Analytical framework for regional migration governance in Africa: key features, patterns and impacts in the ECOWAS and IGAD regions

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1. Introduction

Migration within the African continent is much more prevalent than migration from Africa to Europe or other parts of the world. About two-thirds of African international migrants are living in another African country. The types of mobility thereby range from seasonal labor migration to forced displacement with varying geographic extensions. Against this background, the African Union has defined norms and strategic guidelines regulating migration and forced displacement (AU 2006, AU 2009) and regional organization such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established migration governance structures.

Regional mobility regimes and the corresponding organizations in Africa are increasingly targeted as collaborators by international development organizations and also in the context of recent European migration-related agreements such as the EU Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (“Khartoum Process”) started in 2014 or the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) launched in Valletta, Malta, in 2015 (Castillejo 2016). Likewise, regional migration governance has gained in importance as an object of academic inquiry, particularly in studies of international relations and comparative regionalism.

In the present paper, a framework of analysis of regional migration governance is introduced. The framework was developed in the context of an ongoing three-year research project (2017 – 2019) funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) focusing on the governance of migration in two African sub-regions: These are the Economic Community of Western Africa (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) at the Horn of Africa. The topic figures high on the agendas of both organisations. However, while ECOWAS has pursued free movement policies since the late 1970s gradually expanding these until present, IGAD has only recently developed this thematic field albeit resulting in certain tangible institutional and policy-related outcomes. The research uses a mixed-method qualitative research design involving literature review, document analysis, expert interviews and observation.

The paper is structured as follows. The subsequent, second section draws out migration profiles of our two case study regions. In the third section historical and institutional features of IGAD and ECOWAS migration governance are introduced. Subsequently, the rational and key categories of our analytical framework are presented. We close with first insights drawn from the application of the framework in both regions.
2. Regional migration profiles

2.1 IGAD region

The IGAD region comprises seven member states, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, all forming part of the larger Horn of Africa area. In the region, migration and forced displacement occur in a general context of political instability, weak governance, recurrent armed conflicts, high poverty and environmental degradation, with resulting high levels of individual and collective vulnerability (World Bank 2015: 12). Consequently, it is “one of the major refugee producing and hosting regions in the world” (RMMS 2015: 18), Ethiopia constituting the fifth and Kenya the seventh refugee-hosting nation and Sudan representing the fifth country of origin of refugees in global terms (Carciotto/Orsi 2017).

This being said, the security-related and developmental situation of individual countries differs significantly. While Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda have seen relative political and economic stability by regional standards, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan have been marked by civil war, state fragility and related social and economic destitution in most of the last decade or two. Within countries, high levels of socio-economic disparity between regions and histories of conflict are resulting in tenuous relationships between social and ethnic groups and repeated violent outbreaks.

In terms of environmental and climate conditions, a comparatively large part of the region, particularly in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, is covered by arid lands (IGAD 2012: 57). Against the background of what by common measures can be considered a harsh environment for human subsistence moreover prone to climate-related and other disasters, nomadic pastoralism has evolved as a form of human and livestock mobility on a seasonal or permanent basis (IGAD 2012: 57). While constituting an adaptation and survival strategy for a significant part of the regional population additionally generating large volumes of trade revenue, it has tended to be sidelined on the level of formal regional and national policies (IGAD 2012: 57, IGAD 2013: 46, Byiers 2016: 7).

The IGAD region as other regions in Africa is characterized by a large variety of migration forms, implying a multitude of drivers, paths and patterns. These can best be conceived of as a continuum between (completely involuntary) forced displacement and (completely self-determined) voluntary migration. In the recent policy and also academic discourse, the fluid and variable manifestations between the two extremes are prominently reflected in the notion of ‘mixed migration’ (Adepoju 2016: 13, World Bank 2015: 17, Njuki 2017: 2). Insufficient options for legal migration both within and out of the region feed into diverse forms of irregular migration, not least providing fertile grounds for migrant smuggling and human trafficking (Angenendt/Koch 2017: 7).

Geographically, migration in the IGAD region extends into different directions and distances. About 50 percent of all cross-border migrants move within the region, which compared to
other Sub-Sahara African regions constitutes a rather low proportion (IAGD 2013: 7). For example, in the ECOWAS area this figure stands at 93 percent and in the SADC region at 71 percent (IGAD 2013: 7). Countries in the IGAD region are all origin, transit and destination countries (Adepoju 2016, RMMS 2015) showing however important country-specific differences depending on their levels of political and socioeconomic stability.

Among migrants moving to destinations out of the region, four routes constitute the dominant trajectories (RMMS 2015: 18): The so-called eastern route (people moving to Yemen, oftentimes continuing towards Saudi Arabia or farther); the southern route (via Kenya to the South with South Africa figuring as the main destination country); the northern route (via Egypt and into Israel); and the western route, referring to migrants moving though Sudan and Libya and in possible subsequent steps to Europe (RMMS 2015, World Bank 2015, IGAD 2012, IGAD 2013, Horwood 2015: 10-11). Out of the four mentioned routes, the eastern route towards Yemen is considered the numerically most important one (Horwood 2015: 10). Related to required economic resources at the individual or household levels, the routes have highly diverse implications, with the western route to Europe ranging at the top and the southern route to South-Africa at the bottom (independent expert, IGAD workshop 28 March 2017).

The routes to external destinations mirror established patterns of mobility, but also evolve dynamically depending on international policy changes and national or regional border management practices. For example, recently decreased arrivals in Yemen are attributed to higher incidents of deportation from Yemen back to Djibouti at the beginning of 2017 (RMMS 2016: 2). Moreover, currently negotiated arrangements between the European Union and African transit countries e.g. Libya to for externalized border control (RMMS 2017: 5) are likely to significantly influence migration patterns along the ‘western’ route.

2.1 ECOWAS region

The ECOWAS region consists of 15 member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) virtually covering the entire geographical area of West Africa. The region is characterized by a divide between Anglophone (Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, etc.), Francophone (Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Togo, etc.) and Lusophone (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau) country groups each of these shaped by distinct colonial histories and governance traditions. This being said, the societal, economic, political and ecological situation in the ECOWAS region is highly diverse, partly cutting across language groups.

The region has always been characterized by a high degree of human mobility. More than half of all international migrants holding the citizenship of a Sub-Sahara African country are West Africans (Awumbila et al. 2014). The degree of intraregional migration with about 80% of the international migration from West Africa staying in another West African country is thereby higher than in any other African sub-region (UNDESA 2013).
Ever since, the region has experienced seasonal movements of pastoralists throughout the whole region. Furthermore, intra-regional patterns of circular or seasonal labor migration from the poorer Northern Savannah areas to the Southern economic sectors like the mining sector, the timber industry or - later on - urban services date back to the colonial era (Anarfi et al 2003). They are considered as important as permanent migration.

The migration motives and drivers in the region are very diverse and range from high population densities, environmental change, difficult socio-economic conditions to cultural reasons or armed conflicts (Adepoju 2009). In particular the civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote’d Ivoire led to a massive increase in forced displacement in the region (Devillard et al. 2015: 22). After these conflicts were brought to an end, Nigeria has become the “hotspot” of (internal) displacement in the West-African sub-region with about 2.1 million internally displaced persons at the end of 2015 in particular due to activities of the terror group Boko Haram and the related armed conflict in Nigeria’s North-east (IDMC 2017).

In 2013, the stock of international migrants staying in the region was estimated at 9 million, which is about 3% of its overall population. The main immigration countries in the region – at least in absolute numbers - are also the regional economic “power houses” Cote d’Ivoire (2.5 million migrants), Ghana (1.9 million) and Nigeria (1.1 million). Percentage-wise, Gambia is the greatest immigration country with share of about 17% of migrants in the overall population. In terms of emigration, Mali (1.6 million migrants), Burkina Faso (1.3 million) and Nigeria (1.1. million) are the most important migrant-producing countries within ECOWAS. Percentage-wise it is the Cape Verde, which is the leading emigration country in the region (UNDESA 2013; Adepoju 2016:9-11).

Historically, the directions and the quantities of migration flows within the ECOWAS region are very dynamic and diverse. For instance, although Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria have traditionally been the most important immigration countries for migrants from other countries of the sub-region, the role of these two countries as immigration hubs has over and over been disrupted by conflicts and economic decline. As a result, their emigration rates have tended to (significantly) increase in times of crisis. More recently, the outbreak of Ebola in 2014 has negatively affected the migration flows within the region as travel bans and the closure of some airports, sea ports and some national borders were imposed albeit for a shorter period. A further important feature of migration within the ECOWAS region is its predominant occurrence within the Anglophone (e.g. between Ghana and Nigeria) and Francophone country groups (e.g. between Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire) (Adepoju 2005, Adepoju 2016: 10).

Migration out of the region is likewise diverse. There are larger West African diasporas (mainly Nigerians and Ghanaians) in the USA, South Africa and Great Britain. Likewise, France hosts large cohorts of migrants originating from its former West African colonies. These migrants constitute predominantly high- and medium-/low-skilled workers and their
families (Adepoju 2005). In recent years there is also a growing number of West African citizens who are trying to irregularly enter Europe via highly dangerous routes through the Sahara desert – with Agadez (Niger) being an important travel hub - and the so called Central Mediterranean route by sea from North Africa to Italy. According to EUROSTAT (2017), the percentage of Nigerians applying for asylum in the European Union among the overall group of (first-time) asylum applicants from Sub-Saharan countries was 23% (=51,000 applicants) in the time period July 2016-June 2017. Other larger West African nationals in that statistic originate from Guinea (8%), Gambia (7%), Cote d’Ivoire (6.5%), Mali (5%), Senegal (5%) and Ghana (4%).

3. Regional migration governance structures

3.1 IGAD region

IGAD’s activities on migration officially set off in 2010, following a recommendation in the first IGAD Regional Consultative Process (RCP) on migration. This informal dialogue initiative had been launched in 2008 (IGAD 2008, IGAD 2017). It is spearheaded by the IOM\(^1\) and includes IGAD member states and neighbouring transit and destination countries as well as international observers. Thus, the introduction of migration and forced displacement as additional topical fields of IGAD is strongly related to international policy initiatives on migration setting off at the time. Besides the RCP these were the 2006 African Union (AU) Migration Policy Framework, the 2006 Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development and the African-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment established in 2007 (RMMS 2013: 18-19, Lavenex et al. 2016: 19).

Despite undisputable external influences, member states also had intrinsic motivations to lift the topic on the regional agenda. First, the political instability in the past decades in almost all IGAD member states had brought about high refugee and IDP flows, adding-up to historically large flows of internal and cross-border migrants (IGAD 2012: 6, Njuki 2017: 2). Second, against the background of a generalized securitisation of migration discourses and recurring terrorist incidents by the Al-Shabaab militia (RMMS 2013), security concerns became increasingly prevalent among hosting states of the region (for Kenya, view Betts 2013, RMM 2013). Conversely, the same states noticed that a welcoming attitude towards refugees could contribute to (re-)gaining political legitimacy and credibility in the international arena, thus making refugees a highly apt instrument for national policy tactics (independent expert, 29 March 2017, for Kenya view Betts 2013: 153).

The overall mission of IGAD is to “[promote] regional cooperation and integration to add value to Member States’ efforts in achieving peace, security and prosperity” (IGAD 2017). The organization consists of four divisions reflecting its four pillars of regional cooperation:

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\(^1\) The RCPs constitute informal intergovernmental networks on migration and take place in various world regions tending to focus on security-related dimensions of migration (Lavenex 2016 et al.: 1-2).
Peace and Security, Agriculture and Environment, Economic Cooperation and Social Development.

The governance structure cutting across the thematic areas consists of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as the key policy making, directing and controlling body, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Committee of Ambassadors and the IGAD Secretariat. The Executive Secretary forms the Chief Executive Officer and spokesman of the organization (IGAD 2017). Since 2008, this four-year term position is held by a Kenyan, while Ethiopia has been chairing the Assembly of Heads of State - meant to annually rotate- and the Council of Ministers since the last Ordinary Summit of IGAD which took place in 2008 (Byiers 2016: 14)².

IGAD’s Migration Programme forms part of the Social Development Division, aside with three other programmes focusing on education, employment and youth and health, respectively. In the context of a growing attention and heightened concerns related to migration and forced displacement, both internally and externally, in the last years IGAD has experienced an increasing formalisation of its migration-related governance and operations. Table 5 illustrates the different governance organs of the IGAD migration programme.

Migration and displacement strategies in the region are formulated in the Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF), IGAD’s primary policy guideline on migration. The operational aim of the RMPF is “to support member states efforts in the formulation of national migration policies, to provide a regionally comprehensive approach to migration management and to facilitate the harmonization of policies in migration management and assist towards the achievement of the IGAD minimum integration agenda and eventually the [free trade agreement]” (Njuki 2017a: 4)³. In order to operationalize the RMPF, the Migration Action Plan (MAP) was formulated pointing out priority policy areas, activities, responsibilities and required resources for implementation (IGAD 2017).

In the last five years and supported by donor funding, IGAD has formulated two migration policy frameworks. The first is the IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (IRMPF), adopted by the IGAD Council of Ministers in 2012. The RMPF was derived from the African Union continental framework adopted in Banjul in 2006 (IGAD 2017, IGAD 2013: 7, Njuki 2017: 2), however placing particular emphasis on migration features and challenges distinct to the region such as “migration and pastoralism, migration and human security and internal displacement due to political instability” (IGAD 2012: vi).

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² The long time that has passed since 2008 (and by implication Ethiopia chairing the organ ever since) is considered as somewhat indicative of the organization’s lack of adherence to formal procedures. At the same time, having organized several Extraordinary Summits in the meantime, IGAD is attested an institutional flexibility quite advantageous in the volatile regional context (Byiers 2016: 15).

³ The minimum integration agenda IGAD formulated in 2008 includes a self-commitment to creating a free trade area including policies on migration between 2009 and 2012, which so far has not been met (Byiers 2016: 50).
The ultimate migration-related objective pronounced in the RMPF is to “realize the well-being and protection of migrants including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in all IGAD Member States and the realisation of the developmental potential of migration” (IGAD 2017). It represents a rather comprehensive approach to migration, reflecting and positioning itself on a broad array of migration issues, such as labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, inter-state and inter-regional cooperation and related policy fields, such as health, education, nomadic pastoralism and culture (IGAD 2012).

The second framework is the IGAD Regional Migration Action Plan (MAP) 2015 – 2020. It was formulated in 2013 to facilitate implementation of the RMPF at the member state level. Based on a process of identification of priorities with the member states, it devises twelve priority policy areas both issue- and governance-related. These are: Establishment of National Coordination Mechanisms (NCM’s); National migration governance; Labor migration; Regional integration and protection of human rights; Regional migration governance to counter transnational crime of trafficking and smuggling; Pastoral mobility; Migration data; Free movement of people; Internal displacement; Climate and disaster induced displacement; Migration and development, and IGAD Migration Governance Architecture.

With regard to the two principal migration framework documents of IGAD, it is difficult to establish one dominant narrative of migration. Rather an explicitly comprehensive approach is pursued hardly privileging one issue or priority area over the other – on paper. Both documents explicitly subscribe to the free movement of persons, the RMPF pointing to opportunities “for uninhibited migration, residence and establishment” (IGAD 2012: 1) as one of its guiding principles and the MAP establishing it as one of its strategic priorities (IGAD 2013: 60-65). Rights of migrants are considered as a key regional concern in the RMPF in which i.a. member states are reminded to “reinforce national policies and legal frameworks (...) to domesticate key international instruments that they have ratified and/or are implementing” (IGAD 2012: 20). Again, the protection of human rights is pointed out as a strategic priority in the MAP (IGAD 2012: 26). Developmental aspects and diverse forms of migration, particularly IDPs are equally highlighted.

3.2. ECOWAS region

Like a national government, ECOWAS has an executive branch, a Legislature and a judiciary. The formal head of ECOWAS is the Chairman of Authority of Heads of State and Government. The chairman is appointed by the other Heads of State for a period of one year. The Authority is in charge of defining the general “policy directions” of ECOWAS. Furthermore, it is also meant to be a monitoring body. The executive branch is the Commission of ECOWAS, which is headed by the President of the ECOWAS Commission. The Commission is currently made up of twelve Commissioners and their offices. Migration
issues are treated in an own sub-unit and attributed to the area of operations of the Commissioner of Tourism, Trade, Customs and Free Movement.

In sharp contrast to IGAD, ECOWAS has a long history of migration governance. Already in 1979, shortly after its establishment as a Regional Economic Community following the Treaty of Lagos in 1975, ECOWAS adopted the “Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment”. Its purpose was to facilitate intraregional migration and to achieve the vision of a borderless West African sub-region. The Protocol also included an agreement on three implementation phases. Phase 1, which was implemented between 1980 and 1985), included the right of entry and the abolition of visas. It gives citizens of ECOWAS member states the right of visa-free entry into other member states and the right to stay in the other member states for up to 90 days. From then on, community citizens basically could cross international borders within ECOWAS with national passports and health certificates. Phase 2 (originally scheduled for the time period 1985 to 1990 but only signed in 1986) referred to the right of residence. It granted citizens of all ECOWAS member states the right to reside and work in other member states. Phase 3 (originally scheduled for the time period 1990 to 1995) referred to the right of establishment (including the access to non-salaried activities, creation and management of enterprises and companies and the principle of non-discrimination). But until now Phase 3 has not been ratified, which is related to the circumstances when the Free Movement Protocol was created and Phases 1 and 2 were enforced (Fioaramonti and Nshimbi 2016: 21). The late 1970s and 1980s were also a time of a severe economic decline in the whole of the West African sub-region. Several countries including Ghana and Nigeria were experiencing severe crises, which led to increasing anti-immigrant sentiments in the respective populations. Nigeria, which in the times of its oil-boom had attracted numerous workers and their families from all over West Africa, eventually expelled more than 1 million migrants in 1983. (Adepoju 2009). This and similar incidents in other countries gave way to an undermining of the acceptance and the further implementation progress of the Protocol.

But in the 1990s and 2000s attempts to accelerate the implementation of the Protocol gained momentum again. In 2000, ECOWAS, with support of IOM, established a RCP with the major purpose of furthering the regional integration process and overcoming migration (governance) related problems. The “Migration Dialogue for West Africa” (MIDWA) is based on the following five pillars: 1. Promotion of peace and stability in West Africa and protection of migrants’ rights; 2. Contribution of migrants to the development of their country of origin; 3. Poverty alleviation in emigration areas; 4. Information, sensitization and research on the different aspects of international migration in West Africa; 5. Intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation.

One of the most important outcomes of MIDWA process so far was the “Common Approach on Migration and Development” (IOM 2015). This strategy document was adopted in early 2008 and can be regarded as ECOWAS’ central policy implementation/strategy document in the area of migration. Its importance is also reflected in the establishment of various
working groups, workshops or symposia on the topic. It contains the following action fields:
Promotion of free movement within the ECOWAS Zone (e.g. the establishment of a regional
fund to finance cross-border cooperation), promotion of the management of regular
migration (in the areas: educational migration, diaspora policies, implementation of pilot
experiments at the national and regional levels), migration policy harmonization and actions
addressing the gender dimension of migration. The Common Approach also includes actions
regarding a) a stronger control of irregular migration and b) human trafficking (particularly of
women and children) and actions to protect the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and
refugees and thereby also going beyond ECOWAS’ traditional areas of migration governance
(ECOWAS 2008).

Despite the fact that the implementation of ECOWAS’ migration related policies remains
limited and the Protocol process has experienced its setbacks and difficulties respectively, a
positive narrative on migration has always asserted itself reflecting the commonplaceness of
human mobility in the West African sub-region. ECOWAS migration governance is said to be
a role model for the whole African continent (Fioaramonti and Nshimbi 2016: 22).

4. Analysis framework

The study of regional migration governance only recently gained vigor as an object of
academic inquiry. This is related to the fact that regional migration regimes themselves
constitute a rather recent phenomenon compared to regional trade or security
arrangements notwithstanding a few exceptions (e.g. the EU, view Lavenex et al. 2016: 1).
Against the background of an increasing recognition of the magnitude and variance of intra-
regional migration flows, notably in Africa and Asia, and assumed comparative advantages of
regional versus global migration governance (Nita 2014)\(^4\), strands of research have also
gradually thriven in the last few years, albeit still neglecting regions outside Europe.

The research project this paper is owed to aims at assessing the effectiveness of regional
migration governance in the IGAD and the ECOWAS regions. To this end, a framework of
analysis was developed. The following assumptions and expectations regarding the topic of
enquiry (analysis of effectiveness regional migration governance) underlie the framework:

- All phases of the policy cycle, i.e. normative agenda-setting, written policies,
  implementation and impacts are covered.
- Institutional capacities and discretionary power in the context of the relevant actor
  constellations form part of the analysis.
- The framework shall permit a systematic assessment of institutional and normative
  conditions and also have explanatory capacity.

\(^4\) These are assumed to lie in the higher commonality of interest of members of a region as compared to
global-level arrangements e.g. due to similar socioeconomic and/or cultural characteristics. Regional regimes
are also believed to bring about higher benefits for weak members, i.e. migrant sending states (Nita 2014: 6).
Apart from the nascent academic writing on the topic of regional migration governance the framework is informed by the broader international relations and regionalism literature (e.g. Börzel 2016, Hulse 2014, Peters et al. 2012), in particular as it refers to the African context (Hartmann 2016, Byiers 2016, Knoll/de Weijer 2016: 6f.). It incorporates elements of the two dominant perspectives on international organizations of which regional organizations (ROs) form a subset (Peters et al. 2012: 5). The first, rationalist, perspective focuses on the interests of (strong) member states as principal factor driving the formation and further development of an RO. The second, constructivist angle, places emphasis on the intrinsic logic, identity formation and norm-diffusionist influence of the RO as autonomous actor, also towards its member states (Peters et al. 2012: 14, Söderbaum/Hettne 2009: 10, Hartmann 2016). In this latter sense, the effects of regional migration norms on national and sub-national policies and processes, an as yet rather understudied topic for almost all regions except Europe (Lavenex et al. 2016: 23, de Haas 2013: 41) also seemed of key importance.

Existing frameworks of migration governance, e.g. the recently developed Global Migration Governance Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit 2016 (id. 2016) and the IOM’s Migration Governance Framework (IOM 2015) also inspired our work. However, considering “governance and management of migration from the point of view of the State” (IOM 2015: 2) they proved only partly applicable to our purposes.

The following are the main categories of analysis:

1. **Foundational factors and aims:** This category of analysis looks at the foundational context of the organization, identifying factors related to the regional history, geography, culture or economic structure likely to intersect with migration and its governance. It also sheds light on the present and historical weight of migration as one regional policy field among others.

2. **Institutional structures and processes:** This category provides evidence on key decision-making and operative organs, their respective mandate and functions as well as key actors. Also formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ and the way institutions interact shall be assessed. Thereby, the scope of action of a regional organization vis-à-vis its member states and the agenda-setting power of actors of the continental and international development and migration policy landscape is assessed.

3. **Normative approach:** Against the background of competing international narratives on migration (e.g. free movement-oriented, rights-based, security-focused, view Lavenex et al. 2016: 4, Knoll/de Weijer 2016: 6), this category serves to understand the dominant explanatory and strategic approach pursued. It also sheds further light on competing interests and approaches between relevant internal and external actors.

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5 On problems related to using nation state-centric norms for assessing regional ‘actorness’ see Hulse 2014: 548.
4. **Transfer to policies and praxis**: This category of analysis helps examining the degree to which stated regional policy preferences are translated into written (formal) policies and to what extent they are implemented in practice ‘on the ground’, i.e. nationally and in specific localities. This for instance involves the level of harmonization between regional and domestic migration policies as well as the sub-national depth and extent of implementation.

**Table 1**: Analytical framework of regional migration governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>KEY QUESTIONS (SUB-CRITERIA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundational factors and aims</td>
<td>• What were key motivations and topics in the formation stage of the RO?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• To what degree did migration and displacement form part of the RO’s “raison d’être”?</td>
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<td>• If migration has played a role at the beginning, in how far was this reflected in respective policy initiatives?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• If not, how and why did that change in time?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional structures and processes, actors</td>
<td>• How formalized and centralized are the RO’s decision-making structures in the field of migration?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• How formalized and centralized are the operational structures of the RO migration governance architecture?</td>
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<td>• How are the RO’s migration-related activities financed?</td>
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<td>• Who are the dominant (internal and external) actors influencing the RO and what is their specific impact on the RO’s migration agenda?</td>
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<td>• How advanced is the RO’s data management?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Normative approach</td>
<td>• What is the ultimate aim and are the dominant migration narratives used by the organization?</td>
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<td>• Has the organization established a protocol on free movement? And, if yes, what degree of free movement does it entail?</td>
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<td>• Has the organization pronounced norms on countering smuggling, trafficking and other kinds of human and labour rights violations?</td>
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<td>• Does the RO propose measures to promote development aspects of migration?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does the RO address diverse forms of migration (internal vs. international, forced vs. voluntary), as well as their overlaps?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Transfer policies into and practices

- To what degree do policy frameworks (and migration narratives) of the RO manifest in its implemented projects and programmes? What gaps/inconsistencies can be observed and why?
- To what degree are relevant policy fields harmonized on a regional level (e.g. labor market, trade, education)?
- To what extent are regional policy frameworks reflected in national migration policies in the member states?
- To what degree do regional norms influence sub-national migration-related practices (administration, development planning, police, private sector etc.)?
- How flexibly can the organization respond to changing migration dynamics e.g. sudden mass influxes?

Table1 continued (Source: Own compilation, with Benjamin Schraven)

For the empirical analysis, the framework is intended as a conceptual guideline rather than as structure to be strictly pursued in all instances. This means that during fieldwork, depending on situational, informant and methodological specifics, a selective approach placing a focus on certain categories and aspects but not on others is permitted.

5. Results

Preliminary results of our analysis for both case study regions show that both organizations differ significantly with regard to the introduced categories of analysis. Regarding foundational factors and aims, IGAD’s programming on migration did not start before 2008. Migration does not constitute one of the organization’s traditional thematic areas, but can be traced back to intra-regional challenges and political tensions, but also to pressure and interests of external funders. The ultimate aim of IGAD policies is to ensure that “migration is voluntary and legal, through methods that respect the human rights of migrants and collaboration among actors, including migrants, countries of origin, transit and destination” (IGAD MAP). Rather the opposite can be said about the ECOWAS region and its migration agenda, which is almost as old as the organisation itself and among its essential purposes. Based on the long and diverse migration history of West Africa and a joint understanding of its member states about the potentials of labor migration, ECOWAS already adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment back in 1979. Despite some throwbacks for the protocol, the promotion of regional migration norms is broadly supported.

Significant differences can also be found when it comes to decision-making structures and processes. IGAD shows a strong inter-governmental orientation and has no mandate to take decisions on behalf of member states. ECOWAS appears to have a stronger mandate in that
regard - although both organisations each have a dominant member state: Ethiopia and Nigeria.

Concerning the transfer to policies and implementation, the two organizations show similar weaknesses. While IGAD has come up with significant results in terms of migration policy formulation, implementation of these policies by member states is rather weak. For example, almost none has drafted a national migration policy as yet. A further point in case is the free movement ‘agenda’, constituting a stated aspiration but – except bilateral agreements e.g. between Kenya and Ethiopia – is not translated in day-to-day trade and border management. In the case of ECOWAS, its Common Approach on Migration and Development (2008) has generated some new dynamics concerning ECOWAS migration agenda, as the Common Approach amongst others included refuges and migrants’ rights into the community’s migration policy framework. Nonetheless, ECOWAS is yet to ratify the third phase of its free movement protocol (the right of establishment, whose implementation was originally planned for 1990). Furthermore, the implementation of ECOWAS Regional Labour and Employment Policy in order to support regional labour markets still remains very limited.
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