

Trust the hand that protects you Does UN PK harm governments' legitimacy?


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
Peacekeeping as Statebuilding?

- Policy-wise we see:
 - **Agenda For Peace (Boutros Ghali 1992), Brahimi Report (2000), Capstone Doctrine (2008)**
- Empirically, the trend is:
 - **Broader mandates; longer and phased presence**
- Can (should) UN interventions re-build states?
 - **Consider the risks of externally-led statebuilding on legitimacy in the eye of populations**

The evolution of Peacekeeping Mandates



The evolution of Peacekeeping Mandates



A trade-off?

- Statebuilding goals as part of peacekeeping goals
- Facilitating effective governance may result in:
 - Better performances for national governments
 - Problems in attributing efficacy
- Do missions with strong peacebuilding component threaten or boost states' legitimacy?

Building Capacity

- Robust link between risk of conflict relapse & state fragility (aka the conflict trap)
- State capacity as multifaceted concept
- Key dimensions in state formation (Rubin 2005)
 - ❖ Coercion
 - ❖ Capital
 - ❖ Legitimacy
- Can be applied to state-building as well

How the UN Builds Capacity

❖ Coercion

- DDR and overall violence reduction (Hultman et al 2013, 2014; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017)
- Security Sector Reforms (Blair 2020, 2021)

❖ Capital

- Aid flows and development programs
- Economic boost (Bove, Di Salvatore, Elia 2021)

❖ Legitimacy

- Procedural approach: Elections & Democracy

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❖ Legitimacy

- Procedural approach: Elections & Democracy
- **Performance-based approach**

How the UN Builds Capacity


- Can the UN build performance-based legitimacy?
 - We do not know whether service provision improves (probably null, see Lake and Fariss 2014)
 - Provision of goods reinforces trust (Newton and Norris 2000)
 - But who provides matter (Zoellick 2008)
 - And bypassing states can be costly for democratization (Blair, Di Salvatore, Smidt 2022 w.p.)

Mobilizing Legitimacy

- Peacekeepers are effective security providers
- Peacekeepers heavily assist governments in reforming
- Long missions, with visible deployments, may indicate weakness
- Some observable implications:
 1. Citizens close to UN deployment areas are more likely to trust governments and police
 2. The relationship is mitigated by:
 - a. The duration of the deployment
 - b. The effectiveness of the deployment

Research Design – Case and Data


- UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003-2018)
- Afrobarometer waves 2008, 2012, 2015 (withdrawal phase)
- Subnational deployment data (GeoPKO) + Survey data (Afrobarometer)



Survey Data (Afrobarometer)

- Sampling Strategy based on 2008 National Census
- Citizens age 18 yrs or older
- Nationally representative
- Response rate: > 0.9

Liberia's Counties and Afrobarometer Respondents
UNMIL presence in orange






Liberian counties boundaries, Afrobarometer respondents' locations and deployment locations

Research Design

- 3,598 georeferenced respondents across 3 waves
- DV: Trust for institutions (dummy):
 - President
 - Police
 - Traditional leaders (informal)
- IV:
 - 1 if county of respondent ever hosted UNMIL
 - Duration of deployment in months
 - Average monthly deployment of military before survey
- Mediators: Post-deployment violence; perceived support from UN
- Main model is logit with county-level FE
- Initial plan for ‘unexpected event’ design could not be used

How much do you trust...?


Respondents' Trust Toward:



- 0 = Not at all
- 1 = A little
- 2 = Somewhat
- 3 = A lot

Dichotomized DV

Does PKO affect reported institutional trust?



Furthermore:

- Satisfaction with democracy robustly explain trust for president
- Younger respondents trust traditional leaders more, less so president
- Provision of goods associated with lower trust (quality?)

Conditional Effects

- Exposure to PKO increases probability to trust the president, but this declines as deployments get longer
 - 10 pp from 6 to 12 months
- Ongoing violence post-deployment with UNMIL:
 - Reduces trust for president
 - Increases trust for police
- Citizens acknowledging UN support to Liberia are more likely to trust the president (only run for wave 4 [2008])
- Trust toward traditional leaders has somewhat distinct patterns compared to formal institutions
 - Trust is more likely in absence of UNMIL exposure

So... what is the overall assessment?

- UN peacekeeping does not threaten governments' legitimacy, even when mandates are strongly oriented toward peacebuilding
- However, long deployments may erode trust, possibly by signalling lack of capacity
- When violence lingers:
 - **Governments are blamed**
 - **Security forces may get a confidence boost**
- If the mission performs well, this positively reflects on domestic actors as well