Traditional Norms, Access to Divorce and Women's Empowerment: Evidence from Indonesia

Olivier Bargain [1], Jordan Loper [2] and Roberta Ziparo [2]

[1]Bordeaux University and Institut Universitaire de France (IUF)

[2]Aix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS, EHESS and Centrale Marseille

June 11, 2018

UNU-WIDER Nordic Conference 2018

jordan.LOPER@univ-amu.fr

Motivation

- Legal and institutional framework have a role in shaping women's economic rights and opportunities (Duflo, 2012) Literature
- But social and traditional norms also shape individual behavior (World Bank, 2015) and therefore affect gender (in)equality Literature
- Burgeoning literature assessing the impact of policies in the presence of ethnic norms diversity (Ashraf et al (2018); La Ferrara & Milazzo (2017))
- We aim to understand how social norms interact with legal norms in shaping gender-related development outcomes

This Paper

1. We exploit ethnical heterogeneity (+300 ethnic groups) within *Indonesia* and related post-marital residence traditional cultural practices Ethnical Diversity
   - Worldwide, ancestral patrilocality negatively correlated with contemporaneous indicators of women's empowerment Patrilocality
2. We exploit a serie of reforms (2008-2010) (*"National Access to Justice Strategy"*) which empowered females by easing their access to justice and ability to divorce (i.e. increase in marriage outside option) Policies
3. We characterize variation in treatment effect from whether couple **traditionally** lives with wife's (**Matrilocality**) or husband's (**Patrilocality**) parents

Overview of the Methodology

1. We identify individual's ethnic group's post-marital traditional norm to deal with endogenity issues
   - we show this is a relevant predictor of actual marriage behaviour
   - we show this is associated with greater women's decision-making

2. We theoretically provide testable implications on **divorce** and women's **empowerment** outcomes, then conduct empirical tests

3. We conduct a difference-in-differences strategy, assessing the impact of an exogenous shock in women's access to formal legal institutions, in presence of heterogeneous informal traditional norms

4. We underline spillover effects of women's empowerment on women's well-being

Methodology - Data: Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)

- IFLS 5: 50,148 individuals from 16,204 households (representing 83% of the population) IFLS Map
- Data on Marriage history, intra-household-decision making, health, well-being, ethnicity and community traditional norms, etc.
- Last 3 waves (2000; 2007-2008; 2014-2015)
- Individuals married in IFLS 3 to IFLS 5, who do not change spouse

Methodology - Traditional Norm Identification

Individual's Ethnic Group's Norm (*Buttenheim and Nobles, 2009*):

1. Each ethnicity: compute villages modal *Adat* traditional norm
2. Link Individual's ethnicity with its ethnicity modal *Adat* norm

21 Ethnic Goups with norm identified $\Rightarrow$ 83% Matrilocal individuals vs. 17% Patrilocal individuals Norm by Ethnicity Table

Traditional post-marital residence norms is still a significant predictor of actual household composition in 2015 Prevalent Norm

- Positively correlated with presence wife's relatives in the household
- Negatively correlated with presence husband's relatives in the household

Role of Traditional Norms: Cross-Sectional Analysis

Post-Marital Residence Norm and Wife and her Relatives' Intrahousehold Decision-Making (Cross-Section (2000))

VARIABLES	(1) Share	(2) Large_Exp	(3) Savings	(4) Fam_Transfers	(5) WifeFamTransfers	(6) HusFamTransfers	(7) Contraception
				OLS			
Matrilocal	0.0444***	0.0338***	0.0221**	0.0151**	0.0502***	0.0311***	-0.0221
	(0.00999)	(0.00733)	(0.00891)	(0.00611)	(0.0100)	(0.0106)	(0.0336)
Observations	4,554	4,554	4,554	4,554	4,554	4,554	4,554
R-squared	0.057	0.009	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.006	0.018
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F	26.64	9.420	4.540	6.922	15.38	13.87	6.858

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses.
Data are computed using Husband's answers in IFLS 3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- Positive association between matrilocality and wife's intrahousehold decision-making Empirical Strategy

Robustness checks

- Traditional post-marital residence norm is still very significantly associated with wife's decision-making in 2014
- Results robust when additionaly including wife's answers

Identification Strategy (I)

Difference-in-Differences strategy with Fixed Effects:

$$y_{iet} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 Post_t \times Matrilocal_e + \tau_1 X_{it} + \tau_2 Post_t \times X_{it} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{iet} \quad (1)$$

- y_{iet}: Divorce, Intra-Household Decision-Making and Well-Being outcomes
- $Post_t = 1$ in 2014; 0 in 2007 (= Time FE here, with 2 periods)
- $Matrilocal_e = 1$ if Matrilocal; 0 if Patrilocal
- X_{it}: Indicator variables (university, working, rural and age categories)
- α_i: Individual (=Couple) FE
- ε_{iet}: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level

Identification Strategy (II)

Identification Assumptions:

- Exogenous increase in Courts budgets and Law changes fostering women's access to Justice
- Diff-in-Diff: rules out time invariant confounding factors, systematic differences matrilocal vs. patrilocal

Theoretical Insight (I)

Limited Commitment Collective (LIC) model of Household:

- Spouses maximize their utility over their lifetime, without waste of resources (Pareto Efficiency):

$$max_{C_t^{MH}, C_t^{MW}, Q_t^M} U^H(C_t^{MH}, Q_t^M) + \mu_t U^W(C_t^{MW}, Q_t^M) \tag{2}$$

- where μ_t is such that:

  $U^H(C_t^{MH}, Q_t^M) \geq U^H(C_t^{DH}, Q_t^H)$ and
  $U^W(C_t^{MW}, Q_t^M) \geq U^W(C_t^{DW}, Q_t^W)$.

- The utility under divorce depends on access to formal justice/law (L_r) - with $r = B, A$ - and the position of women under traditional norms (T_j) - with $j = M, P$.

Theoretical Insight (II)

1. Independently of the reforms:

$$\mu_t(L_B, T_M) - \mu_t(L_B, T_P) > 0$$

Matrilocal women have a higher bargaining power than patrilocal women (in level, cross-section)

2. If formal law and traditional norms are complement, after reforms we expect:

$$\Delta U_M^W(C_t^{DW}, Q_t^W) \geq \Delta U_P^W(C_t^{DW}, Q_t^W)$$

Matrilocal women relatively more likely to divorce (DID)

3. And therefore, among couple remaining married (stable couples):

$$\mu_t(L_A, T_M) - \mu_t(L_B, T_M) > \mu_t(L_A, T_P) - \mu_t(L_B, T_P)$$

Matrilocal women relatively more empowered (DID)

Differential Responsiveness to the Reform



- Patrilocal women less responsive Diff-in-Diff estimations
  - the burden of divorce remain too heavy for them Association with Divorce Norms
  - less socially included with their relatives Divorce and Presence of Relatives

Differential Effects on Intrahousehold Decision-Making

Difference-in-Differences Effects on Wife and Her Relatives' Intra-Household Decision-Making

VARIABLES	(1) Share	(2) Large_Exp	(3) Savings	(4) Fam_Transfers	(5) WifeFamTransfers	(6) HusFamTransfers	(7) Contraception
Post	0.205	0.179	-0.0731	0.0180	0.362	0.0976	-0.00673
	(0.177)	(0.217)	(0.109)	(0.0733)	(0.249)	(0.106)	(0.165)
Post_Matrilocal	0.0349***	0.0544***	0.0339**	0.0350***	0.0742***	0.0546***	0.148***
	(0.0122)	(0.0176)	(0.0153)	(0.0119)	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0357)
Observations	9,052	9,052	9,052	9,052	9,052	9,052	9,052
R-squared	0.212	0.088	0.074	0.034	0.084	0.068	0.057
Number of pidlink	5,142	5,142	5,142	5,142	5,142	5,142	5,142
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Cat. Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Age Cat.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Outcome	0.2033	0.0622	0.0280	0.0183	0.0537	0.0367	0.2000

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Mean Outcome: Patrilocal group in 2007
Data are taken from IFLS 4 and IFLS 5.

$\Rightarrow$ Matrilocal women relatively more empowered than patrilocal women following the reforms

Differential Effects on Women's Health and Fertility

Difference-in-Differences Effects on Women's Health and Fertility

VARIABLES	(1) Morbidity_Symptom	(2) Birth_Spacing	(3) Sex_Ratio	(4) Num_Births
Post	0.159	56.23***	0.0856	-0.977
	(0.142)	(17.03)	(0.0655)	(1.273)
Post_Matrilocal	-0.0813***	7.349***	0.00697	-0.250*
	(0.0290)	(2.498)	(0.0204)	(0.140)
Observations	10,800	9,050	5,324	5,369
R-squared	0.036	0.705	0.027	0.555
Number of pidlink	5,651	4,954	3,807	3,834
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Cat. Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Age Cat.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Outcome	0.6997	111.41	0.4833	3.29

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Mean Outcome: Patrilocal group in 2007
Data are taken from IFLS 4 and IFLS 5.

Differential Effects on Women's Assets

Difference-in-Differences Effects on Women's Assets (in thousands of Rupiah)

VARIABLES	(1) Wife_Assets	(2) Wife_Assets	(3) Wife_Assets	(4) Wife_Assets	(5) Wife_Assets	(6) Wife_Assets	(7) Wife_Assets	(8) Wife_Assets
Post	67,981	70,758	-46,553	-41,628				
	(71,799)	(71,619)	(28,445)	(27,888)				
Post_Matrilocal	13,012**	15,293***	8,564*	12,291***				
	(5,469)	(5,198)	(4,401)	(4,138)				
Post_Placebo					48,439	44,149	68,877***	63,973***
					(35,316)	(33,796)	(17,306)	(17,964)
PostPlacebo_Matrilocal					3,760	775.3	4,261*	571.0
					(3,027)	(3,246)	(2,476)	(2,889)
Observations	9,414	9,414	19,881	19,881	9,487	9,487	20,287	20,287
R-squared	0.056	0.055	0.099	0.099	0.132	0.131	0.138	0.137
Number of pidlink	5,228	5,228	10,773	10,773	5,280	5,280	10,817	10,817
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Age Cat. Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Age Cat.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Outcome	30,456	30,456	31,838	31,838	10,239	10,239	11,033	11,033

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Mean Outcome: Patrilocal group in 2007 (in 2000 for Placebo)

Scale: thousands of Rupiah

Data are taken from IFLS 4 and IFLS 5 for columns 1 to 4; and IFLS 3 and 4 for columns 5 to 8 (Placebo).

Columns 1-2 and 5-6: Husbands respondants. Columns 3-4 and 7-8: Husbands and Wifes respondants.

Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7: $Post_t \times Muslim_i$ **included in controls; Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8:** $Post_t \times Muslim_i$ **excluded from controls.**

Differential Effects on Women's Subjective Well-Being

Difference-in-Differences Effects on Women's Subjective Well-Being

VARIABLES	(1) Healthcare	(2) Ch_Std_Living	(3) Ch_Food_Cons	(4) Healthcare	(5) Ch_Std_Living	(6) Ch_Food_Cons
Post	0.164	-0.274	0.0904			
	(0.244)	(0.447)	(0.371)			
Post_Matrilocal	0.214***	0.190***	0.144***			
	(0.0555)	(0.0528)	(0.0534)			
Post_Placebo				-0.705***	-0.776***	-0.327***
				(0.117)	(0.126)	(0.127)
PostPlacebo_Matrilocal				-0.115**	-0.0740	-0.0207
				(0.0495)	(0.0635)	(0.0657)
Observations	10,485	6,271	6,273	10,799	7,683	7,683
R-squared	0.029	0.024	0.044	0.020	0.038	0.034
Number of pidlink	5,544	3,800	3,801	5,537	4,578	4,578
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Cat. Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Age Cat.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Outcome	1.959	2.019	2.048	1.951	2.140	2.187

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Mean Outcome: Patrilocal group in 2007 (in 2000 for Placebo)

Data are taken from IFLS 3, 4 and IFLS 5.

Differential Effects on Women's Labor Force Participation

- No consistent patterns in trend differences between matrilocal and patrilocal women
- Mixed evidences from the literature:
  - Participation in the labor market may help women in securing their outside options in the case of divorce/separation $\Rightarrow$ **increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution can be expected to incentivize them to increase their labour supply (Bargain et al., 2012)**
  - Increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution may increase women's weight in intra-household decision-making $\Rightarrow$ **allow them to benefit from more leisure time (Voena, 2015) and hence to experience an increase in their relative well-being**

Robustness checks

- Placebo tests to ensure that parallel trend assumption was not violated.
- Different subsamples (e.g. women in reproductive age (max. 50) for health and fertility analysis, women in working age (max. 60) for labor market participation analysis) and found robust results.
- Excluding/including $Post_t \times Muslim_i$ provide robust results: diff-in-diff effects are not driven by different time trends between muslim and non-muslim individuals.

Conclusions

- Post-marital residence traditional norm is still a very significant predictor of actual household composition in Indonesia
- Women originating from matrilocal ethnic group benefit from a higher decision-making power than women originating from patrilocal ethnic groups
- Under a more credible threat of marital dissolution following a serie of policies easing women's access to justice, a stronger renegotiation of bargaining powers occured within matrilocal households
- Consequently, matrilocal women were relatively better off than patrilocal women after the experiments:
  - Better health status
  - Better control over their fertility
  - Higher value of their own assets
  - Better subjective well-being

New insights aimed at designing more effective development policies tailored to specific cultural contexts.

Thank you for your attention !

Do you have any questions ?

Ancestral Patrilocality - Contemporaneous Women's Empowerment

- Worldwide, ancestral patrilocality negatively correlated with contemporaneous indicators of women's empowerment (Data sources: Alesina et al. (2013), Ethnographic Atlas and World Value Survey):
  - Female Labor Force Participation (-9,7%***)
  - Share of firms with female ownership (-12,46%**)
  - Proportion of seats in parliament held by women (-3,87%)
  - Proportion of divorced-separated individuals (-4,28%***)

Back to slides

Institutional Literature

Impact of Divorce and Institutional Changes on Women's Empowerment

- **Voena (2015):** Introduction of laws allowing unilateral divorce in *US* states with equal division of property yielded an increase in assets accumulation and a decline in labor force participation of women
- **Bargain et al. (2012):** Legalization of divorce in *Ireland* fostered women's labor force participation
- **Ziparo (2016):** Increase in female labor force participation and in daughter's educational outcomes following the adoption of a law in *France* that reformed the common-law matrimonial regime towards a more egalitarian system and dramatically increased the rights of married women
- **Sun and Zhao (2016):** Improved divorce options in *China* empowered women within marriage, and enabled them to avoid health-damaging sex-selective abortion

Back to slides

Traditional Norms Literature

Impact of cultural norms on gender-related development outcomes

- **Rammohan and Johar (2009):** Married patrilocal women suffer from a decrease in physical autonomy whereas matrilocal ones benefit from higher personal and child-related decision-making autonomy (*Indonesia*)
- **Rammohan and Robertson (2012):** Patrilocality is associated with poorer educational outcomes for women (*Indonesia*)

Back to slides

Ethnical Diversity in Indonesia

- Only ranked 110th by the United Nations with a Gender Inequality Index of 0,494
- Only ranked 92nd in 2015 by the World Economic Forum with a Global Gender Gap Index of 0,681
- 300 ethnic groups across the archipelago

Source: Gunawan Kartapranata

Back to slides

Differential effects of Access to Justice Policies

National Access-to-Justice Strategy: A Natural Experiment

Exogenous increase in Female access to Justice Policies Effect:

- **2008-2009: Justice for the Poor Programm** increased Religious Courts Budgets (+Rp 23 billion in 2008, +Rp 12 billion in 2009 $\Rightarrow$ 18-fold increase)
- **2009: Laws 48, 49 and 50 on Judicial Authority and General/Religious Courts:** increase access to the courts + provide legal advice and assistance
- **2010: Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2010 concerning the National Medium Term Development Plan (2010-2014):** 300 Rp billion for supporting access to the courts

National policies Jointly triggered by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Family Court of Australia and the World Bank, in support to the Indonesian government (*exogeneity*) Back to slides

Methodology

National Access-to-Justice Strategy: A Natural Experiment

$\Rightarrow$ Significant increase in legel divorces initiated by wives

$\Rightarrow$ Break cycles of illegal marriage, illegal divorce, illegal births $\rightarrow$ enable women to exercise their rights

$\Rightarrow$ Enable women to get legal divorce certificates $\rightarrow$ access pro-poor government services (health insurance, rice subsidies, and cash transfer payments, etc.)

$\Rightarrow$ Enable women to exercise their rights in case of domestic violence

$\Rightarrow$ **All in all, increase in wife's marriage outside option $\rightarrow$ increase in husband's perceived risk of marital dissolution $\rightarrow$ renegotiation of bargaining powers within the marriage** Back to slides

IFLS Map

Back to slides

Post-Marital Residence Traditional Norm by Ethnicity

Post-Marital Residence Norm by Ethnicity as reported by Village's *Adat* traditionnal norm experts

Ethnicity	Nb. Villages	Matrilocal (%)	Patrilocal (%)	Ambilocal/Neolocal (%)	Norm
Jawa	109	64.22	17.43	18.35	Matrilocality
Sunda	40	67.50	7.50	25.00	Matrilocality
Bali	15	0.00	86.67	13.33	Patrilocality
Minang	12	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Banjar	10	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Betawi	10	70.00	20.00	10.00	Matrilocality
Bugis	9	77.78	11.11	11.11	Matrilocality
Sasak	9	0.00	100.00	0.00	Patrilocality
Madura	6	83.33	16.67	0.00	Matrilocality
Melayu	6	50.00	16.67	33.33	Matrilocality
Batak	4	25.00	75.00	0.00	Patrilocality
Bima	4	50.00	25.00	25.00	Matrilocality
Cirebon	2	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Makassar	2	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Nias	2	0.00	100.00	0.00	Patrilocality
South Sumatra	2	0.00	100.00	0.00	Patrilocality
Palembag	2	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Toraja	2	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Dayak	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	Matrilocality
Sumbawa	1	0.00	100.00	0.00	Patrilocality
Tionghoa	1	0.00	100.00	0.00	Patrilocality

Note: Data are computed from IFLS 2 (1997) *Adat* questionnaire.

Back to slides

A Prevalent Traditional Post-Marital Residence Norm

Traditional post-marital residence norms is still an important predictor of actual household composition in 2015:

Post-Marital Residence Norm and Presence of Relatives in Household (Cross-Section)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Wife_Rel	Husband_Rel	Share_Wife_Rel	Share_Husband_Rel	Gap_Spouses_Rel	Both_Spouses_Rel
Matrilocal	0.0601***	-0.0291***	0.0307***	-0.0135***	0.0424***	0.00164
	(0.00832)	(0.00877)	(0.00418)	(0.00410)	(0.00609)	(0.00146)
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	24,138	24,138	23,782	23,767	23,752	24,138
R-squared	0.031	0.033	0.051	0.044	0.016	0.001

Notes: Panel: Individuals married in IFLS 5 (2014-2015). Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample: Individuals married in IFLS 5 (2014-2015) Back to slides

Role of Traditional Norms: Cross-Sectional Analysis

We examine the broad cross-sectional relationship between matrilocality and wife and her relatives' intrahousehold decision-making. We estimate:

$$y_{ie} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Matrilocal_e + \tau_1 X_i + \epsilon_{ie} \quad (3)$$

- y_{ie}: Wife and her relatives' intrahousehold decision-making power outcomes (wife and potentially her relatives make decisions while the husband does not have any say) (*Answers from husbands*)
- $Matrilocal_e = 1$ if individual originates from a matrilocal ethnic group; 0 if individual originates from a patrilocal ethnic group
- X_i: Individual covariates (age, age squared, dummies for work, living in rural area, graduated at university, and religion dummmy)

We use husbands' answers to a specific module on Intrahousehold decision-making (answer only if they lived with their spouse during the last 6 months) Back to slides

Post-Marriage Residence Norm and Marriage Stability

Post-Marriage Residence Norm and Marriage Stability (**Panel: Women married in 1997**)

VARIABLES	(1) Divorced	(2) Divorced_Separated	(3) Divorced	(4) Divorced_Separated
Post	-0.00381	-0.00402		
	(0.00457)	(0.00465)		
Post_Matrilocal	0.0111**	0.0116*		
	(0.00502)	(0.00619)		
Post_Placebo			0.0105	0.0213
			(0.00986)	(0.0249)
PostPlacebo_Matrilocal			9.02e-05	-0.00393
			(0.00451)	(0.00576)
Observations	10,770	10,770	12,041	12,041
R-squared	0.007	0.006	0.016	0.020
Number of pidlink	5,998	5,998	6,564	6,564
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Cat. Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time.Age Cat.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Outcome	0.0153	0.0245	0.0131	0.0187

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Mean Outcome: Patrilocal group in 2007 (in 2000 for Placebo)

Back to slides

Villages' Post-Marriage Residence Norm and Divorce related traditional norms

Villages' Post-Marriage Residence Norm and Divorce related traditional norms

VARIABLES	(1) Divorce_Court	(2) Divorce_Court	(3) Div_Hus_Old_Assets	(4) Div_Hus_Old_Assets	(5) Div_Hus_Assets	(6) Div_Hus_Assets	(7) Div_Hus_Child	(8) Div_Hus_Child
Village_Matrilocal	0.102		-0.0429		-0.0560**		-0.173***	
	(0.0652)		(0.0272)		(0.0257)		(0.0456)	
Village_Patrilocal		-0.247***		0.0637*		0.0742**		0.252***
		(0.0710)		(0.0379)		(0.0372)		(0.0623)
Observations	247	247	249	249	249	249	249	249
R-squared	0.010	0.044	0.013	0.021	0.027	0.036	0.071	0.115
F	2.436	12.10	2.480	2.828	4.759	3.990	14.37	16.40

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are taken from IFLS 2 (1997).
This table reports cross-sectionnal estimates of the association of villages' Post-Marital residence norm with villages' traditional norms related to divorce.

- Divorce_Court = 1 if, answer provided by village's *Adat* expert to the question *"If a divorce happens, what decision-making process is used in the divorce ?"* is *"Civil Court"* or *"Religious Court"*; 0 otherwise (*"Family discussion"; "Discussion about traditional laws of the village"; "Husband decides on divorce"; "Other"*).
- Div_Hus_Old_Assets = 1 if answer provided by village's *Adat* expert to the question *"If a divorce occurs, who has the right to claim those assets that existed before the marriage ?"* is *"The husband takes everything"*; 0 otherwise.
- Div_Hus_Assets = 1 if answer provided by village's *Adat* expert to the question *"If a divorce occurs, who has the right to claim those assets obtained since the couple was married ?"* is *"The husband takes all"*; 0 otherwise.
- Div_Hus_Child = 1 if answer provided by village's *Adat* expert to the question *"With whom do young children live with after a divorce ?"* is *"Husband"* or *"Husband's Parents"*; 0 otherwise (*"Wife"; "Wife's Parents"; "Depends on child"; "Depends on situation"; "Decided by court"; "Girls follow mohter, boys follow mother"; "Other"*).

Back to slides

Divorce and Presence of Relatives

Wife's Ethnic Group's Post-Marriage Residence Norm, Divorce and Presence of Wife's Relatives Diff-in-Diff

VARIABLES	(1) Wife_Rel	(2) Wife_Rel	(3) Share_Wife_Rel	(4) Share_Wife_Rel	(5) Wife_Rel_Alone	(6) Wife_Rel_Alone	(7) Gap_Spouses_Rel	(8) Gap_Spouses_Rel	(9) Wife_Alone	(10) Wife_Alone
Post	-0.0973***	-0.0106	-0.0522***	-0.00578	-0.0972***	-0.000191	-0.0334*	0.0268***	0.0295	0.0613***
	(0.0307)	(0.00881)	(0.0179)	(0.00370)	(0.0307)	(0.00662)	(0.0177)	(0.00669)	(0.0189)	(0.0117)
Post_Divorced	0.0934*	0.0310***	0.136***	0.0771	0.0915*	0.0306***	0.135***	0.0518	0.762***	0.755***
	(0.0486)	(0.00895)	(0.0368)	(0.0529)	(0.0487)	(0.0103)	(0.0417)	(0.0545)	(0.0377)	(0.106)
Observations	10,979	2,241	10,979	2,241	10,979	2,241	10,979	2,241	11,410	2,321
R-squared	0.060	0.019	0.064	0.021	0.058	0.023	0.020	0.011	0.161	0.128
Number of pidlink	5,731	1,159	5,731	1,159	5,731	1,159	5,731	1,159	5,759	1,168
Ind. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ind. Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Time.Ind. Controls	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Time.Muslim Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Cat. Dummy	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Time.Age Cat.	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
F	96.72	6.286	96.54	6.882	93.15	6.723	26.46	5.761	205.4	28.04

Note: Standard errors clustered at the village of origin level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data are taken from IFLS 3 and IFLS 4.
Column 1, 3, 5 and 7: Matrilocal women / Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8: Patrilocal women

In the period before the reform (2000-2007), both patrilocal and matrilocal women were significantly more likely to live with their relatives after a divorce.

However, the magnitude of the effect is much larger for matrilocal women: they were more than three times more likely to do so.

Back to slides