Involuntary migration, inequality, and integration

National and subnational influences

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Abstract: Across the world, we observe different experiences in terms of inequality between migrant and ‘host-country’ populations. What factors contribute to such variation? What policies and programmes facilitate ‘better’ economic integration? This paper, and the broader collection of studies that it frames, speaks to these questions through focused comparative consideration of two migrant populations (Vietnamese and Afghan) in four Western countries (Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US). It pays particular attention to involuntary migrants who fled conflict in their home regions beginning in the 1970s. The paper builds in particular on the literature on segmented assimilation theory, exploring new linkages with work on horizontal inequality, to highlight the role of five key sets of factors in such variation: governmental policies and institutions; labour market reception; existing co-ethnic communities; human capital and socioeconomic characteristics; and social cohesion or ‘groupness’.

Key words: economic integration, horizontal inequality, inequality, involuntary migrants, migration, segmented assimilation

JEL classification: F22, D6, O15, J15

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1 Introduction

International migration is a key fact of our increasingly globalized world. One of the major challenges spotlighted by recent world events is how best to support the integration of global migrants into culturally distinct host country economies, societies, and polities. How has integration varied across groups and contexts? What factors explain this variation? What policies and programmes facilitate ‘better’ integration? These questions resonate in turn with a growing research literature on horizontal inequality between ethnic or cultural groups that highlights the dangers such inequality may pose for both peace and economic prosperity (Alesina et al. 2016; Brown and Langer 2010; Cederman et al. 2011; Stewart 2008). While this body of work deals extensively with the implications of horizontal inequality, it leaves considerable space for research into the factors influencing its variation (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). International migration in particular is highlighted as a key source of new inequalities (Stewart 2016), but is largely undertheorized in this literature. Why are inequalities between migrant and majority host country populations deeper and more persistent in some situations than others?

This paper, and the series of which it is a part, approaches these questions through comparative consideration of the experience of two migrant populations (Vietnamese and Afghan) in four Western countries (Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US). It pays particular attention to involuntary migrants who fled conflict in their home regions beginning in the 1970s. It focuses on economic integration and inequality between these involuntary migrants and their descendants on the one hand, and the rest of the population on the other. This paper frames the series. It first situates it within the literature, including a discussion of key factors influencing variation in integration. It then turns to the cases and comparisons explored in this series, providing empirical context within which to consider the individual papers, as well as an introduction to their core arguments. Next, it explores variation across the cases and provides insight into how key factors identified in the literature play out in these studies. This discussion aims not at ‘testing’ theories, but at contributing to theory building and to the identification of promising directions for future research.

Overall, the paper makes three interrelated points. First, with reference to work on horizontal inequality, there should be no single expected ‘outcome’ in terms of the economic integration of international migrants in host countries. Instead, looking several decades or even a generation or two after migration, the literature points to multiple outcomes, ranging from full integration and equality to deep and persistent horizontal inequality. Second, various factors play a major role in influencing which situation results. These include factors influencing migrants’ ‘context of reception’—(1) governmental policies and institutions; (2) labour markets reception; and (3) existing co-ethnic communities (Portes and Borocz 1989; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). They also include factors that characterize the groups themselves—in particular, their (4) human capital and socioeconomic characteristics and (5) social cohesion or ‘groupness’. Third, all five sets of factors can be seen in the studies in this series, but several points seem to stand out in a collective reading focused on variation across the cases. These are the substantial influence of governance policies and practices—both specific migration policies and general social policies: the impact of labour market vulnerability and discrimination; the labour market role of ‘co-ethnic’ communities beyond national origin; and variation in migrant group cohesion and within-group diversity.

This broad argument builds on the literature on segmented assimilation theory, exploring new links with work on horizontal inequality, as well as providing new consideration of the conceptualization of core components and application across countries, speaking to recent critiques (see Luthra et
In addition, it incorporates several key points from recent literature on ethnic politics that point to the value of greater attention to the problematizing of social categories and groups.

2 Horizontal inequality, integration, and influences

This series brings into conversation several literatures. The first, largely from economics and political science, deals with ‘horizontal’ inequality, or inequality between groups in society defined in broadly conceived ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ terms (Stewart 2008). Horizontal inequality is distinguished from ‘vertical’ inequality between individuals and households. This series focuses on horizontal inequality between immigrants (including first-generation migrants and their descendants) and the rest of the population.

Horizontal inequality matters, not only for normative reasons, but also because of its possible negative implications for multiple socioeconomic outcomes, in particular conflict and underdevelopment (e.g. Alesina et al. 2016; Brown and Langer 2010; Cederman et al. 2011; Stewart 2008; United Nations and World Bank 2018). Indeed, the literature suggests, horizontal inequality may have a wider—and possibly greater—impact than vertical inequality and ethnic divisions (see Baldwin and Huber 2010). This implies, in brief, that more attention should be paid to understanding, addressing, and mitigating the negative impacts of horizontal inequalities than is currently the focus of much of the work on poverty and inequality, as well as on ethnic conflict.

Levels of horizontal inequality vary depending not only upon which groups are considered within a given country, but also over time and across subnational regions, as well as—to the extent that meaningful comparison is possible—across countries (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018; Selway 2011). While the literature tells us quite a lot about the potential implications of such variation, it leaves considerable gaps in theorizing its causes—that is, in considering horizontal inequality as an outcome. Work on this has focused on distant origins—linked, in particular, with geography, colonialism and conquest, and historical institutions—alongside factors contributing to the persistence of inequalities thus constituted, over decades and centuries (Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). Migration and the movement of peoples in connection with settler colonialism, slavery, and conquest is a significant theme in this work. It may also be among the major sources of more contemporary shifts and variation in horizontal inequality. Indeed, Stewart (2016) predicts that ‘rising flows of international migration are likely to be the biggest source of new horizontal inequalities’. Yet, while new immigrants in many situations are economically disadvantaged in comparison with majority populations, what to expect in terms of horizontal inequality as migrants settle over years and generations is less clear.

Exploring the multiple pathways that migrant integration takes is precisely the focus of a second body of work drawn on in this paper—largely from sociology. Classical assimilation theory, for one, implies a linear path of integration and assimilation, such that inequality between migrant and majority host-country populations lessens over time, with the eventual dissolution of boundaries between these groups (e.g. Gordon 1964; Warner and Srole 1945). In contrast, segmented assimilation theory suggests a non-linear process and a more diverse set of outcomes (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993). It posits three main patterns of labour market integration: primary labour market integration into professional and technical jobs; integration into immigrant or ethnic enclaves; and secondary labour market integration into low-skilled jobs (Portes 1981). These patterns in turn correspond with upward mobility, parallel integration, and downward mobility for migrants as compared with non-migrants (Zhou 1997).
Considering the implications for horizontal inequality: the first pattern, like classic assimilation theory, suggests an over-time shift towards horizontal equality, along with the merging of migrant and non-migrant ‘groups’. The second implies economically salient and persistent distinctions between migrants and non-migrants, sometimes alongside low or declining levels of horizontal inequality. And the third points to significant and persistent horizontal inequality between these groups.

Although a considerable body of work documents the existence of such diverse patterns of integration, it still may be that the first—consistent with classical assimilation theory—is the norm. Alba and Nee (2003), in particular, argue that the trend towards assimilation holds in the US for both historical and contemporary (post-1965) immigrants, with evidence of movement toward the mainstream in terms of economic outcomes, education, acculturation, language acquisition, and intermarriage. While they show similar patterns for both European and non-European immigrants, however, they also find significant and persistent impediments to assimilation linked to race. This may suggest that, regardless of whether linear assimilation is the norm, a segmented assimilation approach is especially relevant for those physically identifiable as ‘lower status’ within existing ethno-racial hierarchies in host communities.

2.1 Context of reception

Segmented assimilation theory points to the interaction of individual characteristics and the context of reception by the host community, but it has placed particular emphasis on the latter. As Portes and MacLeod (1996: 25) note, ‘the context that receives immigrants plays a decisive role in their process of adaptation, regardless of the human capital the immigrants may possess’. Three aspects of this receiving environment are highlighted: government reception, labour market reception, and existing community reception.

Government reception

As Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 93) note, ‘in every instance, governmental policy represents the first stage of the process of incorporation because it affects the probability of successful immigration and the framework of economic opportunities and legal options available to migrants once they arrive’. The legal status of migrants affects their access to various benefits and services, as well as to the formal labour market. Migrants may be legally admitted on a temporary or permanent basis. Those with refugee or asylum status may also qualify for resettlement assistance, such as housing, job training, or educational loans. Legal immigrants may be eligible for general welfare programmes (alongside citizens), or eligibility may be limited in some way, such as through the imposition of a wait time before enrolment after legal permanent residence is established.

More broadly, social policies and government programmes benefiting the population as a whole shape migrants’ context of reception and might help us to understand variations in integration (see Castles et al. 2010). Other aspects of government reception may also influence variation in migrant experiences across countries. For instance, migrants may be entitled to participate in some government programmes not as migrants, but as members of minority or disadvantaged groups, such as affirmative action in education or public employment.

In addition, to the extent that citizens may have different rights and privileges than non-citizens, variation in government policies with respect to citizenship also influences variation in the context of reception. Such policies can be linked more broadly to political culture, national identity, and models of diversity. For instance, Germany’s ‘ethnic’ approach to citizenship may be contrasted with ‘civic’ citizenship in Canada, the UK, and the US, or Canada’s active promotion of group rights with more hands-off approaches to multicultural citizenship elsewhere (Bloemraad 2007).
While much of the literature on context of reception has focused on national government policies, it is worth paying attention also to the diverse influence of local policies and practices. In one example from the US, Jaworsky et al. (2012) contrast the more welcoming reception of immigrants in Portland, Maine, with that in Danbury, Connecticut.

Finally, in addition to government agencies, a variety of non-governmental institutions are involved in the governance of migrant affairs, such as organizations contracted by governments to provide resettlement assistance. As discussed further below, the studies in this collection provide multiple examples. Thus, this first component of context of reception is referred to below as reception by governance institutions as opposed to government institutions alone.

Labour market reception

This refers to ‘stage in the business cycle, demand for specific kinds of labour, and regional wage differentials’, as well as to the typification of a particular group in positive or negative terms, leading for instance to preferential hiring or discrimination in the labour market (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Likewise, economic integration is influenced by the interaction of labour market conditions and the individual characteristics of migrants. Kogan’s (2006) analysis of 14 countries using European Labour Force Survey data, for instance, suggests lower employment disadvantages for unprivileged immigrants in countries with stronger demand for low-skilled labour and in liberal welfare states with more flexible labour markets.

Research on labour market discrimination against immigrants has important overlaps with work on ethno-racial discrimination more generally. Likewise, the ethno-racial characteristics of migrants may influence patterns of labour market integration: for instance, Villarreal and Tamborini (2018: 686) find in the US that earnings assimilation is racially differentiated such that ‘black and Hispanic immigrants are less able to catch up with native whites’ earnings compared to white and Asian immigrants, but they are almost able to reach earnings parity with natives of their same race and ethnicity’.

The literature suggests that discrimination could be especially pronounced for Afghan migrants—whether involuntary or voluntary. It is argued that the Western ‘war on terror’ since 2001 has created a uniquely negative and securitized context of reception for Muslim migrants because of the false association of Islam with terrorism (Cesari 2012).

Existing community reception

The third core aspect of context of reception highlights that immigrants commonly arrive into places where there is an existing co-ethnic community, which can ‘cushion the impact of cultural change and protect immigrants against outside prejudice and initial economic difficulties’ (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 95). Zhou and Bankston (1998), for instance, provided an illustration of this role among the Vietnamese-origin population in the US.

Although a segmented assimilation approach has been applied in multiple contexts, one critique is that its core theoretical framework is built largely on experiences in the US and that more attention to the generalizability of this framework is needed. For instance, the literature has tended to characterize context of reception overall by migrant nationality group, arguably without sufficiently specifying and measuring its three core aspects independently. This makes it difficult to disentangle the impact of contextual factors from that of group characteristics, and to trace and test the channels through which the theory predicts these factors to operate (see Catron 2016; Luthra et al. 2018). The structure of the project presented in this series—focused on two nationality groups
across four countries and multiple subnational contexts—is designed to offer some new leverage on these points.

2.2 Migrant group characteristics

The characteristics of migrants themselves no doubt also shape integration and labour market experiences. At the individual level, there are clear links with factors such as educational qualifications, work experience, language abilities, age, gender, and marital status. At the level of groups or collectivities—in terms of average or aggregate human capital characteristics—a number of such factors also are considered in the literature (Aydemir 2014; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Silles 2018). Additionally, human capital—such as education and work experience—acquired in the host country, rather than abroad, tends to be more valued in the labour market (Friedberg 2000; Zwysen 2018); indeed, the imperfect transferability of human capital may help to explain wage differentials between immigrants and the host country population (Basilio et al. 2017).

Human capital in broader terms also has a potential impact on integration. Within a segmented assimilation approach, Portes and Borocz (1989), for instance, have considered how labour market integration is influenced by the interaction of overall context of reception (disadvantaged, neutral, or advantaged) and a migrant group’s class of origin (‘manual labour’, ‘professional-technical’, or ‘entrepreneurial’).

A second broad set of factors relates to ‘groupness’ or social cohesion. Migrants are often described as members of a national origin ‘group’ defined by the country they migrated from—as they are, for simplicity, in this paper—but theories of ethnic identity underscore the value of problematizing such ‘groups’ (see Brubaker 2004). For one thing, use of the term ‘group’ tends to suggest a degree of national identification, and organization around this identity, that may not actually exist. Migrants—like most of us—tend to be nominal members of multiple intersecting and overlapping identity groups; national origin may be within these identity repertoires, but less salient than other social identities, such as those linked to language, religion, or race. The economic salience of a migrant’s national origin may also be tempered by within-group inequalities and diverse interests. Likewise, it would not be surprising to find another identity option more salient within particular social contexts such as the labour market—for instance, an ethnic niche economy could be built around (trans-national) religious or cultural identities rather than national origin. Finally, taking groupness into account raises questions about how to consider group-level human capital characteristics and their influence on integration. It is common, for instance, to consider average human capital measures for the group, but this may not be the best approach, especially if there is substantial polarization within a group such that such measures have a bi-modal distribution.

2.3 Involuntary migrants

This series focuses on a particular subset of migrants: those forced to migrate by conflict in their countries of origin, as opposed to those who migrate ‘voluntarily’ for economic opportunity or other reasons. While it is not always possible to draw sharp distinctions, the studies in this series focus on refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers, and what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) labels ‘other persons of concern’. The literature suggests that the factors outlined above may play out somewhat differently for voluntary as compared with involuntary migrants in several key ways.

In terms of context of reception, segmented assimilation theory points out that refugees as a group face different—and generally more positive—reception than economic migrants (Portes and Zhou 1993). This is principally because refugee status is accompanied by assistance and government benefits that economic migrants do not receive, even if refugees may also face considerable societal
and labour market discrimination. While greater public awareness of the conflicts and humanitarian crises giving rise to involuntary migration could imply more active public support overall, involuntary migrants also face considerable antipathy. For instance, Gallup Poll data from the US suggest that 57 per cent of respondents did not support taking in Vietnamese or Indochinese refugees in 1979, a percentage similar to the average across multiple humanitarian crises (Jones 2015).

Involuntary migrants may face other challenges as well. Conflict may entail not only the loss of material assets, but also physical and mental trauma, which can have implications on their participation in the labour market (see Alemi et al. 2014). In addition, the fact of having less choice in the decision to migrate, and where, suggests that ‘fit’ and job market mismatch could be a comparatively larger problem for involuntary migrants (Dadush and Niebuhr 2016). Internal divisions and a lack of cohesion within the migrant group also may be sharper because many of the conflicts that give rise to involuntary migration are linked to deep socio-political divisions within countries.

3 Cases and comparisons in this series

Beginning in the mid to late 1970s, tens of thousands of people left Indochina and Afghanistan in the face of war and conflict. For two decades from 1975, this included more than 2 million people from Indochina, of which about 1.6 million were from Viet Nam (Miller 2015). While early strategy in the Indochinese crisis aimed to resettle refugees outside the region in order to reduce pressure on countries of first asylum, this changed over time; the Indochinese crisis thus marks a shift in Western refugee policy, away from massive refugee resettlement and ‘open-ended commitments to resettlement as a durable solution’ (UNHCR 2000: 103). This shift is evident in the Afghan experience. The first wave of emigration from Afghanistan followed the Soviet invasion in 1979. In the 1980s, at the height of the war, about 3.5 million Afghan refugees were in Pakistan, 2 million in Iran, and thousands elsewhere (Rubin 1996). While many returned to Afghanistan after the Soviet departure, emigration continued at high levels in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1990, the refugee population reached 6.2 million, or about 40 per cent of the Afghan population (Long 2009). A third wave of Afghan migration began in 2001, linked to the war between the Taliban and US-led coalition forces (see Marchand et al. 2014). The vast majority have been hosted by neighbouring countries, although settlement in Western countries increased in the 2000s, as shown below.

This series explores horizontal inequality and the economic integration of these involuntary migrants by drawing on multiple comparisons. Each of the other papers in the series focuses on the experiences of either Afghan or Vietnamese involuntary migrants in Canada, Germany, the UK, or the US. All contributors were invited to participate in the project based on their expertise on a particular group–country pairing. Each was tasked with, first, providing insight into the experience of economic integration and inequality between involuntary migrants and non-migrants at the national level and, second, exploring variation at sub-national level in order to consider sub-national factors influencing economic integration. Beyond that, these papers are diverse by design. Contributors worked with the data available on each group–country pair (which varied significantly in both type and completeness), spotlighted a range of thematic areas, and advanced distinct arguments. While most of the contributors are sociologists, the papers reflect multiple theoretical and methodological approaches, and the broader frame within which this collective project was

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1 More than 3 million from Indochina according to UNHCR (2000).
developed is grounded in comparative political science. Collectively then, this series offers a diverse set of views into our core topics through multiple lenses.

These group–country cases were chosen as particularly instructive for theory building for several reasons (Gisselquist 2014; Tarrow 2010). In terms of focus on involuntary migrants from Viet Nam and Afghanistan, they represent, as described above, some of the largest refugee flows in recent history, including displacement into multiple countries, and the possibility of considering integration processes over multiple years and at least one generation. In addition, in terms of the countries of focus, the selected countries are among the Western countries that have hosted the highest numbers of refugees, including from Viet Nam and Afghanistan. Collectively, as suggested in the previous section, they provide the opportunity to consider migrant integration across countries with a range of models of immigrant incorporation, diversity, and citizenship. Given the significance of South–South migration, a key area for future research is to conduct similar analyses across Southern host countries. Given significant data constraints in analysing many Southern countries, a principal reason for focusing here first on Northern host countries is to explore what can be learned where quantitative data are strongest. The studies in this series illustrate that data constraints are significant even in wealthy countries.

In terms of comparative numbers of Vietnamese involuntary migrants, according to the UNHCR (2000), the US resettled the highest number of Vietnamese refugees by far: 424,590 between 1975 and 1995, not including arrivals under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP), which is discussed further below. The US was followed by Australia (110,996), Canada (103,053), France (27,071), the UK (19,355), and the Federal Republic of Germany (16,848). The studies in this series provide further detail on numbers and trends. In the US, for instance, Bankston and Zhou (2018) report that 125,000 refugees were authorized entry in April 1975. A further 95,200 refugees arrived in 1980 and several tens of thousands per year throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. By 1989, 165,000 had arrived under the ODP programme (Bankston and Zhou 2018). By 2015, there were almost 2 million American citizens and residents of Vietnamese descent. In Canada, Hou (2018) notes the arrival of 7,700 refugees in 1975–1978. By 1981/82, the Vietnamese population in Canada was roughly 40,000. In the UK, Barber (2018) reports the first arrivals of ‘quota’ refugees in 1979 and, by the early 1990s, about 24,000 refugees accepted for resettlement. In 2006, the population of Vietnamese descent in Britain (including voluntary and involuntary migrants and descendants) was estimated at 55,000–65,000 (IOM 2006). Finally, in Germany, Bösch and Su (2018) note that 35,000 refugees arrived in West Germany starting in 1979 (and about 70,000 Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany starting in 1980). About 45,000 contract workers, relatives, and refugees and asylum seekers arrived in the first half of the 1990s, and 25,000 returned to Viet Nam. In 2016, the population of Vietnamese descent was about 176,000, of which two-thirds were foreign-born.

For Afghan involuntary migrants, the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook provides a useful picture of total numbers of Afghan refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless, and others of concern in our four host countries from 1988, the first year of its publication. As Figure 1 suggests, the US accepted higher numbers of Afghan involuntary migrants than the other three countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but was surpassed by them thereafter, and since 2002, Germany has hosted the highest numbers by far. Considering the share of the total host country population reveals similar trends, except that the US line is flatter and close to zero throughout (given its population size). Shares are relatively small: the German peaks in 2002 and 2017 are equivalent to 0.08 and 0.23 per cent of the population, respectively. These figures do not include second-generation migrants and

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2 Excluding returnees and IDPs. UNHCR Statistical Yearbook figures are not reported above for Vietnamese migrants because they are incomplete and thus misleading of trends in our period of interest.
voluntary migrants, so the total Afghan-origin population in each country may be significantly higher.

Figure 1: Afghan ‘persons of concern’ by host country (absolute numbers)

![Graph showing Afghan 'persons of concern' by host country (absolute numbers)](image)

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database.

In considering these figures, a key point to highlight is that, even though the first waves of involuntary international migration from both countries were only a few years apart, the majority of involuntary migrants from Afghanistan arrived in our countries of focus several decades after those from Viet Nam. While the US notably received significant numbers of Afghans in the 1980s, there was an upturn in arrivals in all four countries in about 2000. Especially in Canada, Germany, and the UK. Therefore, Vietnamese involuntary migrants had almost a generation’s head start over Afghan involuntary migrants in resettlement—which is important to keep in mind in cross-group comparisons.

3.1 Papers in this series

In addition to this framing paper, this series includes seven studies. The only group–country case not included in this series is Afghans in Germany, on which other studies have been considered (e.g. Baraulina et al. 2007; Fischer 2017; Juran and Broer 2017; Zulfacar 1998).

The series begins with the Vietnamese cases: Bankston and Zhou (2018) extend their previous work to analyse socioeconomic mobility among Vietnamese refugees and how this has been shaped by policies, institutions, and patterns of social relations, as well as individual agency. After a discussion of nationwide patterns and trends from 1980 to 2015, they consider the comparative experiences of two Vietnamese communities—in New Orleans and Biloxi.

Focusing on Canada, Hou (2018) analyses multi-year census data to characterize over three decades the economic outcomes of Vietnamese refugees who arrived in 1979/80, making comparisons with other immigrants and the Canadian-born population. Using multiple regression models, he also points to the regional contexts shaping economic outcomes, including the influence of

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4 For example, *Growing Up American* (Zhou and Bankston 1998), which is a classic on the US experience.
regional ethnic concentration and labour market conditions, alongside individual and human capital factors, such as age, marital status, education, and language ability.

Barber (2018) considers Vietnamese in the UK, with a focus on experiences across London, where over half of the UK Vietnamese population lives, scattered across boroughs in seven community ‘hubs’. Drawing on qualitative data, including in-depth interviews, she shows how the heterogeneity of this population, along with resettlement policies, has contributed to ‘differentiated embedding’ (Ryan 2018) and divergent integration patterns.

Bösch and Su (2018) exploit Germany’s political history to consider the comparative experiences of Vietnamese refugees to West Germany and Vietnamese contract workers in East Germany, who arrived from 1979 and 1980, respectively. Using mixed qualitative methods, and with particular attention to Berlin as compared with other regions of Germany, they explore the influence of varied contexts of reception alongside diversity of migrant backgrounds. While contract workers were initially disadvantaged by a more negative government reception, they suggest, this may be offset over time by the positive influence of ethnic networks.

The three Afghan cases build upon a more limited body of published research, due at least in part to the later arrival of this population in most of the countries of study. Even sketching national patterns and trends thus involved some significant new analysis in these studies in particular:

In the US, Stempel and Alemi (2018) analyse data from the 2006–2015 American Community Survey (ACS) and the census to fill significant gaps in the literature on Afghan refugees, which has focused much more on mental health issues than on economic integration. They provide new insight into the comparative experiences of first-wave Afghan refugees (arriving between 1980 and 1990) and analyse refugee and immigrant group effects on earned income. They find that, compared with immigrant comparison groups, Afghan refugees have among the lowest earned incomes, and their analysis points to several key explanatory factors, including lower employment levels and discrimination in the labour market.

For Canada, Pendakur (2018) draws on census and other data to provide new analysis of labour force and housing tenure outcomes for Afghans as compared with all immigrants, for differing immigrant intake categories and population groups. Controlling for various individual factors (including time in Canada) and region, analysis shows poor labour force outcomes among Afghan immigrants as compared with other immigrants, but upward mobility for their children. Notably, daughters of Afghan immigrants have both better employment probabilities and earnings than other immigrant women, and several explanations are considered.

Gladwell et al. (2018) consider the experience of Afghan involuntary migrants in the UK through a focus on Afghan youth, in particular unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, an especially vulnerable group (see Allsopp and Chase 2019). This paper, which was written by researchers from the Refugee Support Network, a London-based NGO, provides an example of practice-based research. It draws on in-depth interviews and focus groups in three regions, as well as data compiled from Freedom of Information requests to all local authorities in England. It documents the important role of educational achievement in socioeconomic opportunities and the challenges posed by unresolved immigration status.
4 Selected comparisons and observations

The studies in this series illustrate that by the mid-2010s, the integration pattern of Vietnamese involuntary migrants was overall a story of success and upward socioeconomic mobility, in comparison both with other migrant groups and with non-migrant host country populations—if less so in the UK than in the other three countries of focus. In the US, for instance, Bankston and Zhou (2018) report that that while the median household income of the Vietnamese origin population was 90 per cent of the US average in 1980, by 2015 it had surpassed it by 25 per cent (US$72,000 compared with US$58,000 in 2017 dollars). In Canada, Hou (2018) calculates that, despite their parents’ generally low levels of education, childhood refugees by 2011 (when aged 30–47) held university degrees at a rate surpassing that of other childhood immigrants (36 compared with 32 per cent) and the Canadian-born population (26 per cent). In Germany, Bösch and Su (2018) note that over half of the children of Vietnamese citizens attend prestigious Gymnasien (at 12–13 years), more than any other national group. In the UK, Barber (2018) notes that mapping the mobility of the Vietnamese-descent population is complicated by a lack of ethnic monitoring for the second generation, but points to likely upward intergenerational mobility given available information on educational outcomes.

Distinct ethnic economic niches also have persisted, the best-known across countries being the nail care industry (Eckstein and Nguyen 2011). The UK seems to be at one end of the spectrum here; in the early 2000s, for instance, over half of all Vietnamese businesses in London were in the nail industry (Bagwell 2006; Barber 2018). Elsewhere, there is a clearer trend towards fuller economic integration. In the US, in particular, Bankston and Zhou (2018) describe a ‘mixed-niche strategy’, including participation in a wider range of industries than other migrant groups; in Louisiana, for instance, participation shifted in the 1980s from manufacturing into fishing and food-related industries. Between 1980 and 2015, furthermore, the share of individuals from the Vietnamese-descent population in managerial and professional occupations rose from 12.6 to 26.1 per cent, suggesting increasing primary labour market integration. In terms of the three broad integration patterns reviewed in Section 2, therefore, the Vietnamese-origin population overall seems to fall somewhere between the first and second patterns—with lessening horizontal inequality, alongside some persistence of ethnic niches.

The experience of Afghan involuntary migrants appears to differ in notable ways. While differences in socioeconomic status between Afghan and Vietnamese migrants today would not be surprising given the more recent arrival of Afghans in numbers, available data suggest that integration patterns have differed even at comparable points in time after migration. In Canada, Pendakur (2018) finds that immigrants born in Afghanistan have lower employment probabilities and earn substantially less than other immigrants, after controlling for a number of factors, including years in Canada. Moreover, those who entered Canada as refugees earn less than those categorized as ‘independent class’ immigrants. Afghans born in Canada, however, have better earnings outcomes than those born in Afghanistan and compare favourably with other immigrants as well, suggesting intergenerational mobility and some relative improvement in integration patterns in the second generation.

The US data also permit focused consideration of comparative experiences across involuntary migrant groups. Stempel and Alemi’s (2018) analysis suggests that in 1990, mean earned income for Afghans was at about 52 per cent of the non-Afghan average, while by 2006–2015, it exceeded it by about 9 per cent. However, this had a lot to do with Afghans living in high-cost areas; controlling for local cost of living, first-wave Afghan refugees in fact appear to do worse than others in their communities in terms of income and poverty status.
Ethnic niche economies also do not stand out in the same manner for Afghan involuntary migrants in our studies. Stempel and Alemi (2018) in particular report for the US that ‘the strongest economic niche among Afghans is the 13% of working age Afghan males in Virginia (4% in New York, 5% in California) who were employed as taxi-drivers/chauffeurs’ (p. 16). Nevertheless, there is evidence of ethnic networks playing a role in the labour market. Gladwell et al. (2018), for instance, report that Afghan care leavers with low skills tend to find employment in market stalls and shops owned by other Afghans or Pakistanis. In short, the pattern of labour market integration, across countries, suggests deeper and more persistent horizontal inequality, despite intergenerational mobility, and the possibly weaker emergence of ethnic niche economies—in other words, in terms of the three broad integration patterns reviewed in Section 2, the second or third patterns.

In considering the factors contributing to such divergent patterns of integration, elements of all five sets of factors outlined in Section 2 can be seen in the studies in this series. While there is not space here to review and weigh the evidence on each of these factors in turn, the discussion below highlights several key points that emerge from a collective reading focused on comparisons across the cases.

4.1 The substantial influence of governance policies and practices

In considering the divergent experiences of Vietnamese and Afghan involuntary migrants, the role of international policy stands out. In particular, for many Vietnamese involuntary migrants, resettlement was coordinated under the ODP, created in 1979 under the auspices of the UNHCR and operating until the late 1990s. Under the ODP, the Vietnamese government undertook to facilitate ‘orderly departure’, Southeast Asian countries agreed to provide temporary asylum, and Western countries committed to accelerating resettlement (see Kumin 2008; Robinson 1998). International coordination with regard to Afghan refugees offers a clear contrast: under the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees—a quadripartite agreement between the UNHCR, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (the two main countries hosting Afghan refugees)—arrangement is made for return to the country of origin and temporary protection in the host country (see UNHCR 2012).

Divergent experiences across groups, countries, and time also are linked to variation in national policies and politics, such as restrictions on the entry of Vietnamese refugees in various countries. In the case of the UK, where the first arrival of ‘quota’ refugees was in 1979, it is important to highlight its multicultural model, which focused on groups from the Commonwealth (see Barber 2018). Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also voiced strong opposition to the acceptance of Vietnamese refugees—noting that there ‘would be riots in the streets if the government had to put refugees into council houses’ (Travis 2009). In the US, which was deeply involved in the Vietnam War, doors opened relatively early, with the authorization for entry of 125,000 Vietnamese refugees in 1975 (see Bankston and Zhou 2018). In addition to the ODP, domestic legislation such as the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1988 and the Humanitarian Operation Program of 1989 facilitated the entry of children of American servicemen and former political detainees, respectively.

Although American military involvement in Afghanistan has drawn comparisons to Viet Nam, government policy and practice with respect to the hosting and resettlement of Afghan refugees is comparatively unfavourable. In simple numbers alone, far more Vietnamese refugees were accepted and resettled in the US than Afghan refugees. For instance, in the fiscal year 2001—the year that the third wave of out-migration from Afghanistan began—the State Department’s target of resettlement places for Afghan refugees from Pakistan and other countries was 4,000 (Hetfield
2001). As Gladwell et al. (2018) illustrate poignantly, immigration status has far-reaching effects on lived experience and socioeconomic outcomes for Afghan migrants, including entry into the formal labour market—and the protections that it provides in terms of minimum wages and working conditions—as well access to education and other public benefits.

Policy and practice with respect to pre-settlement and resettlement are other important components of government reception—including consideration of variation at subnational levels. Bankston and Zhou (2018), for instance, point to the crucial influence of the local director of Associated Catholic Charities’ Resettlement and Immigration Services in New Orleans in understanding the comparative success of integration for that community. Based on such experiences, Bankston and Zhou (2018) recommend concentrated resettlement as a way of helping new arrivals ‘to build and rebuild their own social networks’ (p. 19). The UK, for one, adopted an opposite policy of (geographic) dispersal for Vietnamese refugees (Robinson 1989).

Bankston and Zhou (2018) highlight at the same time the influence of non-governmental agencies—including specific individuals—in migrant reception. The role of voluntary and private agencies is also spotlighted, for instance, in Hou’s (2018) discussion of the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Programme, which supports resettlement via private or joint private–public sponsorship. Over 200,000 privately sponsored refugees have arrived in Canada since 1978 (Hyndman et al. 2017).

Finally, beyond migrant-focused policy, Bösch and Su’s (2018) analysis points to the role of the welfare state and universal education in particular in promoting social mobility and thus integration, for both involuntary and voluntary migrants (contract workers). Further research is needed into the relationship between the welfare state and the intergenerational mobility of migrants (see Kesler 2014). For instance, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification leads us to expect some contrast between Germany (a ‘conservative-corporatist’ welfare state) and Canada, the UK, and the US (liberal welfare states), while other work points to important variations among liberal welfare regimes (Myles 1998; Olsen 1994). Variation along these lines is not obvious in the studies in this series, and requires more focused examination.

4.2 Labour market vulnerability and discrimination

Economic recession in the 1970s and early 1980s in all four countries, with high inflation and underemployment, suggests broadly challenging labour market reception for all migrants during this period (Moy 1985). Within countries, variation in economic conditions also played a role in differential economic outcomes. For instance, Hou (2018) points to the influence of regional labour market conditions, among other factors, in the employment rates of Vietnamese refugees in Montreal (lower) as compared with Toronto and Vancouver (higher). Bösch and Su (2018) discuss links between economic conditions and discrimination, finding that while reunification did not ‘significantly disrupt the lives of Germans in the West, it impacted the [Vietnamese] contract workers with real force’ as the ‘increasing unemployment rate and cost of living […] was accompanied by a new wave of nationalism’, including racist violence in the early 1990s (p. 11).

Stempel and Alemi (2018) in particular posit that discrimination underlies some the unexplained negative effects in their models of being an Afghan refugee. This is broadly consistent with work noted above that explores the securitized context of reception for Muslim migrants in general in the 2000s. Although the influence of discrimination on Afghan integration cannot be explored directly in their analysis given the limitations of the data—which do not include measures of discrimination—it is a topic for future investigation.
4.3 ‘Co-ethnic’ communities beyond national origin, and their role in the labour market

When Afghan and Vietnamese involuntary migrants began arriving in large numbers, existing Afghan- and Vietnamese-origin communities in all four countries were generally small. The role of existing co-ethnic communities of national origin was thus limited for first-wave migrants. First-wave migrants, in turn, formed co-ethnic communities of national origin that shaped the contexts of reception of later migrants. Indeed, secondary migration within countries is clearly related to the presence of co-ethnic communities in specific locations (in particular, see Bankston and Zhou 2018; Barber 2018; Stempel and Alemi 2018).

The studies in this series further illustrate how co-ethnic communities beyond national origin may play a role in labour market integration. Alongside regional economic conditions, Hou (2018) in particular points to the significance of ethnic enclaves in Canada—not based on Vietnamese national origin, but around the ethnic Chinese community—for Vietnamese of Chinese origin. In explaining differences in employment rates between Montreal and Toronto, he finds that this ethnic enclave effect accounts for 22 per cent. Likewise, the observation in Gladwell et al. (2018) that low-skilled Afghan care leavers tend to seek employment with Pakistanis underscores that ethno-linguistic, religious, and cultural links, which can cross-cut national origin, can play an important labour market role.

4.4 Group cohesion, and within-group inequality and diversity

The two migrant ‘groups’ considered in this series are by no means homogeneous—in ethnic, political, or economic terms. Nor are the profiles of those belonging to these ‘groups’ across our four host countries equivalent in this sense; contrast, for instance, first-wave Vietnamese involuntary migrants in the US—who were mainly South Vietnamese with US ties—with those in the UK—about 62 per cent from northern Viet Nam and 77 per cent ethnic Chinese (Duke and Marshall 1995, cited in Barber 2018). Barber (2018) attributes the lack of cohesion and comparatively weaker economic integration of the Vietnamese-descent population in the UK in part to such diversity. Human capital factors also may contribute here. As Barber notes, Vietnamese migrants to the UK were relatively rural and poor compared with Vietnamese migrants in other countries. In the US, for instance, 30 per cent had a professional/technical/managerial background, 70 per cent were from urban areas, and only 4.9 per cent were fishermen or farmers (the majority occupation in Viet Nam at the time) (Bankston and Zhou 2018). That said, comparatively strong human capital alone does not necessarily go along with better integration outcomes. Stempel and Alemi (2018) show that Afghan migrants in the US had both higher educational levels and greater English abilities than other immigrant groups, yet this did not translate overall into better labour market outcomes.

Finally, the considerable diversity within the Afghan population in particular is worthy of note, given the fact that ethnic divisions have been politically and socially salient in conflict dynamics. Pashtuns form its largest ethnic group (about 40 per cent), followed by Tajiks (about 30 per cent), and Hazara (about 15 per cent). Smaller populations include Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Aimaqs. The majority of Afghans are Muslim, but distinctions between Sunni and Shia sects have also been salient (Lamer and Foster 2011). We would expect such divisions to be reflected in migrant populations, with a possible influence on integration patterns, but there is relatively little information available on these topics—either in this series or in other work. This is another worthwhile area for future research.
This paper makes three interrelated points. First, multiple outcomes in horizontal inequality may follow international migration, ranging between full integration and equality, parallel and segmented immigration, and deep and persistent inequality between groups. Second, multiple factors influence which of these situations results. These include context of reception by (1) governance institutions, (2) the labour market, and (3) co-ethnic communities, as well as (4) the ‘human capital’ characteristics of the migrant group and (5) its ‘groupness’ and cohesion. Third, all five sets of factors can be seen in this series, but a collective reading of the cases points to several key points: the substantial influence of governance policies and practices, both those targeted at migrants and general social welfare policies; the impact of labour market vulnerability and discrimination, which is arguably especially pronounced and problematic for Afghan migrants; linking to ‘co-ethnic’ communities beyond national origin, and the role of such groups in the labour market; and the significance of group cohesion and within-group diversity.

These last points in turn suggest several key areas for future research. These include further teasing-out and testing of the independent impacts, interactions, and relative significance of these factors. For instance, the divergent experiences of Vietnamese in the US and UK are overdetermined in the analysis presented here—they go along with divergence in government policies, societal reception, human capital, and group cohesion. Additional structured comparisons could be used to provide further leverage on this.

Various other points and questions emerge from a collective reading of the cases that also suggest areas for future research. For instance, how precisely does the size of a migrant group matter in understanding patterns of economic integration? Ethnic enclaves have helped some migrants to mitigate the effects of labour market discrimination, but they may have little success in finding employment through such networks if the group is very small, no matter how cohesive. Our cases show in such situations that some migrants seek employment through cross-cutting or ‘supra-ethnic’ networks—such as ethnically Chinese, Muslim, or South Asian (rather than Afghan or Vietnamese). Would more systematic patterns in terms of national origin group size and labour market integration emerge from a study of a broader selection of cases?

Along different lines, what role does cultural distance play in economic integration? Stempel and Alemi’s (2018) finding that the comparatively low rate of employment among Afghan women in the US helps to explain the comparatively low rate of overall employment among Afghan refugees, for instance, may point in this direction—i.e. that divergent attitudes and practices in terms of women in the workforce have impeded economic integration for this group. At the same time, Pendakur’s (2018) findings of strong labour force outcomes among second-generation Afghan-Canadian women points towards fluidity in such cultural attitudes. What is the role of diverse contexts of reception—in particular government policies—in how such cultural factors evolve and influence behaviour over time?

Finally, given the growing significance of South–South migration, arguably the most important area for future research highlighted by this series is processes of economic integration and their impact on horizontal inequality in the countries of the Global South. To what extent are patterns and influences in ‘Southern’ countries different from or similar to those highlighted in this paper in ‘Northern’ countries?
References


