WIDER Working Paper 2017/126

# Who trusts?

## Ethnicity, integration, and attitudes toward elected officials in urban Nigeria

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June 2017

United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research

wider.unu.edu

**Abstract:** In the developing world, clientelism is common. In Africa, public office is often used to redistribute resources to ethnically defined constituencies, and this form of clientelistic exchange is a key determinant of vote choice. Does clientelistic exchange shape trust in elected officials as well? And does it continue to do so as cross-ethnic contact and integration increase? This paper uses public opinion data from urban Nigeria to investigate how an individual's social position and experiences with the state affect trust in elected officials, especially at the local level. The paper finds that the trust deficit associated with local ethnic minority status does not significantly diminish as these individuals integrate. For members of locally dominant groups, greater cross-ethnic contact and lessened reliance on ethnicity actually dampen expressed trust in local elected officials. These findings suggest the need for greater attention to cross-ethnic contact when evaluating the political implications of ethnic inequality.

**Keywords:** trust, identity, politics, ethnicity, clientelism, urban politics, Nigeria
**JEL classification:** H11, H41, H70, N47, N97

**Acknowledgements:** The research was funded by the Department for International Development (DfID) as part of the iiG, a research programme to study how to improve institutions for pro-poor growth in Africa and South Asia. This paper was supported by UNU-WIDER. The author thanks Cristina Bodea, Rachel Gisselquist, Alisha Holland, Matthew Wright, and participants at a UNU-WIDER workshop for comments on drafts.

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This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'The politics of group-based inequality—measurement, implications, and possibilities for change', which is part of a larger research project on 'Disadvantaged groups and social mobility'.

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Information and requests: publications@wider.unu.edu

ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-352-3

Typescript prepared by Joseph Laredo.

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The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors.

## 1 Introduction

In the developing world, group-based inequalities are often created and institutionalized through political strategies that give some groups greater access to public goods and to elected office. In order to understand citizens' political attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa, political scientists have tended to prioritize ethnicity and its effect on citizens' access to public and private resources. There is good reason for this focus. Public goods may be delivered on ethnic lines, benefiting groups that hold the presidency or are part of national ruling coalitions (Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, & Morjaria, 2015; Franck & Rainier, 2012; Kramon & Posner, 2013). In countries that hold competitive elections, categorical distinctions—such as ethnicity—often provide the basis for political mobilization and structure vote choice (Chandra, 2007; Ferree, 2011; Horowitz, 1985). Elections can also heighten the salience of ethnic identities in sub-Saharan Africa, evidenced by higher rates of ethnic identification during election periods (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010). In Africa, as in much of the developing world, there is convincing evidence that elections reinforce relationships between citizens and elected officials that are based on clientelistic exchange, especially where voters are poor (S. Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013; Van de Walle, 2003; Wantchekon, 2003; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012).

To a large extent, the political science literature has focused on what ethnic clientelism means for voting and for the distribution of public goods. But state–citizen linkages built on clientelistic exchange presumably have implications for citizens' orientations toward the state, including expressed trust in institutions and in elected officials. This is especially the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where state penetration of society is extraordinarily weak, societal orientations toward the state are primarily extractive, and strong expectations exist that office-holders will redistribute public resources to what might be variously termed private, ethnic, or "primordial" publics (Bayart, 1993; Ekeh, 1975; Hydén, 1980; Joseph, 1987). In these settings, attitudes toward state authority and toward elected officials can be seen as partly "positional," insofar as they are shaped by an individual's membership in a group that holds political power. But how strong are these positional effects? And might other aspects of social position, such as greater integration or lessened reliance on ethnic networks, have an effect on individuals' relationships with their elected officials? Might such changes be under way in Africa's fast-growing cities? In addition to more fluid and diverse social environments, cities are characterized by distinct patterns of state–society contact. Urban residents are likely to have more contact with the state than their rural counterparts, and group membership may be a less powerful mediator for these contacts than in rural settings. In cities, for instance, it is often difficult to exclude local minorities from fixed public goods, and slum clearances and bribery often affect minorities and majority group members alike. The positional effects examined here are not unique to urban contexts, but cross-ethnic contact and contacts with the state are currently more common and more likely to sway political attitudes in these contexts than in rural areas.

This paper examines how trust in elected officials is affected by three factors: ethnic minority status at the local level; degree of attachment to the ethnic group as a "trust community;" and both positive and negative experiences with the state. In general, exclusion from national or local ruling coalitions will dampen expressed trust in elected officials, but we expect this effect to be mediated by the degree to which individuals rely on the ethnic group for access to patronage or for other group-provided benefits. Minority members who build social ties across ethnic lines and those who prioritize other identity markers (e.g., class, religion) may be more likely to trust local officials than their less integrated peers. For members of ethnically dominant groups, we might expect the effects of "cosmopolitanism" to be reversed. Because ethnic clientelism rarely distributes benefits within groups evenly (Keefer, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003), individuals with more cross-ethnic ties

and those who do not discriminate in favor of coethnics are likely to be more marginal within patronage networks that prioritize core ethnic supporters. These individuals' likely loss of access to patronage would counteract the positive effect of membership in the locally dominant group on expressed trust in local officials. We might then expect these individuals to express lower levels of trust in local officials than their less integrated coethnic peers. We can see local minority status, level of cross-ethnic contact, and reliance or attachment to their ethnic community (or, alternatively, their level of ethnic chauvinism) as collectively composing an individual's "social position" in her place of residence.

This paper uses public opinion data from urban Nigeria to investigate how social position affects attitudes toward elected officials at the national, state, and local levels. The paper is especially interested in whether integration and experience with state action mediate the effect of local ethnic minority status on trust. The term "social position" as used here signifies the product of both imposed group-based categorization and more voluntary forms of cross-ethnic identification, as referenced above. It is operationalized as an individual's status as a member of an ethnic minority in her city of residence and possession of markers of lessened reliance on the "trust community" afforded by group membership, such as cross-ethnic marriage, a more ethnically diverse social network, or lessened reliance on coethnicity when making decisions to invest money. The intuition is that members of minority groups who integrate—or rely less on the "trust communities" afforded by ethnicity—will have more positive evaluations of elected officials and more positive views toward state authority than do minorities who remain more closely connected to their ethnic kin. For members of ethnically dominant groups, integration and lessened ethnic attachment are expected to dampen the *positive* effect of group membership on expressed trust (i.e., the effect is negative rather than positive). Finally, alongside social position, an individual's orientations toward the state and toward elected officials are expected to be significantly shaped by their evaluations of government performance. Trust is shaped by both positive and negative experiences with state action.

The paper presents four main findings. First, identity works in different ways depending on the level of government about which respondents are asked. The markers upon which the focus often falls—status in national ethnic and religious winning coalitions—have strong effects on reported trust in the president, but they have less traction in explaining variation in trust in elected officials at the state and local levels. Unsurprisingly, local ethnic minority status is more important than membership in national winning coalitions in shaping attitudes toward officials at lower levels of government. Local ethnic minorities are significantly less likely to trust local elected officials than members of locally dominant groups.

Second, integration has little effect on local minorities' trust in their local officials: those with higher levels of integration and cross-ethnic ties do not express higher degrees of trust in officials than their counterparts without these contacts. But, for members of dominant groups, higher levels of cross-ethnic contact and lessened reliance on or orientation toward ethnicity both dampen expressed trust in local officials. This third finding may suggest that these more integrated or less "ethnic" members of dominant groups are less likely to benefit from their position in winning coalitions, which would be consistent with other findings of an uneven distribution of benefits within patronage networks (Keefer, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003).

Finally, both positive and negative experiences with the state independently affect individuals' expressed trust in local officials. The literature on clientelism has largely focused on how ethnicity affects public goods provision. There has been relatively less attention paid to how ethnic group membership may shape exposure to negative state action, such as bribery and eviction.

The paper proceeds as follows. The following section situates the paper in a larger discussion of ethnicity and inequitable access to the state, and it introduces four hypotheses that will guide empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses patterns of ethnic inequality in Nigeria, introduces the data, and discusses key differences between our urban sample and the Afrobarometer's nationally representative Nigeria survey. The next two sections of the paper discuss measures and results, and the conclusion points out directions for future research and refinement of the analysis presented here.

## 2 Trust networks and orientations to the state

There are two reasons that ethnic minorities might express lower levels of trust in elected officials. The first stems from expectations about the purposes of voting and political support in settings of ethnic clientelism. In this context, voters are presumed to throw their support behind coethnics with the expectation that these politicians, if elected, will favor their own core ethnic constituencies in the distribution of benefits and access to government (Bates, 1983; Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008; Carlson, 2015; Ejdemyr, Kramon, & Robinson, 2015; Horowitz, 1985). Those who are ethnic minorities or non-coethnics may receive fewer clientelistic benefits, especially in terms of private transfers, and fewer constituency services than those whom representatives see as core ethnic supporters. Alternatively, variations in levels of trust across ethnic groups may be driven less by this kind of instrumentalist logic than by an affective one. Individuals may simply prefer their coethnics as elected representatives, either because they view coethnics as more competent and trustworthy or because they are swayed by negative associations with members of other ethnic groups (Ferree, 2011; Horowitz, 1985). This would increase coethnic voting and would also result in greater levels of expressed trust in local officials among locally dominant groups, since these groups would presumably have the numbers to put their coethnics in office. The observed effect of being an ethnic minority would be similar for both these mechanisms. Ethnic minority status is therefore expected to dampen expressed trust in local officials, either because it disadvantages individuals in terms of patronage or because it limits the development of affective ties between these citizens and their elected representatives.

> *$H_1$: Those who are ethnic minorities in their places of residence express lower levels of trust in elected officials.*

Importantly, being an ethnic minority in one's place of residence is likely to have different effects across levels of government. Individuals who are "losers" in local electoral contests may very well be "winners" at the national level. Due to high levels of ethnic fractionalization in most African countries, small ethnic groups can be important for the building of national winning coalitions. Rather than building coalitions around partisanship or policy preferences, African ruling parties tend to be multiethnic coalitions, which rely on ethnic brokers and traditional rulers to deliver ethnic constituencies for the party (Arriola, 2012; Koter, 2013). This gives a larger number of ethnic groups a share of the spoils, but the greatest beneficiaries of this system tend to be individuals who live in more ethnically homogeneous areas. Individuals who live outside these zones may not experience the direct benefits of membership in the national winning coalition, but their attitudes toward national institutions and elected officials may still be shaped by whether their ethnic group is in power at the national level or in alliance with the president.

The trust-boosting effects of belonging to the national winning coalition would not shape local minorities' views of more geographically proximate local officials, since local elections would similarly be structured around ethnic rather than partisan or policy debates. The logic of clientelistic exchange within a locality still results in preferential distribution to members of locally

dominant groups, and members of local minority groups would generally be excluded from the private or public benefits that accrue to members of locally dominant groups. Elected officials may employ sophistical strategies to funnel resources to allow discrimination in resource distribution on group lines. For instance, Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson (2015) find that Malawian members of parliament from ethnically segregated constituencies use their constituency development funds to provide non-excluded public goods to areas inhabited primarily by their coethnics. In constituencies where high levels of residential integration render this strategy difficult, MPs instead provide private transfers, such as subsidized fertilizers, rather than public goods from which local minorities cannot be excluded. Thus, local ethnic minority status is associated with less access to resources than would be the case for members of locally dominant groups. Local ethnic minorities are therefore likely to express low levels of trust in local officials and institutions, while their assessments of politicians and institutions at the national level remain unaffected.

*$H_{1A}$: Local minority status is more likely to shape trust in local officials than in national ones.*

Ethnic group membership is important in determining one's position in a political system defined by ethnic clientelism, but this is not the only role that ethnicity plays in an individual's life. Ethnic groups can also be seen as institutions or identity-based "trust communities" that arise in the absence of a state to provide collective goods to their members, to facilitate interactions between members, and to allow for opportunity-hoarding behavior by the group (Tilly, 2005). These networks are often underlain by norms that support cooperation and reciprocity within the group or by "technologies" that allow members to detect and punish those who violate commitments to the group (Greif, 1989; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2009). For minorities and majorities alike, there are clear advantages to investing in trust communities rather than throwing in one's lot with weak and unreliable state institutions. This is particularly the case in clientelistic systems, where state actions may reproduce categorical inequality and restrict access to public goods to members of selected groups. Strong trust-based networks can offer individuals protection from economic exploitation and also some privileged access to either state-provided public goods or group-generated club goods.

Individuals vary, however, in their orientation to the trust communities afforded by their ethnic group membership. Some individuals have more diverse social networks or may choose to invest less in the "trust communities" afforded by ethnic, religious, or other identities. For minorities, this kind of integration-oriented behavior may allow them greater access to clientelistic rewards or other benefits that typically accrue to members of politically dominant groups. If these integration-seeking individuals are penalized by coethnics for their cosmopolitan ways, in terms of either lost business opportunities or lost access to group-provided club goods, these penalties are unlikely to affect their orientation toward elected officials or toward the state. Since local ethnic minorities rarely wield substantial electoral power at the local level, a more marginal position within that group would not necessarily entail diminished access to politician-provided goods or services. Put simply, for members of local minority groups, integration has potential rewards but few apparent costs when it comes to politician-provided resources. We therefore expect integration to boost expressed trust in local officials for members of ethnic minorities.

The situation is, however, different for members of locally dominant groups. Patronage is rarely distributed equally within clientelistic networks: though age and sex are likely to be determinants of one's status within a network (e.g., Wantchekon, 2003), politicians use other cues to direct private transfers and other clientelistic benefits. For instance, where party machines are well developed, local brokers will assess whether individuals constitute core versus marginal supporters and will steer resources toward core supporters (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). In settings of ethnic clientelism, we would expect this evaluation of core versus marginal support to be based on an individual's orientation toward the ethnic trust community. Since ethnic clientelism operates as a

form of opportunity hoarding, we would expect individuals who are seen as less committed to prioritizing group identity or privileging coethnics in economic transactions to be viewed as possible defectors in terms of vote choice. Since more ethnically diverse social networks and a lack of preferential treatment for coethnics in economic transactions would be visible to one's local ethnic community, we expect these traits to be associated with less access to clientelistic benefits for members of dominant groups.

The different expected effects of cross-ethnic contact and pro-ethnic attitudes for members of local minority and locally dominant ethnic groups suggest the following two hypotheses:

> *H2: Integration (intermarriage, diverse social networks, use of non-native languages) lessens the effect of local minority status on attitudes toward elected officials.*

> *H3: The effects of cross-ethnic contact and pro-ethnic attitudes are reversed for members of locally dominant groups, such that lower levels of cross-ethnic contact and higher levels of ethnic preference are associated with greater expressed trust in local officials.*

Finally, the analysis below views both positive and negative experiences with state performance as independent drivers of attitudes toward elected officials. One of the primary drivers of greater trust in elected officials—and, presumably, greater overall satisfaction with state institutions—is positive experience of state delivery. We view this as potentially distinct from clientelistic benefits, which often take the form of private transfers and excludable services that accompany ethnic group membership. In many parts of Africa, it is hard to exclude local ethnic minorities from many of the goods that politicians provide, such as schools or roads (Ichino & Nathan, 2013). These kinds of public goods are still more likely to be non-excludable in cities, where higher levels of ethnic diversity and anonymity make policing of access and exclusion of ethnic minorities from state-provided services more difficult.

But citizens have other experiences that negatively affect their assessment of state and politician performance. We would expect individuals who have lost their homes or livelihoods due to state actions, as well as those who have been subject to extortion by state officials, to express less trust in government institutions and in elected officials. Similarly, expressed trust in elected officials is likely to be lower among those who report experience of electoral intimidation or are victims of election-related violence. Does membership in ruling coalitions protect individuals from these kinds of negative state contact? Existing research suggests that the opposite may be the case: a study of 30 countries in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that presidential coethnics are more attractive targets for state tax extraction than other groups (Kasara, 2015), and new research on bribe solicitation in Malawi found that shared ethnicity with an official sometimes increased the likelihood of a bribe demand (Robinson & Seim, 2016). The data used here find no significant correlation between local ethnic minority status and likelihood of being a victim of state clearances, bribe solicitation, or electoral intimidation. We expect these factors to have a independent negative impact on expressed trust in elected local officials.

> *H4: Positive experiences with the state boost trust in elected officials, while negative experiences with the state depress expressed trust in elected officials.*

We examine these hypotheses below, focusing especially on attitudes toward local officials. Before proceeding, however, we briefly discuss patterns of inequality and ethnic exclusion in our case.

## 3 Inequality and political attitudes in Nigeria

Urban Nigeria is an especially good context in which to examine questions of identity, marginalization, and political trust. Ethnic politics is central to violent political competition at the local level, and ethnicity is a primary determinant of how Nigerians interact with each other and relate to politicians (Osaghae, 2003; Ukiwo, 2003). Data from the third round of the Afrobarometer (2005–2006) suggest that ethnic attachment—and a concomitant weakness of identification with the nation—is stronger in Nigeria than in other African countries. When asked to choose between national and ethnic identity, only 17 per cent of Nigerians chose to identify with the nation, versus an average of 41 per cent across the set of 16 African countries surveyed in that round of the Afrobarometer (Robinson, 2014).

Economic inequality is substantial in Nigeria, and it is strongly associated with ethnicity. The most visible political consequence of ethnic inequality is violence. Anti-system movements, including full-scale insurgencies, have often capitalized on group grievances and feelings of exclusion (Adesoji, 2011; Adunbi, 2015). In addition to group mobilization against the state, ethnic inequalities have created a fertile terrain for communal violence, which many argue has increased substantially since the return to multiparty politics in 1999 (Bratton, 2008; Collier & Vicente, 2014; Smith, 2006). Electoral campaigns at the local level make ethnicity more salient and may convince voters that economic mobility and access to public goods are substantially determined by ethnic group membership. Though Nigerian parties attract cross-regional and cross-ethnic support in national elections, campaigning at the local and state levels relies on ethnic mobilization and, in some places, the encouragement of violence against ethnic minorities and migrants (Kendhammer, 2010). All of these dynamics are more pronounced in urban spaces, which are more ethnically heterogeneous. For this reason, cities and their immediate environs have long been the locus of group-based violence in Nigeria. In addition to urban minorities' exclusion from clientelistic redistribution, these groups face real security risks in their cities of residence.

In addition to ethnic minority status, indigeneity is a salient political concept in Nigeria: it is independent from birthplace, referring instead to one's family's state of origin; it carries some ethnic connotation, as only Yoruba would be indigenous to Oyo State, for instance; but it is also a distinct marker of identity, as Yoruba born in Lagos could be indigenous to Lagos State or could be indigenous to a different state, depending on where their family originated, often several generations before.

Indigeneity is an important driver of ethnic inequality in Nigeria. The 2011 constitution guarantees equal citizenship to all groups, but it also allows positive discrimination in favor of those "born of the soil." State governments interpret this very differently: in some states, civil service jobs are restricted to those who have indigenous status, while other states have accorded indigenous status to migrants who have lived in the state for a certain period. Overall, non-indigeneity is used as a basis for formal discrimination in employment, educational access, and access to land; non-indigenes also face other forms of discrimination in their places of residence, such as informal bars to political participation and social services (Human Rights Watch, 2006). In the more diverse cities of Nigeria's "Middle Belt," conflicts over indigeneity and group rights to land result in violent group confrontations (Higazi, 2008).

There remains widespread public disagreement about whether discrimination against non-indigenes is acceptable, and some have suggested that the return of multiparty elections in 1999 has intensified opposition to non-indigenous or "settler" groups. In the survey data used in this paper, over 60 per cent of respondents agree or strongly agree that "only indigenes of this state should be eligible for election into public office in this state." When asked about their own status

as non-indigenous "by virtue of place of origin of your family," roughly 40 per cent of our sample identified as non-indigenous.[1] Crucially, a majority of those identifying as non-indigenous still support barring non-indigenes from elected office. This may reflect disagreement over how indigenous status should be assigned, or it may be that those who are non-indigenous in their state of residence would still like to bar non-indigenes from office in their home states where they no longer reside.

Nigeria's institutional structure makes these local patterns of belonging and exclusion even more important in shaping citizens' experiences with the state. As a federal system, Nigeria has three tiers of government: national, state, and local. For ordinary citizens, however, state and local governments are the most visible actors, especially in terms of services delivery. This is especially true in the country's fast-growing cities. Few urban residents have meaningful interaction with federal authorities; instead, they are most likely to pay taxes and rates to their local councils and, in a small number of reformist states, to state governments.[2]

Data used in this paper are taken from a survey of 2,750 individuals conducted in 11 Nigerian cities in December 2010.[3] These cities differ in terms of ethnic composition, riot propensity, and level of government services provision. The selected cities range across Nigeria's major geographic zones: there are three northern cities (Bauchi, Kano, Sokoto), three Middle Belt cities (Jos, Kaduna, Lafia), three cities in southeast Nigeria (Aba, Enugu, Onitsha), and two in southwest Nigeria (Ibadan, Lagos).[4] In each city, a city-representative sample was selected using a stratified, clustered sampling procedure, and respondent households were selected using a random-walk protocol from GIS-selected starting points. In order to prevent undersampling of women in parts of northern Nigeria, gender parity was imposed.

How do urban respondents compare with other Nigerians? Trust in government institutions and in elected officials is low across Nigeria due to the country's history of predatory state rule, high levels of corruption, and weak rule of law. Table 1 shows the differences on key attitudinal measures between the 2010 urban survey used in this paper and a nationally representative survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in May 2008. Both sets of respondents report fairly low levels of institutional trust, but urban residents are not appreciably different from other Nigerians on these and other questions. There are also few significant differences between respondents to the urban survey and those surveyed by the 2009 Afrobarometer when it comes to various measures of political participation and engagement (e.g., voting, attendance at community meetings, partisanship, meeting with a government official).

On other dimensions, however, urban residents are distinct. The 2010 urban sample expresses significantly weaker abstract support for democracy and is less willing to reject the use of violence

[1] Since large cities attract migrants from many different places, this figure is much higher than it would be in a nationally representative sample. The Afrobarometer has never collected data on indigenous status.

[2] Registration and collection of value-added tax (VAT) is administered by the federal government, but implementation is uneven, especially when it comes to the informal sector. Personal income tax, which is due to state governments, has not typically been collected, though this is changing quickly. For more details on taxation in Nigeria, see Bodea & LeBas (2016) and De Gramont (2015).

[3] Data and further details on survey administration are publicly available.

[4] Maiduguri in the far northeast state of Borno was originally included in the sample; however, after a series of armed confrontations between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces, we were forced to suspend fieldwork (already in progress) in Maiduguri. Bauchi is roughly comparable to Maiduguri in a number of respects (including the presence of Boko Haram), so it was chosen as a replacement.

in politics than nationally representative samples collected by the Afrobarometer in 2007 and 2008.[5] Though there is some evidence that support for democracy and democratic norms has eroded in Nigeria since elections began in 1999,[6] it seems unlikely that the two or three years between surveys explains these differences given the stability of other attitudinal measures. Rather than reflecting a trend over time, the difference in abstract support for democracy seems to reflect the greater political alienation of urban residents. When asked if democracy was preferable, a full 18.6 per cent of our sample agreed with the statement "for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have." This is roughly double the proportion of the Afrobarometer national sample who agreed with the statement. When asked about how democracy worked in Nigeria, 18.6 per cent of our 2011 sample volunteered the response "Nigeria is not a democracy," versus only 3 per cent of the Afrobarometer national sample. Attitudes toward the legitimacy of the use of violence also differ markedly: roughly 14 per cent of the urban sample agreed very strongly that violence is sometimes necessary in support of a just cause, while only 5 per cent of those surveyed by the Afrobarometer responded similarly. As noted in Table 1, the level of agreement that "violence is never justified" is 20 per cent lower in the urban sample. This greater degree of political alienation is consistent with surveys completed in slums in Nairobi and Lagos, which found that slum dwellers expressed much higher levels of alienation and weaker commitment to democratic norms than their non-urban peers (LeBas, 2013).

Table 1: Common indicators of institutional support (%)

| | Afrobarometer national survey 2008 | Nigeria urban survey 2010 |
|---|---|---|
| Trust in president ("somewhat" or "a lot") | 44.36 | 52.36 |
| Trust in elected local council ("somewhat" or "a lot") | 28.06 | 25.82 |
| Trust in police ("somewhat" or "a lot") | 24.22 | 23.09 |
| Satisfaction with state of democracy in Nigeria (fairly or very satisfied) | 30.76 | 40.51 |
| When asked about preference for democracy, answering "for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have" | 9.68 | 18.62 |
| Agreement or strong agreement with statement "The use of violence is never justified in Nigerian politics" | 78.1 | 58.0 |

Source: Author's construction.

Another important factor that differentiates urban respondents is the higher level of ethnic diversity and inter-group mixing in cities in Nigeria, as in cities elsewhere. The Afrobarometer does not include measures of ethnic intermarriage, rootedness, or other types of integration behavior, such as the ethnic diversity of individuals' discussion networks. This kind of data is rarely gathered by survey researchers working in the developing world. But cities in Nigeria, like other fast-growing urban centers in the developing world, are more ethnically diverse and have more various forms of inter-group interaction than rural areas. Overall, our urban sample *likely* reports higher levels of inter-group mixing and inter-group marriage than would be found in rural areas. Even so, there is significant variation in these factors across our cities. In ethnically diverse Middle Belt towns like Lafia and Jos, more than 70 per cent of respondents report having a member of another ethnic

[5] The question regarding the acceptability of the political use of violence was not asked in Round 4 of the Afrobarometer, so these data are taken from Round 3.5, which was conducted in January 2007. All other Afrobarometer data are from the June 2009 Round 4 survey. All data are available at www.afrobarometer.org.

[6] There was a 16-point drop in abstract support for democracy in Nigeria between the first Afrobarometer survey in 2000, conducted shortly after the first elections, and 2006 (Lewis, 2006).

group among the people with whom they speak most; in contrast, in more ethnically homogenous Enugu and Onitsha, fewer than 15 per cent of respondents report similar cross-ethnic interaction.

Figure 1 shows the substantial differences across cities in terms of expressed trust in public officials. For each city, stacked bars represent the percentage of respondents who reported that they trusted the specified official "somewhat" or "a lot." Readers should keep in mind that the survey was conducted in December 2010, roughly 11 months after Goodluck Jonathan had taken over presidential duties due to the medical incapacity of elected President Umaru Yar'Adua, a Muslim from northern Katsina State. Though Jonathan contested the presidency in 2015, his party lost both the presidency and control of many of the state governments it had previously controlled. Voting patterns were starkly regional, Jonathan and his party receiving less than 25 per cent of the vote across the northern states, though they were markedly more competitive in the Middle Belt. The same regional patterns of support for Jonathan are visible in our data. The reported trust levels for the president are associated with ethnicity, as levels of presidential trust are highest in the southeastern cities of Aba, Enugu, and Onitsha. Reported trust in governors and local officials tends to be lower, but there is a great deal of cross-city variation.

Figure 1: Percentage of city residents who trust official "a lot" or "somewhat"




Source: Author's construction.

Given different levels of development, riot propensity, and government performance, we would expect residents of different cities to have very different levels of trust in governors and local councilors. There are also striking differences in city-level mean tax attitudes across the cities, and these are not associated with states' differential reliance on internally generated data or other plausible drivers of these attitudes (Bodea & LeBas, 2016: 223–224). Further analysis might examine whether city-level factors, such as riot propensity or diversity, explain variation in expressed trust in elected officials. Given the insignificance of the city-level factors included in multi-level analysis in Bodea & LeBas, however, that line of inquiry has not been pursued here.

## 4 Measures

The main dependent variables used in the paper are measures of trust in elected officials: the president, the governor of the respondent's state, and the respondent's elected local councilor. Responses range on a four-point scale from "don't trust at all" to "trust a lot" for each of the three questions. Individual identity markers and context-specific social position affect individual attitudes toward different levels of elected officials in different ways. Thus, ethnic and religious identity are likely to more strongly shape trust in the president, as presidential contests divide the electorate on ethnic and religious lines, while trust in state and local officials is likely to be more directly affected by individuals' social positions within their cities—notably whether they are members of local ethnic minorities and whether they belong to ethnically homogenous communities within their cities.

We first establish whether an individual is a member of an ethnic minority in her city of residence. Minority status depresses institutional trust, as minorities are presumably more likely to be socially excluded, to lack political influence, and to have less access to patronage. Where the sizes of groups are roughly similar or where the population is diverse enough that there is no clear dominant group, this alienation is less likely to occur. None of our cities is characterized by ethnic balance between two groups, so there exist clear ethnic minorities in all sampled cities.[7] In most cities, levels of ethnic homogeneity are high, especially in the southeast. In this area of the country, Igbos constitute over 90 per cent of our samples. In Lagos and Ibadan, Yoruba are over 70 per cent; in the northern cities of Sokoto, Kano, and Bauchi, Hausas are similarly dominant. The Middle Belt cities of Jos, Kaduna, and Lafia are significantly more ethnically diverse, though Hausa still constitute the largest group in each city (between 25 and 45 per cent of the population). Ethnic minority status is operationalized as minority ethnic status or, in the case of the Middle Belt cities, as non-Hausa ethnicity. We should note that data on governors' ethnicity do exist, but we lack similar data on the ethnicities of local councilors. It is reasonable to expect that the majority of local councilors are coethnic with the majority group, and our findings are consistent with this assumption.

Because indigeneity is an important concept in the Nigerian context, we also include it as an independent driver of trust in our initial analysis of trust in officials across levels of government. To determine individuals' status, we ask respondents if they are indigenous or non-indigenous to their state of residence "by virtue of place of origin of your family." As noted above, place of family origin is distinct from place of birth, and this distinction would be readily apparent to Nigerians.[8] Importantly, this measure does not correlate highly with local ethnic minority status: though many ethnic minorities would be non-indigenous to their place of residence, members of the locally dominant group could also be non-indigenous. In Lagos, for instance, 76 per cent of the dominant Yoruba group in the city identify as non-indigenous; in Kaduna, the proportion of non-indigenous Hausa is smaller, only about 27 per cent, but still significant. Overall, 40 per cent of our sample identifies as non-indigenous, versus 29 per cent with local ethnic minority status.

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[7] Majority Igbo cities are Aba, Enugu, and Onitsha; majority Yoruba cities are Ibadan and Lagos; and majority Hausa cities are Bauchi, Kano, and Sokoto. Though Hausa are not strict majorities in Kaduna, Lafia, and Jos, they constitute the largest ethnic group and are dominant politically (this is much less true in Jos).

[8] There is a follow-up question that asks for familial state of origin, which could conceivably be used as a proxy for cultural distance from the dominant group. We have not used this measure in the current analysis.

### 4.1 Measures of integration and ethnic attachment

The paper uses three separate measures of integration: ethnic diversity of an individual's close discussion networks; marriage to a member of a different ethnic group; and reported use of a non-native language as the language of primary daily use. In terms of ethnic diversity of discussion networks, the survey asks respondents to provide information about "the people [to whom] you think you talk the most," and the ethnic identity of each of these individuals. This measure is associated with a high rate of refusals, about 20 per cent of our sample. Of those who did answer, the majority (about 59 per cent) reported no cross-ethnic friendship (i.e., networks that are homogenously coethnic) and about 18 per cent reported networks that were more than 50 per cent non-coethnic. In order to operationalize this as network diversity, the number of reported cross-ethnic friendships is divided by the respondent's reported network size (maximum of 6 friends recorded). This generates a measure of network diversity that ranges between 0 (purely coethnic) to 1 (entirely cross-ethnic). The paper does not currently take into account how network size might affect calculated network diversity.

Of those respondents who are married, 11 per cent reported that they were married to at least one spouse of a different ethnic group. This translates into 4 per cent of our sample that is married across ethnic lines. Finally, respondents were asked which language "on a normal day" they spend the most time speaking. If they reported mostly speaking a language other than their mother tongue, then the language-swapping variable used here takes on a value of 1. About 32 per cent of our sample reports speaking mostly a non-native language: of these language-swapping respondents, about 30 per cent report speaking Hausa, about 47 per cent report speaking mostly English, and 8 per cent report speaking Pidgin.

In order to examine an individual's attachment to their own group—effectively the opposite of integration—our preferred measure captures costly ethnic preference in investment. This question asks individuals to make a choice between two different investment opportunities: they could invest with a coethnic and earn 10 per cent after six months, or they could invest with a member of a different ethnic group and earn 15 per cent after the same amount of time. Roughly 49 per cent of our sample preferred or strongly preferred the idea of investing with a member of their own ethnic group at the lower rate of return. We have retained the 4-point scale associated with this question, with 4 indicating the strongest preference for investing with a coethnic and 1 indicating a strong preference for investing with a non-coethnic at the higher rate of return. In the analysis below, we also use alternative measures of investment in local trust communities, which tend to be structured around ethnicity in Nigeria's cities. The first of these is an explicitly expressed preference for investing money with a coethnic. We ask individuals which qualities they would value or think about when choosing to invest money with another person. Individuals were read a list of eight qualities that are generally thought to shape business skill, such as track record with investments, age, education, or standing in the community, and respondents could choose up to three qualities. We use this to construct a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for those who said they would value ethnic group and 0 for those who specified only other qualities. Roughly 24 per cent of the sample said that they would value ethnic group in making this decision. We assume the lower rate of ethnic preference for this measure versus the above investment question is due to social desirability bias, as individuals may not want to explicitly state that they use ethnic identity to determine trustworthiness. We do not believe that either of these measures necessarily reflects actual investment decisions, but they serve as solid indicators of individuals' pro-ethnic bias or attachments to ethnicity, especially when making low-information choices.

We include two other measures that may capture some degree of individual reliance on ethnic trust communities: reported reliance on vigilante security and reported use of savings clubs. In urban Nigeria, as in many other parts of the developing world, individuals regularly lack access to state-

provided security, such as policing, while high levels of poverty make them vulnerable to sudden income shocks. Often, individuals turn to their affective networks or trust communities in order to cope with these challenges, and these networks are often organized on ethnic lines in sub-Saharan Africa, even in urban settings. In addition to the two measures of ethnic preference or pro-ethnic orientation, two other measures serve as alternative proxies for individual reliance on ethnically defined trust networks. The first of these is reliance on vigilante protection. This binary variable takes on a value of 1 if respondents said that they would turn first to a vigilante group for help in solving a crime. About 9 per cent of our sample reported that they would find a vigilante group most helpful. The second measure of possible reliance on ethnic trust communities is reported use of savings clubs. The variable takes on a value of 1 for the 8 per cent of the sample who reported using savings clubs. Access to vigilante protection or to savings clubs is not limited to members of locally dominant groups, but this is more likely to be the case in our sample. Among our respondents, members of these dominant groups are more than three times more likely to rely on vigilantes for protection than members of local ethnic minorities, and they are a bit less than twice as likely to have participated in savings clubs.

### 4.2 Measures of state performance

The four measures used to measure individuals' interactions with the state are intended to capture both positive and negative experiences of state contact. The first is a measure of concrete public goods receipt. The survey asks if the current administration had built any of the following in the respondent's community: a hospital or clinic, a primary or secondary school, pipes for water, boreholes, roads, a police post, or new market stalls. The index used in analysis can therefore take on values ranging from 0, in which none of these goods was provided under the current administration, to 7. Roughly 73 per cent of respondents reported the construction of at least one public good, and 40 per cent reported more than 2 public goods constructed in their local community. The survey has an additional measure of public goods access that asks respondents if various public services have gotten better or worse under the current administration. Because we fear potential endogeneity associated with assessment of services quality and expressed trust in elected officials, we prefer the index of concrete public goods provision as a measure of individuals' differential access to public goods. A count of concrete public goods built in an area is likely to be less subject to bias than a more subjective assessment of quality.

The remaining measures of state performance capture respondents' negative experiences with the state or with state officials rather than access to public goods, which has been the primary lens through which the literature on clientelism views state–society relations. Our first measure establishes whether individuals were affected by state-sponsored evictions or slum clearances, which are common in Nigerian cities and in cities throughout the developing world. Respondents were asked if they were affected by state clearances of illegal structures, and they could report either economic losses, such as seizure or destruction of property, or loss of residence. Just over 8 per cent of respondents reported losing their place of residence due to state clearances, and an additional 21 per cent of respondents reported economic losses. We use these responses to construct a binary variable for which any experience of victimization associated with state eviction takes the value of 1 and no experience of victimization has the value of 0. The second measure used for negative state contact is bribe victimization. Roughly 29 per cent of respondents reported having been solicited for a bribe by a state official in the past 12 months. Finally, since direct experience or fear of election-related violence may affect individuals' attitudes toward elected officials, we include a measure that captures individual exposure to electoral intimidation. The questions asks respondents: "Before the last election in 2007, how often (if ever) did someone threaten or intimidate people here in your neighborhood to get them to vote in a certain way?" Responses varied from 1 "never" to 4 "often." We collapse this variation into a binary variable, such that all those who report any intimidation are coded as 1 and respondents who answer

"never" are coded as 0. Notably, for all three of these measures of victimization, there were only very slight or non-appreciable differences in rates of victimization between local ethnic minorities and members of locally dominant groups.

### 4.3 Controls

Standard demographic controls are used: the respondent's age, education, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, socioeconomic status, and gender. In order to capture an individual's socioeconomic status, we included as a control a measure of food deprivation, which reflects lived poverty ("In the past year, how often did your household go without enough food to eat?"), as well as occupational controls (e.g., employment in the informal sector; white collar employment). Household income is included in our survey, but it is characterized by a large amount of missing data and is somewhat unreliable, as both poor respondents and those who work in the informal sector have difficulty accurately reporting their income. The findings reported here are similar when alternative measures of socioeconomic status, including household income, perceived access to safe water, and asset ownership, are used.

Since both level of interest in public affairs and voting behavior are common political engagement variables that are usually correlated with trust in elected officials and government institutions, they are included as controls here. The political interest question simply asks respondents how interested they are in "public affairs," and responses range on a 4-point scale from "not at all interested" to "very interested." If respondents said that they voted in the 2007 election in Nigeria, the voting behavior variable takes on a value of 1. Finally, we include recent urban migrant status as a control, as these individuals are likely less knowledgeable about and less engaged in local politics. Of the 25 per cent of our sample who reported moving within the past 5 years, only 16 per cent reported moving from outside their city of residence. Overall, these new migrants represent only 4 per cent of our sample.

## 5 Results

Due to the ordinal nature of our dependent variables and substantial unobservable heterogeneity across cities, all regressions use ordered logit with city-fixed effects. Table 2 examines the effect of local minority status and other identities on expressed trust in the three types of elected officials. Overall, the findings suggest that national-level identity cleavages shape trust in the president but have no significant effect on individuals' trust in their governors or local councilors. Both Igbo ethnicity and Protestant religion have consistent, positive, and significant effects on trust in the president, which are robust across alternative model specifications. Individuals who follow traditional religions, a group that composes less than 2 per cent of our sample, also place more trust in the president. Other ethnic and religious variables do not have significant effects on expressed trust in the president. The direction and significance of these effects is as expected: the administration of Goodluck Jonathan, who was president at the time of the survey, was viewed as benefiting ethnic groups from southeastern Nigeria, including the Igbo. Further, the winning presidential candidate in the 2007 election had been a northern Muslim; after his death in May 2010, many Muslims felt that Jonathan's succession to the presidency had robbed northern Nigeria of its rightful place in the north–south presidential rotation.

Table 2: Trust in elected officials across levels of government

| | Trust in president | Trust in governor | Trust in local councilor |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic minority in city of residence | -0.061 | -0.074 | -0.440 |
| | (0.174) | (0.176) | (0.179)** |
| Non-indigene | 0.098 | -0.087 | 0.089 |
| | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.088) |
| Igbo | 0.415 | -0.003 | -0.180 |
| | (0.175)** | (0.175) | (0.179) |
| Protestant religion | 0.504 | 0.156 | -0.004 |
| | (0.143)*** | (0.135) | (0.125) |
| Traditional religion | 0.604 | 0.302 | 0.003 |
| | (0.346)* | (0.262) | (0.316) |
| Voted in 2007 election | 0.183 | 0.286 | 0.057 |
| | (0.081)** | (0.082)*** | (0.083) |
| Interest in public affairs | 0.297 | 0.234 | 0.071 |
| | (0.039)*** | (0.040)*** | (0.041)* |
| Education | -0.031 | -0.034 | 0.003 |
| | (0.019)* | (0.019)* | (0.019) |
| Female | 0.195 | 0.173 | 0.264 |
| | (0.079)** | (0.080)** | (0.080)*** |
| Religiosity | 0.009 | 0.048 | 0.051 |
| | (0.027) | (0.027)* | (0.029)* |
| Food-deprived | -0.040 | -0.078 | -0.110 |
| | (0.042) | (0.041)* | (0.042)*** |
| Index of public goods receipt | 0.009 | 0.105 | 0.089 |
| | (0.021) | (0.022)*** | (0.021)*** |
| N | 2,461 | 2,463 | 2,414 |
| $R^2$ | 0.0594 | 0.0629 | 0.0370 |

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Models include city fixed effects and all control variables. Most variables that are consistently insignificant are not reported. The dependent variable takes higher values for higher trust in elected officials (maximum 4).

Source: Author's construction.

There are other notable findings in Table 2. Ethnic minority status in one's city of residence has no effect on presidential or gubernatorial trust, but it has a significant negative effect on trust in local councilors, which will be examined in greater detail below. Measures of political engagement—here, voting in the last election and expressed interest in public affairs—have significant positive effects on expressed trust in public officials, though this effect is weaker for local councilors. Women are more likely to express trust in elected officials, while the educated and the poor both express lower levels of trust in elected officials, though these effects vary across levels of government. Positive experience of public goods receipt significantly boosts trust in both governors and local councilors, but it has no effect on expressed trust in the president. This accords with the greater importance of state and local government in the provision of public goods in Nigeria. Individuals' experiences of state performance will be examined in greater detail below.

Finally, non-indigeneity has no significant effects on expressed trust in elected officials, a non-finding that is robust across many alternative model specifications. This is surprising in the Nigerian context, since indigeneity often shapes access to public-sector jobs and security of land tenure, as discussed above. Though individuals who are not indigenous to their states of residence may also be local ethnic or religious minorities, this is not what is driving the insignificance of non-indigeneity. Not only are the measures not strongly correlated, but indigeneity remains insignificant in models that exclude ethnic minority status, which seems to suggest the unreliability of this measure as a means of capturing perceived local exclusion or inclusion.

Further analysis examines the effects of local social position and other political experiences on attitudes toward elected local councilors. All analysis again uses ordered logit with the full set of controls and city-fixed effects. Table 3 presents results for three sets of variables that we

hypothesize shape trust in local officials: cross-ethnic contact or integration; pro-ethnic attitudes and community engagement; and negative experiences with the state. These variables shape trust in local officials through the mechanisms discussed above, which relate to an individual's position in clientelistic networks and experiences of government performance. Model 1 shows little support for the idea that cross-ethnic contact or integration uniformly boosts trust in local councilors, at least for the full sample. Ethnic minority status remains significant and negative in its effect on expressed trust. Cross-ethnic marriage has no significant effect on trust, but linguistic assimilation—or primary use of a non-native language—does have a significant and positive effect on trust. On the other hand, those who have diverse social networks are significantly less likely to express trust in local councilors.[9] It was expected that integration would yield heterogeneous effects based on ethnic minority status, and these effects will be examined more fully in a moment. Public goods receipt has a strong and positive effect on expressed trust, again as expected. Control variables also have effects in the expected directions: female respondents and those who are interested in public affairs are more likely to express trust in local councilors, while the poor and those working in the informal sector are less likely to express trust. Ethnic and religious affiliation, as well as education level, have no statistically significant effects on trust.

Model 2 presents results for our four measures of reliance on trust communities. The first two measures explicitly capture ethnic preference in investment decisions, while the other two measures, membership in savings clubs and reliance on vigilante protection, are typically (but not necessarily) associated with ethnic trust communities in these settings. The results show that both measures of preference for investment with coethnics, which we see as the best proxies for pro-ethnic orientation, are strongly and positively associated with expressed trust in local councilors. Both membership in savings clubs and reliance on vigilantes do not have significant effects. Model 3 presents results for what we see as aggravating or negative experiences associated with state contact. These are negative experience with state eviction, experience of being solicited for a bribe by a government official, and reported electoral intimidation in the respondent's area of residence. The first two types of state contact are significantly and negatively associated with expressed trust, while electoral intimidation does not have significant effects on expressed trust.

The final combined model in Table 3 shows strong support for several of our hypotheses, though we do not present results regarding possible heterogeneous effects of cross-ethnic contact and pro-ethnic orientation. Nearly all the variables that reach significance in the other models retain their significance in the combined model, except for our second and less preferred measure of ethnic preference. As in model 1, greater levels of network diversity dampen trust, while linguistic assimilation seems to boost it. Consistently with the other models, public goods receipt, female sex, and religiosity increase expressed trust in local elected officials, while poverty and working in the informal sector dampen trust. Public goods receipt retains its strongly positive effect on reported trust. In contrast to the other models, both level of public interest and past voting are insignificant.

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[9] Readers will recall that 20 per cent of our sample refused to answer this question. Our variable of network diversity treats respondents who do not respond as lacking diverse social networks, and we then control for those who refused the question. Refusal has no significant effects on trust. An alternative specification of this measure, which results in a loss of over 540 respondents, yields very similar results across models, though the level of statistical significance associated with network diversity moves to $p<0.001$. All models that include the network diversity measure also include a "refused network question" control, just as all models including cross-ethnic marriage include a control for those who are not married. Results are very similar across alternative specifications, including those with substantially smaller numbers of respondents.

Table 3: Effects of social position and state action on trust in elected local councilors

| | Integration | Ethnic reliance | Aggravating state factors | Combined model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic minority | -0.414<br>(0.183)** | -0.401<br>(0.176)** | -0.333<br>(0.174)* | -0.366<br>(0.184)** |
| Network diversity | -0.466<br>(0.151)*** | | | -0.458<br>(0.153)*** |
| Cross-ethnic marriage | 0.173<br>(0.174) | | | |
| Use of non-native language | 0.251<br>(0.121)** | | | 0.257<br>(0.124)** |
| Pro-ethnic bias (investment) | | 0.121<br>(0.038)*** | | 0.114<br>(0.038)*** |
| Pro-ethnic bias (value) | | 0.189<br>(0.096)** | | 0.128<br>(0.094) |
| Member of savings club | | 0.034<br>(0.143) | | |
| Reliance on vigilantes | | -0.142<br>(0.159) | | |
| Suffered eviction | | | -0.283<br>(0.099)*** | -0.271<br>(0.097)*** |
| Bribe solicitation | | | -0.210<br>(0.089)** | -0.207<br>(0.091)** |
| Electoral intimidation | | | -0.014<br>(0.097) | |
| Index of public goods receipt | 0.085<br>(0.022)*** | 0.079<br>(0.023)*** | 0.095<br>(0.021)*** | 0.085<br>(0.022)*** |
| Level of public interest | 0.070<br>(0.041)* | 0.075<br>(0.043)* | 0.052<br>(0.041) | 0.059<br>(0.042) |
| Female | 0.205<br>(0.082)** | 0.268<br>(0.083)*** | 0.247<br>(0.080)*** | 0.181<br>(0.083)** |
| Religiosity | 0.045<br>(0.029) | 0.056<br>(0.030)* | 0.050<br>(0.029)* | 0.056<br>(0.030)* |
| Food deprivation | -0.107<br>(0.042)** | -0.106<br>(0.043)** | -0.091<br>(0.042)** | -0.090<br>(0.042)** |
| Informal sector employment | -0.336<br>(0.111)*** | -0.330<br>(0.116)*** | -0.365<br>(0.111)*** | -0.357<br>(0.113)*** |
| $R^2$ | 0.0389 | 0.0394 | 0.0393 | 0.0454 |
| N | 2,457 | 2,277 | 2,451 | 2,389 |

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Models include city-fixed effects and all control variables. Most variables that are consistently insignificant are not reported. Models with network diversity and cross-ethnic marriage also include controls for refused network responses and unmarried status. The dependent variable takes higher values for higher trust in elected officials (maximum 4).

Source: Author's construction.

The size of these effects is substantial. Ordered logit does not allow this to be directly inferred from coefficient values in the combined model, so predicted probabilities are calculated in order to assess the marginal effects. Being a member of a local ethnic minority dampens the likelihood of reporting the highest level of councilor trust by more than 28 per cent, while movement from a homogeneously coethnic social network to one with half non-coethnics decreases the likelihood of the highest level of trust by roughly 19 per cent. Moving from the lowest to the highest levels of expressed pro-ethnic investment preference increases the likelihood of high trust in one's councilor by 36 per cent, while even moving between intermediate levels (2 and 3) on this variable is associated with a 10 per cent increase. Similarly large marginal effects are associated with

individuals' experiences of state contact. Experience of eviction lessens the likelihood of expressing "a lot" of trust in one's local councilor by 22 per cent, while a roughly modest increase from 0 to 2 on our index of public goods receipt increases the same by 17 per cent. These are substantial marginal effects, suggesting that future research should pay greater attention to local social position, integration or pro-ethnic orientation, and negative experiences with state contact. These findings also suggest that the effect of ethnicity on attitudes toward elected officials is more complicated than suggested in some of the existing literature on clientelism.

### 5.1 Differential effects on minority and majority groups

How do we square the contradictory results on cross-ethnic contact? And do the trust-boosting effects of pro-ethnic sentiment apply to ethnic minorities as well as members of dominant groups? In order to examine possible interactions between local ethnic minority status and these causal factors, we run a series of regressions that investigate possible interactions between local ethnic minority status and our measures of integration and pro-ethnic sentiment. Since ethnic minority status's trust-dampening effects are hypothesized to operate mainly through exclusion from patronage networks and from community voice, minorities with higher levels of integration into the dominant group would presumably express higher levels of trust in elected officials than their less integrated peers. The results (available in an online appendix) show no evidence of significant interaction effects. In other words, minorities with strong cross-ethnic connections do not seem to differ substantially from their less integrated peers in terms of expressed trust in governors. If ordered logit is run on separate samples composed of local ethnic minorities and members of locally dominant groups, we find similar results for members of dominant groups to those reported in Table 3. This supports our intuition that the bulk of the trust-dampening effects of integration and the trust-boosting effects of pro-ethnic attitudes operate largely within locally dominant groups. Ethnic minorities who have positive experiences of state delivery express higher levels of trust in local elected officials, and those who have suffered eviction or bribe solicitation express lower levels of trust in local officials. But there is no evidence that integration or greater cross-ethnic contact lessens the effect of ethnic minority status on expressed trust in local elected officials.

## 6 Conclusions

Existing literature has shown that identity shapes individual trust in government institutions and individuals' expectations regarding government delivery. The bulk of this literature, however, has fixed its attention either on aggregate measures, such as the level of ethnic diversity, or on an individual's position vis-à-vis national ruling coalitions. This is indicative of a general bias in the study of distributional politics, which continues to view politics in the developing world through the lens of elite-level clientelism. From this standpoint, individuals' views of the state and of politicians are determined by their position in larger clientelistic networks, i.e., those organized on the national level. This paper examines whether an individual's position in local electoral winning coalitions, which is largely determined by local minority status in Nigeria, is similarly powerful in shaping attitudes toward elected local councilors. The results in this paper are consistent with the logic of a differential political patronage story: groups that are politically disadvantaged—those who are ethnic minorities in their places of residence—express views that are indicative of greater political alienation.

But how strong is ethnic clientelism in settings where cross-ethnic contact and cosmopolitanism are increasing? In the fluid and diverse cities of the developing world, does social position remain simply a function of ethnic group membership? The findings above suggest that other aspects of

social position, such as local ethnic minority status and cross-ethnic contact, can also be consequential in shaping political trust. The paper suggests the need for a more fully relational approach to understanding the political consequences of group-based inequalities, one that takes into account how individuals relate to identity beyond the political realm. Some individuals interact largely with those who attend the same churches or speak the same language, i.e., they rely heavily on the trust networks afforded by ethnic or religious identity, while others choose to form relationships and do business across group lines. These different ways of coping with group-based difference have significant effects on individuals' political attitudes. The complexity of group inequality and local social relations should be investigated to a greater extent in future research on distributional politics and political attitudes. Finally, the paper shows that state actions, both positive and negative, shape both ethnic minority and dominant group members' trust in elected officials.

Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that attitudes toward officials are driven largely by the logic of clientelistic exchange, in spite of increased urbanization and social integration. But the paper also shows that social positional factors, often neglected by political scientists working in sub-Saharan Africa, are also important drivers of citizens' trust in local officials and, presumably, their broader orientations toward the state.

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