Promoting education under distortionary taxation

Equality of opportunity versus welfarism

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Abstract: How does the public provision of education and the deployment of distortionary tax and subsidy instruments differ when the government’s objective is conventional welfarist compared to when the objective is the non-welfarist one of equality of opportunity? This paper develops a framework in which the tax and provision rules in the two settings can be easily compared and contrasted. A range of results are derived which help to answer questions such as whether it is the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under opportunities-based objectives. We show that progressive taxation still plays a role in achieving the objective of equal opportunities, and illustrate how its use may differ under the two objectives. We also show how the provision of public education depends on how private education choices respond, especially the differential responses by higher- and lower-income families. These themes reflect concerns in the policy discourse, and our framework provides an entry point into a systematic exploration of a broad range of issues in comparing the consequences of welfarist and equality of opportunity objectives.

Keywords: educational subsidies, equality of opportunity, income taxation, inequality, public good provision

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1 Introduction

An often heard refrain in the policy discourse is that rather than use progressive taxation to reduce inequality of incomes, the government should use equal public provision of education to reduce inequality of education, and then let the distribution of income be whatever it turns out to be. Preference for equalizing education over equalizing incomes is sometimes argued for in terms of the presumed greater efficiency, since income taxation would distort the choice between labour effort and leisure. But perhaps a stronger strand in the argument is that equalizing education equalizes opportunities, and that equality of opportunity rather than equality of incomes should be the objective of policy.

Consider, then, an unequal society in which parents spend some of their earned incomes on the education of their children, and this parental input together with equal provision of public education leads to the educational outcomes for children. The government has at its disposal instruments of taxation as well as the level of public provision of education. How should the government choose these instruments in such a setting? The answer depends of course on the government’s objectives.

Since the earning of higher incomes requires the use of higher labour effort, the appropriate measure of parental well-being is not income per se, but utility. One strand of the literature takes as the government’s objective a social welfare function defined on the distribution of utilities, which in turn are the outcomes of optimal parental choices on labour, leisure, and expenditure on inputs for children’s education. This will be recognized as the classic ‘welfarist’ formulation of the problem emanating from the work of Mirrlees (1971)—welfarist, because the government’s objective function depends on, and only on, the ‘utility outcomes’ (of parents in this case).

Contrast this with a ‘non-welfarist’ formulation in which the government cares about, and only about, the distribution of educational outcomes, since this is the distribution of opportunity for the next generation. Parental utility functions do not matter directly in the government’s objective function and thus neither do inequalities of utilities or incomes. This follows the arguments of Roemer (1998), which draws on a philosophical tradition going back to Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981), and Sen (1985), and distinguishes between ‘circumstances’ (factors outside the control of the individual) and ‘effort’ (factors within the individual’s control). In this view, inequalities attributable to circumstances are the only legitimate target for government intervention.

The analytical distinction between welfarist and non-welfarist objective functions makes sharp the informal distinction between ‘outcomes-based’ and ‘opportunities-based’ objectives in the policy discourse. It allows us to explore in a systematic way the alternative uses of taxation and public education provision under the two types of objectives. Is it the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under opportunities-based objectives? If it is still used, what does the differential use of progressive taxation under the two objectives depend upon? Is it the case that higher provision of equal public education can advance the opportunities-based objective? Will the provision of public education in this case necessarily be higher than when the objective is welfarist? These are the types of questions to which the policy discourse gives rise.

There is a very large literature on the optimal choice of taxation and public provision of education in the welfarist tradition.1 There is a small but growing literature on this same question in the equality of opportunity tradition.2 But to our knowledge there is no literature that compares public policy on taxation and education provision, directly comparing the classical welfarist formulation in the tradition

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1 A small selection of papers is as follows: Balestrino et al. (2017); Blumkin and Sadka (2008); Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005); Brett and Weymark (2003); Gasparini and Pinto (2006); Hare and Ulph (1979); Tuomala (1986); Ulph (1977).

2 See Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018); Roemer and Unveren (2016); Valletta (2014).
of Mirrlees (1971) with the non-welfarist equality of opportunity formulation which emanates from the work of Roemer (1998). Our paper is a first step in this direction. By deriving and presenting optimal taxation and public provision formulae for the two approaches in a comparable manner, we are able to pinpoint the differences between them in a sharp way. We are also able to place alternative developments in the literature in the context of the contrast between welfarist and non-welfarist frameworks of optimal policy.

This paper frames the difference between ‘equality of outcomes’ and ‘equality of opportunity’ as the distinction between a ‘welfarist’ and a ‘non-welfarist’ objective function. Section 2 lays out the basic setup, in which parents with unequal productivities choose labour effort and inputs to children’s education to maximize a parental utility function. Section 3 sets out the base results for optimal taxation and public education provision of the welfarist formulation, in which the social welfare function depends only on parental utilities, as the benchmark for later comparison with the equality of opportunity case. Section 4 shows how the optimal tax and public provision formulae are changed when the objective function is non-welfarist, specialized to depending only on the distribution of educational outcomes for children. This section also contrasts our formulation of the objective function for equality of opportunity from that proposed by Saez and Stantcheva (2016), which we argue does not fall in a pure ‘non-welfarist’ category. Sections 2–4 restrict themselves to the case of linear income taxation. Section 5 extends the analysis to non-linear income taxation. Section 6 relates our analysis to that of Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) in the equality of opportunity framework. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Individual behaviour

The individual budget constraint is \( y^i = (1 - \tau)z^i + b = x^i + c^i \), where \( z^i = w^i l^i \) denotes labour income, and \( \tau \) is a linear income tax, which the government uses to finance a lump-sum transfer \( b \). Individual \( i \) allocates after-tax income \( y \) to private purchases of education \( c \) and other consumption \( x \). In the first version of the model, education is thought to benefit the children of the parents who invest in education.

The government can intervene either by public provision of education or by subsidizing private purchases of education. In the first case, utility is \( u = u\left[ e^i(c^i, g), x^i, l^i \right] \), where \( g \) represents public provision of education and \( e^i \) represents the overall educational level.

The household maximizes the Lagrangian

\[
u^i = u\left[ e(c^i, g), x^i, l^i \right] + \lambda \left[ (1 - \tau)w^i l^i + b - x^i - c^i \right].\]

Its maximum value is denoted by

\[
u^i = u\left[ e(c^i, g), x^i, l^i \right] + \lambda \left[ (1 - \tau)w^i l^i + b - x^i - c^i \right].\]

The individual maximization also gives the demand functions \( c^i = c^i \left[ (1 - \tau), b, g \right] \) and \( x^i = x^i \left[ (1 - \tau), b, g \right] \) as well as labour supply \( l^i = l^i \left[ (1 - \tau), b, g \right] \).

In the case with no public provision but with a possible educational subsidy \( s \), the budget constraint of the household can be written as \( x^i + (1 - s)c^i = (1 - \tau)z^i + b \). It is notationally simpler to normalize the situation so that instead of the labour income tax, the government levies consumption taxes on both education and other consumption, and deviations of uniform commodity taxation can be seen as subsidies or taxes on education. Therefore, we work with a model with budget constraint of the form \( \sum_j q_j x^j = z^i + b \), where \( q_j = (p + t_j) \) denotes the consumer price of a good \( j = c, x \), with producer prices all equal to \( p \), and \( t_j \) represents the tax on good \( j \) (a subsidy when \( t_j < 0 \)). Now \( v^i(q, b) \) and \( x^i(q, b) \) are the indirect utility and consumer demand functions.
3 A welfarist benchmark

3.1 Income taxation

A welfarist government maximizes $\sum W \left\{ v^i [(1 - \tau), b, g] \right\}$ subject to its budget constraint $\sum \tau w^i l^i = Nb + N\pi g$, where $\pi$ is the per-pupil cost of public education and $N$ is the number of households, who have different ability levels $w^i$. The first-order conditions, shown in the Appendix, can be used to derive the optimal linear income tax formula:

$$\frac{\tau^*}{1 - \tau^*} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \left( 1 - \frac{z(\beta)}{\bar{z}} \right),$$

where $\beta^i = W^i \partial v^i / \partial b$ is the social marginal value of income for person $i$ and $z(\beta) = \sum \beta^i z^i / \sum \beta^i$ denotes the welfare-weighted average income. The elasticity of total income is represented by $\varepsilon = d\bar{z} / d(1 - \tau) (1 - \tau) / \bar{z}$. The rule is the same as in Kanbur et al. (2018: section 2.1). The interpretation is the following: when the government has a relatively large welfare weight on the lowest incomes, $z(\beta)$ is small relative to mean income ($\bar{z}$), and the optimal income tax rate is high. On the other hand, the optimal tax rate declines when $\varepsilon$ increases.

An alternative way of writing the optimum rule is one due to Dixit and Sandmo (1977), which utilizes the notion of net (of tax revenue) social marginal value of income, following Diamond (1975):

$$\rho^i = \frac{\beta^i}{\mu} + \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g}. \tag{2}$$

Using this definition, the tax rule can be expressed as

$$\tau^* = \frac{\text{cov}(\rho^i, z^i)}{N \sum w^i \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)}}, \tag{3}$$

where $\frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)}$ is the derivative of compensated labour supply. Again, distributional concerns are taken into account in the numerator and the denominator captures efficiency impacts.

3.2 Public provision

The rule for optimal provision of education is given by

$$\sum \beta^i m^i = \mu \left( N\pi - \sum \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} \right), \tag{4}$$

where $m^i = v^i / \beta^i$ is the marginal rate of substitution for the public good and $\mu$ is the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint. This is close to the first-best provision of a publicly provided private good, but the marginal rate of substitution at the left is a weighted one, and at the right a tax revenue term reduces the costs of provision if an increase in public provision increases labour supply. Following Sandmo (1998), the rule can also be written as

$$N \frac{\sum \beta^i m^i}{\sum \beta^i} = \gamma \left( N\pi - \sum \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} \right), \tag{5}$$
where $\gamma = \bar{\beta}$ and $\frac{1}{N} \sum \beta^i = \bar{\beta}$. This means that Equation (5) can also be written as

$$\sum_i m^i (1 + \delta) = \gamma \left( N\pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} \right), \quad (6)$$

where

$$\delta = \frac{\text{cov} (\beta^i, m^i)}{\beta m} \quad (7)$$

is the distributional characteristic of publicly provided education. If the government pays no attention to distributional matters, $\delta = 0$ and the left of Equation (6) is just the conventional sum of the marginal rate of substitution. When distributional concerns matter, the social benefit of public provision increases if the marginal valuation of the publicly provided good is higher for households with low incomes (i.e. high social marginal value of income). In addition, the government needs to take into account the impact of public provision of tax revenues it collects from labour income via the term $\sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g}$. If public provision boosts income, then the costs of public provision are reduced relative to the case where public provision would have no impact on tax revenues.

An alternative rule can be derived with the help of the notion of net social marginal value of income:

$$\rho^i = \frac{\beta^i}{\mu} + \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b}. \quad (8)$$

Equation (52) in the Appendix implies that $\bar{\rho} = 1$. It is shown in the Appendix that the public good rule can also be expressed as

$$\sum_i m^i = N\pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial \tilde{\mu}}{\partial g} - N\text{cov} (\rho^i, m^i). \quad (9)$$

Here, if the covariance is positive (public provision is valued by low-income people with high social net marginal value of income), it reduces the costs of provision and pushes educational expenses up. To the best of our knowledge, the welfarist public provision rule has not been written in this form before.

### 3.3 Commodity taxation: subsidizing education

The government maximizes $\sum_i W^i \left( v^i (b, q) \right)$ subject to its budget constraint $\sum_i \sum_j t_j x^i_j - Nb = R$. It is useful to redefine

$$\rho^i = \frac{\beta^i}{\mu} + \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial b} \quad (10)$$

as the net social marginal utility of income for person $i$. This notion again takes into account the direct marginal social gain, $\beta^i$, and the tax revenue impact arising from commodity demand changes. The rule for optimal commodity taxation for good $k$ is shown to be

$$\sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial q} = N\text{cov} (\rho^i, x^i_k). \quad (11)$$

The left-hand side of the rule is the aggregate compensated change (weighted by commodity taxes) of good $k$ when commodity prices are changed. The right-hand side refers to the covariance of the net marginal social welfare of income and consumption of the good in question. The rule says that the consumption of those goods whose demand is the greatest for people with low net social marginal value of income (presumably the rich) should be discouraged by the tax system. Likewise the consumption of goods such as necessities should be encouraged by the tax system. This means that education ought to be subsidized only if its relative valuation is higher among the low-income households.
4 Equality of opportunity

As our framework is strictly paternalistic, we start with a general formulation in which the government maximizes a general paternalistic objective function, \( \sum P(e^i(c^i, g), x^i, l^i, g) \). After having derived general tax and public provision rules, we interpret them using societal objectives that only depend on an equitable distribution of education—in our case on \( \sum P(e^i, x^i, l^i, g) = \sum O^i \{ c^i ((1 − τ), b, g), g \} \). For the general case the first-order conditions are:

\[
\sum \frac{dP^i}{d(1 − τ)} + \mu \sum \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 − τ)} + w^i l^i \right) = 0 \quad (12)
\]

\[
\sum \frac{dP^i}{db} + \mu \sum \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} \right) = 0 \quad (13)
\]

\[
\sum \frac{dP^i}{dg} + \mu \sum \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} \right) = 0 \quad (14)
\]

where the total derivative is, for example in the case of \( g \), \( \frac{dP^i}{dg} = \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial g} + \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial g} + \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial \tau} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial g} + \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial \beta}{\partial g} \). In other words, the total impact of extra public provision depends on its direct valuation by the social planner and its indirect impact on the consumption of goods and labour supply.

4.1 Income taxation

One way of writing the optimal tax rule (as shown in the Appendix) is:

\[
τ^* = \frac{\text{cov} (ρ^i, z^i)}{\sum_i w^i (z^i)} + \frac{D}{\sum_i w^i (1 − τ^i)}
\]

(15)

The first term is the same as in the welfarist case in Equation (3). The second term, where \( D = \frac{C_b}{N} \sum_i ρ^i - \frac{C_{1−τ}}{N} \) (within which \( C_b = \sum \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial b} - \sum \beta^i ; C_{1−τ} = \sum \frac{\partial P^i}{\partial (1 − τ)} - \sum \beta^i z^i \)), is a corrective term that takes into account the differences between marginal paternalistic and welfarist valuation of changes in \( b \) and \( 1 − τ \). The presence of \( D \) drives the tax rate up if the social value of greater \( b \) is large, relative to the welfarist case, or the social value of the increase in the take-home pay \( (1 − τ) \) is small. The basic principle that the optimal tax rule is a combination of a welfarist term and a corrective term is in line with the general idea expressed (for the non-linear tax) by Kanbur et al. (2006).

For this particular Dixit–Sandmo type of optimal tax rate expression, the interpretation using the function \( \sum O^i \{ e^i [c^i ((1 − τ), b, g), g] \} \) is not particularly instructive. However, a rule in line with the welfarist term in Equation (1) is more intuitive. It is derived in the Appendix and is given by

\[
\frac{τ^*}{1 − τ^*} = \frac{1}{e} \left( 1 − \frac{\hat{O}}{\bar{O}} \right),
\]

(16)

where

\[
\hat{O} = \frac{\sum O^i \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial (1 − τ)}}{\sum O^i \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial b}}
\]

is the impact of the income tax on education, relative to the effect of additional income on education. If increasing taxes leads to a large drop in educational attainment (the numerator in Equation (17)), \( \hat{O} \) goes down, which decreases the tax at the optimum. If, in turn, the sensitivity of educational investment on income (the denominator in Equation (17)) becomes larger, the optimal tax is increased. The higher the income effects—especially at the bottom of the distribution, as they get a higher weight in the social
evaluation function—the greater the increase. A budget-neutral increase in the marginal tax rate also implies a greater lump-sum benefit—that is, a policy that increases progressivity. The implications of this analysis are collected in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1.** A government that only cares about inequality in educational outcomes should also use progressive income taxation, in addition to possibly subsidizing education. The tax system is more progressive when the increase in educational attainment is highly sensitive to increases in income, especially among those at the bottom of the educational distribution.

### 4.2 Public provision

Consider first a general paternalistic formulation for public provision. It can be written, following Equation (4) as:

$$
\sum_{i} \beta_i m_i = \mu \left( N\pi - \sum_{i} \tau_w \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial g} \right) - C_g, 
$$

(18)

where $C_g = \sum \frac{dt}{dx} - \sum \beta_i m_i$. In other words, again the rule includes a corrective term that compares paternalistic versus welfarist marginal value of an increase in public provision. If the paternalistic valuation exceeds the welfarist one, the term reduces the costs of public provision.

We now turn to examine the public provision rule in more detail when equality of opportunity concerns affect the provision rule. Let us now denote $O \frac{de_i}{db_i} = \beta_i$, which is again the marginal social (gross) value of income, but now for an equality of opportunity government. Let

$$
m_i^O = \left( \frac{de_i}{dg} \right) / \left( \frac{de_i}{db} \right)
$$

(19)

denote the efficiency of public provision in increasing education relative to the income effect. Then, Equation (18) can also be written as

$$
\sum_{i} \beta_i m_i^O = \mu \left( N\pi - \sum_{i} \tau_w \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial g} \right),
$$

(20)

which also implies

$$
\sum_{i} m_i^O (1 + \delta_O) = \gamma_O \left( N\pi - \sum_{i} \tau_w \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial g} \right),
$$

(21)

where $\gamma_O = \frac{\mu}{\beta_0}$ and

$$
\delta_O = \frac{\text{cov}(\beta_i^O, m_i^O)}{\beta_0 \bar{m}_O}.
$$

(22)

This is now the distributional characteristic in the equality of opportunity case. To interpret the provision rule in Equation (21), notice first that in the case where the distributional characteristic $\delta_O$ is zero, implying that the government is not at all averse to inequality in educational attainment, the left-hand side just measures the relative benefit of affecting overall educational level via the publicly provided good versus leaving the income to the households. This is captured by the sum of $m_i^O$. This benefit needs to be weighed against the cost of provision, captured by the first term at the right, $\gamma_O N\pi = N\pi$ in the case with no distributional concerns. As in the welfarist case, the cost of provision is reduced if the publicly provided good leads to an increase in the tax revenue (this happens if $\frac{dl}{dg}$ is positive).

Consider now the influence of aversion against inequality in educational attainment, captured by $\delta_O$. The denominator in $m_i^O$ is always positive (education is a normal good). The sign of the numerator in
depends on the net impact of public provision on education. As we discussed above, it is likely to be positive, but if public provision is a substitute for private purchases of education at the lower end of the income distribution and a complement at the upper end, the net impact of public provision could well be higher in the upper end. With no distributional concerns, that would lead to an increase in the benefits of public provision. However, since $\beta^O_i$ is small for households with high incomes, the covariance in this case would be negative, meaning that education should be under-provided relative to the case with no distributional concerns. Naturally, in the case that $m^O_i$ were higher for households with low incomes, the covariance would become positive, leading to over-provision of education. This discussion is summarized below.

**Proposition 2.** Optimal public provision of education for a government whose social welfare function is motivated by equality of opportunity concerns is increasing in the relative impact of public provision versus additional income on educational attainment. The provision rule suggests distorting the public provision upwards if education services are more sensitive to public provision at the lower end of the distribution.

The proposition suggests that the role of public education depends on whether low-income students substitute or complement education by public provision. Peltzman (1973) suggested that public education could crowd out private purchases of schooling, and could even reduce overall schooling consumption. Empirical research has since found some support for the hypothesis, though the overall evidence is mixed. Cohodes and Goodman (2014), Cellini (2009), and Long (2004) find strong crowding-out effects in the context of public colleges in the USA, suggesting that the net effect on education consumption of increasing public provision could be zero or even negative. However, in a similar context, Castleman and Long (2013) do not find public provision to affect private education consumption. Slightly more positive results have been found in the context of preschool programmes. Several papers have found the net impact of public provision to be positive, as private provision is either not substituted for public provision, or at least is substituted only partly (Bassok et al. 2014; Bastos and Straume 2016; Brinkman et al. 2017; Cascio 2009; Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013).

Only a few papers look at heterogeneity of crowding out across income levels. Cohodes and Goodman (2014) find that public college subsidies increased enrolment among the poorest students, even though on net the programme reduced education consumption (as the poorest students formed a small share of the target population). However, Long (2004) finds the opposite, that the poorest students are more sensitive to public subsidies and education crowding out is therefore more severe at the lower end of the income distribution. In the preschool context, Brinkman et al. (2017) find no heterogeneity between poorer and less poor families in Indonesia, but Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) find that crowding out is focused among higher-income families in the U.S., as they substitute private care for less expensive public care.

There is not much literature on the income effect on consumption of education, but Long’s (2004) simulations suggest that changing the in-kind tuition subsidy to public schools into a non-tied grant that can be used in any college, students would consume more education by choosing four-year colleges over two-year colleges, and more selective private colleges over public colleges. Low-income students would be more sensitive to the change than high-income students.

Given the mixed results in the empirical literature, the sign of the numerator of $m^O_i$ is likely to be very context-specific, although we consider it plausible that it would be more positive or less negative for poorer families. There is suggestive evidence that the denominator would be positive, and more strongly so for the disadvantaged students.
4.3 Commodity taxation: subsidizing education

The government maximizes \( \sum_i O^i \left( e^i(q, b) \right) \) subject to its budget constraint \( \sum_i t_i x_i - Nb = 0 \). It is shown in the Appendix that optimal commodity taxation can be characterized with the rule below:

\[
\sum_i \sum_j t_j \partial \tilde{x}_i^j = N \text{cov}(\rho_{O}, x_i^k) - \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_i O^i \frac{\partial \tilde{e}^i}{\partial q_k},
\]

where \( \rho_{O} \) is again the net social marginal value of income. The left-hand side of Equation (23) is the compensated aggregated change in the demand of each good. The right-hand side now includes, in comparison to the welfarist rule in Equation (11), an extra term on top of the covariance rule. Moreover, the covariance rule now measures the relation between the paternalistic net social marginal value of income and the demand for a particular good. According to the second term at the right, when considering the price of education \( (k = e) \), the demand for education should be encouraged by the tax system, since the own price effect on compensated demand is always negative. This term works towards subsidizing consumption by the tax system. The second term, the covariance term, takes into account distributional concerns, now measured in terms of equality in access to education. If education is highly appreciated by households with high marginal social net value of income (low-income households), this term works towards further effective subsidies on education. In cases where education is valued more by households with low social weight, the covariance term is negative, and it tends to reduce educational subsidies. This leads to Proposition 3:

**Proposition 3.** Educational services should be encouraged by the tax system. The greater the relative price sensitivity of educational services among households with higher income, the lower the degree of encouragement.

4.4 Interpretation using generalized social marginal welfare weights

We now contrast our approach with that of Saez and Stantcheva (2016) and work with their notion of generalized marginal social welfare weights. These weights are represented by \( \xi^i(c^i, x^i, z^i, u^i, \chi^i, b^i, s^i) \). Here, \( \chi^{i, a} \) denotes characteristics that enter the private utility function, \( \chi^{i, b} \) those that are accounted for only by the social planner, and \( \chi^{i, s} \) those characteristics that affect both individual and social welfare. We extend their approach, which was used in the case of income tax alone, to also cover public provision and commodity taxation. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) show in their online appendix how, in the case in which the individual utility is a money-metric one, the approach can be thought of as if the government were maximizing \( \sum_i \xi^i v^i \). When indirect utility is money-metric, the social marginal value of income to individual \( i \) is just \( \xi^i \). If the government were welfaristic with a social welfare function of \( W \{ v \} \), then \( \xi^i = \frac{\partial W}{\partial v^i} \).

We can show that the public good provision rule is then simply

\[
\sum_i m^i (1 + \delta_{SS}^i) = \gamma \left( N \pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial g} \right),
\]

where

\[
\delta_{SS}^i = \frac{\text{cov}(\xi^i, m^i)}{\xi m},
\]

with the distributional characteristic of publicly provided education now defined on the basis of \( \xi \). Alternatively, the rule can be written as

\[
\sum_i m^i = N \pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial g} - N \text{cov}(\rho_{SS}^i, m^i).
\]
Here,
\[ \rho_{SS}^i = \frac{\xi_i}{\mu} + \tau w_i \frac{\partial \bar{f}}{\partial g} \] (27)
is the generalized net social marginal value of income.

In the case of commodity taxation, the optimal tax rule is of the form
\[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial \bar{x}_i^j}{\partial q_j} = \text{cov}(\rho_{SS}^i, x_k^i), \] (28)
where
\[ \rho_{SS}^i = \frac{g_i}{\mu} + \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b}. \] (29)

However, the Saez–Stantcheva (SS) approach only works for such social preferences that are not paternalistic—that is, they accept individual welfare as a starting point. Therefore, our formulation above, where \( O(e) \) is a function of education alone and does not put any welfare weight to the consumption of other goods or leisure, is not compatible with the SS approach. Alternative formulations of equality of opportunity could be in line with the SS framework and we explore them below in Section 6.

5 Non-linear income taxation

5.1 Mixed taxation

The model is now extended so that the government still taxes (or subsidizes) commodities using linear instruments, but it can tax income in a non-linear fashion. Income after direct taxation is \( y^i = z^i - T(z^i) \), where \( T \) denotes any non-linear function. Again, \( y^i \) is spent on consumption goods, subject to linear taxes, such that \( y^i = q^i \), where \( q = p + t \), with \( p \) denoting producer prices.

It will be useful to utilize the dual approach for this analysis, as done by Tuomala (1990). We denote the expenditure function as \( E(q, z, w, v) \), which is defined as the minimum expenditure to reach utility \( u(x, z, w) = v \). The partially indirect utility is \( v(q, b, z, w) \), which results from the household choosing consumption optimally given a budget constraint \( q x = b \), where \( b = E \) is the expenditure available for the linearly taxed good.

As always in a non-linear income tax problem, we need to take into account the household incentive compatibility constraint. Using the expenditure function, it can be stated as (for any \( w, w' \)):
\[ E[q, z(w), u(x(w), z(w), w), w] \leq E[q, z(w), u(x(w), z(w), w'), w'], \] (30)
since the right-hand side is greater than or equal to \( q x(w) \). On the other hand, the latter is the same as the left-hand side. This means that \( w' = w \) is the value that minimizes the expression at the right. The derivative with respect to \( w' \) vanishes at \( w \) so that
\[ E_v u_w + E_w = 0. \]

This serves as the incentive compatibility constraint. Alternatively, it can also be written as
\[ v'(w) + \frac{E_w}{E_v} = 0, \] (31)
because \( u_w = v'(w) \) by the envelope theorem.

The resource constraint is

\[
\int (z - p\tilde{x}) f dw = 0,
\]

where \( \tilde{x}(q, z, v, w) \) denotes the compensated demand for goods.

Kanbur et al. (2006) study in this setting optimal taxation when the government minimizes income poverty, whereas in the present paper the government objective is to achieve a suitable distribution of education. \( \int O[\tilde{e}(q, z, v, w)] f dw \). Note that the government objective only depends on one of the consumption goods—education—and it is written in terms of compensated demand similarly to the rest of the analysis that follows.

As shown in the Appendix, the rule for optimal commodity taxation can be written as

\[
\int t \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial q} f dw = -\int \omega \frac{\partial x}{\partial w} f dw - \int \frac{1}{\mu} O' \frac{\partial \tilde{e}}{\partial q} f dw,
\]

where \( \omega = E^{-1} \alpha / \mu > 0 \). In this formula, the left-hand side is the compensated aggregated change in educational purchases and the first term at the right is the conventional welfarist term. Originally derived by Mirrlees (1976), it states that the consumption of goods that are valued relatively highly by high-ability types—that is if \( \frac{\partial x}{\partial w} > 0 \)—should be discouraged by the tax system. Further analysis has shown that this term vanishes if utility is separable between commodity demand and leisure (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976).

In addition, there is a new term that measures the impact of commodity taxes on educational purchases. The own price effect is negative, implying that the term is on the whole positive. This works towards encouraging the consumption of education, and this term becomes greater with higher social welfare weight for the household in question (i.e. for low-skilled households) and with more price-elastic demand. This result is summarized below.

**Proposition 4.** In an optimal mixed tax system, the consumption of educational services should be encouraged by the tax system. The larger the compensated own-price elasticity of demand, in particular among low-skilled households, the greater the degree of encouragement.

A corollary to this finding is that even if preferences are separable between commodity demand and leisure, uniform commodity taxation is not optimal. The reason is that the social planner still wants to encourage the consumption of educational services.

We now turn to examining the non-linear part of taxation. For that purpose, one takes the derivative of the Lagrangian in Equation (70) with respect to \( z \). The optimality condition is

\[
O' \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{e}(q, z, v, w)}{\partial z} \right) f - \mu \frac{\partial x}{\partial z} f + \alpha \frac{\partial (E_w/E_v)}{\partial z} = 0.
\]

This expression can be modified (see the Appendix) to obtain a condition for the effective marginal tax rate (i.e. the increase in labour income and commodity taxes when income increases)—which is just the marginal income tax rate in case in which there are no commodity taxes or subsidies:

\[
\left( 1 - t \frac{\partial x}{\partial b} \right) s + 1 + t \frac{\partial x}{\partial z} = -\frac{1}{f} \omega s_w - \frac{1}{\mu} O' \frac{\partial \tilde{e}}{\partial z},
\]

where \( s = \frac{v_z}{v_z} \) is the marginal rate of substitution between \( z = wl \) and expenditure on goods, \( \omega > 0 \), and \( s_w \) is the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution with respect to ability level. The left-hand side
measures the effective marginal tax rate. The first terms at the right are the same as in the standard Mirrlees (1976) welfaristic model. The second term at the right is the impact of the equality of opportunity concerns on the marginal tax rate. In general it means that the marginal tax rate is not zero at the end points. The last term consists of two components, the first capturing the concavity of the social objective function and the second the link between labour supply and private educational purchases. If an increase in earnings leads to an increase in educational purchases by the households, the last term is on the whole negative, and implies a reduction in the tax rate. The impact of this concern is greater for low-income households, as the social marginal welfare weight tends to be larger for them. These observations lend themselves to Proposition 5.

**Proposition 5.** In an optimal mixed tax system, the effective marginal tax rates at the end points are not zero. The effective marginal tax is, ceteris paribus, smaller when labour income and educational purchases are complements. The higher is the social marginal value of education at that ability level, the larger this effect is.

Naturally, when income and education are substitutes, effective marginal tax rates tend to increase. These mechanisms serve as a way for the government to indirectly influence the educational level via labour supply. An interesting case is one in which income increases at one ability level raise the demand for education and lead to reductions in education at another. Consider, for instance, a situation in which at low ability levels income and education are complements, whereas they would be substitutes at higher ability levels. This would mean that the effective marginal tax rate tends to go down at low income levels and is pushed upwards at higher incomes. As always in optimal tax research, one needs to remember that this reasoning is only valid when other things are equal, and these other things may not remain intact as the optimality conditions are evaluated at different levels when making comparisons between traditional welfarist versus non-welfarist analyses.

### 5.2 Public provision

The provision rule for public education is presented here for the case in which it is financed with a non-linear income tax. For brevity, subsidies and other indirect taxes are assumed away, but enlarging the analysis to cover them would be straightforward along the lines of the analysis by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004: section 5). The government objective function is now written as $\int O[e(\tilde{c}(z,v,w,g),g)] f dw$.

Again we show in the Appendix how this can be further modified to arrive at the following provision rule:

$$\int \pi f dw = \int \sigma f dw - \int \omega \sigma_v dw + \int \frac{1}{\mu} O' \left( \frac{\partial e}{\partial c} \frac{\partial \tilde{c}(z,v,w,g)}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial e}{\partial g} \right).$$

(36)

The rule compares the marginal cost of public provision (the left-hand side) with the marginal benefits (right-hand side). The first two terms are familiar from the welfarist case. They measure the willingness to pay for the public provision and the way this willingness is linked with ability level. The last term at the right is novel: it measures the impact of public provision on equality of education. The greater the overall impact (both directly and indirectly via private purchases), the higher the marginal benefits of public provision.
The last approach to equality of opportunity we apply is a version of the fairness theory developed, for example, by Fleurbaey (2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). It is non-welfarist and yet based on individual preferences, and is closely associated with theories of equality of opportunity developed, for example, by Roemer and Trannoy (2015, 2016).

Like modern theories of justice and equality of opportunity, the fairness theory seeks a balance between reward (right to fruits of own effort) and compensation (right for compensation due to bad circumstances beyond individual control). This is done through axioms specifying the acceptable transfers, usually Pigou–Dalton transfers, and accepting the Pareto principle. These, together with a money-metric measure of individual welfare proposed by Hansson (1973) usually lead to a maximin or leximin social welfare ordering over the money-metric utilities. The money-metric welfare is obtained by asking what lump-sum income (transfer), with everybody facing the same salient (determined by used requirements of justice) circumstances, would make an individual indifferent between her present state and the state in which she faces the equalized circumstances. We focus on this ‘egalitarian equivalence’ concept of fairness, as it is closest to the other recent theories of equality of opportunity. This obviously requires fixing the salient circumstances.

The questions studied in this paper have been studied from the fairness point of view in a closely related paper by Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) focusing on optimal (non-linear) income taxation. We use and extend the linear taxation version presented in the working paper version of their paper (Fleurbaey and Valletta 2013). In this section we (1) show that the Fleurbaey–Valletta model and the model used in the previous sections produce qualitatively similar results for linear income taxation and education subsidies; (2) show that the results from the fairness approach can be formally presented in a way similar to results in the previous sections, improving the comparability, and also show more detailed characterizations of the optimal fair policies; and (3) extend the fair tax model with commodity taxation and public provision of education.

In the Fleurbaey–Valletta-model, education improves personal productivity instead of increasing individual welfare as in the models used in the previous sections. In both approaches the key is the education production function, that is the education level is a function of private investment and public provision of education. Fleurbaey and Valletta use it in the form of the (individual) cost of obtaining a certain level of education for a given public level of public provision. The cost function is taken as a circumstance facing individuals.

The education production function used above, $e^i (c^i, g)$, can be inverted to find the cost of obtaining a given level of education:

$$c^i = c^i (e^i, g), \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial e^i} > 0, \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial g} \leq 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (37)

Fleurbaey and Valletta, based on Valletta (2014), argue that the salient circumstances are the average productivity and the average cost of education. The same justice requirements can be applied to the model used above, but we also indicate how the results would be modified if education also has an impact on individual productivity. Thus the transfer needed to make the individual indifferent between her present state and the state with harmonized circumstances is the value function of the optimization

\footnote{See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018); Fleurbaey et al. (2003). It is also consistent with Pareto efficiency.}

\footnote{This is one way of avoiding Arrow’s impossibility result.}
problem:

$$\min x + \tau (e, g) - \pi l$$

s.t. $$u^i(e, x, l) \geq u^i(e', x', l')$$

(38)

Here, $$u^i(e', x', l')$$ is the welfare of individual $$i$$ at the current allocation of resources. Thus, the value function (the transfer) for individual $$i$$ is

$$\vartheta^i = \vartheta^i(\tau, \pi, u^i(e, x, l)).$$

(39)

Note that we allow for heterogeneity in individual utility functions and assume individuals to be responsible for their preferences. An individual’s welfare is, for the case of linear income tax and public provision of education, given by the indirect utility function $$v^i(t, b, g)$$, as above, and is analogous for the case of commodity taxes.

Social welfare is maximized by maximizing the welfare of the worst-off person.\(^5\) We give this person index $$o$$ (so that individuals are indexed as: $$i = 1,...,N-1,o$$).

The case of non-linear taxation is dealt with thoroughly by Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) and Valletta (2014). In general, their results are in line with the results here: the optimal income tax is progressive, but there are modifications especially in the case where subsidization/taxation of education is also allowed. This shows up also in the case of linear taxation.

Our main results specify exact conditions that the worst-off person’s consumption patterns, willingness to pay, and investments have to hold for commodity taxation to favour the worst-off person, the social cost of public provision to be reduced, and private investment to education to be taxed (or subsidized). These are more detailed than obtained in the welfarist or equality of opportunity approach analysed above. The details of the derivation are presented in the Appendix.

6.1 Linear taxation

Optimal policies maximize the money-metric measure of the worst-off person, $$\vartheta^o(\bar{\pi}, \bar{\tau}, v^i(1 - \tau, b))$$. In the Appendix we show that the tax rule satisfies

$$\frac{\tau^*}{1 - \tau^*} = \frac{1 - A \theta^o}{\sum_i \theta^i \varepsilon^i_{1-\tau}}.$$  

(40)

Here, $$A \equiv 1 - \tau \sum_i \frac{w^i}{\pi b} \varepsilon^i_{1,b} > 0$$, and $$\varepsilon^i_{y,x}$$ is the elasticity of $$y$$ with respect to $$x$$. $$\theta^i$$ denotes the share of individual $$i$$’s income in total income, $$\theta^i \equiv \frac{w^i}{\sum_i w^i}$$. The tax rate is positive and below unity as long as $$\sum_i \theta^i \varepsilon^i_{1-\tau} > 0$$, which is plausible, and when $$A \theta^o < 1$$. The formula in Equation (40) is analogous to our results for linear tax in the other cases. The difference is that it focuses on the income of the worst-off citizen relative to the average income as the key parameter. In other words, the theory proposes this ratio as the key parameter to look for when analysing the fairness of linear income tax systems.

In the case where education improves productivity, the qualitative results are exactly the same as above, but one must add terms including elasticities of labour supply with respect to the net-of-tax rate and the demogrant, as well as elasticities of wage with respect to the same variables. In effect, the elasticities that matter are the elasticities of individual incomes with respect to tax and the demogrant.

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\(^5\) Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) discuss conditions for the existence of a worst-off person.
6.2 Public provision

The optimality conditions in the fairness case can be written in exactly the same format as the welfaristic optimality conditions in the previous sections. This is as the fair social welfare function gives $\beta_0^o \equiv \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \rho}$ as the marginal social welfare weight of the worst-off person, while the weight for the others is $\beta_i^o = 0, i \neq o$ (as $\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial \rho} = 0$). Thus, the public provision rule can be expressed as follows:

$$\beta_0^o m^o = \mu \left( N \pi - \sum_i \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} \right).$$

(41)

This is the fairness equivalent to the welfarist public provision rule (Equation 4). It is difficult to infer from Equation (41) what it implies for public education compared to the public provision and to the Samuelson-efficient provision. In both cases, though, if increased public education increases tax revenue, the cost of public provision is lower than in the Samuelsonian case. But there are other effects. To get ahead, note that $\beta_0^o m^o = \sum_i \beta_i^o m^i$, and hence Equation (41) can be rewritten as, equivalent to Equation (6),

$$\sum_i m_i (1 + \bar{\delta}_F) = \mu \left( N \pi - \sum_i \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} \right),$$

(42)

where $\bar{\delta}_F = \frac{\text{cov}(\beta_i^o, m_i)}{\beta_i^o m_i}$, with $\bar{\beta}_F \equiv \frac{\sum_i \beta_i^o}{N} = \frac{\beta_o^o}{N}$.

The ‘fair’ demand for public education is higher (or the cost of public provision lower) than the Samuelson-efficient demand if $\bar{\delta}_F > 0$. This holds (see the Appendix) if and only if

$$m^o > \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} m_i}{N-1},$$

(43)

otherwise the demand is reduced. Thus, if the worst-off person values education more than the other citizens on average, the fairness criterion suggests, ceteris paribus, extension of public education. But this does not have to be the case.

The result is also different from the welfarist case. In the welfarist case distributional concerns (social value of income to low-income earners) increase the value of public provision if it covaries positively with the private valuation of education. In the fairness case, only the private valuation of education by the worst-off person matters.

This result can be further developed, as in the welfarist case above, by again defining the net social marginal value of income to person $i$ as $\rho_i^f = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \rho} + \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho}$. Using the Edwards et al. (1994) decomposition (Equation 54), this results in:

$$\sum_i m_i = N \pi - \sum_i \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} - N \text{cov}(\rho_i^f, m^i).$$

(44)

As $\beta_i^o = 0$ for all but the worst-off person, $\rho_i^f = \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} < 0$ for all $i \neq o$: their net social marginal value of income is negative. Equation (44) tells us that if $\text{cov}(\rho_i^f, m^i) > 0$ then the (social) cost of public provision (the left-hand side of Equation (44)) is reduced. Utilizing again the structure of the net social marginal value of income in our special case and the fact implied by Equation (88) that $\frac{\sum_i \beta_i^o}{N} \equiv \beta_F = 1$, this holds if and only if (for a proof see the Appendix)

$$m^o > \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \left( 1 - \tau \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} \right)} m^i.$$  

(45)

---

Note that with endogenous productivity this would be $\rho_i^f = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \rho} + \tau w_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho} + \tau l_i \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial \rho}$. 

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Again the crucial requirement is that the worst-off person puts a relatively high value upon publicly provided education. This does not have to be the case.

A third interpretation for the optimal education policy is:

\[ m^o = \frac{N\pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \pi}}{N - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \pi}}. \]

This can be rewritten as

\[ Nm^o = \frac{N\pi - \sum_i \tau w^i \epsilon_{i,g}}{1 - \sum_i \tau w^i \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \pi}}. \]

Here, \( \epsilon_{i,b} \equiv \frac{\partial \pi^i}{\partial b^i} \) is the income elasticity of labour supply and \( \epsilon_{i,g} \) is the corresponding elasticity with respect to public provision of education. We know that \( \epsilon_{i,b} < 0 \) if leisure is a normal good, as we assume.

This formulation is the equivalent to the standard optimality condition for optimal public good production. The left-hand side of Equation (47) gives the willingness to pay for the public education and again highlights the importance of the willingness to pay for public education by the worst-off person. This is important, as Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) argue, because the worst-off person is not only one of the deserving poor, but also a person with high cost of education (e.g. due to the high cost of reaching a given level of education). This can arise, for example, if public education does not reduce the overall cost of education, which is the case when the education level is very insensitive to changes in public education: \( \frac{\partial e^o}{\partial g} \) is small. This would mean that public education is not very effective in improving the social welfare (nor the welfare of the worst-off person). It raises the possibility that taxing education is optimal.

Note that the optimal income tax rate is exactly the same as in the case of pure linear tax system without public provision.

6.3 Commodity taxation

Using \( \beta_i^k \) as above (\( \beta_i^k \equiv \frac{\partial \pi^i}{\partial x^k} \)); \( \beta^0_i = 0, i \neq o \), the optimal commodity taxes satisfy the condition, similar to the welfarist case above,

\[ \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_i^j}{\partial q_j} = N\text{cov} (\rho^o_F, x^o_k), \]

where

\[ \rho^o_F = \frac{\beta^o_i}{\mu} + \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b}. \]

As in the welfarist case, this means that if the individuals with the greatest social weight tend consume less of good \( k \) than the people with less weight, the commodity taxes are set to reduce the consumption of the good. In the fairness case we can actually say something more specific. It can be shown that the covariance is negative if and only if:

\[ x^o_k < \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \frac{\alpha^i \overline{x}^i}{(\sum_i \alpha^i) \overline{x}^i}, \]

where \( \alpha^i = 1 - \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b} \). The consumption of good \( k \) by the worst-off person must be below a weighted average of the consumption of the same good by other individuals for the commodity taxes to punish
the consumption of the good. The intuition is clear: the investment by the worst-off is taxed but so are all other investments, which, on average, are higher than the investment by the worst-off. This implies that the gain in education tax revenue is high enough to either reduce the income tax rate or increase the demogrant $b$ enough to increase the (money-metric) welfare of the worst-off person.

This result is analogous (but not exactly the same) to the result of Fleurbaey and Valletta (2013). In the more general case, where the optimal income tax rate can vary by the level of income, this result does not hold (Fleurbaey and Valletta 2018). Instead, the education investments are to be subsidized up to some level, after which the subsidy rate equals 0, but are never taxed.

7 Conclusion

Let us return to the four questions posed in the introduction, which emerge from the policy discourse. Is it the case that progressive taxation is not used at all under opportunities-based objectives? We have shown that the argument of ‘progressive taxation for welfarist objectives and equal provision of public education for equality of opportunity objectives’ poses a false dichotomy. Progressive taxation is a potent instrument for equalizing opportunity through equalizing education outcomes. What does the differential use of progressive taxation under the two objectives depend upon? We have derived and presented optimal tax formulae in a way that facilitates comparison between the two regimes. When educational outcomes are highly sensitive to parental inputs relative to public provision, perhaps paradoxically the case for progressive taxation tends to be stronger under the equality of opportunity objective.

Is it the case that higher provision of public education can advance the opportunity-based objective? Will the provision of public education in this case necessarily be higher than when the objective is welfarist? We have shown how answers to these questions depend on the nature of the ‘education production function’—the precise way in which parental and public inputs go together to produce educational outcomes for children. The extent of public provision is relatively low, if education is valued relatively more by high-income households (as might well be the case).

The answers to these questions illustrate how our framework can help to address specific questions in the policy discourse. Our analysis has, however, been wider ranging. We have used our framework to assess commodity taxation, where we get results on education subsidies similar to those on public provision. We have analysed non-linear income taxation under the two regimes and shown that, unlike for the welfarist case, for equality of opportunity the effective marginal tax rates should not be set to zero at the end points of ability distribution. We have also highlighted how the generalized welfare weights framework of Saez and Stantcheva (2016) cannot fully capture the non-welfarism inherent in equality of opportunity objectives.

Our paper relates to a recent, growing literature on taxation in an equality of opportunity and fairness framework. Most recently, Roemer and Ünveren (2016) set up an intergenerational model in which the current generation makes decisions on education for their children, the future generation. They use public provision of education as the tool to equalize opportunities. The taxes, however, are not used for redistribution but only to finance the public provision of education. Their numerical simulations show that when private acquisition of education is possible, it can undo the intended effect of state provision. They also consider the implications of banning private purchases of education.

Other recent contributions related to our paper are those by Fleurbaey (2006), Valletta (2014), and Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018). These works extend the literature on fair taxation (e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2006, 2011) by considering optimal taxation together with goods such as education and health expenditure, which affect the individual’s labour productivity and over which they also have direct preferences.
We have discussed Fleurbaey and Valletta’s (2018) model extensively in Section 6. They build on Valletta’s (2014) simpler model by considering a continuum of types and outcomes, and consider a broader context of human capital investment, which can mean either education or health expenditures, or a combination of both. Unlike our paper, both of these works only consider the case of public subsidies and not of direct public provision. Further, multi-dimensional heterogeneity makes it quite complicated to obtain more general results. In this paper we have presented a formulation that relates the Fleurbaey and Valletta (2018) formulation to conventional formulations in the literature, allowing easier comparisons and understandings.

Equality of opportunity has emerged as a major framework for the public policy discourse. This paper has attempted to present a framework in which the consequences of this framework can be compared to those of the welfarist literature. In the process we have asked and answered a number of specific questions on taxation and public provision to show the utility of the formulation. In particular, we have shown that progressive taxation and equality of opportunity are not opposed to each other. A rich research agenda lies ahead.
References


Appendix

Welfarist benchmark

The Lagrangian for a welfarist government is

\[
\sum_i W \{ v^i [(1 - \tau), b, g] \} + \mu \left( \sum_i (1 - a) w^i l^i - Nb - N\pi g \right),
\]

where \( a = 1 - \tau \). The first-order conditions of the government optimization problem with respect to \( 1 - \tau, b, \) and \( g \), are:

\[
\sum_i W' \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} - w^i l^i \right) = 0 \tag{51}
\]

\[
\sum_i W' \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial b} + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} - 1 \right) = 0 \tag{52}
\]

\[
\sum_i W' \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial g} + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} - \pi \right) = 0 \tag{53}
\]

Equations (51) and (52) can be used to derive the optimal linear income tax in Equation (1) (see Kanbur et al. 2018).

As per public good provision, Edwards et al. (1994) show that the following Slutsky-type property

\[
\frac{\partial l^i}{\partial g} = \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial g} + m^i \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial b} \tag{54}
\]

(where \( \tilde{l} \) depicts compensated labour supply) holds. Using these concepts, Equation (53) becomes

\[
\sum_i W' \frac{\partial v^i}{\partial g} + \mu \sum_i \left[ \tau w^i \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial g} + m^i \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial b} \right) - \pi \right] = 0 \tag{55}
\]

\[
\iff \sum_i \left( \frac{\rho^i}{\mu} + \tau w \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial g} \right) m^i = N\pi - \sum_i \tau w \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial g}. \tag{56}
\]

\[
\iff \sum_i \rho^i m^i = N\pi - \sum_i \tau w \frac{\partial \tilde{l}^i}{\partial g}. \tag{57}
\]

The left-hand side of this formulation can be written as:

\[
\sum_i \rho^i m^i = N \frac{\sum_i \rho^i m^i}{N} + N \frac{\sum_i \rho^i \sum_i m^i}{N} - N \frac{\rho^i \sum_i m^i}{N} \tag{58}
\]

\[
= \sum_i m^i + N \text{cov} \left( \rho^i, m^i \right).
\]

Rewriting it leads to the rule given in the main text in Equation (9).
Equality of opportunity and income taxation

Equation (15) can be obtained as follows. First, rewrite the first-order conditions (12) and (13) by adding and subtracting terms as:

\[
\sum_i \beta^i z^i + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} - w^i l^i \right) + \sum_i \frac{dP^i}{d(1 - \tau)} \sum_i \beta^i z^i = 0 \tag{59}
\]

\[
\sum_i \beta^i + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} - 1 \right) + \sum_i \frac{dP^i}{db} \sum_i \beta^i = 0. \tag{60}
\]

Denote \( \sum_i \frac{dP^i}{d(1 - \tau)} \sum_i \beta^i z^i = C(1 - \tau) \) and \( \sum_i \frac{dP^i}{db} \sum_i \beta^i = C_b \). Multiply Equation (60) by \( \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \beta^i \) and divide Equation (59) by \( N \). Then subtract the former from the latter to get:

\[
\frac{\sum_i \beta^i z^i}{N} - \frac{\sum_i \beta^i \sum_i z^i}{N} + \frac{\mu \tau}{N} \left( \sum_i w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} - \sum_i w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} \sum_i \frac{\partial z^i}{N} \right) + \sum_i \frac{dP^i}{d(1 - \tau)} + \left( \frac{C(1 - \tau)}{n} - \frac{C_b \sum_i z^i}{n} \right) = 0. \tag{61}
\]

Collecting terms then yields the result in the main text.

When the social objective is to achieve an equal distribution of education, the first-order conditions governing the choice of the tax rate are:

\[
\sum_i O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial e^i} \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} - w^i l^i \right) = 0 \tag{62}
\]

\[
\sum_i O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial c^i} \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial b} + \mu \sum_i \left( \tau w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} - 1 \right) = 0. \tag{63}
\]

Dividing these two yields:

\[
\frac{\sum_i O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial c^i} \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial b}}{1 - \tau \sum_i w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)}} = \frac{w^i l^i - \tau \sum_i w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)}}{1 - \tau \sum_i w^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)}}. \tag{64}
\]

Following the steps in Kanbur et al. (2018: 83–84) yields the rule in Equation (16).

Equality of opportunity and commodity taxation

The first-order conditions are:

\[
\sum_i O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial b} + \mu \left( \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b} - N \right) = 0 \tag{65}
\]

\[
\sum_i O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial q_k} + \mu \left( \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial q_k} + \sum_j x_j^i \right) = 0. \tag{66}
\]

The first one of these can be used if the government is allowed/able to set the demogrant optimally. Denote again

\[
\rho^\circ = O^i \frac{\partial e^i}{\partial b} \frac{1}{\mu} + \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b} \tag{67}
\]

as the net social marginal utility of income for person \( i \). Equation (65) implies that \( \rho^\circ = 1 \). Using the Slutsky equation,

\[
\frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial q_k} = \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial q_k} - x_j^i \frac{\partial x_j^i}{\partial b}
\]
Consider first the first-order condition with respect to commodity prices, \( q \).

This means that

\[
\sum_i O \frac{1}{\mu} \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{v}_i}{\partial q_k} - q_i \frac{\partial v'_i}{\partial p} \right) + \left[ \sum_i \sum_j t_j \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{x}_j}{\partial q_k} - q_j \frac{\partial x'_j}{\partial p} \right) + \sum x_k \right] = 0.
\]  

(68)

With the help of Equation (67), Slutsky symmetry, and by rearrangement, this can be written as

\[
\sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial \tilde{x}_j}{\partial q_j} = \sum_j \rho_j x_k - \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_i O \frac{\partial \tilde{v}_i}{\partial q_k},
\]

(69)

which can also be expressed in a covariance format (Equation 23) in the main text.

Equality of opportunity and mixed taxation

The government maximizes its social welfare function subject to the constraints in Equations (31) and (32). The Lagrangian of this problem is

\[
L = \int \left\{ \left( \tilde{v}(q, z, v, w) + \mu(z - px) \right) f + \alpha v'(w) + \frac{E_w}{E_v} \right\} dw
\]

\[
 = \int \left\{ \left( \tilde{v}(q, z, v, w) + \mu(z - px) \right) f - \alpha' v(w) + \frac{E_w}{E_v} \right\} dw
\]

(70)

+ \alpha(\infty)v(\infty) - \alpha(0)v(0),

where \( f \) is the distribution function of abilities and where the equality follows from integration by parts.

Consider first the first-order condition with respect to commodity prices, \( q \), which is given by

\[
\int O' \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{v}(q, z, v, w)}{\partial q} \right) f dw - \int O \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{x}(q, z, v, w)}{\partial q} \right) f + \alpha \frac{\partial (E_w/E_v)}{\partial q} \right) dw = 0.
\]

(71)

The rule for optimal commodity taxes in the case of mixed taxation (Equation 33) can be derived as follows. Note first that because of the properties of the expenditure function,

\[
\frac{\partial (E_w/E_v)}{\partial q} = \left( E_{wq} E_v - E_{vq} E_w \right) / E_v^2 = \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial w} - E_{wq} \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial v} \right) / E_v
\]

(72)

\[
= E_v^{-1} \left( \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial w} - u_w \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial v} \right) = E_v^{-1} \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial w}.
\]

Note also that because of the property \( q \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial q} = 0 \), one obtains

\[
\frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial q} = (q - t) \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial q} = -t \frac{\partial \tilde{x}}{\partial q}.
\]

(73)

Using these two conditions in Equation (71) gives the expression in Equation (33).

We now turn to the derivation of the effective marginal tax rate. Note that the marginal rate of substitution between income and expenditure on commodity goods can be written as \( s = \left( -\frac{b}{\tilde{z}} \right)_u = -E_z(q, u, z, w). \)

This means that

\[
\frac{\partial (E_w/E_v)}{\partial z} = E_v^{-1} \left( E_{wz} - (E_w/E_v) E_{vz} \right) = E_v^{-1} \left( E_{wz} - (E_w/E_v) E_{vz} u_z \right) \]

\[
= E_v^{-1} s_w(q, z, u, w).
\]
Also, because
\[
p \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial z} = q \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial z} - (q - p) \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial z} = E_z - t \left( \frac{\partial x}{\partial z} + \frac{\partial x}{\partial b} E_z \right) = - \left( 1 - t \frac{\partial x}{\partial b} \right) s - t \frac{\partial x}{\partial z}, \tag{75}
\]

one can rewrite the first-order condition in Equation (34) as the rule in Equation (35).

Finally, the Lagrangian in the case of public good provision is:
\[
L = \int \left\{ O \left[ e(\hat{c}(z,v,w,g),g) \right] + \mu(z - p\hat{x} - \pi g) f + \alpha v'(w) + \alpha \frac{E_w}{E_v} \right\} dw
\]
\[
= \int \left\{ O \left[ e(\hat{c}(z,v,w,g),g) \right] + \mu(z - p\hat{x} - \pi g) f - \alpha' v(w) + \alpha \frac{E_w}{E_v} \right\} dw + \alpha(\infty)v(\infty) - \alpha(0)v(0),
\tag{76}
\]

where the only difference to the Lagrangian in the previous section, in addition to the presence of public provision in the commodity demand, is the cost of provision that needs to be taken into account in the resource constraint. The first-order condition with respect to \( g \) is:
\[
\int O' \left( \frac{\partial e}{\partial c} \frac{\partial \hat{c}(z,v,w,g)}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial e}{\partial g} \right) f dw - \int \left( \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial q} + \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial b} \right) f - \mu\pi f + \alpha \frac{E_v}{E_v} \right\} dw = 0. \tag{77}
\]

To derive the optimum condition for public provision of education services under non-linear taxation, note that
\[
\frac{\partial (E_w/E_v)}{\partial g} = E_v^{-1} \left( E_{wg} - E_w E_{vg}/E_v \right) = E_v^{-1} \left( E_{wg} + E_{vg} v' \right)
\tag{78}
\]
\[
= E_v^{-1} \sigma_w(q,z,u,w),
\]

where \( \sigma = \frac{v_k}{v_h} = -E_k. \) Further, since \( t = 0, \) we have:
\[
p \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial g} = q \frac{\partial \hat{x}}{\partial g} = E_g = -\sigma. \tag{79}
\]

Using these two formulae in Equation (76) leads to the rule in Equation (36).

**Fair income taxation**

Individuals maximize their utility \( u^i(e^i,x^i,l^i) \) subject to the budget constraint \((1 - \tau) w^i l^i + b = x^i + c^i(\hat{e}^i). \) The optimization leads to the indirect utility \( v'(1 - \tau, b). \) The optimal policies maximize the money-metric measure of the worst-off person \( \theta^o(\hat{w}, \hat{e}, v'(1 - \tau, b)). \) The government budget constraint remains intact.

The first-order conditions for optimal policies are:
\[
\frac{\partial \theta^o}{\partial v^o(1 - \tau)} + \mu \left( - \sum \tau^i l^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} \right) = 0 \tag{80}
\]
\[
\frac{\partial \theta^o}{\partial \tau^o} \frac{\partial \tau^o}{\partial b} + \mu \left( \sum \tau^i l^i \frac{\partial l^i}{\partial b} - N \right) = 0. \tag{81}
\]

Dividing these equations side by side and utilizing Roy’s identity gives:
\[
w^o l^o = \frac{\sum \tau^i l^i - \sum \tau^i w^i \partial l^i / \partial (1 - \tau)}{N - \sum \tau^i w^i \partial l^i / \partial b}. \tag{82}
\]

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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of Equation (82) by $N$ and expressing labour supply effects in elasticity form leads to the equation:

\[
\left(1 - \tau \sum_i \frac{w_i' l_i b_i}{N b_i \partial \ell_i} b_i \right) w_i' l_i = \frac{\sum_i w_i' l_i}{N} - \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} \sum_i \frac{w_i' l_i}{N} \frac{\partial l_i}{\partial (1 - \tau)} l_i - \frac{1 - \tau}{1 - \tau},
\]

(83)

which can be rewritten as:

\[
A \theta^o = 1 - \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} \sum_i \theta^i \epsilon^i_{1 - \tau}.
\]

(84)

Here, $A \equiv 1 - \tau \sum_i \frac{w_i'}{N b_i} \epsilon^i_{1 - \tau} > 1$, $\epsilon^i_1$ is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to $x$, and $\theta^i \equiv \frac{w_i'}{\sum_i w_i'}$. Equation (84) can be solved for the tax rate, given in Equation (40) in the main text.

**Fair public provision**

The optimal public provision condition in Equation (41) is directly analogous to the welfarist case. The proof to obtain Equation (45) is analogous to the proof for Equation (50) in the fair commodity taxation case presented below.

**Fair commodity taxation**

Let the consumer price of good $j$ be $q_j$ with $q_j = 1 + t_j$. Ignoring public provision, the optimal policy maximizes $\theta^o = \theta^o (\tau, w, u^o (e^o, u^o, l^o))$, where the current choices by the individual maximize utility $u^o (e^o, x^o, l^o)$ subject to the budget constraint $w^o l^o + b \geq \sum_j q_j x^o_j + c^o (e^o)$. This gives the indirect utility $v^o (q, b)$ with $q$ denoting the vector of consumer prices. The social welfare function now becomes $\theta^o = \theta^o (\tau, w, v^o (q, b))$. The government maximizes this with the budget constraint (as above in the welfarist case): $\sum_j t_j x^o_j = Nb + R$, where the individual choices of consumption, labour supply, and education depend on tax rates $t_j$ and the lump sum income $b$. The first-order conditions are:

\[
\frac{\partial \theta^o}{\partial v^o} \frac{\partial v^o}{\partial q_k} + \mu \left( \sum_i x^o_i + \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^o_j}{\partial q_k} \right) = 0 \quad (85)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \theta^o}{\partial v^o} \frac{\partial v^o}{\partial b} + \mu \left( \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^o_j}{\partial b} \right) - \mu N = 0. \quad (86)
\]

Denote $\beta_F^o = \frac{\partial \theta^o}{\partial v^o} \frac{\partial v^o}{\partial b}$ for the worst-off person $o$. For all other $i \neq o$, $\beta_F^o = 0$. The direct marginal weight of a person in social welfare is 0 for all others than the worst-off person.\(^7\)

As $\frac{\partial \theta}{\partial q_k} = -\frac{\partial x^o}{\partial x_k}$ for any indirect utility function, Equation (85) can be rewritten (recalling that $\beta_F^i = 0, i = 1, \ldots, N - 1$) as:

\[
-\sum_i \beta_F^i x^o_i + \mu \left( \sum_i x^o_i + \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^o_j}{\partial q_k} \right) = 0.
\]

(87)

---

\(^7\) This is not true of the net social marginal utility of income of a person (see Equation 49). The net social marginal utility of a person other than the worst-off is positive if the change in her consumption due to a higher lump sup transfer increases commodity tax revenue, and negative in the reverse case.
Also, Equation (86) can be rewritten as:

$$\sum_i \beta_i^o + \mu \left( \sum_i \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial b} \right) = \mu N. \quad (88)$$

Now Equations (87) and (88) are formally identical to their counterparts in the welfarist case. The tax rule in Equation (48) can be derived from Equation (88) using the Slutsky equation

$$\frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial q^k} = \frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial q^k} - x^o_i \frac{\partial x^i_j}{\partial b}$$

and Slutsky symmetry.

In order to prove Equation (50), note first that the term in the right-hand side is obtained in a fashion similar to the commodity taxation case in the appendix of (Kanbur et al. 2018) by using

$$N \text{cov} (\rho_i^F, x_i^j) = \left( \frac{\beta^o}{\mu} + \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^o_j}{\partial b} - 1 \right) \left( x^o_i - \bar{x}^i \right) \left( x^k_i - \bar{x}^k \right)$$

$$+ \left( \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^1_j}{\partial b} - 1 \right) \left( x^1_i - \bar{x}^1 \right) + \ldots + \left( \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^{N-1}_j}{\partial b} - 1 \right) \left( x^{N-1}_i - \bar{x}^{N-1} \right). \quad (89)$$

Use Equation (88) again to get:

$$\frac{\beta^o}{\mu} = N - \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^o_j}{\partial b} - \ldots - \sum_j t_j \frac{\partial x^{N-1}_j}{\partial b}. \quad (90)$$

Substitute this in the covariance expression and note that $x^1_i - \bar{x}_k = x^1_i - x^o_i + x^o_i - \bar{x}_k$ to get the following expression:

$$N \text{cov} (\rho_i^F, x^i_j) = \left( 1 - \sum_i t_i \frac{\partial x^1_i}{\partial b} \right) \left( x^o_i - x^1_i \right) + \ldots + \left( 1 - \sum_i t_i \frac{\partial x^{N-1}_i}{\partial b} \right) \left( x^o_i - x^{N-1}_i \right). \quad (91)$$

By rearranging this, one can separate out terms in $x^o_i$ and the sum of other consumption levels. Requiring then the covariance to be negative results in Equation (50).