Work is now marked by:

- **Empirical focus**, with close attention to
  - Endogeneity issues
  - Data, esp. (but not only) large administrative datasets

- **Administrative aspects**
  - Likely too an increasing focus, given digitalization

A large, still rich agenda: better integrating theory, evidence, and practicalities—not least for tax
OUTLINE

• Research on tax administration
• Tax gaps in tax analysis
• Optimal tax administration
• Concluding
RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION
Until recently

Literature on tax administration had focused on:

• Measuring administration and compliance costs

• Embellishing/puzzling over models of tax evasion

No established framework by which to evaluate administrative interventions—unlike policy
Many excellent papers using experiments, natural or other, to address aspects of compliance. E.g.:

- **Compliance in VAT chains** (Pomeranz, 2015)
- **Lotteries** (Naritomi, 2013)
- ‘**Nudges’** (reviews in Alm (2014), Luttmer and Singhal (2014))
What has all this taught tax administrators?

• Implications for enforcing VAT chains
  – Pomeranz results seem to imply “Start at the end”

• Importance of withholding and third party information well-known
  – British land tax 1697; and Milton Friedman’s regret!

• Are lotteries/nudges first order importance?
Making theory more useful

...by providing practicable frameworks integrating policy and administration

Illustrate this with thinking around ‘tax gaps’

• What significance in wider analysis of tax systems?

• What is the ‘optimal’ tax gap?
  – Answering that requires thinking about ‘optimal’ tax administration more widely
TAX GAPS IN TAX ANALYSIS
Decomposing VAT revenue: ‘C-efficiency’

Can write VAT revenue (in percent GDP) as

\[
\frac{V}{Y} = \tau_s E^c \left( \frac{C}{Y} \right)
\]

where \( V \) is VAT revenue, \( Y \) is GDP, \( \tau_s \) is the standard VAT rate, \( C \) is consumption, and

\[
E^c \equiv \frac{V}{\tau_s C}
\]

is ‘C-efficiency’
C-efficiency drove changes in VAT Revenue, 2003-2010.
So what drives C-efficiency?

With $V^*$ the revenue that would be raised if implementation of current system were perfect:

$$E^C = \frac{V}{\tau_S C} = \left(\frac{V^*}{\tau_S C}\right)\left(\frac{V}{V^*}\right) = (1 - P)(1 - \Gamma)$$

where $P$ is a ‘policy gap’ and $\Gamma$ a ‘compliance gap’
The compliance gap

Excess of tax (e.g. VAT) theoretically due over that actually collected, as percent of former

- An increasing focus in many countries. E.g.:
  - UK has produced ‘VAT gaps’ for several years
  - Reckon (2009) and CASE (2013) for EU
  - RA-GAP project at IMF, esp. for developing countries

- Ideally, combine with analysis of ‘policy gaps’
  - Similar to tax expenditures
For example (from RA-GAP)

Uganda

South Africa

- Compliance gap [ratio to PV1]
- Tax Expenditure [ratio to PV2]
- Policy gap (PV3 - PV1) [ratio to PV3]
Uses of gap analysis

Can identify:

• **Priorities for reform:** e.g.:
  – In Uganda, key issue is compliance gap, halving it would raise 3% of GDP
  – For South Africa, policy gap seems the larger concern

• **Areas in which to improve compliance**
  – Not just total gap that matters
VAT gaps by sector

Potential vs Actual Revenue by Sector
– South Africa

Sectors:

1. Agriculture, forestry and fishery
2. Mining and quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Electricity, gas and water
5. Construction
6. Wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodations
7. Transport, storage and communications
8. Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services
9. Community and social services
And UK compliance gap

![Graph showing the trend of fraud and crisis from 2004 to 2010.](image-url)
But—Is compliance gap too big or too small?

• A tendency to think that whatever compliance gap is, it’s too big
  – But closing it is costly, including through possible impact on activity

• So what is the optimal compliance gap?
  – How, more generally, to characterize optimal administrative interventions?
OPTIMAL TAX ADMINISTRATION
Three Questions
Q1: How should we assess administrative Interventions?

• There is an established framework for assessing optimal tax rates—focused on the “elasticity of taxable income”

• Is there are an administration-side analogue?
  – i.e. a sufficient statistic summarizing what’s needed to make normative judgments?
Q2: What is the optimal compliance gap?

• The compliance gap is not a welfare measure
  – As noted earlier: may not be worth expend resources to reduce the gap; and reducing it may worsen the tax distortion

• So, how do we know if a compliance gap is too big or too small?
Q3: Administration or policy to raise revenue?

A very basic question for policy-makers:

If additional revenue is needed, is it better to secure this by

(a) Strengthening administration, or
(b) Increasing statutory rates?
A framework to address them
Integrating the analysis of tax policy and administration (Keen-Slemrod, 2016)

Pure efficiency: Extending a standard model to allow (non-) compliance and administration costs

\[
U = wl - T(wl - e) - C(e, \alpha) + V(r)
\]

where \( r = T(wl - e) - A(\alpha) \)

Taxpayer chooses \( l \) and \( e \); government chooses \( T \) and \( \alpha \)
Optimal choice of tax rate, $T$

• Well-known: A sufficient statistic for behavioral responses to tax rate changes is "elasticity of taxable income" = elasticity of reported tax base to (one minus) tax rate
  – Higher this is, the lower is the optimal tax rate

• Large empirical literature seeks to estimate this
  – Almost all for advanced countries
Answers
Choice of administrative intervention

The optimal choice of $\alpha$ satisfies

$$\phi = E(z, \alpha)$$

where:

- $\phi$ is an adjusted ratio of (marginal) administration and compliance costs to revenue
- $E(z, \alpha)$ is the enforcement elasticity of tax revenue
So answer to Q1 is: The enforcement elasticity

Like the taxable income elasticity, $E(z, \alpha)$ is a sufficient statistic for behavioral impact.

E.g. If $\nu' = 1.2$, $a/z=0.006$ and $c/z=0.011$, more enforcement is desirable iff $E(z, \alpha)$ exceeds 0.1.
What we know about the enforcement elasticit(ies) of taxable income?

• Evidence from panel of EU compliance gaps suggests $E_Z = 0.17$

• Experimental evidence
  – For audit, $E_Z = 0.1-0.2$

• Empirically, some IRS work (Plumley)...
  – Mainly concerned with choice between administrative instruments
  ...suggests $E_Z$ for audit of 0.6-0.85 (?)
More on the cost term

This is

\[ \phi = \frac{\alpha \left( \frac{c\alpha}{v'} \right)}{t\varepsilon} + \alpha a' \]

which differs from standard cost/revenue ratio in:

(a) Discounting compliance costs by \( v' \): because they are not financed from distorting tax revenue

(b) It is marginal costs that matter
A discrete administration reform is desirable iff

\[ \Delta U \equiv (v' - 1)t\Delta z - v'\Delta a - \Delta c \]

Meiselman (2017) applies this to effect of letters sent to suspected non-Detroit city tax nonfilers

Finds welfare gain negative

– mainly because of large compliance costs
A2: Optimal compliance gap

The gap is \( g \equiv e/wl \), and the optimal gap is characterized by an inverse elasticity rule

\[
\frac{g}{1-g} = \frac{-\phi}{E(e,\alpha)}
\]

So for this we need to know the evasion elasticity.

E.g., with the cost figures above, a compliance gap of 14.5% is optimal iff a 10 percent increase in spending on enforcement would reduce evasion about 5%.
A3: Administration vs. rate increase

Answer is more likely to be enforcement:

• Higher is the elasticity of taxable income
  – Because that means high inefficiency

• Higher is the tax rate

• Higher is enforcement elasticity

• Lower are administration and compliance costs
  – Former especially damaging to case for implementation
And more
Are enforcement and tax rates strategic complements or subs.?

Matters because e.g.:

• If technology makes detecting evasion easier...

• Optimal tax rate goes down if strategic substitutes (on left)...

• ...but goes up if they are complements
Some extensions

• Many are straightforward...
  – Multiple administrative instruments
    • Results on allocation of a fixed administration budget
  – Discrete reforms
  – When part of $c$ is a transfer
  – Multiple households

• Generalizing concealment costs to $c(e, avoidance, l)$—but only a small redefinition of $\phi$ is needed
CONCLUDING
Two views

“...it is time to put to rest the claim that [evasion, avoidance, and administration] is...understudied”
Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002

“...there is still only a relatively small scholarly literature [on] tax administration”
Hasseldine, 2011

First view has become more persuasive—but much remains
And two new data sources

**ISORA/RA-FIT:** Collects RA data and establish baselines/benchmarks

**TADAT:** Assessment tool

- Accountability and Transparency
- Integrity of the Registered Taxpayer Base
- Assessment and Mitigation
- Supporting Voluntary Compliance
- Filing of Tax Returns
- Payment of Obligations
- Ensuring Accuracy of Reporting
- Tax Dispute Resolution
- Operational Efficiency and Effectiveness
- Performance Outcome Areas
ISORA: Collecting information on tax administrations

- Understand historical performance
- Establish baselines by income group and other groupings
- Identify trends

On Time Filing Rates By Region

Source: RA-FIT Database, 2010
Scores Breakdown: Zambia

- A: 20%
- B+: 15%
- B: 20%
- C+: 0%
- C: 40%
- D+: 0%
- D: 5%

Results from 27 countries

www.tadat.org
References


