



UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSITY
UNU-WIDER

DRAFT

This paper is a draft submission to

Inequality—Measurement, trends, impacts, and policies

5–6 September 2014 Helsinki, Finland

This is a draft version of a conference paper submitted for presentation at UNU-WIDER's conference, held in Helsinki on 5–6 September 2014. This is not a formal publication of UNU-WIDER and may reflect work-in-progress.

THIS DRAFT IS NOT TO BE CITED, QUOTED OR ATTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM AUTHOR(S).

The Role of Information and Mobilization for Redistributive Preferences: A Survey Experiment in South Africa

Miquel Pellicer, Patrizio Piraino, and Eva Wegner*
GIGA Hamburg and SALDRU, University of Cape Town†

First Draft

June 14, 2014

Abstract

This paper presents a survey experiment in South Africa that focuses on the role of mobilization for demand for redistribution. Previous literature has found that providing information on inequality raises concerns about inequality but does not lead to a change in tax preferences. We argue that mobilization might provide the missing link between information and political behavior regarding demand for redistribution. We operationalize mobilization from an individual perspective as the belief that a decrease in inequality is a feasible enterprise. If this belief is absent, information about inequality might simply increase the pessimism of respondents and remain inconsequential for policy preferences. We test this idea with a survey experiment in two townships in Cape Town, which includes three treatments. The first treatment gives simply information on local inequality. The second treatment provides information on inequality in comparative perspective, including information on the (much lower inequality) in neighboring countries. The third is elite support for redistribution with video messages of South African leaders about the need to fight inequality. Consistent with previous literature, we find that information on local inequality increases concern for inequality but has no effects on tax preferences. Information on inequality in comparative perspective and the videos shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible and consequently lead to a change in tax preferences. While the mechanism regarding information on inequality in comparative perspective is as

*Corresponding Author: eva.wegner@giga-hamburg.de

†We would like to acknowledge the funding of the EU's Seventh Framework Programme through the "NOPOOR - Enhancing knowledge for renewed policies against poverty" project. We would also like to thank Jan Schenk for his feedback on our questionnaire and treatment design throughout this project and for the diligent work of his survey company ikapadata.

expected, the one for the videos is puzzling: videos make people believe that inequality is more, instead of less, inevitable, and this leads to lower tax preferences. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of credibility of the leaders considered which makes viewers more pessimistic and has a demobilizing effect.

1 Introduction

There is increasing concern with the rising income inequality observed during recent decades in many countries of the world. This concern has not been followed however by increasing levels of progressive redistribution. This is puzzling because the standard framework for thinking about redistribution would suggest that increasing inequality should lead to higher demand for redistribution and, ultimately, to more observed redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In fact, this puzzle applies more generally, to comparisons between countries as much as to trends over time.

In response to these observations, a large literature has emerged trying to refine our understanding of how levels of redistribution are determined. An important part of that literature has focused on the demand side: on how preferences for redistribution are formed. In a recent review article, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) survey several models and theoretical arguments from this literature. Starting with seminal contributions such as the role of expected upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001), the authors emphasize factors such as: perceptions on the fairness of the income distribution, political indoctrination, and perceptions regarding negative externalities of inequality, among others.

From an empirical point of view, the attempts to uncover the role of such factors have been largely observational (for example Alesina and Ferrara (2005)). Acknowledging the difficulty to interpret these estimates causally, a strand of studies has emerged that provides experimental evidence based on survey experiments. Survey experiments are particularly well suited to answer causal questions about the role of information and perceptions. Thus, such experiments have studied empirically the role of providing different types of information and priming towards different types of perceptions on demand for redistribution and related social policy preferences. The type of information provided in these experiments include the true position of households in the income distribution (Cruces et al., 2013) and the demographic characteristics of welfare recipients (Kuklinski et al., 2000); the type of framing/priming concerns importantly the way taxes are presented to respondents (McCaffery and Baron, 2006) (McCaffery and Baron, 2004).

In an important recent contribution, Kuziemko et al. (2013) study the role of providing information on the income distribution for demand for redistribution in the US. Using a series of survey experiments the authors find that providing information on the increase in US inequality leads respondents to consider inequality as a more serious problem. However, this change in perception does not

carry over to actual tax policy preferences.¹ This holds true despite the fact that the information they provide includes evidence suggesting that inequality is not harmful for growth.

This paper presents a survey experiment on demand for redistribution in South Africa focusing on a factor so far disregarded by the literature on demand for redistribution: the importance of mobilization. This concept is central in the literature on sociology and social psychology of collective action which highlight the fact that knowing about the extent of inequality or even being concerned by it is not enough to drive political behaviour: Individuals need to be mobilized. We operationalize the concept of “being mobilized” as the belief that a decrease in inequality is a feasible enterprise. This corresponds to the idea of “group efficacy” from the social psychology literature on collective action (see Tajfel (1974), Klandermans (1984) and Van Zomeren et al. (2008)).² Mobilization in general and beliefs regarding the inevitability of inequality in particular may provide an answer to the puzzle from Kuziemko et al. (2013) that providing information on inequality raises concerns about it, but does not lead to changes in tax preferences. We argue and test the idea that the missing link between information and stated tax preferences is precisely the belief in the inevitability of inequality. If this belief is present, information about inequality might simply increase the pessimism of respondents and remain inconsequential for policy preferences.

Individuals might hold the belief that high inequality is inevitable particularly in places where inequality and redistribution are not prominent in elite discourse, thus making it appear that there is no possibility of reducing it (see Bidner et al. (2013) for a model that could justify such mechanism). This channel points to the importance of (credible) leadership discourse for understanding changes in preferences for redistribution and can thus help explain why increases in inequality might not be accompanied by higher demand for redistribution. The importance of mobilization for demand for redistribution can also address an additional puzzle in the context of South Africa: while having one of the largest levels of inequality in the world, South Africa displays only average levels of demand for redistribution. We argue this can be due to the shift in elite discourse from a primarily redistributive one at the beginning of the transition to one mainly focused on jobs and growth subsequently.

We present the results of a survey experiment conducted in two different townships in Cape Town: Khayelithsa, a ‘Black African’ township, and Delft, a ‘Coloured’ township. Black African and Coloured groups in Cape Town differ on average in many respects and this is reflected in our two samples. The Khayelithsa sample is poorer, more likely to live in informal settlements, and more likely to feel politically close to the ANC, the party ruling South Africa

¹The only tax preference that is affected concerns the estate tax, that apparently only affects about the top one thousandth richest families

²Two types of mechanism could push such individuals to state low preferences for redistribution. First, the need to avoid cognitive dissonance can lead them to justify their inaction with low stated preferences for redistribution (see Mullainathan et al.(2009)). Second, the emotional cost of perceiving the high inequality as inevitable may push individuals to justify it as legitimate and thus demanding a lower tax (see Major et al. (2001)).

since the democratic transition with an overwhelming African Black base. The full study consists on two waves. The first wave, of 1,390 respondents was interviewed in March and April 2014 – just before the South African general elections. A second wave is planned for fall 2014. This will allow us to examine whether our survey yields different results in an environment with high political mobilization (i.e. pre-election) and one without.

Our survey includes three treatments. One treatment shows information on local inequality: differences in income and asset ownership between different neighborhoods in Cape Town. This treatment is meant to capture the effect of local information on redistribution preferences in a way roughly comparable to Kuziemko et al. (2013). Our second and third treatments attempt to influence the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible in two ways. The first is information on inequality in comparative perspective, including information on neighboring countries. Through this treatment, we attempt to increase respondents’ perception that very high inequality is not a fact of life. The second treatment in this vein is elite support for redistribution with video messages of South African leaders about the need to fight inequality. With this, we are attempting to counteract the dominant economic discourse in South Africa since the late 1990s which has emphasized growth, fiscal discipline, and employment instead of inequality and redistribution.

An important novelty of our survey is that it offers a real action component. Whereas some extant studies ask about impact on vote choice, or intention to send a petition, our survey offers respondents the possibility to act on the spot, by signing a petition or by sending an sms to their ward councilor - at their own cost.

Our findings corroborate those of Kuziemko et al. (2013) regarding the role of local information. We find that local information on inequality increases the chances of viewing it as a serious problem but has no effects on tax preferences or support for redistributive policies. This evidence, emerging as it does in a vastly different setting from the one in Kuziemko et al. (2013), provides strong support for the external validity of their findings.

The two treatments seeking to shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible do show large impacts on tax preferences, in the two townships. The “international inequality” treatment has the expected effects: a large negative effect on believing that the high level of inequality in South Africa is inevitable, leading to an increase in support for top taxes and for the introduction of a basic income grant. In Khayelitsha, it also increases the willingness to take action. The video messages with elite support for inequality have, in contrast, the opposite effect. They *increase* the perception that inequality is inevitable, and decrease support for top taxes as well as the willingness to take action.

The fact that tax preferences follow perceptions of inequality inevitability in the expected direction in the two treatments and that this applies to the two townships is quite strong evidence in favor of the relevance of the factor we propose. The fact that elite discourse shows such a strong negative effect on the perceptions of individuals in the two townships is however puzzling. We might

have expected this to occur in Delft, where voters might feel distant from the leaders selected, but it was not expected for Khayelitsha. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of source credibility (Druckman, 2001) the size of which we had somewhat underestimated. The divergence between policies and personal lifestyle of certain South African leaders over the last decade on the one hand, and the messages shown in our experiment on the other, might have been too large for it to have the intended effect. Instead, it appears to have increased the pessimism of respondents.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short background of inequality and redistribution in South Africa. Section 3 describes the survey and its design. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the results and section 6 concludes.

2 Inequality and Demand for Redistribution in South Africa

South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to standard political economy models (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) this would lead to very high levels of redistribution. As the origins of present-day inequality lie in a colonial history and Apartheid institutional arrangements where a white minority enriched itself by denying political and economic rights to a black majority, one might expect redistribution to be even higher since the democratic transition. However, fiscal redistribution is only slightly above the low Latin American levels (Leibbrandt et al., 2011).³

The African National Congress (ANC) that came to power after the end of Apartheid and has governed with large majorities since made a strong emphasis on redistributive justice only initially. In 1994, it was elected on a redistribution promise in form of the reconstruction and development programme (RDP) (Natrass and Seekings, 2001). However, already in 1996, the government presented a new economic policy strategy, "Growth, Employment, and Redistribution" (GEAR). Its main emphasis – and the dominant economic policy discourse since its inception – is growth and employment. In contrast, the GEAR strategy document paid only scant attention to RDP issues and education, health and welfare policies (Michie and Padayachee, 1998). Both in practice and in discourse, the South African leadership has very strongly focused on employment generation instead of redistribution. Only since 2013, there has been a growing discussion in the ANC leadership regarding the need for a "second" transition", implying that the transition in 1994 had indeed been a political transition only. This change of mind is probably partly due to the emergence of the "Economic Freedom Fighters", a new party founded by Julius Malema, a former leader of the

³Leibbrandt et al. 2011 find that taxes and transfers decreased the Gini coefficient only by around five points, which is only slightly better than redistribution in Latin America, where the average is a decrease of 2 percentage points for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Mexico (Goi et al., 2011). In contrast, in Europe the figure is close to 20 (ibid.).

ANC's Youth League, that seeks to mobilize the large numbers of unemployed youth. This party's discourse questions strongly the post-Apartheid economic policies and demands the nationalization of mines and the redistribution of land without compensation.

Most of the ANC's social policies have focused on the rolling out social grants, such as the pension fund and the child support grant, on which an increasing number of the population depends to make ends meet. While these have had an effect on poverty, the income distribution remained largely unaffected (Leibbrandt et al., 2010) and continues to follow the Apartheid pattern with the white population still being predominantly in the top decile, followed by the Indians, the Coloureds, and the African blacks being at the bottom.⁴

Against this background, it is surprising that South Africans do not have higher levels of demand for redistribution, according to standard surveys. Inspecting two variables from the 2007 World Value Survey, that are typically used in cross country studies on demand for redistribution reveals that South African demand is generally average and in fact smaller than in other non-OECD countries (see table1). Although an increasing number of service delivery protests as well as generally low levels of trust suggest dissatisfaction with government performance, this has not transformed in an increase in demand for redistribution. This mixed picture was also confirmed in focus group discussions that were carried out by the authors in June and October 2012 in preparation of this study. Although respondents were generally disappointed by the small economic returns of the democratic transition, they generally demanded jobs from the government, not redistribution through social policies.

[Table 1 around here]

3 The Survey

3.1 Data Collection

The data presented in this paper consists of 1,390 respondents that were interviewed in March and April 2014 – just before the South African general elections at the beginning of May. The sample consists of residents of two different townships in Cape Town: 956 African Blacks in Khayelitsha and 434 Coloureds in Delft. Both are poor townships with high levels of unemployment and low income. The Coloured parts of Delft are a bit better off than Khayelitsha but much worse off than the rich white parts of Cape Town. We used an English questionnaire as basis that was translated in Xhosa and Afrikaans, a back translation was done with the feedback of the fieldworkers. Respondents could choose the questionnaire language at the beginning of the interview.⁵

⁴The key change in the income distribution since the end of Apartheid is the growing intragroup inequality.

⁵The surveyors' population group corresponded to that one of the respective interviewees. The data was collected by a survey company, the authors provided training for the fieldworkers.

The data was captured on mobile devices and directly transmitted to the server after the completion of the interview together with the gps location. This allowed for an immediate check of the accuracy of the interview location and for the monitoring of data quality. Data quality was monitored throughout the survey by the survey company and the investigators who had access to the data as it was coming in. About half way through the survey, we adapted the design to allow for a higher incidence of the international treatment alone. This change will be controlled for in each of the OLS regressions below.

3.2 Treatments

The survey was designed to test different drivers of demand for redistribution through three types of treatment. A first type concerns information about inequality, a second is a hybrid between information and mobilization, and a third is elite mobilization against inequality. (An overview of the survey design is presented in figure 1 below.)

[Figure 1 around here]

The first set of treatments (“local”) presents information on inequality in South Africa in a variety of ways. We focus on differences between neighborhoods in Cape Town, that local residents automatically - and correctly - associate with different population groups. This is so because of the Apartheid laws that assigned population groups (“races”) specific areas of residence. Although these laws were abolished in the early 1990s, income constraints have left the homogeneity of neighborhoods induced by the Apartheid laws almost intact in most areas.

In a first step, participants were asked to guess the median income in a typically white neighborhood of Cape Town. Subsequently, they were shown the correct figure in comparison to typically Coloured areas such as Athlone and typically African areas such as Gugulethu. In a second step, differences in ownership of assets in these neighborhoods were displayed. The objective was to inform participants about the high levels of inequality between neighborhoods that they associate with their own group vs. others. (See 2 for an example of this treatment).

[Figure 2 around here]

The second treatment “international” presents inequality in South Africa in comparison to other countries. It shows the rich-poor ratio in South Africa, as well as in some other developing and Western countries. Importantly, it includes some neighboring countries of South Africa and shows that South Africa’s rich:poor ratio is by far the worst among the countries presented. The treatment is constructed so that respondents first see the rich:poor ratio in different countries and then are asked to guess the figure for South Africa. The last screen shows them the correct bar for South Africa among the other countries as shown in figure 3. The treatment thus has two components. The first is information about inequality in South Africa, this time in international perspective. The

second component intends to suggest to respondents that South Africa’s level of inequality is not a fact of life given that it is much lower in other countries.

[Figure 3 around here]

The third type of treatments “video” is elite support for redistribution. We operationalize this in form of three video speeches by members of the South African elite, one by South Africa’s president Jacob Zuma, one by archbishop Desmond Tutu, and a third by the above mentioned Julius Malema.⁶ These speeches are quite different in content and level of involvement of the speaker: Desmond Tutu condemns the gap between rich and poor in moral terms in an engaged way, Jacob Zuma is reading from a script that announces the government’s intention to decrease inequality, whereas Julius Malema aggressively speaks up against inequality mostly in racial terms and promises a variety of redistributive policies. These speeches are intended influence respondents’ perceptions of the possibility of collective action for decreasing inequality. Importantly, these speeches are given *in addition* to either the “international” treatment or different “local” treatments.

4 Data

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows some key descriptive statistics for the Delft and Khayelitsha sample compared to the data from the 2011 population census, where available. The survey’s aim was not to be fully representative of these two townships as we are not interested in them *per se*. However, we did want to avoid obtaining an overly peculiar sample. In particular, we did want to include both formal and informal dwellers. Our sampling strategy consisted of drawing randomly a set of Enumeration Areas, stratified by formality (EAs have around 200 household each) and then let fieldworkers choose every 12th house in a random walk in the EA.

[Table 2 around here]

The key difference of our samples compared to the census is that we have more women. This has to do with the fact that male are more likely to be employed and absent from the dwelling during daytime. Although we asked fieldworkers to schedule appointments with the potentially absent person selected for the interview, we only asked them to return to the house prior to sunset, for security reasons. To improve the sex ratio in our survey, we instructed fieldworkers to do as many interviews as possible during the weekends but this was only partially possible because alcohol abuse is a common problem in townships in the weekend. Given this, we are generally satisfied with the gender ratio. In Khayelitsha, the gender ratio carried over to having fewer employed persons than in the census although this could also be the result of asking the question in a different way.

⁶The videos were available either in English or in dubbed Xhosa/Afrikaans versions to the participants.

The share of formal housing is perfectly in line with the census data and so is *median* income additionally increases our confidence in the data. The level of high school graduates (“matric”) is roughly in line with census data.

There are some notable differences in our sample between Khayelitsha and Delft in terms of employment status, mean income, formal housing and the reception of government grants. This is mainly the legacy of the Apartheid regime that invested slightly more in Coloured areas than in African areas. Although both groups were politically excluded and had no freedom of movement, Coloureds had some small privileges compared to Africans. In the post-Apartheid world, these carry over to better housing, employment and income. In this context, it is noteworthy that Delft is a relatively bad-off Coloured Area.

4.2 Outcome Variables

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of our outcomes variables for the control group.. The first outcome variable of interest is a question about whether inequality is a serious problem in South Africa, emulating the surveys in Kuziemko et al. (2013).⁷ The second is whether the high level of inequality in South Africa is inevitable. Third, we have two outcome questions about redistributive preferences, one about the increase of the top marginal tax rate, and the second about the introduction of a basic income grant in South Africa.⁸

The fourth type of outcomes are “action” outcomes where respondents can transmit their redistributive preferences to politicians. Compared to other survey experiments, we believe that this is an important innovation of our survey. At best, other survey experiments ask whether respondents would be willing to take action but to the best of our knowledge have never followed up on this. In our survey, respondents can choose between sending an sms to their ward councillor (at a real cost) and signing an online petition on the surveyor’s tablet. In the petition and sms they can express their opinion on tax increases and the basic income grant.

[Table 3 around here.]

All variables are coded as binary variables so the values in table 3 are the shares in the two samples favouring a certain position/action. There are some noticeable results in general as well as regarding differences between the groups. The first is the very high share in both groups agreeing with the statement that inequality is a serious problem in South Africa. This contrasts sharply with the low shares in the control group that would want to increase taxes for the rich. Support for the basic income grant is higher in comparison. This is generally in line with the elite discourse in South Africa, where social grants have large

⁷The question is identical to that Kuziemko et al. survey with one exception: because our pilots showed that respondents seem to confuse inequality with equality we replaced the word with “gap between rich and poor” throughout the survey.

⁸A discussion about the introduction of a basic income grant has been going on for years in South Africa, whereas there is no public debate about raising taxes for top earners Notice that this latter group starts with around 60000 Zar per month

place in elite discourse but increasing taxes has not. Noteworthy is also the large amount of respondents willing to take action, especially through signing a petition. In general, demand for redistribution, willingness to take action, and concern about inequality is higher in Delft than in Khayelitsha in the control group.

4.3 Randomization

Tables 4 and 5 show the demographic characteristics and some pre-treatment attitudinal variables in Khayelitsha and Delft by treatment arm. Each column corresponds to a regression of the respective variable as outcome on the four treatments: local, loca+video, international, international+video. These and all regressions below are performed using OLS with robust standard errors; since outcomes are binary this implies we use a linear probability model framework.

Because of the randomization, there should not be any significant differences between the respondents in the various treatment groups and the control. This is generally correct but there are some relevant outliers. In Khayelitsha, respondents receiving the local and international treatments were slightly older than the control. There is also a relatively large difference in formal housing between the international and the international treatment group, where the international group was less likely to live in formal housing than the control and the international video group more likely. In Delft, the only noteworthy difference is that the international video group had more males than the control.

With the exception of the differences in formal housing in Khayelitsha, the randomization looks generally fine but we will nevertheless control for demographic characteristics and the attitudinal variables shown in tables 4 and 5 when analysing our data below.

[Tables 4 and 5 around here]

5 Results

We will first look at the effects of our treatments in the full sample, shown in table 6, starting with the “local” treatment.⁹ As explained above this treatment gave respondents information about the extent of income inequality in Cape Town. Consistent with the findings in (Kuziemko et al., 2013), information about inequality affects whether respondents see inequality as a problem but has no bearing on their tax preferences (toptaxincrease) or other redistributive policies, such as the introduction of a basic income grant in South Africa (big). Confirming this finding in South Africa – a completely different context – suggests that this is a more general relationship. In our survey, information increases the share of respondents viewing inequality as a problem by 5 per cent, a sizable effect if one considers that already 87 per cent in the control group are of this opinion.

⁹The results tables without controls are shown in the Appendix. All the core results hold.

We now inspect the effect of the two treatments supposed to affect whether respondents view inequality change as likely: The “international” treatment and the video messages. Treatment variables are coded so that coefficients for the video variables are to be interpreted as the effect of the video in addition to that of the respective information on its own, which is in turn given by the coefficient of the information variables.

The international treatment alone has indeed a strong negative effect on believing that inequality in South Africa is inevitable. It also affects respondents’ preferences for redistribution strongly, making them more likely to support an increase in taxes for the rich and the introduction of a basic income grant.

The video messages have no effect or a positive effect on inevitability perceptions. In particular, watching one of the videos after the being provided with local information has no effect, whereas watching a video after the “international” treatment makes people pessimistic about the persistence of income inequality, i.e. they are more likely to think that inequality is inevitable. In fact, the size of the coefficients are such that the video essentially undoes the effect of the international information.

Importantly, the shock to inevitability perceptions carries over to tax preferences: Watching the video after the international treatment leads people be pessimistic *and* demand less redistribution. Watching the video after the local information treatment has no effect neither on inevitability nor on tax preferences.

Tables 7 and 8 carry the analysis separately for the Khayelitsha and the Delft sample. Remarkably, all our main results are present in both samples.

The strong discouraging effect of the videos on the feasibility of inequality change was not expected. While we anticipated no or even a negative effect for Delft, where political preferences are generally against the leaders shown in the videos, we expected a positive effect for Khayelitsha. We suspect that this is the effect of credibility issues of the leaders shown in the video messages. Both Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema have been involved in corruption scandals and are known for their lavish lifestyle and respondents appear to be unwilling to believe their calls for redistribution. Interestingly, this happens only after receiving the international treatment before. A possible explanation is that whereas the local treatment does not raise respondents’ hopes, the international treatment does. Seeing their (discredited) leaders talk about inequality only confirms reality to the local treatment group, whereas it angers the international group (that has just seen that things are much better even in neighboring countries).

Finally, we move to the last type of outcomes, the “action” outcome. Consistent with the findings above, the local treatment has no action effects, whereas the international increases the propensity to take action and the videos decrease them. In the Khayelitsha sample (see table 7) the coefficients become significant. This is consistent with an interpretation that the international treatment operates as a mobilizing force: as respondents see inequality as less inevitable, they adapt their tax preferences and are willing to take action in favour of redistribution.

6 Concluding Remarks

To be completed.

References

- A. F. Alesina and P. Giuliano. Preferences for redistribution. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA, 2009.
- Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara. Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89(5-6):897–931, 2005.
- R. Benabou and E. Ok. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The poum hypothesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(2):447–487, 2001.
- Chris Bidner and Patrick Francois. The emergence of political accountability*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(3):1397–1448, 2013. 00000.
- Guillermo Cruces, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, and Martin Tetaz. Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 98:100–112, 2013. 00036.
- James N. Druckman. On the limits of framing effects: who can frame? *Journal of Politics*, 63(4):1041–1066, 2001. 00632.
- Edwin Goi, J. Humberto Lopez, and Luis Servn. Fiscal redistribution and income inequality in latin america. *World Development*, 39(9):1558–1569, 2011. 00042.
- Bert Klandermans. Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. *American sociological review*, pages 583–600, 1984. 00894.
- James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F. Rich. Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship. *Journal of Politics*, 62(3):790–816, 2000. 00277.
- Ilyana Kuziemko, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva. How elastic are preferences for redistribution? evidence from randomized survey experiments. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
- Murray Leibbrandt, Eva Wegner, and Arden Finn. The policies for reducing income inequality and poverty in south africa. 2011. 00005.
- Murray V. Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn, and Jonathan Argent. *Trends in South African income distribution and poverty since the fall of apartheid*. OECD Paris, 2010. 00178.
- Brenda Major and Toni Schmader. Legitimacy and the construal of social disadvantage. *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations*, pages 176–204, 2001. 00079.

- Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron. Framing and taxation: Evaluation of tax policies involving household composition. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 25(6):679–705, 2004. 00068.
- Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron. Thinking about tax. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, 12(1):106, 2006. 00074.
- Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(6):914–927, 1981. 02829.
- Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee. Three years after apartheid: growth, employment and redistribution? *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 22(5): 623–636, 1998. 00062.
- Sendhil Mullainathan and Ebonya Washington. Sticking with your vote: Cognitive dissonance and political attitudes. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(1):86–111, 2009. 00000.
- Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings. Democracy and distribution in highly unequal economies: the case of south africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(3):471–498, 2001. 00081.
- Henri Tajfel. Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Social Science Information/sur les sciences sociales*, 1974. 01481.
- Martijn Van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears. Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: a quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological bulletin*, 134(4):504, 2008. 00311.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Demand for Redistribution in South Africa vs. Average World Values
Survey

	Mean Incomes more equal	Mean government take care of poor
South Africa	4.5	6.1
Non-OECD	5.1	6.3
OECD	4.3	5.7
Total	4.9	6.1

Data from the 2005-2007 Wave. N Country=57. Weights used.

Both variables range from 1-10. Higher values imply more demand.

Table 2: Mean Demographic Characteristics, by area

area	female	employed	age	household income	matric	formal housing	government grants
sample Khayelitsha	0.62	0.29	36.63	2,301	0.28	0.45	0.42
census 2011 Khayelitsha	0.51	0.40	NA	1,706*	0.35	0.45	NA
Delft	0.64	0.42	40.31	2,584	0.22	0.85	0.33
census 2011 Delft	0.51	0.38	NA	*	0.19	0.85	NA

* This is median instead of mean income. Median income is 1750 ZAR in the Khayelitsha sample and 2500 ZAR in Delft

Table 3: **Outcome Variables in Control Group, by area**

area	Inequality Problem	Inequality Inevitable	Top tax Increase	B. Income Grant	Action	SMS sent	Petition
Khayelitsha	0.85	0.57	0.21	0.52	0.44	0.11	0.57
Delft	0.93	0.44	0.36	0.72	0.69	0.18	0.83
Total	0.87	0.53	0.26	0.59	0.53	0.13	0.66

Table 4: Randomization Check Khayelitsha

	(1) age	(2) fem	(3) earn	(4) hhincome	(5) grants_receive	(6) matric	(7) formal	(8) corrupt	(9) workvsluck	(10) lazyvsunfair
local	3.741*** (1.23)	0.0215 (0.04)	0.00343 (0.04)	-7.164 (220.61)	-0.00157 (0.04)	-0.000337 (0.04)	0.00751 (0.04)	0.0615 (0.09)	-0.666*** (0.25)	-0.310 (0.23)
international	3.841** (1.84)	0.0652 (0.06)	-0.0124 (0.06)	-24.44 (266.41)	0.0558 (0.06)	-0.0306 (0.06)	-0.157*** (0.06)	0.200 (0.13)	-0.533 (0.33)	0.107 (0.30)
videolocal	-0.831 (1.29)	-0.000225 (0.04)	0.0390 (0.04)	299.8 (224.25)	0.00549 (0.04)	0.0248 (0.04)	-0.0298 (0.04)	-0.0388 (0.09)	0.190 (0.24)	0.360 (0.23)
videointernational	-1.040 (2.11)	-0.135* (0.07)	0.0632 (0.07)	561.6 (351.73)	0.00389 (0.07)	0.00975 (0.07)	0.226*** (0.07)	-0.147 (0.15)	0.210 (0.40)	-0.523 (0.38)
_cons	33.31*** (1.02)	0.601*** (0.04)	0.277*** (0.04)	1642.2*** (178.57)	0.400*** (0.04)	0.259*** (0.04)	0.396*** (0.04)	3.710*** (0.08)	5.117*** (0.22)	6.965*** (0.19)
<i>N</i>	950	956	956	793	956	955	956	862	942	945

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control: Design Change

Table 5: Randomization Check Delft

	(1) age	(2) fem	(3) earn	(4) hhincome	(5) grants_receive	(6) matric	(7) formal	(8) corrupt	(9) workvsluck	(10) lazyvsunfair
local	-1.401 (1.81)	-0.0205 (0.06)	0.0474 (0.06)	143.9 (269.03)	0.0429 (0.06)	0.00133 (0.05)	-0.0506 (0.05)	-0.0841 (0.12)	0.132 (0.30)	-0.288 (0.31)
international	-3.042 (2.49)	0.115 (0.08)	-0.0502 (0.08)	-405.0 (419.11)	0.00435 (0.08)	-0.0472 (0.06)	0.00538 (0.06)	-0.0788 (0.16)	0.379 (0.45)	-0.723* (0.42)
videolocal	0.845 (1.94)	-0.0140 (0.07)	-0.0270 (0.07)	48.47 (366.69)	0.0626 (0.07)	-0.0109 (0.06)	0.0744 (0.05)	-0.0813 (0.14)	0.0319 (0.32)	0.153 (0.29)
videointernational	3.431 (3.62)	-0.194* (0.11)	0.103 (0.10)	846.6 (611.08)	0.0361 (0.10)	0.0116 (0.08)	-0.0333 (0.08)	-0.100 (0.23)	-0.656 (0.55)	0.620 (0.51)
_cons	39.53*** (1.48)	0.625*** (0.05)	0.602*** (0.05)	3339.7*** (228.80)	0.205*** (0.05)	0.373*** (0.05)	0.913*** (0.04)	3.775*** (0.11)	5.312*** (0.23)	5.997*** (0.23)
<i>N</i>	428	434	431	332	429	429	434	401	429	428

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control: Design Change

Table 6: Treatment Results: Full Sample

	(1) inqinevitable	(2) inqproblem	(3) toptaxincrease	(4) big	(5) action	(6) smstrue	(7) petition_progr
local	-0.0425 (0.04)	0.0513** (0.02)	0.00911 (0.03)	-0.0321 (0.04)	0.0000671 (0.03)	0.0323 (0.04)	-0.0202 (0.05)
international	-0.188*** (0.05)	0.0522* (0.03)	0.131*** (0.05)	0.115** (0.05)	0.0454 (0.05)	-0.0431 (0.04)	0.0922 (0.07)
videolocal	-0.00654 (0.04)	0.0109 (0.02)	-0.0350 (0.03)	0.0584 (0.04)	-0.0605* (0.04)	-0.0365 (0.04)	-0.00458 (0.06)
videointernational	0.109* (0.06)	-0.00334 (0.04)	-0.150*** (0.05)	-0.0955 (0.06)	-0.0423 (0.06)	-0.0193 (0.05)	-0.0354 (0.09)
<i>N</i>	1217	1223	1169	1183	1206	552	607

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls: Fieldworker Effects, Design Change, demographic and attitudinal pre-treatment variables

Table 7: Treatment Results: Khayeltisha

	(1) inqinevitable	(2) inqproblem	(3) toptaxincrease	(4) big	(5) action	(6) smstrue	(7) petition_progr
local	-0.0282 (0.04)	0.0658** (0.03)	0.00601 (0.03)	-0.0599 (0.04)	-0.00541 (0.04)	0.0650 (0.04)	-0.0414 (0.07)
international	-0.196*** (0.06)	0.0579 (0.04)	0.115** (0.06)	0.127** (0.06)	0.119* (0.06)	-0.0757 (0.05)	0.160* (0.09)
videolocal	-0.0329 (0.04)	0.0228 (0.03)	-0.0500 (0.04)	0.0684 (0.05)	-0.0629 (0.04)	-0.0701 (0.04)	-0.0225 (0.07)
videointernational	0.116 (0.08)	0.0108 (0.05)	-0.126** (0.06)	-0.109 (0.08)	-0.127* (0.08)	0.0396 (0.06)	-0.137 (0.11)
<i>N</i>	833	836	816	823	833	405	417


Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls: Fieldworker Effects, Design Change, demographic and attitudinal pre-treatment variables

Table 8: Treatment Results: Delft

	(1) inqinevitable	(2) inqproblem	(3) toptaxincrease	(4) big	(5) action	(6) smstrue	(7) petition_progr
local	-0.0679 (0.06)	0.0210 (0.03)	0.0408 (0.07)	0.0458 (0.06)	0.0260 (0.06)	-0.0359 (0.07)	0.0372 (0.09)
international	-0.160* (0.08)	0.0502 (0.04)	0.180** (0.09)	0.0755 (0.08)	-0.0739 (0.08)	0.0520 (0.08)	-0.0454 (0.13)
videolocal	0.0532 (0.07)	-0.0124 (0.04)	0.00562 (0.07)	0.0330 (0.06)	-0.0487 (0.06)	0.0591 (0.07)	0.0373 (0.10)
videointernational	0.145 (0.11)	-0.0236 (0.06)	-0.229** (0.11)	-0.0418 (0.11)	0.142 (0.11)	-0.162* (0.10)	0.183 (0.15)
<i>N</i>	384	387	353	360	373	147	190

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls: Fieldworker Effects, Design Change, demographic and attitudinal pre-treatment variables

African Blacks: sample size 1000
 Coloureds: sample size 450



Computers




Figure 2: Example local treatment




Figure 3: International Treatment

Appendix

Table 9: Treatment Results: Full Sample Without controls

	(1) inqinevitable	(2) inqproblem	(3) toptaxincrease	(4) big	(5) action	(6) smstrue	(7) petition_progr
local	-0.0214 (0.04)	0.0414* (0.02)	-0.0266 (0.03)	-0.0502 (0.04)	-0.0265 (0.04)	0.00347 (0.04)	-0.0318 (0.05)
international	-0.181*** (0.05)	0.0552* (0.03)	0.125** (0.05)	0.124** (0.05)	0.0355 (0.05)	-0.0360 (0.05)	0.0578 (0.07)
videolocal	-0.0143 (0.04)	0.0171 (0.02)	-0.0182 (0.03)	0.0379 (0.04)	-0.0501 (0.04)	-0.0303 (0.04)	-0.0376 (0.05)
videointernational	0.144** (0.06)	-0.0203 (0.03)	-0.170*** (0.06)	-0.112* (0.06)	-0.00317 (0.06)	-0.00695 (0.06)	0.00905 (0.09)
<i>N</i>	1352	1364	1295	1315	1354	621	671

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 10: Treatment Results: Khayeltisha Without controls

	(1) inqinevitable	(2) inqproblem	(3) toptaxincrease	(4) big	(5) action	(6) smstrue	(7) petition_progr
local	-0.0116 (0.04)	0.0702** (0.03)	-0.0368 (0.04)	-0.0729* (0.04)	-0.0440 (0.04)	0.0263 (0.04)	-0.0581 (0.06)
international	-0.190*** (0.06)	0.0643* (0.04)	0.102* (0.06)	0.138** (0.06)	0.108* (0.06)	-0.0376 (0.05)	0.120 (0.09)
videolocal	-0.0344 (0.04)	0.0219 (0.02)	-0.0219 (0.03)	0.0562 (0.04)	-0.0330 (0.04)	-0.0461 (0.04)	-0.0463 (0.06)
videointernational	0.146** (0.07)	-0.00296 (0.04)	-0.134** (0.06)	-0.100 (0.07)	-0.0674 (0.07)	0.0244 (0.06)	-0.0536 (0.10)
<i>N</i>	939	944	910	925	943	464	460

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 11: Treatment Results: Delft Without controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	inqinevitable	inqproblem	toptaxincrease	big	action	smstrue	petition_progr
local	-0.0506 (0.06)	-0.0115 (0.03)	0.00476 (0.06)	0.0145 (0.06)	0.0349 (0.06)	-0.0620 (0.07)	0.0211 (0.08)
international	-0.145* (0.08)	0.0406 (0.05)	0.168* (0.09)	0.0891 (0.08)	-0.119 (0.08)	-0.0599 (0.10)	-0.0667 (0.12)
videolocal	0.0165 (0.06)	-0.00386 (0.04)	0.00394 (0.07)	0.0236 (0.06)	-0.0687 (0.06)	0.0297 (0.08)	0.00859 (0.09)
videointernational	0.0955 (0.11)	-0.0407 (0.06)	-0.222* (0.12)	-0.0933 (0.11)	0.249** (0.11)	-0.127 (0.15)	0.218 (0.15)
<i>N</i>	413	420	385	390	411	157	211

Robust standard errors in parentheses