Political representation in the wake of ethnic violence and post-conflict institutional reform

Comparing views from Rwandan and Burundian citizens

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Abstract: The lack of political representation often lies at the origin of identity-based violence, and, when not resolved, can re-ignite violence. We study who perceives gains and losses in political representation in Rwanda and Burundi and why. We rely on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of over 700 individual life histories that cover the period 1985–2015. For both countries, we observe a sharp drop in perceived political representation in the run-up to and during violence, and a reversal across ethnicities in its aftermath, when Tutsi feel more represented than Hutu in Rwanda, and Hutu feel more represented than Tutsi in Burundi. We find that the gap in perceived political representation narrows over time in Rwanda as Hutu gradually perceive increases in substantive representation, which is in line with the idea that Tutsi elites in Rwanda who lack ‘input legitimacy’ maximize policies aiming for ‘output legitimacy’. In Burundi, the gap is widening, suggesting that the Burundian regime has failed to give either input or output legitimacy.

Key words: political representation, violence, Rwanda, Burundi, life histories, legitimacy

JEL classification: D72, D74

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† Bert Ingelaere was professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp, Belgium. His research focused on the legacy of mass violence in Africa’s Great Lakes region. He unexpectedly passed away on 4 February 2022. You can find more information on Prof. Ingelaere and his work on this ‘In memoriam’ page. Bert collected the data used in this paper, drafted the proposal for this paper, and we were working on a first draft at the time of his passing. It was not easy for us to complete this paper without Bert. We are very thankful for the comments we received, especially from scholars who knew Bert and his work, which helped us to do justice to his carefully collected data.
1 Introduction

Despite the optimism that accompanied the end of the cold war, the world continues to witness a large number of armed conflicts, with a post-1946 record of 56 armed conflicts in the year 2020 (Pettersson et al. 2021). The African continent accounts for a predominant proportion of these conflicts (Pettersson et al. 2021; Venkatasawmy 2015). Politicization of ethnicity on the continent has proven to be one of the main drivers of armed conflicts, with a history of political exclusion and associated horizontal inequalities fuelling polarization and an ‘all or nothing’ competition for power (Alcorta et al. 2018; Cederman et al. 2011; Esteban et al. 2012). The lack of (perceived) political representation thus lies at the origin of many so-called identity-based conflicts and should be addressed in order to pave the way to sustainable peace. Hence, post-war initiatives to address ethnic conflicts revolve around institutional remaking, with power-sharing and integrative state institutions being the most popular approaches (Simonsen 2005).

Yet, the conceptualization and operationalization of these institutional solutions are generally elite-centred, and we have very little understanding of how this institutional remaking is perceived by ordinary citizens. What we do know from the micro-level conflict literature is that war and mass categorical violence polarize social identities, affect prosocial behaviour, and reshape political power relations (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Cordoba 2021; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015a, 2015b; Guariso et al. 2018; Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2020). There is a need to extent this micro-level research to the post-conflict period, and understand how institutional remaking is affecting individual perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour. To add to this goal, we study perceived political representation by different ethnic groups in Burundi and Rwanda before, during, as well as after identity-based violence. Concretely, we ask who experiences gains and losses in political representation before, during, and after mass categorical violence? And how do these experiences relate to the post-war remaking of institutions?

We study these questions by comparing changes in perceptions of ordinary Burundian and Rwandan citizens during transitions from identity-based political violence to peace in the period 1985–2015. Rwanda and Burundi are often referred to as ‘false twins’: they have some clear similarities, but also striking differences. Their shared characteristics include their ethnic composition with a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority, a similar language, a relatively long tradition of statehood, the political salience of ethnicity, and a long history of political and ethnic violence (Curtis 2015; Uvin 1999). As they emerged from conflicts in the 1990s, former rebel groups—the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda and the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi—have conquered the political power and eventually became hegemonic parties. However, their paths to power fundamentally differed. The RPF got to power after an outright victory over the regime that committed the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, while CNDD-FDD rose to power through elections after years of rebellion and peace negotiations (Curtis 2015). As a result, the policies that these parties adopted to accommodate the ethnic divide differed fundamentally (Vandeginste 2014). Burundi has adopted consociational power-sharing, that is, a political model that recognizes ethnic fragmentation and provides for a ‘joint decision making between ethno-political groups’ to ensure ‘the effective representation and participation of both majorities and minorities in government’ (McCulloch 2020: 85). Rwanda has instead opted for an integrationist approach that promotes Rwandan citizenship, de-emphasizes the political salience of ethnicity, and even criminalizes reference to ethnicity in everyday life (Blouin and Mukand 2019; Rafi 2021; Vandeginste 2014).
To analyse changes over time in perceived political representation (denoted as ‘PPR’ in what follows), we rely on a combination of quantitative and narrative dimensions of life histories of ordinary citizens. Whereas life history researchers usually collect just a few stories, we have stories from more than 700 individuals. For both countries, the stories cover the periods from before the start of war and mass violence in the 1990s until up to 15 years after the formal end of the violent conflicts. The respondents were part of a sample that was stratified geographically across rural communities and (sub)ethnic categories. To allow for a quantitative analysis, the life history interviews were structured by a ranking exercise in which the respondents were asked to systematically rank their PPR on a scale of −5 to +5 for every year in their adult life, providing us with 22,546 observations of self-reported rankings of political representation. The narrative dimension includes reasons for explaining the changes in these self-reported rankings. To systematically analyse the narratives, we coded them according to the four dimensions made by Hanna Pitkin (1967) in her seminal work: formalistic representation or the formal and institutional arrangements preceding ‘representation’ and making the latter possible such as, for instance, elections; descriptive representation or the congruence of pertinent characteristics of the represented and the representative; symbolic representation or the emotional responses evoked by the representative; and substantive representation or policy dividends that the represented obtains through the work of the representative.

Our findings point to common trends as well as differences across Rwanda and Burundi. First, in both countries, prior to violence, the ethnic group deprived of power (Tutsi in Rwanda and Hutu in Burundi) has a relatively low PPR. Second, PPR declines in the run-up to violence and reaches a low point when mass ethnic violence erupts, for both ethnic groups in both countries. Third, after the end of mass violence, PPR recovers, but reverses across ethnic groups, reflecting the post-war ethnic power shifts, and thus indicating the sensitivity of PPR to descriptive and symbolic representation, or the ‘standing for (an ethnic group)’ dimension. Fourth, we also find PPR to be responsive to the organization of elections, constitutional reforms, and peace accords, that is, formalistic representation. Fifth, respondents refer to policies that affect their lives when explaining changes in PPR, which points to the significance of substantive representation. We find that substantive representation accounts for a larger part of the PPR recovery in Rwanda than in Burundi. Moreover, references to substantive representation are mainly mentioned by Rwandan Hutu, who are relatively deprived of descriptive political representation. This provides empirical support to the argument made by Chemouni (2016) and Mann and Berry (2016) that the minority Tutsi regime in Rwanda seeks its legitimation partly by adopting policies that appeal to the Hutu majority. As a result, we see that post-war PPR of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda converges over time. In contrast, the recovery of PPR in Burundi does not continue after the 2005 election, and instead stagnates at a relatively low level, especially for Burundian Tutsi, who lost power throughout the decades under study. This indicates that, in Burundi, gains through formalistic representation—and descriptive and symbolic representation for Burundian Hutu—were not sustained by substantive representation. In addition, the 2010 elections were already perceived as much less fair than the 2005 ones, which means that gains in formalistic representation were rather short-lived.

2 Literature

Political representation, defined as ‘mental perceptions, conceptions, and processes whereby a representative or a group of representatives stands for a represented person’ (Daloz 2017: 8) is an important determinant of legitimacy of political decisions and institutions (Arnesen and Peters 2018; Pantoja and Segura 2003). Especially in fragmented societies, (the perception of) a fair political representation is essential to safeguard a peaceful co-habitation of the diverse ethnolinguistic groups. Indeed, horizontal inequality, resulting from differential power and wealth
distribution (Cederman et al. 2011), has proven to be one of the key divisive factors and drivers of identity-based conflicts (Cederman et al. 2011; Hillesund 2019; Hillesund et al. 2018; Østby 2008; Reynal-Querol 2002).

Pitkin (1967) has distinguished four types of political representation—descriptive representation, substantive representation, formalistic representation, and symbolic representation—although these cannot always univocally be distinguished from one another (Tate 2001). In scholarly debates, most attention has been on descriptive representation (standing for) and substantive representation (acting for), as well as their nexus.

A balanced descriptive representation for all ethnonational groups—that is a situation whereby ‘representatives are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent’ (Mansbridge 1999: 629)—is the most formally tangible way to achieve equitable representation in fragmented societies. Inversely, when descriptive representation is denied to categories of citizens—or when their share of descriptive representation is perceived as unfair—this can result in political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003); that is, ‘a social condition in which citizens have or feel minimal connection with the exercise of political power’ (Pantoja and Segura 2003: 441). One of the potential consequences of political alienation is violent political activities (Pantoja and Segura 2003). Indeed, according to Gurr (1993), armed conflicts erupt when groups within society have no or little other possibilities to make the political system act on their demands. Thus, in fragmented societies, power-sharing can mitigate the risk of resorting to violence (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Ishiyama 2000; Kohn 1997).

The importance of descriptive representation is arguably amplified in countries where clientelism is rampant, and descriptive representation is therefore tightly linked to substantive representation (Bauer et al. 2016; De Luca et al. 2018; Eifert et al. 2010; Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016; Lynch 2017). A case in point is Burundi, where the Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD government has implemented post-conflict policies (e.g., the land restitution policy) that clearly favour and appeal to the Hutu ethnic majority (Nyenyezi and Giraud 2021; Tchatchoua-Djomo et al. 2020). The coincidence of descriptive representation with substantive representation, however, is not a given, but a matter of political choice. For instance, in Rwanda, it has been argued that the RPF regime, composed of the Tutsi demographic minority, had political interests in designing and implementing policies and programmes that are pan-ethnic in nature (see Chemouni 2016; Mann and Berry 2016).

While there is a consensus among scholars on the necessity to include all segments in the polity to pacify ethnic coexistence, a heated debate concerns the type of institutional design that would fit divided societies. Some scholars, particularly those associated with the consociationalist school of thought, advocate for a proportional type of representation (Lijphart 2004), which was introduced in one of our case study countries, Burundi. Another approach to fragmentation is an effort to depoliticize ethnicity, a path chosen by the Rwandan political and military elite (Vandeginste 2014; Wimmer 1997). In practice, this strategy consists of concealing any reference to ethnicity or any politically salient identity marker (Vandeginste 2014). These debates on the ways of approaching fragmented societies speak to the concept of representation. However, they are also elite-centred and top-down in their nature. Knowing how these different approaches to fragmentation affect

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1 A third approach contends that emphasis should rather be put on the type of representation (Ishiyama 2000). In this regard, democratization would be the most effective way of addressing fragmentation and its consequences. By giving free way to a fair political competition (formalistic representation), ethnic salience would be de-emphasized, thus mitigating the risk of reinforcing polarization (Ishiyama 2000).
the so-called ordinary people’s experiences and perceptions of their representation is of utmost importance.

In general, perceptions are predominantly shaped by past and current experiences and interests (Bash and Ezlina-Phillips 2006), and so are political perceptions. Because ethnicity, in both Burundi and Rwanda, has for long determined individuals’ life opportunities and aspirations, we expect Burundians and Rwandans to be influenced by ethnic identity in their perceptions of political representation. That is, we expect PPR to be correlated with the extent of descriptive representation. If ethnic clientelism prevails, we also expect descriptive representation to correlate with substantive representation, thus amplifying PPR of the group benefiting from high descriptive representation. In addition to this, given that ethnic conflicts make people feel insecure, and thus unprotected by the state, we expect the eve of ethnic conflicts to be characterized by lower substantive representation, and thus lower PPR. Conversely, as countries formally adopt power-sharing institutions as a strategy to appease ethnic conflicts, we expect to observe an increase in PPR in the post-war period. Depending on the nature of these institutions, and how they affect descriptive and substantive representation of the different ethnic groups, we expect such formalistic representation to lead up to convergence or divergence of PPR across ethnic groups.

3 Background

In colonial times, from 1916 till 1962, the Ruanda–Urundi territory was a UN trust territory administered by Belgium. The colonial power, through indirect rule, favoured the Tutsi minority (14 per cent) over the Hutu majority (85 per cent) (Lemarchand 1994; Prunier 1995). In doing so, ethnic identities became institutionalized and rigidified, also by the issuing of ethnic identity cards. Although Burundi and Rwanda share the same colonial past, they followed different political paths when they became separate and independent states, with a Hutu majority rule in Rwanda and a Tutsi minority rule in Burundi. In both countries, however, the decades following independence were marked by discrimination of the members of the ethnic group deprived of power and by waves of ethnic violence.

In Rwanda, a political big bang—the ‘social revolution’ in 1959—took place in the run-up to independence and led to the installation of a Hutu-dominated republic. In this period, between 100,000 and 200,000 Tutsi fled the country (Long 2012; Van Der Meeren 1996). As early as 1962, Tutsi refugees launched armed attacks with little impact except for retaliatory violence against Tutsi living inside the country, triggering new waves of Tutsi refugees. In 1973, a military coup brought Hutu General Juvenal Habyarimana to power, which he justified by the need to prevent an otherwise unavoidable ethnic conflict, but ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi minority continued (Verpoorten 2005). In Burundi, independence did not immediately result in an important political reconfiguration, as the Tutsi minority remained in charge with a Tutsi-led military dictatorship taking control over power. In the three consecutive military regimes (1966–1993), Tutsi officers monopolized all state institutions, particularly the army, disenfranchised the Hutu majority, and crystallized ethnic antagonism and a climate of mutual fear (Uvin 1999).

The last decade of the century, the 1990s, would turn out to be the most dramatic for both countries. African countries were pressured to democratize at the end of the 1980s. This resulted in the introduction of multi-party politics in Rwanda in 1990. Almost at the same time, the RPF, mainly composed of descendants of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda, attacked. The democratization wave and external military threat forced the Habyarimana regime to the negotiating table, but ultimately both parties resorted to further political violence. Political elites played the ethnic card. Considered accomplices to the RPF, all Tutsi inside Rwanda became
enemies of the state through intensive government propaganda. A genocide against the Tutsi minority followed the downing of the presidential plane on 6 April 1994. In Burundi, the one-party system dominated by the Tutsi minority also came under pressure and was replaced by a ‘government of national unity’ that issued democratic elections in 1993, in which Melchior Ndadaye was elected as the first Hutu president of Burundi (Ngurok and Nkurunziza 2000; Reyntjens 1993). The democratic transfer of power was thwarted, however, by a military coup staged by Tutsi soldiers in October 1993 in which the president and other important Hutu politicians were killed. The consequences in the short run were massive reprisal killings of Tutsi civilians and, in the longer run, the gradual emergence of Hutu rebellions.

Over the years, the CNDD-FDD became the most important rebel group in Burundi that ultimately signed a ceasefire in 2003 after several years of peace talks. The politico-military process led to the adoption of a new constitution in 2005 where quotas assured the sharing of power at different levels (De Roeck et al. 2016; Vandeginste 2014). A 60/40 per cent division among Hutu and Tutsi was introduced for ministerial positions and at the level of the National Assembly. CNDD-FDD registered as a political party and won the 2005 elections with Hutu Pierre Nkurunziza elected as president. This made Burundi one of the few successful stories of transition from war to democracy (Lemarchand 2007). The initial optimism soon disappeared, however. Whereas the 2005 elections were relatively free and fair, the 2010 elections were boycotted by most of the opposition parties and accompanied by important security incidents and massive human rights violations. An even more important blow to the transition from bullets to ballots was the 2015 political crisis following Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third unconstitutional mandate, which sparked violence and, again, refugee streams.

In Rwanda, the genocide and ongoing civil war ended not with peace talks, but with a victorious RPF ousting the Hutu-dominated regime and its National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, MRND), the party that had played an important role in implementing the genocidal project. With the remaining parties, the RPF put in place a unity government, and two Hutu individuals known for their opposition to the MRND rule headed the first post-genocide government respectively as president and prime minister. In 2000, however, Hutu president Bizimungu was forced to resign, and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi born and raised in exile and leader of the RPF rebellion, rose to power. In May 2003, Rwanda adopted a new constitution. Three months later, Kagame was elected president. In contrast to post-war Burundi, the post-war Rwandan policy was to remain silent on ethnicity and promote the idea of ‘Rwandanicity’, or the union of all Rwandans (Hilker 2009; Ingelaere 2010; Longman and Rutagengwa 2004). In practice, however, ethnicity does play a role, not least in politics. For instance, in 2016, 13 out of the 21 Rwandan ministers belonged to the Tutsi minority (De Roeck et al. 2016).

In sum, the 1990s in Rwanda implied a clear reversal of ethnic political power relations and an increase of descriptive political representation by Tutsi from below 10 per cent to roughly 60 per cent of ministerial positions. In Burundi, the 1990s also meant a reversal of descriptive political representation across ethnicities, but here it was the Hutu majority who gained descriptive political representation, raising their representation among executive positions from around 30 per cent in 1987 to 50 per cent (from 1988 to 1992) and to 60 per cent in 1993 (De Roeck et al. 2016).

Next to very different political turns, Rwanda and Burundi also travelled very different socioeconomic paths in the aftermath of mass political violence. Rwanda has made tremendous socioeconomic progress, recording average annual growth rates ranging around 7 per cent, and making impressive progress in education and health outcomes to the extent that the country became top achiever of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (Gready 2010; McKay and Verpoorten 2016; Reyntjens 2015). At the same time, the RPF rule has been marked by a shrinking
public space and clear human rights violations (Beswick 2010; Gready 2010). Some argue that these are two sides of the same coin. According to Chemouni (2016), for instance, the Rwandan regime is ‘forced’ to deliver outputs and thus gain output legitimacy because, controlled by a minority Tutsi elite, it has a deficit in ‘input legitimacy’, that is legitimacy resulting from process (Weiler 2012). Hence, to gain both domestic and international legitimacy, this elite has emphasized that it not only succeeded in ending the genocide but also plays off its economic and social performances. In a way, the regime aims at successful substantive representation, or ‘acting for’, to compensate for a lack of sufficient descriptive and symbolic representation, or ‘standing for (the Hutu majority)’. One could also argue that besides this existential motivation to ‘act for’, the RPF—having come to power with an outright victory and thus monopoly over power—had the leeway to implement its social and economic policies without hindrance (Chemouni 2017), a considerable advantage that cannot be expected in contexts of ‘chaotic’ grand coalition governments as is the case in Burundi (Chemouni 2018; Jones and Murray 2018).

While the Rwandan regime, from its very first days, was needing and able to deliver on matters relating to substantive representation, the same cannot be said for Burundi (Chemouni 2016). In the first two years of the CNDD-FDD rule, as the country struggled to implement one of the most challenging political transitions, important efforts were needed to sustain the fragile peace process. These efforts involved operationalizing the power-sharing agreement, coming up with an agreement with the National Forces of Liberation (Forces nationales de libération) Palipehutu, reforming key state institutions, and addressing political conflicts within the ruling party. All these pressing priorities left limited time and resources to develop technocratic capacities that would bolster the state’s capacities and thus enable the government to deliver substantive representation dividends. In fact, the country’s economy has stalled, and its human development outcomes are very far removed from meeting the Millennium Development Goals (Ndoricimpa 2014). This context of state underperformance has arguably shaped the Burundian citizens’ expectations towards their government. According to Stel and Ndayiragije (2014), with time, Burundians lowered their expectations and evaluated the government based on input considerations (elements that allude to descriptive and symbolic representation) rather than output considerations (elements that connect to substantive representation).

4 Data and method

4.1 Data collection

Whereas life history researchers usually collect a few stories, we have stories of 302 individuals in Burundi and 412 in Rwanda. To collect these atypically large number of stories, the first author on this article trained and supervised a team of seven local collaborators, was continuously present in the field during the data collection (in total 28 months in the period 2007–15), was present during one-third of the interviews, and verified all of the collected material on a daily basis to guarantee quality and provide feedback to the local collaborators. The respondents were part of a sample that was stratified geographically across rural communities and ethnic subcategories. Seven communities were chosen in Rwanda and six in Burundi (see Figure 1). The choice was guided by the principle of maximum variation, aiming at a large variance in conflict and post-conflict experiences across locations. To select individuals, lists were compiled in each community with

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2 The same data as in this study have been used for two other studies, namely a study on female political representation (Guariso et al. 2018) and a study on inter- and intra-ethnic trust in the aftermath of mass violence (Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2020).
the names of all the household heads and their ethnic markers. Subsequently, households were selected through a random sampling scheme, stratified by ethnic subcategories. Then, the household head or, in case they were absent, another adult member was interviewed.3

Figure 1: The location of research sites: (a) Burundi and (b) Rwanda

(a) Burundi

(b) Rwanda

Note: the locations correspond to small administrative sectors.
Source: authors’ compilation in ArcGIS.

3 All respondents selected were over 25 years old, a criterion that assured that they had lived through the turbulent 1990s consciously. The average age of the respondents was 49 years in Burundi and 50 years in Rwanda. All interviews were conducted in the house of the respondent without onlookers present.
Since the use of ethnic markers is strictly policed by the Rwandan regime (contrary to the Burundian situation at the time of fieldwork), the stratification across ethnic subcategories was based on alternative markers that underlie these categories and that are commonly used by Rwandans. The subcategories related to Tutsi include ‘genocide survivor’ and ‘returnee’ and those related to Hutu include ‘not accused in gacaca’, ‘accused in gacaca’, and ‘liberated prisoner’.4 Besides, Rwandans do speak about sensitive topics, such as ethnicity or political representation in private settings and when relationships of trust are cultivated and developed with interlocutors, as several authors with extensive fieldwork experience have stressed (Fuji 2010; Ingelaere 2015; King 2009; Thomson 2010). Table 1 provides an overview of the sample by ethnic group. It shows that the share of Tutsi in our sample is close to 30 per cent in Rwanda as well as Burundi, about twice their estimated population share, which is the intended consequence of the stratified sampling.5

Table 1: Sample observations by ethnicity, and across interview rounds

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<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: attrition indicates the share of Round 1 respondents that could not be traced in Round 2. Most of Round 2 interviews with Rwandan respondents took place in 2011, but 38 were conducted in 2015 with respondents who could not be interviewed in 2011, mainly because they were in prison or in re-education camps.

Source: authors’ compilation in Excel.

To allow for a quantitative analysis, we needed to extract systematic information from the stories. To this end, the stories were structured by a ranking exercise in which the respondents were asked to systematically comment on political representation and rank it on a scale of −5 to +5 for every year in their life history. Figure 2 shows the ‘ladder of life’ used for the ranking exercise. The enumerators were trained to always use exactly the same phrasings to explain the nature of the ladder and its steps. The respondents were asked to situate themselves on the ladder, through time, starting with the year of the interview, by answering the following question: ‘Currently, on what step [on the ladder] do you situate your experience of political representation?’ Subsequently a move back in time was made to the year of marriage or the first year of adult life (if single), repeating the question for that point. The same question was then asked with reference to the past, asking a rating for every year. The findings from the life history narrative were used to help people recall their situation at a certain moment in time. For example, when someone told us they had a firstborn child in 1986, reference would be made to 1986 as ‘the year when your first child was born’.

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4 For more details on the sampling and subcategories, see Ingelaere and Verpoorten (2020).

5 To present representative results for the Hutu and Tutsi groups, we apply weights to the subgroups proportional to their actual share in the population. Results with unweighted data lead to similar conclusions (available on request).
The ranking exercise was developed in a pilot phase that included 50 full life story interviews with 30 Hutu and 20 Tutsi respondents, each lasting between 7 and 14 hours, spread over several sessions. These interviews were conducted through open-ended questions touching on almost every aspect of the interviewee’s life. The subsequent structuring and focus on a limited number of salient themes (including political representation\(^6\)) reduced the interview time to 1.5–3.5 hours. However, also in their semi-structured form, the interviews gave the respondent room for ‘telling’ their life history.

In the pilot phase, we also explored how to best enquire about ‘political representation’. This enquiry revealed a shared understanding of ‘gubagararirwa’ in Rwanda and ‘guserukirwa’ in Burundi as ‘political representation’, which literally mean to act in one’s name, but take on a broader meaning when taking into account their figurative meaning as well. Probing into what is considered as good political representation, it was revealed that gubagararirwa/guserukirwa is considered good when (i) authorities are aware of the needs of the population and take care of those needs, and (ii) they govern in an impartial way and prevent the suffering of any kind of injustice that remains unpunished.

For the more recent years, since 2000, respondents were asked to explain in their own words what the reasons of change were in case they changed the ranking of political representation from one life history year to the other. In total, this resulted in 553 ‘narratives of change’ related to political representation in Burundi and 729 in Rwanda. For instance, a Rwandan Hutu man, aged 57 years, explained his PPR increase in political representation in 2006 as follows: ‘The authorities released me [from prison]. I was so happy!’ And a Burundian Hutu women aged 42 years explained her PPR increase in 2005 in the following words: ‘The elected president brought us peace and security.’ To analyse the narratives, we coded them systematically, which is explained next.

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\(^6\) Ingelaere and Verpoorten (2020) provide an analysis of another salient theme—inter- and intra-ethnic trust.
4.2 Coding

Through discourse analysis, we coded the narratives based on four different dimensions of political representation, inspired by Pitkin’s (1967) theorization: formalistic, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. Table 2 presents our coding guide and example of each dimension. If, in a single statement, we found more than one type of political representation, we used more than one code but started with the one that seemed most salient. To ensure that we had a common understanding of the narratives, the first two authors on this paper both coded all narratives, compared their coding, and discussed the reasoning behind each other’s coding to eventually reach a consensus. The coded narratives on political representation allow us to conduct a qualitative analysis of changes in political representation. Concrete examples follow in Section 5.

Table 2: Coding guide for narratives related to changes in perceived political representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of PPR</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalistic representation.</strong> Formal and institutional arrangements preceding ‘representation’ and making the latter possible. It deals with the ‘rules of the game’ through which representatives achieve their position and through which they can be punished, for instance by losing their position as a representative.</td>
<td>Elections, peace accords, new or updated constitutions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic representation.</strong> How the representative ‘stands for’ the represented and how this works ‘on the minds of people’ (Pitkin 1967: 101). It focuses on the figurative dimension in the relationship between the representative and the represented, namely the question of ‘meaning’. It is about the response evoked and transformation achieved in attitudes, opinions, perceptions on the side of representatives regarding what the representative stands for as a symbol and the institutional arrangement through which the representation happens. The representative power resides in what the representative is able to evoke.</td>
<td>Women stand as symbols for women, thereby inspiring other women to raise their aspirations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive representation.</strong> How the representative ‘stands for’ the represented. It focuses on the pictorial dimension in the relationship between the representative and the represented, namely to what extent the dimension of resemblance, mirroring between the represented and the representative is achieved. The representative power resides in what the representative is.</td>
<td>Women stand for women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive representation.</strong> How the representative ‘acts for’ the represented. It focuses on actions taken in the interest or on behalf of the represented. It is about the content of the representative relationship. It is about an outcome and therefore focuses on the policy dimension in the relationship between the represented and the representative, namely to what extent the best interests of the represented are served.</td>
<td>Service delivery through the provision of public goods (e.g. security), or private goods (e.g. food aid).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other.</strong> When the narrative does not fit in any of the above typologies of representation, that is, when someone says that they felt represented or not for reasons that have nothing to do with political representation, as we conceptualize it.</td>
<td>‘End of hunger period’, ‘My house was clean’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ synthesis based on Daloz (2017), Krook (2020), Lawless (2004), Lombardo and Meier (2018), Mansbridge (1999), Pitkin (1967), Severs (2012), and Stout et al. (2021); Tremblay (2022).

4.3 Biases

While the combined quantitative and qualitative approach enriches our analysis, there are three main potential threats to the validity of our data: recall bias, attrition bias, and social desirability bias.

To get a sense of the magnitude of the recall bias, we exploit the fact that respondents were visited twice. The first wave of interviews took place in 2007 in Rwanda and 2008 in Burundi; the second wave took place in 2011 and 2015, respectively. In the second round of interviews, the

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7 For the second round of interviews in Rwanda, 38 respondents were interviewed in 2015 unlike in 2011, because they were not available in 2011 (being in prison or in re-education camps or just visiting family).
respondents were asked to describe their life history starting from 2000, so we have an overlapping period of life history years and ranking of political representation across the two survey rounds, namely the years between 2000 and 2007/08. This allows us to assess recall bias. For the overlapping period 2000–08, we find an average difference of 0.14 (on an 11-unit scale) in the score reported by the Burundian respondents across the two survey rounds, while the average gap is 0.11 for the overlapping period 2000–07 in Rwanda. These relatively small discrepancies reduce concerns of large recall bias. In the figures we present in the main text, we rely on Round 1 for the overlapping period. Relying instead on Round 2 does not alter our main conclusions (figures available on request).

When implementing consecutive data rounds, typically a proportion of respondents cannot be traced. When these ‘dropouts’ systematically differ in terms of key characteristics of interest—political representation in our case—results may be biased. Across the two data rounds, 12.5 per cent of the Rwandan respondents and 16.8 per cent of the Burundian respondents dropped out. To investigate attrition bias, we compare the level of political representation as reported in the first round across the dropouts and the traced respondents. We find that the reported levels of political representation by these two subsamples are not far apart, 0.48 units on average for Burundi for the period 1986–2008 and 0.22 units on average for Rwanda for the period 1986–2007. In our baseline results, we rely on the subsample of respondents that could be traced over time. Using the full unbalanced sample gives very similar results (figures available on request).

Finally, the last concern is that, in the absence of incentives for responding truthfully, other motives may take precedence, most importantly social desirability, or—not unimportantly in a repressive authoritarian regime—political desirability bias. While we have no way of formally checking for this, the data collection method that we implemented likely limits the risk of untruthful but socially or politically desirable answers. First, all interviews were taken in a private setting, without onlookers present. Second, the reporting is embedded in the respondent’s life history, thus imposing a ‘consistency constraint’. Indeed, the reported political representation needs to be compatible with other events in the life history and its related narratives of change. While not completely ruling out biases, the use of a calendar approach through which event history data are collected has proven to be more reliable than standard survey approaches (Belli et al. 2001), also in the context of data collection following traumatic events (Barber et al. 2016).

5 Findings

In this section, we show how PPR evolves for Burundian and Rwandan respondents, before, during, and after identity-based mass political violence. We start by discussing the PPR rankings leading up to and during political violence, then we turn to the post-war recovery pattern, and finally we analyse the narratives that provide reasons for the post-2000 recovery in PPR.

5.1 PPR leading up to and during political violence

Figures 3a and 3b show the perception of political representation as reported by our Burundian and Rwandan respondents throughout their life history years, starting from the year 1985. In the period 1985–92, Tutsi in Burundi clearly felt better represented than Hutu in Burundi. This is unsurprising. A Tutsi army officer, President Bagaza, ruled Burundi between 1976 and 1987. He came to power through a military coup. He managed to achieve some important improvements in the infrastructural development of the country, but power was exercised by force and concentrated among the Tutsi. Bagaza also abolished the reference to ethnic identities. The ethnic violence experienced in the past was therefore not addressed but silenced through an imposed policy of
national unity. In practice, ethnic sentiments and distinctions sharpened. Indeed, Lemarchand (2009: 129) remarks that it is not because one abolishes ethnic references that these identities cease to have meaning and force in daily life. The ethnic divide in rankings aligns with Lemarchand’s point.

Figure 3: Rankings of perceived political representation as reported in life stories: (a) Burundi, 1985–2015 and (b) Rwanda, 1985–2011

(a) Burundi, 1985–2015

(b) Rwanda, 1985–2011

Note: based on the life story rankings of 302 traced Burundian respondents and 412 traced Rwandan respondents. Round 1 data series is used for the overlapping period 2000–07/08. Round 2 data series starts from 2008/09 onwards. To yield representative results for the Hutu and Tutsi groups, we apply weights to the ethnic subgroups proportional to their population share.

Source: authors’ compilation in Stata.
In 1987, another Tutsi army officer, Pierre Buyoya, deposed Bagaza and took over the presidency. Political liberalization followed, with increasing but limited openings to voice discontent. However, in 1988, ethnic violence engulfed two northern communes (municipalities). The combination of a harsh way of governing by some Tutsi civil servants in the specific localities and politically motivated underground activities by Hutu in conjunction with a mix of other factors sparked the violence (Chrétien et al. 1988). The Tutsi inhabitants of the region were killed and their houses looted and destroyed. In response, the army and gendarmerie entered the region and killed Hutu civilians in an attempt to restore order and in retaliation to the acts committed. This short episode of ethnic violence coincides with a dip of PPR for both Hutu and Tutsi.

In 1993, PPR in Burundi not just declined but plunged to an all-time low. Initially, the outlook in 1993 seemed promising for political representation, especially for Hutu. Political liberalization continued and resulted in multi-party elections in June 1993 that were won by Melchior Ndadaye, the leader of Frodebu (Front pour la Démocratique au Burundi), who thus became the country’s first Hutu president. However, just a few months after his election, he was killed by Tutsi elements in the army. A bold Frodebuisation of the state apparatus that was initiated after Ndadaye took power had caused panic in the circles of the old Tutsi elite (Reyntjens 2000). Not only did Frodebuisation result in a de-Tutsification of the system, but also vested economic interests and privileges were at stake. The news of the assassination of President Ndadaye resulted in the killing of thousands of Tutsi civilians throughout the country. Some qualified these killings, which were a combination of spontaneous anger by ordinary Hutu and incitation by the national and local administrative and political authority figures, as ‘genocide’ (Rutamucero 2007). Retaliation followed by bands of Tutsi youth and the army that was still mono-ethnically Tutsi. Apart from tens of thousands of casualties, the episode resulted in thousands displaced and others seeking refuge outside Burundi. This episode of widespread ethnic violence led to an absolute low point in PPR, for both Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi.

In contrast to Tutsi in Burundi, Tutsi in Rwanda report lower PPR than Hutu in the 1980s. This is unsurprising given Rwanda’s Hutu majority rule at the time, and thus a (latent) awareness among Tutsi of not being fully represented. The idea of Hutu supremacy—or at least majority—was institutionalized through a policy of ethnic quotas by which Tutsi were allocated 9 per cent of government positions, with no real power, and the same percentage of places in schools and at universities. As in Burundi, the onset of violence in Rwanda triggered a decline in PPR, for both ethnic groups. In particular, PPR started declining in 1990, the year of the RPF invasion that marks the beginning of a civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government. The Arusha Peace Accords of 1993 brought some stabilization, which is reflected in PPR stabilizing as well, but not for long.

The Arusha-brokered multi-party system failed, and Rwanda plunged into chaos in 1994. PPR reached an all-time low for both ethnic groups, but more so for Tutsi. After the shooting down of the plane that carried both the Rwandan and Burundian presidents on 6 April 1994, and in an effort to cling on to power, the hardliners within the Habyarimana regime appealed to ethnic sentiments and managed to align multiple cleavages dividing the socio-political landscape with the central cleavage animating politics: the Hutu–Tutsi bi-polarity. Tutsi living inside Rwanda became stigmatized as ‘enemies from within,’ ‘cockroaches’ (inyenzi), and ‘accomplices’ (ibyitso) of the RPF, the enemy on the outside of Rwanda perceived as a Tutsi rebel force eager to undo the achievements of the 1959 Hutu revolution (Des Forges 1999: 76–78). They were ordered to be killed. In barely 3 months, an estimated 600,000 Tutsi were killed, as well as many Hutu perceived as ‘moderates’. Many more Hutu died in the years afterwards, either in reprisal killings, from disease in refugee camps, or from dire wartime conditions (Verpoorten 2020).
In sum, we find that before the onset of mass violence, the ethnic group deprived of power and with a relatively low descriptive political representation feels relatively poorly represented. This is true for the Hutu majority in Burundi as well as the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. Political representation declines with the onset of violence, for both ethnic groups in both countries, and reaches an all-time low at the peak of mass violence (in 1993 for Burundi and 1994 for Burundi), which is most pronounced for Tutsi in Rwanda who were targeted to be exterminated in the genocidal campaign against them.

5.2 PPR in the aftermath of political violence

After the 1993 low in Burundi, PPR started a gradual recovery process. PPR also started to recover in Rwanda when the RPF put an end to the genocide against Tutsi in July 1994. As Figures 3a and 3b show, the post-war recovery trajectories of PPR are characterized by non-linearities, with periods of relatively fast recovery alternated by periods of relatively slow recovery or stagnation. This suggests the importance of macro-level events and policies in explaining changes in post-conflict PPR. We illustrate this non-linearity more clearly in Figures 4a and 4b, where we focus on the recovery period and put changes in PPR instead of levels on the vertical axis. The red bars indicate the average yearly change for Tutsi, while the green lines depict the average yearly change for Hutu. Apart from the recovery of PPR in the years immediately following its absolute low point, we note recovery peaks for Burundian Tutsi in 1996, for Burundian Hutu in 2000 and 2005, and for both Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi in the years 2000 and 2003. What are the events underlying these peaks?

Figure 4: Average annual change in the rankings of perceived political representation: (a) Burundi, 1994–2015 and (b) Rwanda, 1995–2011
(a) Burundi, 1994–2015
In Burundi, the 1993 killing of first Hutu president Ndadaye resulted in what was later considered to be a ‘creeping coup’, leading to the coming back to power of Tutsi army officer Buyoya in 1996 (Reyntjens 2005: 117). Although this non-democratic takeover of power was condemned and also sanctioned by the international community, it gave Tutsi a renewed sense of political representation. Hence, the 1996 upsurge in PPR for Tutsi, but not for Hutu. In Rwanda, the PPR rankings bounced back very rapidly for Tutsi immediately after the RPF took power, strongly contrasting with the much more gradual recovery for Hutu. Consequently, and as clear from Figure 3b, reversal of PPR is evident across ethnicities from 1995 onwards. This reversal mimics the ethnic reversal of power in Rwanda: the new regime was Tutsi-dominated and perceived as being in the service of Tutsi. The genocide, the war, and its violent aftermath left communities thus not only devastated economically but deeply divided along ethnic lines, also with respect to PPR.
From 2000 onwards, the legacy of political violence gradually led to formal institutional changes, which had a positive effect on the self-reported changes in PPR in both countries (Figures 4a and 4b). In Burundi, 2000 was the year of the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. It also laid the basis for the formal relinquishing of the power monopoly held by Tutsi in Burundi, who—in contrast to Hutu—reported a small decline in PPR in 2000. The year 2003 was marked by the accession of a Hutu president, Domitien Ndayizeye, to power, the ceasefire agreement between the government and the CNDD-FDD, and the integration of CNDD-FDD combatants (predominantly Hutu) in the army. Self-reported PPR spiked, but more so for Hutu than for Tutsi. The overall 2005 peak for Hutu in Burundi marked the launching of a new constitution and elections; with the latter resulting in a clear victory of the CNDD-FDD with 59 per cent in legislative elections (Daley 2007), it also marked the reversal of PPR across ethnic groups in Burundi. As is clear from Figure 3a, for the first time in the country’s history, Hutu citizens of Burundi felt more politically represented than its Tutsi citizens.

In Rwanda, 2000 marked the end of the insurgency war in the northwest and the start of a reconciliation and unity narrative in public discourse (Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2020) materialized by the formal inception of the Gacaca mechanism to deal with genocide-related crimes in June 2002. The 2003 peak in Rwanda coincided with the introduction of a new constitution and the first national-level elections, which were won by Paul Kagame with 95 per cent of votes (Kiwuwa 2005), and his party, the RPF, that won 74 per cent seats in the parliament (Stroh 2010). These formal institutional changes coincided with an upsurge in PPR for both ethnic groups. The effective start of gacaca, the grassroot trials, coincided with a small PPR drop for Tutsi, which however did not persist.

Now that we have discussed which macro-political events coincided with noticeable changes in PPR, we turn to the narratives that give the self-reported reasons behind these changes, thereby providing us with more insights ‘from below’.

5.3 Self-reported reasons for changes in post-war PPR

As explained in Section 4, the open-ended narratives were collected in the second data collection round from life history year 2000 onwards, and then coded according to Pitkin’s (1967) four types of political representation: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive. Figure 5a compares the relative frequency of these four categories across Burundian and Rwandan respondents, aggregated for the decade 2001–11.\(^8\) Figure 5b adds a disaggregation layer across ethnic groups. Figures 6a and 6b set out the frequency of the four categories across time for Burundi and Rwanda, respectively.

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\(^8\) We drop the years 2012–15 for Burundi to facilitate comparison with Rwanda for which data points end in 2011.
Figure 5: Relative frequencies of the coded narratives denoting reasons for change in perceived political representation

(a) Burundi and Rwanda, aggregated across 2001–11

(b) Burundi and Rwanda, aggregated across 2001–11, for Tutsi and Hutu separately

Note: BDI, Burundian; RWA, Rwandan. Based on the life story rankings of 302 traced Burundian respondents and 412 traced Rwandan respondents. To allow for cross-country comparison, we provide relative frequencies (instead of absolute frequencies), with the coded narratives summing to 100 per cent for each of the bars. In addition, and also for reasons of comparison, we have restricted the time period to 2001–11, thus dropping the life history years 2012–15 for Burundi.

Source: authors' compilation in Stata.
Figure 6: Relative frequencies of the coded narratives denoting reasons for change in perceived political representation, across time

(a) Burundi, 2001–11

(b) Rwanda, 2001–11

Note: based on the life story rankings of 302 traced Burundian respondents and 412 traced Rwandan respondents. To allow for cross-country comparison, we provide relative frequencies (instead of absolute frequencies), with the coded narratives summing to 100 per cent across the 10 years. In addition, and also for reasons of comparison, we have restricted the time period to 2001–11, thus dropping the life history years 2012–15 for Burundi.

Source: authors’ compilation in Stata.
We find that formalistic representation accounts for 16.7 per cent of the narratives in Burundi and 13.9 per cent in Rwanda, and this difference is statistically significant.\(^9\) As can be seen in Figures 6a and 6b, for both countries, narratives mentioning formalistic representation peak in the election years 2005 and 2003, respectively. Here are examples of narratives that highlight formalistic representation as a reason for an increase in PPR:

> We elected the president of the republic and I hope he will start realizing the promises made to the population. (Rwanda, Hutu, liberated prisoner, man, aged 39 years, 2003; emphasis added)

> The authorities had accepted to share power with other politicians who were fighting. (Burundi, Hutu, never moved, man, aged 50 years, 2002; emphasis added)

Symbolic representation accounts for 17.0 per cent of the narratives in Burundi and 13.4 per cent in Rwanda, a strongly statistically significant difference.\(^10\) We again note a concentration in the election years 2003 and 2005, respectively, thus indicating an association between formalistic and symbolic representation.

> The authorities treat me as any other citizen. The current chief of sector even paid me a visit; he was in charge of social affairs. He asked me a number of questions on the size of my family and the situation of my husband. (Rwanda, Tutsi, survivor, woman, aged 53 years, 2005; emphasis added)

> The authorities are interested in us because we give reliable information. (Rwanda, Hutu, not convicted, man, aged 53 years, 2010)

Descriptive representation accounts for only 4.4 per cent of narratives in Burundi and 3.3 per cent in Rwanda, and this difference is only weakly significant.\(^11\) Thus, although we see a clear reversal in PPR across ethnic groups over time, explicit mention of ethnicity in the respondents’ narratives of change is relatively rare. This could be because ethnicity is only latently playing a role in a respondent’s PPR, or because respondents prefer not to name it explicitly.

> Segregation among authorities. Particularly, contradictions among ruling elites depending on whether one is a survivor or not. Citizens would follow the ruler based on subjective factors such as whether or not they belong to the group of genocide survivors. (Rwanda, Tutsi, survivor, woman, aged 54 years, 2003; emphasis added)

> There was no Tutsi representative in our commune. (Burundi, Tutsi, never moved, man, aged 61 years, 2004; emphasis added)

Symbolic and descriptive representation combined, or the ‘standing for’ component counts for 21.4 per cent in Burundi compared with only 16.7 per cent in Rwanda, which is a highly statistically significant difference of 4.7 percentage points.\(^12\) Conversely, the ‘acting for’ dimension, or substantive representation accounts for 55.7 per cent of the narratives in Burundi and 62.7 per cent of...
cent in Rwanda, which is a difference of 7 percentage points, and highly statistically significant.\textsuperscript{13} Examples are:

- Local authorities distributed aid such as beans, maize flour, clothing, and hoes. (Burundi, Hutu, never moved, aged 71 years, 2002; emphasis added)

- Improvements in the detention conditions. It was possible and easier to chat with our friends prisoners. (Rwanda, Hutu, accused, man, aged 65 years, 2002; emphasis added)

The 4.7 percentage point higher ‘standing for’ and 7 percentage points lower ‘acting for’ in Burundi compared with Rwanda is also reflected in the distribution of coded narratives over time. Indeed, comparing Figures 6a and 6b, we see that the coded narratives for Burundi peak very strongly in and around the 2005 election year, whereas the coded narratives for Rwanda are spread out much more evenly across years.

Moreover, Figure 5b shows that substantive representation in Rwanda is relatively high for Rwandan Hutu. We find that 45.9 per cent of PPR changes by Rwandan Hutu are explained in terms of positive substantive representation compared with only 36.6 per cent for Rwandan Tutsi. This 9.4 percentage point difference is highly statistically significant,\textsuperscript{14} and further corroborates the conjecture that the Rwandan Tutsi elite tries to win hearts and minds of the Hutu majority with popular policies, and that this seems to be paying off despite the concentration of power by a small Tutsi elite, and the regime’s heavy-handedness and elimination of political opponents (Hintjens 2008; Reyntjens 2015). It is also possible that this pattern stems from government propaganda that succeeds in promoting a single narrative that highlights the regime’s (socioeconomic) success and that pushes criticism aside. However, propaganda cannot be the whole story, as it does not explain why positive substantive representation is reported more by Rwandan Hutu than by Rwandan Tutsi, neither why a relatively large part of narratives point to negative substantive representation in Rwanda, and more so for Tutsi (24.6 per cent) than for Hutu (17.2 per cent). If the ‘acting for’ dimension were aligned with the ‘standing for’ dimension, we would expect the reverse pattern, with Rwandan Tutsi referring more to net positive substantive political representation than Rwandan Hutu. Such alignment is exactly what we see in Burundi: the Burundian Hutu majority that enjoyed a post-war improvement in descriptive political representation refers more to both positive symbolic and positive substantive representation than Burundian Tutsi. Here, there is no compensation but rather an amplification across these dimensions of political representation.

6 Discussion

Our findings demonstrate who experiences political gains and losses after identity-based violence in Rwanda and Burundi. Compared with the period before mass categorical violence, PPR reverses across ethnic groups. The Tutsi respondents in Rwanda and the Hutu respondents in Burundi report increasing PPR when the Tutsi-dominated RPF and Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD, respectively, access power at the end of hostilities and bring about changes in the ruling elite and, progressively, in the institutional infrastructures through the adoption of new constitutions, the holding of elections and other policy changes. Also after the coming to power of CNDD-FDD, Burundian Hutu report stronger gains in representation than their Tutsi counterparts. In contrast,

\textsuperscript{13} The difference is significant at the 1 per cent level ($Pr(T < t) = 0.0000$).

\textsuperscript{14} The difference is significant at the 1 per cent level ($Pr(T < t) = 0.0000$).
despite a strong grip on power in Rwanda by a Tutsi elite, it is not the Rwandan Tutsi but the Rwandan Hutu who report stronger substantive political representation, leading to a convergence of PPR across ethnic groups in Rwanda over time. This conclusion, that substantive representation closes the ethnic divide, thereby overcoming the deficit in descriptive representation in Rwanda, is also supported by the changes of PPR over time and the associated narratives. The election of Kagame and thus his official coming to power in 2003 is less translated into an increase in PPR compared with the election in Burundi. Moreover, there is much more reporting of changes in PPR after the actual coming to power of Kagame and the consolidation of RPF dominance in state institutions, and mostly in the domain of substantive political representation.

These trends in PPR can be explained by focusing on the sources of political legitimacy: what makes the ruling elites legitimate in the eyes of those represented by them and how they represent them. Following Chemouni (2016: 208), we can differentiate between input and output legitimacy to make sense of the trends. Input legitimacy points to people’s belief that the ruling elite is justified to access power and rule. Political legitimacy, or the lack thereof, is then a consequence of whether rulers are seen as having brought peace or liberation, how ‘popular’ the politico-military movements and their elites are, or whether their power is ‘validated’ through free and fair elections. Output legitimacy, by contrast, resides in the ability to improve people’s lives; that is, whether they can guarantee security, well-being, and services to the population. It thus closely aligns with substantive representation. Overall, one can say that in Burundi, the rulers mainly relied on input legitimacy, capitalizing on the war effort, the reversal of historical injustices, and the emphasis on the rural and popular origins of the rebel movement. In contrast, in Rwanda, these potential sources of legitimacy made the RPF more illegitimate from the viewpoint of the Hutu majority of the population. Rulers in Rwanda, therefore, had to bet on a policy of output legitimacy.

Our findings also suggest that people’s perception of political representation is heavily influenced not just by the actual prevailing descriptive representation but also by various subjective considerations, including expectations, feelings, and prior fortunes. These subjectivities are also central to the concept of relative deprivation (Gurr 1993). Specifically, a group that is—objectively speaking—disproportionately overrepresented (e.g., Tutsi in Rwanda) can report a lower level of political representation due to a mismatch between the social, economic or political goods people expect or feel that they are rightfully entitled to on the one hand, and what they are capable of attaining and maintaining on the other (. . .)’ (Hillesund et al. 2018: 465, emphasis added). Conversely, a group (e.g., Hutu in Rwanda) that would expect to be disenfranchised considering the history of genocide can report a higher level of representation when the state invests in common goods. In the same way, a relatively underrepresented group compared to its demographic weight (as Hutu in Burundi) can report a higher representation level because the reference is the period of exclusion they endured for years, whereas a group that is overrepresented compared to its demographic weight (Tutsi in Burundi) can report a lower perceived representation, mainly because it uses as reference the time it enjoyed a monopoly of political power.

References


