The effectiveness of social protection in five African countries through normal times and times of crisis

Katrin Gasior¹, Iva V. Tasseva² & Gemma Wright¹

¹SASPRI ²Department of Social Policy, LSE

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Motivation and Background

- To cope with a negative shock, in the absence of social protection, individuals can:
 - Self-insure (by borrowing, drawing on savings, relying on support from family members etc)
 - Insure privately on the market
- But:
 - Not everyone can save or borrow
 - Ability to rely on others may be constrained at times of widespread increase in needs
 - Private insurance against a job loss usually does not exist
- Government policy response via social protection benefits key for redistributing resources and providing social assistance and insurance

Motivation and Background

- Social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa
 - A large share of benefits go to the poor (e.g. Handa et al. 2012; Coady et al. 2004)
 - But limited benefit coverage of the poor and limited effectiveness of systems to redistribute resources and reduce poverty (e.g. World Bank 2022; Warwick et al. 2022; Adu-Ababio 2022; Bargain et al. 2021; Gasior et al. 2021; Brown et al. 2018; Inchauste and Lustig 2017)
- Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa increasing due to Covid-19 and surging prices (Mahler et al., 2022) but little government spending on social protection in the region (ILO, 2021)
- Little evidence on how responsive social protection systems are to negative shocks in low- and lower-middle-income countries
 - Important to understand in order to design (more) effective systems

Our paper

- Examine the performance of social protection systems in five African countries
 - Lower-middle-income: Ghana and Tanzania
 - Low-income: Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia
- Study population coverage of social protection benefits and their impact on consumption poverty in normal times and times of crisis
 - 'Normal' times \rightarrow pre-pandemic 2019
 - $\textit{Crisis} \rightarrow$ simulate hypothetical reduction to household earnings or employment
- Use a new microsimulation model for Sub-Saharan African countries (SOUTHMOD)
 - Uses nationally representative household surveys
 - To calculate benefit entitlements, tax liabilities, and hh net income in normal times and during crisis
- Study effects of benefits on hh consumption

Our paper

- 1. Assess the extent to which social protection benefits provide support to households in 'normal' times
 - The better benefit coverage and adequacy, the better households are prepared for an economic shock
- 2. Examine how effective benefits 'automatic stabilisers' are in protecting incomes/consumption during crisis
 - The more responsive policies are to changes in people's circumstances, the more insurance and income/consumption smoothing provided

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Why are automatic stabilisers (AS) important?

- In-built flexibility of existing benefits to respond automatically to expansion and contraction of economy, e.g. unemployment insurance and means-tested benefits
- ↓ variation in hh incomes and consumption and provide social insurance against risks (Brewer and Tasseva 2021; Cantó et al. 2021; Jara et al. 2021; Lastunen et al. 2021; Fernández Salgado et al. 2014; Dolls et al. 2012; Browning and Crossley 2001)
- \downarrow poverty volatility over the business cycle (Bitler and Hoynes 2016)

Redistribute resources (Paulus and Tasseva 2020)

Why are AS important?

Many advantages of AS over discretionary gov't response. With AS:

- No extra gov't intervention needed \rightarrow no time delay between gov't decision and new policy
- Support provided for as long as needed and targeted to those in need

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- Policy provision via existing administration and infrastructure
- Policy makers freed up to focus on the idiosyncratic and unanticipated aspects of crisis (Orszag et al., 2022)

Constraints on AS

- By design policies may not respond to fluctuations in hh incomes or only respond with a delay, e.g. proxy means-tested benefits
 - But can act as a safety net for families in receipt prior to shock
- Limited effectiveness due to limitations of existing policies, e.g. gaps in coverage or low value of benefit payments
- Limited fiscal space to expand spending in crisis, e.g. inability to borrow limiting impact of policies
 - But all countries raised debt to GDP levels substantially through the pandemic (by 19% in Uganda to 32% in Zambia in 2020 compared to 2019)

Existing benefits

	Ghana	Mozambique	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia
Non-means-tested benefits (NMTB) Children, youth Old-age Farmers	\checkmark			\checkmark	√ √
Means-tested benefits (MTB) Social assistance Farmers	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark
Social insurance pensions (P)	\checkmark	\checkmark			\checkmark

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NMTB = universal within a certain group e.g. children.

MTB = targeted at poorer/vulnerable groups subject to a means-test.

P = eligible if paid social insurance contributions for e.g. old-age or disability.

Existing benefits

- Eligibility for means-tested benefits includes an income-test in Mozambique and Tanzania
- But generally linked to proxies of income, and not income itself, and/or eligibility criteria are tight
 - e.g. food insecurity (Tanzania, Zambia); vulnerability (Ghana, Zambia); hh presence of children (Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia) and/or disabled or chronically ill people (Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia)
- Unemployment insurance programmes generally don't exist
- Overall little spending on social protection as % of GDP
 - 1.7% in Ghana and Tanzania and <1% in Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia
 - Compared to 3.8% on average for Africa and 12.9% for the World

The data and SOUTHMOD

- Nationally representative household budget surveys
 - Main source for official national statistics on poverty and inequality
 - Source for the World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform + Our World in Data's poverty section
- Tax-benefit model SOUTHMOD (Decoster et al., 2019)
 - Developed by UNU-WIDER, SASPRI, Uni Essex + national partners in each country
 - Combines survey info on household gross incomes, consumption and characteristics with tax-benefit policy rules

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 Calculates, for each household, social protection benefit entitlements, tax liability and net income

Simulation of shocks

- Stress-test the benefit system (Atkinson, 2009)
- Simulate two types of shock (Dolls et al., 2012) to:
 - Earnings: 10% proportional reduction to individual's earnings
 - Employment: randomly move people into unemployment, so aggregate earnings fall by 10%
- Use SOUTHMOD to calculate hh benefits, income and consumption before & after shock
 - Assume Marginal Propensity to Consume of 1, i.e. all of an increase in income is consumed (results assuming MPC=0.7 qualitatively similar)
- Advantages of hypothetical shocks over observing actual crisis:
 - Isolate response of benefit AS, without interactions with potential discretionary gov't response
 - Assess cross-country differences in benefit AS
 - Assess if type of shock matters for benefit responsiveness

Benefit coverage: % of individuals living in households receiving benefits

	В	NMTB	MTB	Р
Ghana	53.7	52.5	.8	1.4
Mozambique	8.5	.0	6.6	2.0
Tanzania	8.0	.0	8.0	.0
Uganda	3.8	3.8	.0	.0
Zambia	53.0	39.7	23.4	.9

Notes: Number of people living in households receiving benefits, as a proportion of total population. B = all benefits (NMTB + MTB + P). NMTB = non-means-tested benefits. MTB = means-tested benefits. P = social insurance pensions.

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Benefit coverage by income/consumption quintiles



Notes: Number of people living in households receiving benefits, as a proportion of total population/population in quintile group.

Consumption poverty rate and poverty reduction (Δ) due to benefits

	Poverty	rate (%)	Δ (% points) due to	
	Total	Pre-B	В	
Ghana	17.3***	19.8***	-2.5***	
	(.46)	(.50)	(.20)	
Mozambique	56.7***	57.5***	8***	
	(.49)	(.48)	(.07)	
Tanzania	44.3***	44.3***	.0	
	(.63)	(.63)	(.00)	
Uganda	65.3***	65.5***	2***	
0	(.58)	(.58)	(.04)	
Zambia	54.3***	56.6***	-2.3***	
	(.66)	(.65)	(.16)	

Notes: The poverty line equals \$1.9 per day (2011 PPP). Total = total hh consumption. Pre-B = hh consumption before accounting for benefits receipt. B = the reduction to poverty due to benefits (i.e. the difference in poverty based on Total versus Pre-Benefits consumption).

Results so far

- Less than 1 in 10 individuals receive social protection benefits in Mozambique and Tanzania and 1 in 20 in Uganda, compared to 1 in 2 in Ghana and Zambia
- Relatively high poverty rate in Ghana (17%) and very high poverty rates of more than 40% in remaining countries
- A large proportion of the consumption-poorest 20% of population receive benefits in Ghana (74%), Zambia (68%) and Tanzania (40%)
- But, though an important source of income for some in poverty, benefits do relatively little to reduce poverty in normal times
 - Highest impact in Ghana of 2.5pp reduction (14.5%), and Zambia of 2.3pp (4%)
 - Negligible impact in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda

Benefit coverage in normal times and impact of a shock

	Normal times	Impact of a shock (% points)		
	(%)	Employment shock	Earnings shock	
Ghana Mozambique Tanzania Uganda Zambia	53.7 8.5 8.0 3.8 53.0	.0 .1 .0 .0	.0 .1 .0 .0	

Notes: Coverage = number of people living in households receiving benefits, as a proportion of total population.

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Consumption poverty rate in normal times and impact of an employment shock

	Normal times			Impact of a shock: Δ (% points) to normal times		
	Total	Pre-B	В	Total	Pre-B	В
Ghana	17.3***	19.8***	-2.5***	3.6***	3.7***	1
	(.0)	(.1)	(.0)	(.3)	(.2)	(.1)
Mozambique	56.7***	57.5***	8***	1.4***	1.4***	.1***
	(.4)	(.4)	(.0)	(.0)	(.0)	(.0)
Tanzania	44.3***	44.3***	.0***	2.9***	2.9***	.0
	(1.8)	(1.8)	(.0)	(.4)	(.4)	(.0)
Uganda	65.3***	65.5***	2***	2.5***	2.5***	.0***
	(.2)	(.2)	(.0)	(.1)	(.1)	(.0)
Zambia	54.3***	56.6***	-2.3***	2.2***	2.1***	.0
	(.5)	(.8)	(.3)	(.1)	(.2)	(.1)

Notes: The poverty line equals \$1.9 per day (2011 PPP). Total = total hh consumption. Pre-B = hh consumption before accounting for benefits receipt. B = the reduction to poverty due to benefits (i.e. the difference in poverty based on Total versus Pre-Benefits consumption).

Impact of an employment shock on mean net income



Notes: The figure shows the distributional impact of the shock. Changes in net income are broken down by income source and based on equivalised household net income.

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Conclusion

- Assess effectiveness of benefit systems to respond to negative shocks in five low-/lower-middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Benefit system in all countries ineffective in stabilising income and consumption during crisis
- Benefit coverage higher in Ghana and Zambia and lower in Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda
- Benefits pro-poor in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia but overall equally distributed across households in Mozambique and Uganda

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Conclusion

- Simulated shocks to earnings and employment → reduction in net income and consumption and a rise to poverty
- Benefits are not responsive to changes in person's earnings or employment because:
 - universal within a certain group e.g. children
 - linked to proxies of income, and not income itself, and/or eligibility criteria are very tight

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 Designing strong benefit stabilisers important to prepare for future crises

Thank you!

katrin.gasior@saspri.org





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