.3	3 706	1 182	31.9
Romania	(1977)	15-24	1 754	1 106	63.1	1 709	934	54.7
		25-54	4 336	4 128	95.2	4 354	3 481	80.0
		55+	1 735	810	46.7	2 198	509	23.1
Yugoslavia	(1981)	15-24	1 858	1 627	87.4	1 765	693	39.3
		25-54	4 328	4 048	93.5	4 435	2 511	56.6
		55+	1 619	741	45.8	2 164	413	19.1

Sources: ILO: *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, (Geneva), 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1984, table 1.

From: ILO/INSTRAW, 1985, p. 138.

Table 6

Distribution of women workers by branch of the national economy (per cent)  
(1960-1983)

		Industry Construction	Agriculture and Forestry	Transport and Commu- nications	Trade, Pub. catering, material & technical supply procurement	Housing Commercial and other services	Science and science services	Health physical culture and Social Security	Education art and culture
Bulgaria	1960	45.2	9.1	3.7	10.8	2.5	1.3	7.4	13.3
	1975	36.8	21.0	3.7	10.7	2.1	1.8	6.5	10.5
	1983	34.5	21.9	3.8	11.2	1.2	2.0	7.2	11.0
Czechoslovakia	1960	44.7	8.0	4.5	15.9	3.3	1.5	6.6	8.5
	1975	39.8	4.9	5.0	17.2	4.2	1.9	8.4	10.4
	1983	36.5	4.3	5.0	18.0	4.4	2.0	9.3	11.7
German Democratic Republic	1960	41.5	5.7	5.9	18.6	...	...	...	...
	1975	39.3	3.2	6.3	16.5	2.0	1.2	10.4	9.8
	1983	37.2	3.2	5.9	16.0	1.9	1.6	12.0	11.5
Hungary	1960	26.0	41.6	2.9	9.2		18.5		
	1975	35.9	19.8	4.3	13.4		23.3		
	1983	31.7	19.7	4.7	13.9		27.0		
Poland	1960	38.6	4.2	4.3	16.7	2.5	0.7	10.2	12.4
	1975	37.5	4.9	5.2	15.6	3.2	1.4	9.5	11.9
	1983	31.8	4.9	5.6	15.5	3.5	1.1	12.5	15.0

Source: *Women in socialist society, (Moscow, CMEA, 1985).*

Table 7

Percentage of women in the total number of manual and non-manual workers by branch of the national economy (1960-83)

		Industry Construction	Agriculture and Forestry	Transport and Commu- nications	Trade, Publ. catering, material & technical supply procurement	Housing Commercial and other services	Science and science services	Health physical culture and Social Security	Education art and culture
Bulgaria	1960	33.8	31.7	13.8	38.9	28.3	45.7	66.4	57.3
	1975	48.5	45.7	20.3	59.7	49.0	50.0	73.5	69.2
	1983	49.2	47.8	25.7	63.4	50.0	52.3	74.7	72.9
Czechoslovakia	1960	37.7	38.1	23.7	64.5	52.2	30.2	73.5	60.4
	1975	42.5	37.4	31.5	69.9	52.9	35.7	79.7	68.2
	1983	41.3	35.4	32.5	71.2	53.3	37.4	80.3	68.7
German Democratic Republic	1960	39.5	42.4	33.7	66.7	....	....	....	....
	1975	43.5	43.1	37.1	72.8	54.2	46.2	71.9	86.7
	1983	42.0	39.7	36.0	74.3	45.2	47.9	74.2	84.2
Hungary	1960	32.7	38.1	17.4	52.0		45.1		
	1975	44.7	38.8	23.8	63.8		58.7		
	1983	45.1	38.6	26.5	65.0		61.9		
Poland	1960	30.4	18.4	14.9	54.9	28.4	41.9	75.3	62.9
	1975	39.2	25.1	24.4	71.4	35.4	45.1	77.9	71.3
	1983	36.5	25.6	27.4	70.7	32.6	47.3	76.9	73.8
USSR	1975				76	53	50	84	73
	1983				76	51	52	82	75

Source: *Women in socialist society*, (Moscow, CMEA, 1985.) Reply of Government of the URSS (1984) to UN questionnaire for the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women, Nairobi, July 1985.



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