

Levels and Dynamics of Inequality in India: Filling in the blanks

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Summary of Findings from the India Component of the UNU-WIDER “Inequality in the Giants” Project

UNU-WIDER Conference: Think Development – Think WIDER
Helsinki, September 14, 2018

Introduction

- Inequality in India is in the public eye (and political debate)
 - Chancel and Piketty: “Inequality in India 1922-2015: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj?”
 - WID.world Working Paper Series 2017/11
 - James Crabtree: The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India’s New Gilded Age (Oneworld)
- Main contention:
 - Alongside recent acceleration of economic growth, wealth and income inequality in India is exploding.
 - The top tail is much thicker and extends far further than was previously believed.
 - This was long undetected due to data constraints
- **Although this has also been contested:**
 - Surjit Bhalla: “No evidence that India has experienced an above average increase in inequality...” (Indian Express, Aug 11, 2018)

Introduction

- This project seeks to complement these new (but also contentious) insights
 - Is inequality in India high?
 - Is the only action on inequality in the top tail?
 - Is there an inequality analogue to the impressive rates of poverty reduction in India?
 - What are the trends in inequality beyond income?
 - What is happening in rural areas and at the local level?
 - How is structural transformation shaping the distribution of income?
 - What are the patterns of income mobility shaping the trends in income inequality?

Project Contents

- Six papers
 1. Inequality Trends and Dimensions: Himanshu and Murgai
 2. Village level inequality and structural change: Elbers and Lanjouw
 3. Spatial decomposition of inequality: Mukhopadhyay and Urzainqui
 4. Intra-generational Mobility: Dang and Lanjouw
 5. Inter-generational mobility and human capital: van der Weide and Vigh
 6. *(Housing prices and top income inequality: Rongen)*
- Draft papers trickling in.

Himanshu and Murgai:

Levels and Trends in Indian Inequality: Evidence from Secondary Data (1983-2012)

Key Findings:

- * Inequality is indeed high and has been rising with recent economic growth
- * But inequality was actually falling in India during growth episode in 1980s
- * Important group dimensions of inequality:
 - state/region
 - education
 - scheduled caste/ schedule tribes
 - gender
 - occupation
 - economic sector/ formal-informal

Elbers and Lanjouw

Inequality under a microscope: levels and trends in an Indian village (1958-2015)

Key Findings:

- * Inequality has risen, alongside average income growth and falling poverty
- * Increase income mobility
- * But intergenerational mobility is falling
- * Stylized village model replicates Palanpur's distributional outcomes with the introduction of exogenous technological change in agriculture followed by non-farm diversification

Mukhopadhyay and Urzainqui

Decomposing Spatial Inequality

Approach and Key Findings:

- * Combine NSS and night lights data to decompose inequality
- * Gauge the importance and trends over time in *within village* inequality (*within-block* in urban areas)
- * Within-village inequality accounts for the bulk of total inequality
- * Within –village inequality is rising in most states

Dang and Lanjouw

Intra-generational Mobility: Levels and Trends

Approach and Key Findings:

- * Construct synthetic panels from NSS data
- * 1987, 1993, 2004, 2009, 2011 rounds
- * Validate against IHDS true panel for 2004-2011
- * Intra-generational mobility has risen alongside falling poverty and rising inequality
- * Upward and downward mobility are associated with different group characteristics

Van der Weide and Vigh

Intergenerational Educational Mobility




Approach and Key Findings:

- * Consider education of parents and children in 6 rounds of NSS data (1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2011)
- * Work at the NSS region level
- * By international standards mobility in India is low
- * But intergenerational educational mobility is rising
- * In regions with lower mobility, economic growth of the poor is particularly penalized, while that of the rich is less affected.



Himanshu and Murgai

- Summarize the rapidly growing literature on inequality in India
- Document evidence from multiple data sources pointing to high, and rising inequality
- Illustrate the sectoral transformation of the Indian economy out of agriculture; point to significant growth of the unorganized sector and casual wage and non-agricultural self employment activities.



Inequality and the incidence of growth



Income versus Consumption inequality



Wealth Inequality and Top Incomes



Inequalities among Population Groups

	Consumption share/Pop share			Income share/ Pop share	
	1993-94	2004-05	2011-12	2004-05	2011-12
All India					
ST	0.76	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.67
SC	0.79	0.78	0.8	0.71	0.79
OBC	--	0.92	0.93	0.89	0.92
Others	1.09	1.33	1.34	1.45	1.39
Rural					
ST	0.83	0.76	0.77	0.75	0.72
SC	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.75	0.83
OBC	--	1	1	0.95	0.96
Others	1.07	1.23	1.21	1.42	1.38
Urban					
ST	0.83	0.81	0.81	1.02	1.08
SC	0.75	0.72	0.76	0.77	0.82
OBC	--	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.87
Others	1.05	1.24	1.26	1.24	1.24

	Consumption share/pop share			Income share/ Pop share	
	1993-94	2004-05	2011-12	2004-05	2011-12
All India					
Hindu	0.99	0.99	1	0.98	0.99
Muslim	0.91	0.91	0.87	0.92	0.91
Christian	1.23	1.41	1.39	1.74	1.52
Others	1.12	1.28	1.29	1.22	1.21
Rural					
Hindu	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.98
Muslim	0.95	0.98	0.94	1.03	1
Christian	1.18	1.44	1.43	2.07	1.53
Others	0.95	0.98	1.05	1.19	1.24
Urban					
Hindu	1.02	1.03	1.04	1.03	1.03
Muslim	0.76	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.74
Christian	1.22	1.29	1.23	1.28	1.3
Others	1.15	1.33	1.18	1.29	1.33

Inequalities in human development

Figure 1 Under-five child stunting (%)





Figure 1 Average annual dropout rates (%)



Elbers and Lanjouw

- Examine evolution of inequality in the village of Palanpur over 7 decades (1957-2015)
 - Small village in Uttar Pradesh
 - Multi-caste structure/ small muslim community
 - Stable and moderate population growth
 - Growth from 500 to 1255 villagers 1957-2015
 - Fixed village land; thin land market
 - Economy of Palanpur profoundly shaped by:
 - “Green Revolution” technological change from 1960s onwards
 - Non-farm diversification and rural-urban commuting from 1980s onwards

Distributional outcomes in Palanpur

- Per capita income growth: 2% per year average
 - Harvest variability “good year” “bad year”
- Declining poverty
 - Headcount:

1957	1962	1974	1983	2009
47%	54%	11%	34%	20%
- Increased intra-generational mobility
- BUT, Rising inequality
 - Gini:

1957	1962	1974	1983	2009
0.34	0.35	0.27	0.31	0.38
- Himanshu et al (2018) draw attention to changing village-level institutions, norms, in face of these distributional outcomes


Gatsby Curve in Palanpur: Declining Intergenerational Mobility

	1958-1983	1983-2009	1958-1974 (1983)	1974(1983)- 2009
Number of observations(in the age group 25-35 years)	58	100	58	100
Gini Coefficient in terminal year	0.336	0.379	0.235	0.379
Intergenerational Elasticity	0.328	0.396	0.294	0.441

Is Palanpur “typical”?

Counterfactuals with a simulation model

- Study the impact of drivers of inequality
 - Technological change and occupational diversification
 - Inspired by Lewis, Kuznets
- “Palanpur-like” village
 - Focus on 3 castes (Jatabs, Muraos, Thakurs)
 - Classify households as “agricultural” or “non-agricultural”
 - Based on largest income share
 - Postulate similar population growth
 - Calibrate model on Palanpur data



Dynamics

- Income model $\log y_{t+1} = \alpha + \beta \log y_t + \sigma \varepsilon_{t+1}$
- Occupation dynamics
 - Individual occupations determined by Markov transition process; transitions between occupations governed by caste- and occupation-specific probabilities
- After calibration:

year	data	model
1958	0.33	0.33
1963	0.34	0.34
1974	0.29	0.30
1983	0.31	0.31
2009	0.38	0.38

Exploring Counterfactuals

1. Distributional outcomes with no technological change
 2. Distributional outcomes with no occupational diversification
- Switching these largely exogenous forces “on/off” we can broadly generate the pattern of distributional outcomes observed in “Palanpur-like” villages
 - THUS Is rising village-inequality a more general phenomenon?

Mukhopadhyay and Urzainqui

- Palanpur study points to the possibility that inequality *within* villages is high and possibly rising
- Note: Inequality trends at the aggregate (state or national) level may mask what is happening at the village (or urban block) level.
 - Which inequality actually matters?
- This paper seeks to assess the significance of village level inequality in the country as a whole

Shedding light on local inequality

- Available data cannot yield village-level inequality estimates
- Paper combines NSS survey data with data on night-lights intensity as well as GIS data
 - Impute average per capita consumption to all of India's villages (and urban blocks) based on a district-level prediction model calibrated with NSS consumption data, night-lights data and district level variables.
 - Calculate between-village inequality (Theil measure)
 - Derive the share of village-level inequality in total inequality by between between-village inequality from total inequality
 - At the national and state level

Village level inequality accounts for most inequality and this share is rising

All India	2001	2011
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Within State	0.175	0.143
Between States	0.013	0.017

Within District	0.149	0.156
Between Districts	0.039	0.05

Theil (All India)	0.188	0.21
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Rural

Within State	0.13	0.126
Between States	0.01	0.017

Within District	0.11	0.11
Between Districts	0.03	0.034

Theil (Rural India)	0.14	0.143
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Urban

Within State	0.227	0.25
Between States	0.006	0.014

Within District	0.193	0.21
Between Districts	0.041	0.06

Theil (Urban India)	0.234	0.26
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Rural India (NSS)	2004	2011
Rural Inequality based on Village Level Imputation (Between)	0.140	0.143
Residual: Within Village	0.035	0.037
	0.105	0.106

Urban India (NSS)	2004	2011
Urban Inequality based on Urban Blocks (Between)	0.234	0.260
Residual: Within Urban Block	0.029	0.032
	0.205	0.228

* Based on the NSS. Numbers may not add because of rounding off

Selected states

	2004			2011		
	Total	Between	Within	Total	Between	Within
Rajasthan	0.125	0.036	0.088	0.133	0.028	0.105*
UP	0.158	0.035	0.123	0.194	0.033	0.160*
Bihar	0.082	0.039	0.043	0.082	0.023	0.059*
Jharkand	0.144	0.077	0.067	0.143	0.059	0.084*
Orissa	0.155	0.069	0.086	0.145	0.046	0.099*
Chhattisgarh	0.193	0.040	0.153	0.175	0.037	0.138
Madhya P.	0.173	0.042	0.131	0.190	0.036	0.154*
Maharashtra	0.225	0.050	0.175	0.251	0.050	0.201*
Andhra P.	0.183	0.021	0.162	0.147	0.018	0.129
Karnataka	0.194	0.035	0.159	0.264	0.022	0.242*
Kerala	0.258	0.012	0.246	0.310	0.009	0.301*
Tamil Nadu	0.216	0.024	0.193	0.190	0.018	0.171

Dang and Lanjouw

- Investigate intra-generational mobility trends
- Mobility analysis ideally based on panel data
 - Only one panel dataset in India (IHDS 2004-2011)
- Dang and Lanjouw develop *synthetic panels* from NSS cross section data (43rd, 50th, 61st, 66th and 69th rounds)
- Validate results against IHDS panel for the 2004-2011 interval

Transitions across three categories: 1993-2004

Diagonal=59.7%

Table 2: Welfare Transition Dynamics Based on Synthetic Panel Data, India 1993/94- 2004/05 (percentage)

Panel A: Vulnerability line corresponding to V-index= 0.2		2004			
		Poor	Vulnerable	Middle class	Total
1993	Poor	29.4	13.7	1.8	44.9
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
	Vulnerable	9.9	18.8	8.3	37.0
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
	Middle class	0.9	5.7	11.5	18.1
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)
	Total	40.2	38.2	21.6	100
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)	
Panel B: Vulnerability line equals twice poverty line		2004			
		Poor	Vulnerable	Middle class	Total
1993	Poor	29.4	14.8	0.7	44.9
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
	Vulnerable	10.5	26.7	6.6	43.8
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
	Middle class	0.3	4.3	6.7	11.3
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)
	Total	40.2	45.8	14.0	100
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)	


Transitions across three categories: 2004-2011

Diagonal=48.1%

Table 7: Welfare Transition Dynamics Based on Synthetic Panel Data, India 2004/05- 2011/12 (percentage)					
Panel A: Vulnerability line corresponding to V-index= 0.2		2011			
		Poor	Vulnerable	Middle class	Total
2004	Poor	15.3	15.9	5.7	37.0
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
	Vulnerable	8.2	18.2	13.8	40.3
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
	Middle class	1.5	6.7	14.6	22.8
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)
	Total	25.0	40.8	34.1	100
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)	
Panel B: Vulnerability line equals twice poverty line		2011			
		Poor	Vulnerable	Middle class	Total
2004	Poor	15.3	18.4	3.2	37.0
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
	Vulnerable	9.0	26.6	12.1	47.7
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
	Middle class	0.7	5.5	9.1	15.3
		(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)
	Total	25.0	50.5	24.5	100
		(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)	


Correlates of mobility

Upward



Note: dashed lines represent the national average for each period (i.e., 27.4% for 1993-04 and 57% for 2004-11).

Downward




Note: dashed lines represent the national average for each period (i.e., 27.2% for 1993-04 and 8.8% for 2004-11).


Van der Weide and Vigh

- Investigate intergenerational mobility trends
 - Build on recent cross-country study by Narayan and v.d. Weide (2018) *Fair Progress* (World Bank)
- Consider *educational* mobility rather than income mobility
- Look at households where sons and fathers are *co-resident*
- 6 rounds of NSS data: 1983-2011
- Calculate intergenerational regression and correlation coefficients

IGM is low but rising



Is education IGM linked to income inequality?



Correlates of educational IGM

- Public expenditure too is positively associated with mobility
- Political competition at state level (% second largest - % largest party): positively associated with mobility
- % of parents without an education: positively associated with mobility (if large majority of parents are uneducated, parental education will not be an important predictor of individual education; for this reason, it is important that we control for this, which we do)