On the Origins of Inequality in Chile

Dante Contreras U de Chile Jorge Rodriguez U of Chicago Sergio Urzua U of Maryland

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Income distribution is unequally distributed



Per capita income by percentil (Casen 1990 vs 2011, \$2011)





Fuente: Top Incomes Project (Atkinson-Picketty-Saez, 2014), Fairfield- Jorrat (2014)

Key Questions:

- What are the underlying causes?
- What is the role of the schooling system?
- Have educational policies impacted individual's labor market performance?

Chilean educational system

- In 1981, Chile's military government established a "textbook" voucher scheme, by providing vouchers to any student wishing to attend a private school, and by directly tying the budgets of public schools to their enrollment.
- Three type of schools: Public, Voucher, Private Paid.
- Today, voucher schools about 54% enrollment.
- Voucher schools
 - Co payment, selection
 - For profit Non for profit
- Large evidence on school choice and educational achievement: Public \approx Voucher ; clear advantage of PP
- Evidence limited by data, mostly cross section information.

Table 2: Academic performance by school type

	Lan	guage	Ν	Math		
School	Average	Std. Dev.	Average	Std. Dev.		
Public	239.9	46.4	234.1	45.7		
Private-voucher	256.6	47.6	250.8	49.2		
Private-fee-paying	275.4	49.9	280.7	58.7		

Introduction

- We explore the effects of pre-labor market characteristics on income inequality using **new longitudinal** data for Chile.
- Using reduced-form models we investigate whether institutional factors (educational system), students pre-labor market abilities and individuals socio-economic characteristics during high school can explain the significant disparities in labor income.
- We observe individuals pre-labor market abilities at age 15 and labor market outcomes at age 25.
 - Better identification strategy

Main Results

- We find a clear link between individuals' high school type (public, voucher or private) and their labor market income.
- Particularly, **private-fee-paying schools have higher returns** on labor market outcomes than public and voucher schools, even after controlling for family background and pre-labor market abilities.
- We also document the relative importance of educational policies (JEC and SNED) aimed at improving school quality on earnings inequality.
- Our results suggest that JEC and SNED did <u>not have effects</u> on adult earnings, except among voucher schools.

Brief Literature Review

- There is a vast literature documenting and analyzing the sources of this high inequality.
- Most of previous studies approach income inequality analysis from a static perspective (cross-sectional studies). More recently cohort studies.
- Literature: De Gregorio and Cowan (1996); Bravo and Marinovic (1997); Contreras and Ruiz-Tagle (1997).Contreras (1998); Bravo, Contreras and Rau (1999); Ruiz-Tagle (1999); Bravo, Contreras, Urzua (2002); Contreras (2002); Sapelli (2011); and many others.

Brief Literature Review

- This is the first paper in Chile linking data on individuals schooling achievement and adult labor market performance.
- This allows us to study the origins of inequality for a recent cohort.
- The paper also contributes to the early endowments and adulthood effects literature.
- Literature: Heckman and Masterov (2007); Cunha et al (2008); Heckman, Stixrud, Urzua (2007); Urzua (2008); Reyes, Rodriguez, Urzua (2012); Prada (2012); Chetty,Friedman and Rockoff (2011); and many many others.

• So, we posit the following linear model:

 $w_{i,\bar{t}} = \gamma_1 Q_{i,t_0} + \gamma_2 s_{i,t_0} + \gamma_3 F_{i,t_0} + \gamma_4 A_{i,t_0} + \gamma_5 P_{i,t_0} + v_{i,\bar{t}}$

- Where Q_i is a vector of exogenous characteristics, s_i school characteristics, F_i family background variables, A_i academic achievement as proxies for <u>individuals abilities</u> and P_i public policies that may influence school quality.
- All covariates are measured at a particular period $t_0 < \bar{t}$. We account for all those factors, assuming that are relevant elements determining school choice.
- Our goal is to reveal the contribution of each of these variables in adult earnings.

Implementation

- E_{i,t_0} may not be totally exogenous. Wealthier families with high-ability students may prefer to enroll their students in private-fee-paying families. If we fail to account for these types of factors, estimates from the reduced-form model would be biased.
- Our identifying assumption consists in including different covariates accounting family background and proxies for individuals abilities that may be causing this selection bias → using panel data.

Data

- We observe data on test scores at age 15. This information comes from the 2001 Measurement System of Education Quality (SIMCE) (_______ graders).
- We define our exogenous characteristics vector. Q_i includes age, age squared, gender, and previous attendance to pre-primary education.
- F_i includes mother and fathers education, family income and number of books at home.
- A_i ncludes language and math test scores. We also have a variable indicating that if a student has repeated previous courses.

Data

- We observe students earning 10 years from the time they took SIMCE.
- We extract this data using Unemployment Insurance data base. This information saves individuals taxable earning for formal workers, that is, with labor format contracts.
- We have earnings from January to December 2011. Our dependent variable is the average of earnings (including 0s) over 2011.

Data

- SIMCE data base accounts for 187,914 students.
- However, our analysis is based on 78,049 individuals.
 - We drop students from the data base with missing values in some on the covariates (from SIMCE) included in our regression analysis reduces considerably our sample.
 - Next, we consider only students affiliated to the Unemployment Insurance System.
 - Finally, leaving observations with non-zero total 2011 earnings delivers our final sample.

Variables	SIMCE data	Valid obs	Affiliated	Earnings $2011 > 0$
Wages (US\$ 2011)	414.8	418.4	497.9	672.2
Age (2011)	26.2	26.2	26.2	26.2
Language score	251.6	255.3	252.2	251.3
Math score	246.9	251.1	247.4	247.1
Public school (%)	48.0	47.2	48.8	48.6
Private-voucher school (%)	35.9	36.4	36.6	36.7
Private-fee-paying school (%)	16.1	16.5	14.6	14.7
JEC (%)	46.3	45.1	44.1	43.6
SNED_1 (%)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
SNED_2 (%)	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4
SNED_3 (%)	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8
Observations	187,914	125,378	105,374	78,049

 Table 6: Descriptive statistics

Source: Authors' estimates. Notes: We show the process of dropping observations from our data. The first column shows descriptive statistics for all SIMCE data. Second column drops observation with missing values in some of the variables considered in our analysis. The third column shows only students affiliated to the unemployment insurance system. The fourth column presents data for students with average monthly earning of 2011 greater than 0.

Table 5: Mother's education: SIMCE and earnings

Mother's education	SIMCE Math	SIMCE Language	Monthly Earnings 2011 (US\$)
Primary	230.7	236.7	595.0
Secondary	247.3	252.5	669.8
Vocational Secondary	252.8	258.2	714.0
CFT	274.8	273.3	776.3
IP	279.6	278.3	829.3
University	297.9	290.8	913.7

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Source: Authors' estimates.

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Non-parametric association between earnings and SIMCE (Math)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Private-voucher	0.105***	0.0755***	0.0523***	0.0290***	0.0376***	0.0286***	0.0266***
	(0.00951)	(0.00997)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
Private-fee-paying	0.334***	0.298***	0.208***	0.154***	0.109***	0.155***	0.154***
	(0.0131)	(0.0136)	(0.0147)	(0.0148)	(0.0154)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)
Language				0.0150**	0.0180***	0.0149**	0.0149**
				(0.00641)	(0.00642)	(0.00641)	(0.00641)
Math				0.139***	0.115***	0.139***	0.139***
				(0.00679)	(0.00880)	(0.00679)	(0.00679)
Math*Private-voucher					0.00320		
					(0.0111)		
Math*Private-fee-paying					0.114***		
					(0.0134)		
Exogeneous characteristics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Familiy Background	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Policies (in levels)	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Policies (with interactions)	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049
Adjusted R-squared	0.009	0.037	0.040	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.052

Table 9: Earnings regressions

Source: Authors' estimates.

Notes: (i) We show estimates of equation (4). Exogenous characteristics include age (2011), age squared, previous assistant to pre primary education, gender and region. In family background we include mother and father's education, log of family income and number of books at home. In performance variables we control for math and language test scores as well as previous repeated courses. Finally, we include two variables indicating if an student attends a school with JEC or SNED program. (ii) Math and language test scores are included as standarized variables (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). (iii) In Column (6) we add dummy variables indicating studying in a school participating in JEC. We also add a dummy variable which equals 1 if a student attends a school winning SNED three times and 0 otherwise. In column (7) we interact JEC and SNED variables with indicators of school type. (iv) Robust standard error are in parenthesis (*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Private-voucher	0.0224**	0.0272***	0.0370***
	(0.0104)	(0.0104)	(0.0114)
Private-fee-paying	0.131***	0.134***	0.0765***
	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0163)
Language _i	0.0135**	0.0149**	0.0148**
	(0.00651)	(0.00650)	(0.00650)
Math _i	0.124***	0.119***	0.115***
	(0.00723)	(0.00729)	(0.00742)
$\overline{\text{Language}_j}$	-0.0430	-0.0205	-0.0182
	(0.0271)	(0.0278)	(0.0278)
Math _j	0.0977***	0.0621**	0.0709***
	(0.0248)	(0.0264)	(0.0264)
$Language_i \times \overline{Language_j}$		0.00327	0.0117
		(0.0108)	(0.0108)
$Math_i imes \overline{Math}_j$		0.0248***	-0.0172
		(0.00879)	(0.0130)
$Math_i \times \overline{Math}_j \times Private-voucher$			-0.0238
			(0.0175)
$Math_i \times \overline{Math}_j \times Private-fee-paying$			0.0946***
			(0.0141)
Provide the standard standard			

Model for earnings including average SIMCE at school level

Exogeneous characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Familiy Background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	78,049	78,049	78,049
Adjusted R-squared	0.052	0.052	0.054

Educational Policies

- Two major educational reforms took place around 1996 when the Chilean government announced a set of new initiatives designed to improve the quality of education:
 - Full Schooling Day program (JEC as in Spanish acronym)
 - The National System of School Performance Assessment (SNED)

Educational Policies: JEC

- JEC consisted in extending the number of classroom hours by 30% annually without lengthening the school year.
- The objectives of this program were to improve student learning and to increase equality in education.
- Bellei (2009) shows a small, positive and significant effect on academic performance in language and mathematics tests.

Educational Policies: SNED

- SNED was the introduction of the only scaled-up teacher incentive program in the world.
- Since 1996, the Chilean Ministry of Education has incorporated a monetary based productivity bonus called (SNED).
- This is a **rank-order tournament** directed towards all public and private-voucher schools in the country.
- The program is directed at all primary and/or secondary subsidized schools in the country and is financed by the government.

Educational Policies: SNED

- The SNED, which is a supply side incentive, was created with two objectives.
 - First, to improve educational quality provided by subsidized schools through monetary rewards to teachers.
 - Second, o provide the school community, parents, and those responsible for children with information on the educational progress of schools.
 - It was expected that the school administrations and teachers would thus receive feedback on their teaching and administrative decisions
- SNED is a competitive system in which schools with similar characteristics are grouped into homogenous groups. The competition takes place within each distinct group.
- Thus, schools compete on the basis of their average performance and monetary rewards are distributed equally among all teachers in the winning schools.

Policy	(1)	(2)
JEC	0.00459	
	(0.00843)	
Public*JEC		-0.0149
		(0.0121)
Private-voucher*JEC		0.00866
		(0.0135)
Private-fee-paying*JEC		0.0612^{***}
		(0.0226)
Exogeneous characteristics	Yes	Yes
Familiy Background	Yes	Yes
Performance	Yes	Yes
School type	Yes	Yes
SNED	Yes	Yes
Obs.	71,896	71,896
Adjusted R-squared	0.056	0.056

Table 10: The effect of JEC on earnings

Source: Author's estimates.

Notes: (i) We show estimates of equation (4). Exogenous characteristics include age (2011), age squared, previous assistant to pre primary education, gender and region. In family background we include mother and father's education, log of family income and number of books at home. In performance variables we control for math and language test scores as well as previous repeated courses. Finally, we include school type (private-voucher or private-fee-paying). (ii) Math and language test scores are included as standarized variables (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). (iii) We add a dummy variable which equals 1 if a student attends a school winning SNED three times and 0 otherwise. (iv) Robust standard error are in parenthesis (*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).

Policy	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SNED1	0.0232	0.0231	0.0246	0.0232		
	(0.0330)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)		
SNED ₂		-0.0105	-0.0106		-0.0110	
		(0.0375)	(0.0375)		(0.0375)	
SNED ₃			0.153^{***}			0.153^{***}
			(0.0458)			(0.0458)
Exogeneous characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Familiy Background	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
School type	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
JEC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049	78,049
Adjusted R-squared	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052

Table 12: The effect of SNED on earnings

Source: Authors' estimates.

Notes: (i) We show estimates of equation (4). Exogenous characteristics include age (2011), age squared, previous assistant to pre-primary education, gender and region. In family background we include mother and father's education, log of family income and number of books at home. In performance variables we control for math and language test scores as well as previous repeated courses. Finally, we include school type (private-voucher or private-fee-paying). (ii) Math and language test scores are included as standarized variables (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). (iii) We add a dummy variable which equals 1 if a student attends a school with JEC, 0 otherwise. (iv) $SNED_j$ equals 1 if a student attends a school with JEC, 0 otherwise. (iv) $SNED_j$ equals 1 if a student attends a school with JEC, 0 otherwise. (iv) $SNED_j$ equals 1 if a student attends a school with JEC, 0 in parenthesis (*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).

Policy	(1)	(2)	(3)
Public*SNED ₁	0.0415		
	(0.0420)		
$Private-voucher*SNED_1$	0.000314		
	(0.0527)		
Public*SNED ₂		-0.00801	
		(0.0407)	
$Private-voucher*SNED_2$		-0.0276	
		(0.0954)	
Public*SNED ₃			0.0747
			(0.0651)
Private-voucher*SNED ₃			0.255***
			(0.0622)
Exogeneous characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Familiy Background	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance	Yes	Yes	Yes
School type	Yes	Yes	Yes
JEC	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	78,049	78,049	78,049
Adjusted R-squared	0.052	0.052	0.052

Table 13: The effect of SNED on earnings by school type

Source: Authors' estimates.

Notes: (i) We show estimates of equation (4). Exogenous characteristics include age (2011), age squared, previous assistant to pre-primary education, gender and region. In family background we include mother and father's education, log of family income and number of books at home. In performance variables we control for math and language test scores as well as previous repeated courses. Finally, we include school type (private-voucher or private-fee-paying). (ii) Math and language test scores are included as standarized variables (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). (iii) We add a dummy variable which equals 1 if a student attends a school with JEC, 0 otherwise. (iv) $SNED_j$ equals 1 if a student attends a school winning SNED j times (j = 1, 2, 3). (v) Robust standard error are in parenthesis (*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).

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Conclusions

- Controlling for exogenous characteristics, abilities and family background, we document that different types of school produce different future labor market outcomes on students.
- Most of the "action" among private high schools with more than 300 points in SIMCE. Higher returns to educational expenses. Intergenerational transmission of inequality: Elites beget elites. This is a result of rational and efficient resource allocation.
- Educational policies directed to improving schools quality might have short/medium term effects, but they may not help improving income inequality.

Thanks

The effect of investing in education

- We have information on tuition and other education-related expenses from families.
- We obtain total costs by adding the associated amount of subsidies for voucher and public schools.
- Let c_i be the total education-related expenses for individual i.
- Thus, consider:

 $Y_i = \gamma_1 \log(c_i) + \gamma_2 \log(c_i) PV + \gamma_3 \log(c_i) PFP + \gamma_4 Q_i + \gamma_5 F_i + e_i$

• where PV is private-voucher, PFP is private-fee-paying, Q_i denotes exogenous characteristics, and F_i represents family background.

The effect of investing in education

With this equation

 $Y_i = \gamma_1 \log(c_i) + \gamma_2 \log(c_i) PV + \gamma_3 \log(c_i) PFP + \gamma_4 Q_i + \gamma_5 F_i + e_i$

we compute

$$\left. \frac{\delta Y_i}{\delta Y_i} \right|_{PV} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2$$

$$\left. \frac{\delta Y_i}{\delta \log c_i} \right|_{PFP} = \gamma_1 + \gamma_3$$

Table 13: Total average cost (private and public) of education by school type and academic performance

Math test score	Public	Private-voucher	Private-fee-paying	Total
< 200	79.6	94.3	59.4	82.9
200 - 300	75.8	99.4	100.8	88.0
300 - 400	76.9	107.6	207.2	131.0
> 400	80.5	116.8	247.0	185.6
Total	76.8	100.1	137.3	94.3

Source: Authors' estimates.

Notes: We show average costs of education. We calculate them as the sum of monthly tuition cost paid by families and other self-reported expenses. We add to this last number the amount of subsidy associated for private-voucher and public schools. We also consider additional subsidies for schools with JEC.

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Table 14: Total cost (private and public) of education by school type

Variable	Estimate
Log(cost)	0.025***
	(0.009)
Log(cost)*Private-voucher	0.014***
	(0.002)
Log(cost)*Private-fee-paying	0.066***
	(0.004)
Exogeneous characteristics	Yes
Familiy Background	Yes
Type of school	$\partial \log(w_i) / \partial \log(Cost)$
Public	0.025
Private-voucher	0.039
Private-fee-paying	0.090

- Reduced-form linear regression models to account for the role of individuals abilities, school characteristics, family background and educational policies at school age on earnings inequality (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1962; Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2007; Card 2001).
- Consider the model for labor income associated with individual i in period
 t̄:

$$\mathbf{w}_{i,\tilde{t}} = C_i \alpha + E_{i,\underline{t}} \beta + \delta \theta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- where C_i are individual characteristics, $E_{i,t}$ denotes schooling attainment and θ_i represents individuals abilities.
- We observe wages at period \bar{t} and schooling variables from $t = t_0 \dots \underline{t} < \bar{t}$.

• For the sake of simplicity, let's assume the following linear model for $E_{i,t}$:

$$E_{i,t} = \lambda E_{i,t-1} + k\theta_i + \phi c_i + V_{i,t}$$

• Our approach consists in looking at early endowments (say, at $t = t_0$) and it effects on the log of wages at $t = \bar{t}$.

• The reduced-form model relating labor market outcomes and early endowments is:

$$w_{i,t} = \beta \lambda^t E_{i,t_0} + \theta_i (\delta + k \sum_{t=0}^{t-1} \lambda^t) + c_i (\alpha + \phi \sum_{t=0}^{t-1} \lambda^t) + \tilde{\epsilon_t}$$

• Thus, the effect of education at early ages ($t = t_0$) can be calculated by estimating the composite parameter $\beta \lambda^t$.

(1)

• Last term contains the direct impact of education on earnings, but also the impact of early interventions on subsequent schooling.

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- Second and third terms show direct and indirect effects of individuals abilities and other characteristics on wages.
- Notice that we could have modeled abilities in a similar fashion (i.e., skills beget skills as in Cunha and Heckman, 2007)
- In that case, reduced-form parameters would also include these indirect effect. We are not interested on identifying structural parameters.

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- Consider the model for labor income associated with individual i in period
 t̄:

$$\mathbf{w}_{i,\tilde{t}} = C_i \alpha + E_{i,\underline{t}} \beta + \delta \theta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

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- Notice that we could have modeled abilities in a similar fashion (i.e., skills beget skills as in Cunha and Heckman, 2007)
- In that case, reduced-form parameters would also include these indirect effect. We are not interested on identifying structural parameters.

Implementation

- E_{i,t_0} may not be totally exogenous. Wealthier families with high-ability students may prefer to enroll their students in private-fee-paying families. If we fail to account for these types of factors, estimates from the reduced-form model would be biased.
- Our identifying assumption consists in including different covariates accounting family background and proxies for individuals abilities that may be causing this selection bias.

Caveats

• We posit the following linear model:

 $w_{i,\bar{t}} = \gamma_1 Q_{i,t_0} + \gamma_2 S_{i,t_0} + \gamma_3 F_{i,t_0} + \gamma_4 A_{i,t_0} + \gamma_5 P_{i,t_0} + v_{i,\bar{t}}$

- Where Q_i is a vector of exogenous characteristics, S_i school characteristics, F_i family background variables, A_i academic achievement as proxies for individuals abilities and P_i public policies that may influence school quality.
- All covariates are measured at a particular period $t_0 < \bar{t}$. We account for all those factors, assuming that are relevant elements determining school choice. Our goal is to reveal the contribution of each of these variables in adult earnings.

Entonces ...

CHILE: Dime dónde estudiaste y te diré quién eres...



Wednesday, January 9, 13

CHILE: Dime dónde estudiaste y te diré quién



CHILE: Dime dónde estudiaste y te diré quién



CHILE: Dime dónde estudiaste y te diré quién



Wednesday, January 9, 13