

# Schooling and Labour Market Impacts of Bolivia's Bono Juancito Pinto

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# Bolivia's Social Protection System

## Objective:

- To examine the impact of the conditional cash transfer programme on schooling and child labour.

# Bono Juancito Pinto

- Established by Executive Decree (DS 28899) in October 2006
- Provides an annuity of 200 Bolivian pesos (USD 28) to school-age children
- Aims to reduce extreme poverty and increase school enrolment and completion

## Conditions:

- To be enrolled in a public school (90% of children)
- To attend to at least 80% of school days

# 200 Bolivian pesos...

## Keep in mind

- Minimum wage: 6 000 bolivian pesos/year in 2006 and 14 400 in 2013 .
- Children earn in average 8 400-9 600 bolivian pesos per year (2014).

## 200 Bolivian pesos are equivalent to:

- 3% of of a worker's yearly earnings at the minimum wage in 2006
- 1.4% of of a worker's yearly earnings at the minimum wage in 2013
- 2% of of a child's top yearly earnings in 2014

# Background of the programme

**Table:** Coverage of Bono Juancito Pinto

Year	Eligible children beginning of school year	Educational levels covered end of school year	Announcement date	Payment
2006	-	1st-5th grade	October 2006	200 Bs.
2007	0-4th grade	1st-6th grade	October 2007	200 Bs.
2008	0-5th grade	1st-8th grade	July 2008	200 Bs.
2009	0-7th grade	1st-8th grade	October 2009	200 Bs.
2010	0-7th grade	1st-8th grade	October 2010	200 Bs.
2011	0-7th grade	1st-8th grade	October 2011	200 Bs.
2012	0-7th grade	1st-9th grade	October 2012	200 Bs.
2013	0-8th grade	1st-10th grade	October 2013	200 Bs.
2014	0-9th grade	1st-12th grade	October 2014	200 Bs.
2015	0-11th grade	1st-12th grade	-	200 Bs.

- **Household Surveys**  
**(MECOVI - Encuesta de Hogares)**
- Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE)
- National representative survey
- Repeated cross-sections
- 2005, 2006, and 2013
- Sample: children aged 7-17 years

# Identification strategy

Completed years of schooling	2005-2006	2013
0	B	T
1	B	T
2	B	T
3	B	T
4	B	T
5	B	T
6	B	T
7	B	T
8	B	T
9	B	C
10	B	C
11	B	C

**Figure:** Identification strategy

# Estimation

Outcomes: school enrolment and labour supply.



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Kernel propensity score matching - difference in difference strategy  
(Blundell and Dias (2009))

# Estimation

Work and enrolment status of child  $i$  are modeled using the following reduced form:

$$Y_{igt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{ig} + \gamma T_{ig} * P_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^J X_{ij} \theta_j + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{igt},$$

where  $Y$  is the outcome of interest, i.e. work participation, hours worked, or school enrolment,

$P$  is an indicator variable equal to one for the years when the transfer was paid,

$T$  is an indicator variable equal to one for eligible individuals and zero otherwise,

$X_i$  is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics,

$\delta_t$  controls for potential time varying effects of each round of data.

# Model specification

## Control variables (X):

- **Household characteristics:** a dummy for rural households and dummy variables for the nine Bolivian departments.
- **Household's head characteristics:** educational attainment (years), gender.
- **Household structure:** household size, the number of household members working.
- **Children characteristic:** age, gender, ethnic origin.
- **Wealth proxies:** piped water, toilet connected to sewage, and electricity.

# Results: school enrolment

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on school enrolment

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
Effect	0.052** (0.019)	0.108* (0.046)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.029 (0.026)	0.082** (0.029)
Observations	2,472	727	1,734	1,235	1,210

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. *Significance level at \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$*

# Results: work participation

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on work participation

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
Effect	-0.062 (0.047)	-0.097 (0.099)	-0.002 (0.043)	-0.039 (0.066)	-0.078 (0.065)
Observations	2,472	727	1,734	1,235	1,210

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. *Significance level at \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$*

# Results: hours worked

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on hours worked

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
Effect	-1.275 (1.108)	-3.692 (2.348)	0.584 (1.250)	-2.130 (1.722)	-0.870 (1.422)
Observations	2,389	703	1,671	1,183	1,179

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. *Significance level at \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$*

## Conclusion:

- Positive effects of the programme on children's education, consistent with previous research on cash transfer programmes in developing countries.
- There is no evidence of a reduction on the intensity of child labour or the probability to work (which is expected given the small amount of the transfer).

**Thanks!**



# Spillover effects: school enrolment

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on school enrolment: spillover effects

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
No. eligible children in hh x 2013	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.016)
No. eligible children in hh	0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.014)	0.016* (0.008)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.020 (0.012)
Observations	2,472	727	1,734	1,235	1,210

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. Significance level at \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

# Spillover effects: work participation

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on work participation: spillover effects

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
No. eligible children in hh x 2013	0.015 (0.022)	0.006 (0.038)	0.034 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.041)	0.043 (0.038)
No. eligible children in hh	0.036 (0.014)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.060* (0.028)	0.020 (0.024)
Observations	2,472	727	1,734	1,235	1,210

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. Significance level at \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

# Spillover effects: hours worked

**Table:** Impact of the BJP programme on hours worked: spillover effects

	National sample	Rural	Urban	Boys	Girls
No. eligible children in hh x 2013	0.521 (0.513)	0.276 (1.026)	0.979 (0.683)	-0.737 (0.039)	1.550 (0.905)
No. eligible children in hh	0.718* (0.338)	0.471 (0.671)	0.001 (0.484)	1.747* (0.724)	-0.035 (0.587)
Observations	2,389	703	1,671	1,183	1,179

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis. Significance level at \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

# Preprogramme time trends

**Table:** Preprogramme time trends in schooling, work, and hours worked

	School enrolment	Work participation	Hours worked
Treatment group $\times$ 2006	0.034 (0.033 )	-0.044 (0.066)	0.639 (1.584 )
Observations	1,228	1,228	1,180

Note: Coefficients are estimated using kernel propensity score matching using a difference-in-differences approach. In all specifications we use control variables, time and department fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at household level, 1200 repetitions. *Significance level at \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$*