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Youth, violence, and sustaining peace

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Abstract: Violent conflicts affect the lives and livelihoods of almost one quarter of the world’s population. But the effects of violent conflict are not uniform. This study assesses the differential effects of violent conflict on young people’s education, job prospects, and forms of civic engagement and investigates using available (limited) data the potential role of young people in supporting peace and stability in their communities in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Nepal. The empirical analysis points to two suggestive patterns. First, violent conflict causes immense destruction but is not always associated with negative outcomes among young adults. Second, there is largely no statistically significant association in the four case studies between the share of young adults and the likelihood of communities experiencing violent conflict. In fact, young people are more likely to be engaged in their community and have a more positive outlook on life and future perspectives in conflict-affected areas. We expect this study to stimulate further rigorous research into the role of young adults in conflict contexts, as well as much-needed investments in adequate datasets that map and identify the potential role that young men and women may be able to play in preventing conflicts and sustaining peace in their communities.

Key words: youth, violent conflict, peace, civic participation

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Note: tables at the end of the paper. Online appendix available on the working paper’s [webpage](#).

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1 Introduction

Violent conflicts affect the lives and livelihoods of almost two billion people, with substantial direct and indirect costs at the time of the conflict and for many years thereafter (WDR 2011; Justino 2009, 2012a; OECD 2016; World Bank 2020a, 2020b). Violent conflicts are associated with the loss of life and injury to millions of people every year, the destruction of infrastructure, services, markets, assets, and livelihoods, the displacement of families and communities, and growing fear and distrust. There are currently over 100 million forcibly displaced people in the world, the highest figure on record.¹ Two thirds of the world's extreme poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected countries by 2030 (World Bank 2020a, 2020b)—with a large percentage concentrated among children, adolescents, and young adults, who will grapple for decades to come with the consequences of ongoing armed violence.

People that live in areas affected by violence and conflict display various degrees of vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience (Justino 2012a). For many individuals and households, exposure to armed violence means a life of deprivation from which few are able to escape. These include displaced and refugee populations, households that have lost their main livelihood sources, and individuals who become severely injured or mentally or physically incapacitated. Some people will get by in a variety of ways, depending on their ability to navigate local conflict dynamics and political actors on the ground. Others may do well out of the war economies that emerge during armed conflict. Overall, levels of vulnerability, adaptation, or resilience to violent conflict depend on a series of factors both within and outside of the control of those affected by violence, shaped by the institutional and social changes that take place during armed conflict (Justino 2009, 2013, 2022a). One of these forms of institutional and social change relates to the roles, behaviour, and aspirations of young people affected by violence, either directly or indirectly.

The lives of young women and men can adjust dramatically and in very different ways in response to being directly affected by violence (through attacks, abductions, recruitment, displacement, and so forth), to changes in their households and their communities, and to changes in how markets, economies, and local politics are organized during conflict (Justino 2006, 2009; Balcells and Justino 2014). But young people—young men, in particular—are typically portrayed as potential ‘peace spoilers’, and demographic youth bulges have been shown to be significantly associated with the onset of violent conflict at the country level (Urdal 2006). The (re)integration of young men in society and the economy is therefore often viewed as a ‘challenge’ to be addressed in demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes or in other post-conflict recovery interventions (such as employment programmes). However, the effectiveness of such approaches has been at best mixed (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Blattman and Ralston 2015), often because, despite country-level correlations, at the micro level the motivations for why different individuals engage in conflict processes and the effects of armed conflict on their lives are not well understood. An in-depth understanding of this range of motivations is typically absent from conflict recovery programmes, which continue to focus on the more military aspects of recruitment and the macroeconomic effects of wars, rather than considering the multiple forms of vulnerability or resilience that drive individual choices and behaviour during wartime, and subsequent choices and behaviour in the aftermath of armed conflicts (Justino and Stojetz 2018).

In contrast with the view of youth as ‘spoilers’, a relatively new body of research has shown that the recruitment of young people into the military and into non-state armed groups, and the

¹ See <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (retrieved on 31 July 2023).

exposure of young men and women to violence, may result in increased individual political participation and leadership amongst ex-fighters and those victimized by war once the conflict is over. Participation and leadership may take on several forms including increased community meeting attendance, voting, joining community and political groups, as found in Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2009), and greater leadership in community-level activities and in political participation among former child soldiers in post-conflict Northern Uganda (Blattman 2009). In addition to these findings, in a large comparative study using micro-level data, Berman et al. (2011) have failed to find any statistically significant association between unemployment among young men and levels of violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. Another complementary line of research has, in fact, reported how young people (including children) who have experienced violent conflict have a greater sense of fairness towards their community members, despite their exposure to traumatic experiences (Bauer et al. 2011). Justino and Stojetz (2018) show that ex-combatants involved in the Angola civil war are more likely to be involved in the provision of public goods in their community 12 years after the end of the war.

These studies suggest that there may be considerable gains to be made in drawing young men and women into activities that will support their future roles as responsible citizens and foster positive aspirations. In recognition of these facts, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in December 2015, followed by the publication of its Youth Strategy (United Nations 2018). These initiatives represent important international policy efforts to recognize and seek to document the positive roles young men and women may perform in sustaining peace and security worldwide.

However, despite these important research and policy advances, there is still a considerable lack of systematic and rigorous evidence on the impact of violent conflicts on young adults, or on roles young men and women can potentially play in the economic, social, and political recovery of post-conflict societies and in sustaining stability and peace. This means that policy programming around youth in post-conflict contexts is currently being designed based on very limited rigorous evidence, with a continued emphasis on demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) and employment generation programmes, many with mixed evaluations.

The aim of this study is to compile existing survey data to assess the impact of violent conflict on education levels, employment, and civic engagement of young men and women, and the potential roles young men and women living in conflict-affected contexts can play in ensuring positive forms of citizenship and supporting peace efforts. Overall, the study finds a paucity of rigorous evidence on the roles of young people during conflict and in the post-conflict period. Nonetheless, a number of existing datasets—for Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Nepal—have allowed us to compile useful information on what we know and what we need to know about the impact of violent conflict on young people and the role of young men and women in supporting positive forms of citizenship and peace efforts. This study intends thus to offer only a first step towards the generation of rigorous evidence on the relationship between violent conflict, youth, and peacebuilding processes. The focus of the study is on young women and men aged 15 to 30 years. While there are a number of different definitions of what constitutes a ‘young adult’, the study adopts this age bracket as it is commonly used in household surveys.

2 Brief literature review

There is currently a small but growing literature on the relationship between young adults, violent conflict, and peacebuilding.² Below we discuss in turn studies that have analysed the effect of violent conflict on young adults, and studies focussing on the role young men and women play in conflict and peace dynamics and processes.

2.1 The effects of violent conflict on young people

Many of the early quantitative studies on the impact of violent conflict on young adults originated from a study on Northern Uganda conducted by Chris Blattman and colleagues among former ex-child soldiers. A series of papers examined empirically the effect of the war in Northern Uganda on the long-term human capital and wellbeing of abducted children by armed groups during the civil war. Annan et al. (2008) analysed the effect of abduction on female and male youth aged 14 to 35 years at the time of the survey. The main outcomes measured included education, livelihoods, household assets, participation in violence, victimization, and participation in civic activities. The study found that abduction was related to lower employment rates upon reintegration (though wages are similar to non-abductees) and to lower educational attainment. Males and females perpetrated violence at similar rates, but males reported a higher number of incidents of violence. Women who were abducted reported being used as sex slaves, but also being involved in combat and support roles for the military groups that abducted them. In two follow-up studies, Annan et al. (2009) reported significant differences in mean education levels observed between abducted and non-abducted male youth, whilst Annan et al. (2011) found that the abduction of young women and men during the civil war in Northern Uganda affected education and labour market outcomes. Notably, abducted males experienced a 10 per cent reduction in education levels, a 0.4 standard deviation decrease in wealth (assets), a 45 per cent decrease in earnings, and a 31 per cent reduction in participation in skilled work, in comparison to comparable males that were not abducted. In the case of female youth, the study did not find statistically significant effects of the abduction on human capital or labour market participation. The only significant effect reported in the study is a 0.28 standard deviation reduction in wealth and two fewer days employed in the time period of the survey. The authors interpret these results with caution since rates of education for non-abducted females were very low in Uganda.

In another subsequent study, Blattman and Annan (2010) examined in more detail the long-term human capital consequences of being a former child soldier in Uganda. The study found that abductees were not less likely to find work when compared to those not affected by the violence. However, abductees were much less likely to access high-skill or capital-intensive jobs due to losses in education during wartime. According to the study, each year of abduction was associated with 0.25 fewer years of education and a nine-percentage-point reduction in literacy rates. These adverse effects, in turn, resulted in a 57 per cent reduction in wages in comparison to those not abducted during the war.

² This section is based on a non-exhaustive, non-systematic literature review conducted for the purpose of this study. The literature review focused on papers using quantitative methods to analyse the relationship between violent conflict, youth outcomes, and peacebuilding. In terms of youth outcomes, the review focused largely on those of interest to this paper: education, labour market participation, and civic engagement. The literature review included both peer-reviewed publications and the grey literature (PhD theses, NGO reports, and so forth). The literature review concentrated on findings related to young adults aged 15 to 30 years. There is a much larger literature on the effect of violent conflict on younger children that was not included in this section (see reviews in Justino 2012a, 2012b; Justino et al. 2013b, 2014; Tranchant et al. 2020; Verwimp et al. 2019).

A few additional studies have analysed empirically the impact of violent conflicts on young adults in other countries. Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) examined the impact of the civil war in Guatemala on human capital outcomes. The study focused on individuals that were exposed to violence when young adults and investigated the long-term effects of this exposure. Interestingly, the study reported an increase in 1.25 years of schooling among urban non-Mayan males exposed to the initial period of violence in the 1960s. The effect, however, disappears in the cohorts that were exposed to the most violent periods of the war. The study reported also persistent increases in schooling across female cohorts exposed to violence. Mansour (2012) analysed the effect of the civil war in Lebanon on human capital outcomes among a sample of Lebanese young adults aged 15 to 22 years. This was a short-term conflict and, as a result, the study found that direct exposure to the violence was not associated with statistically significantly lower attendance at school (whether high school or university). However, indirect exposure to violence through reductions in household income and job losses was statistically significantly associated with lower school attendance.

Rodríguez and Sánchez (2012) analysed the effect of armed violence in Colombia on school dropout rates and participation in the labour market among children aged six to 17 years. The study found that exposure to armed violence had adverse effects on children over the age of 11, in terms of school dropout and early joining of the labour market, as a response to lower household income, deaths, and lower school quality. Akresh et al. (2023) report the effect of the 1967–70 Nigerian Civil War on the first and the second generations of exposed individuals. They find adverse effects of exposure of female adolescents on long-term health and educational outcomes. The first-generation effects on mothers transmit to their children's survival rates, growth, and education outcomes.

2.2 The role of young people in sustaining peace

The empirical literature on the role of young people in peacebuilding processes is to date rather limited. However, some papers have documented the civic roles that young people perform during and in the aftermath of violent conflicts—arguably a key determinant of how young men and women may shape peace processes and engage in the recovery of post-conflict societies. Other studies have examined the effect of exposure to violence during childhood and adolescence on later life political outcomes, testing the hypothesis that experiences during childhood shape the formation of adult political identities (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Jennings and Niemi 2014; García-Ponce and Laterzo 2023).

Barber (2001) presents findings from a study that collected information among a sample of 6,000 adolescents (high-school aged) from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in the Palestinian Family Study in 1994 and 1995. The study reports that during the period of the Intifada, a large number of young people (80 per cent of male children, 85 per cent of male adolescents, 50 per cent of female children, and 65 per cent of female adolescents) were involved in demonstrations against the occupation. A substantial number also reported having been harassed by opposition soldiers: 68 per cent of male children, 86 per cent of male adolescents, 34 per cent of female children, and 48 per cent of female adolescents. Interestingly, the study reports that both young males and females directly affected by the Intifada reported high levels of commitment to religion. Moreover, direct involvement and exposure to the Intifada was found to be unrelated to levels of aggression, school grades, current and future investment in education, and the quality of parent–child relationships.

In a later study, Barber (2008) discusses results from the Adolescents and Political Violence Project, which has done a significant amount of mixed-methods data collection. The paper presents a series of interesting descriptive statistics regarding the exposure of youths to violence

in Bosnia and in Palestine and their role in caring for those that were wounded in violent events, participation in demonstrations, and participation in acts of violence. In the case of Palestine, the study reports a high level of involvement of young males in caring for the wounded, with 72 per cent of surveyed young men reporting one instance of caring for the wounded, 32 per cent reporting more than one instance, and 19 per cent reporting doing so frequently. A significant proportion of Bosnian youth also reported caring for the wounded: 42 per cent of surveyed young males and 40 per cent of young females. The study examined also the participation of young people in demonstrations and political violence. In Palestine, 88 per cent of males and 63 per cent of females reported having participated in a demonstration (typically marching). In terms of participation in violence, 88 per cent of young males reported having ‘thrown stones’ at least once, 66 per cent more than once, and 47 per cent frequently. The numbers are slightly lower but still substantially for young women: 50 per cent reported having ‘thrown stones’ at least once, 18 per cent more than once, and 8 per cent frequently. Civic engagement of youth in Bosnia was lower, with upwards of 80 per cent of Bosnians youth reporting never having demonstrated.

Beber and Blattman (2013) examined in more detail the determinants of abduction during the Northern Ugandan conflict using the datasets discussed in the previous section. They show that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) disproportionately targeted adolescents: according to the study, a 14-year-old youth had a 5 per cent chance of being abducted by the armed group, in contrast with probabilities of around 2.5 per cent for individuals aged 9 or 23. These adolescents were involved in extreme acts of violence: 6 per cent of abducted youth in the sample reported having been forced to harm or kill a civilian, 23 per cent were forced to desecrate dead bodies (a deeply held taboo among local communities), and 12 per cent reported having been forced to kill a family member or a close friend. Young abductees were forced to commit these acts in order to ensure a complete breakdown with their communities of origin. However, despite these horrific experiences, Blattman (2009) shows that abduction of child soldiers in Uganda was associated with greater participation of them as young adults on voting in the aftermath of the civil war. According to the study, former abducted child soldiers were 27 per cent more likely to vote, and twice more likely to be community leaders than comparable young people not abducted during the war. Similar results were found for the participation of young abductees in peace clubs. The author, however, argues that civic engagement of young people was limited to political engagement but not to non-political forms of social activity.

In contrast to the results above, a study by Grossman et al. (2015) examined the effect of combat exposure among young male adults on their support for peaceful conflict resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study uses a non-random sample of veterans of the Israel Defense Forces and finds that these individuals are less likely to support reconciliation, and more likely to vote for extreme parties. The results do not, however, hold for young adults in the sample that fought during the post-Gaza withdrawal phase of the conflict. The authors interpret these different results in terms of the salience of the Second Intifada in Israeli politics, and the fact that the type of combat exercised was different.³ Along similar lines, García-Ponce and Laterzo (2023) find that exposure to militarization of Mexico’s adolescents during the Drug War had long-term adverse

³ There is also a small number of studies that examined the adverse effect of exposure to violence, aggression, and guns on violent behaviour among young people. This literature largely focuses on cities in developed countries. For instance, Bingenheimer et al. (2005) estimate that exposure to firearm violence in Chicago almost doubles the probability that a given adolescent will perpetrate serious violence in the next two years, while Merrilees et al. (2013) provide evidence for positive links between youth exposure to sectarian anti-social behaviour at the community level and youth aggressive behaviour in Belfast. It is unclear whether these findings would be applicable to contexts affected by violent conflict.

effects on trust in institutions and on trust in family and neighbours, arguably key factors in how young people engage in political and social life.

Taken together, the studies reviewed above show mixed results on the effect of violent conflict on education and labour outcomes among young adults, and on their engagement in social and political activities. How these roles are performed and their implications for the sustainability of peace processes seem to be largely shaped by the nature of the conflict, levels of violence exposure, and the long-term effects of the conflict. These mechanisms remain under-researched, partly due to a scarcity of datasets that allow the empirical analysis of the effects of actions, behaviour, and attitudes of young people on processes that may (or may not) sustain peace in the aftermath of violent conflicts.⁴ To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has produced systematic, comparable quantitative evidence across different countries and conflict contexts on the relationship between youth, peace, and conflict. This study provides a tentative step towards addressing this gap in the literature.

3 Empirical approach

Over the last 15 years, there has been a large improvement in the availability of micro-level data to assess the impact of armed conflicts on a variety of economic, social, and political outcomes measured at the individual, household, and community levels.⁵ A common practice in empirical research on conflict, and one that we have followed in this study, has been the use of general purpose socio-economic surveys collected in conflict-affected countries by large organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations (Justino et al. 2013a; Brück et al. 2013, 2016). These surveys, in general, collect rich data on living conditions of nationally representative, random samples of households. In a few cases, such as the surveys conducted in Afghanistan, Mexico, and Nepal used in this study, these surveys incorporate questions on experiences of conflict and violence.⁶ To complement this information, this study uses localized conflict event data, following common practice in quantitative studies on the effects of violent conflict. Several datasets can be used for this purpose, ranging from cross-country datasets on the occurrence of violent events at disaggregated levels of analysis (such as ACLED, CERAC, among others),⁷ to country-specific

⁴ In contrast to quantitative studies, an extensive body of qualitative and policy-oriented literature has examined the role of young men and women in peacebuilding. This body of research is, however, usually based on small-scale, non-replicable, and non-comparable methodologies.

⁵ Research programmes at the forefront of data collection and compilation efforts in conflict-affected countries include the MICROCON programme at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) funded by the European Commission FP6 Framework (www.microconflict.eu), the Households in Conflict Network (www.hicn.org), the Program on Order, Conflict and Violence at Yale University, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Evidence in Governance and Politics project (E-GAP), the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT, and the Innovations for Poverty Action project. See also 3ie's Peacebuilding Evidence Gap Map.

⁶ Researchers have also collected surveys in a number of conflict-affected countries with the specific purpose of analysing micro-level processes and consequences of violent conflict. These surveys generally include specific modules on conflict and experiences and perceptions of violence, and are usually directed towards specific population groups, such as ex-combatants, victims, displaced persons, or beneficiaries of post-conflict reconstruction programmes. Time and budget constraints did not, however, allow us to explore the use of these surveys, as many are not immediately publicly available. These are reviewed in Justino et al. (2009), Verwimp et al. (2009, 2019), and Brück et al. (2013, 2016) (see also Justino and Verwimp 2013; Justino 2016; Dowd et al. 2020).

⁷ <http://www.iiss.org/>; <http://www.cewarn.org/>; <http://www.acleddata.com/>; <http://www.cerac.org.co/en/>.

data collected by researchers or local institutions. In this study, we make use of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for the case studies of Mexico and Nepal.⁸ This dataset is particularly useful due to its worldwide coverage of violent events and political actors involved in them at very small geographical units, and comparability across countries. In the case of Colombia, we use information on conflict exposure collected as part of the community questionnaire implemented in the *Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana* (ELCA). In the case of Afghanistan, we use a conflict event dataset collected in the country by the United Nations.

The empirical analysis in this study has been conducted in two steps. First, the study examines the quantitative effect of violent conflict on three outcomes experienced by young men and women in each of the case studies. These outcomes—education attainment, labour market participation, and levels of civic engagement—were chosen because they represent important effects of violent conflict with long-term implications for how young people will live and exercise their rights and responsibilities as citizens in the aftermath of violent conflict. A large literature in development economics has shown ample evidence for the role of education in future levels of productivity, earnings, and job satisfaction (see Glewwe 2014). However, while several studies have documented the adverse, long-lasting legacies of violent conflicts on education among young children (see review in Justino 2016a), much less is known about the effect of violent conflicts on education outcomes among young adults that may still be of age to attend secondary and higher education. Employment is another important outcome among youth given the ingrained—albeit sometimes mistaken—belief that unemployed young adults, males in particular, are more likely to be involved in acts of violence. Thus, if conflict exacerbates unemployment, it follows that young unemployed males may become ‘peace spoilers’. However, as discussed in a recent review of employment programmes in fragile countries, ‘[p]oor and unemployed young men, it is often said, are more likely to fight, riot, steal, rebel, or join extremist groups [...]. Unfortunately, these links from [...] employment to stability are based first on faith, second on theory, and last on evidence. Not surprisingly, most of these faith-based employment programs have failed to deliver jobs, poverty relief or stability’ (Blattman and Ralston 2015: i). There is, in particular, a surprising lack of evidence about the effect of violent conflict on employment among young adults and the long-term social and economic consequences of such effect, which we will address in this study. The final outcome, civic engagement, is also key to understanding the role of young people in conflict-affected contexts given the new evidence discussed above on the links between violent conflict, social cohesion, and youth civic participation. This study will build on research done to date on the links between violent conflict and civic engagement to document this relationship in three additional countries.⁹

The second step of the study focusses on the roles young people have performed in either sustaining peace and cohesion or fomenting further violent conflict in their communities or regions. To the best of our knowledge, no quantitative study to date has analysed the involvement of young people on peace activities directly. This is largely due to the almost complete absence of quantitative datasets that ask about the individual participation of young adults in peacebuilding or in activities that may promote and sustain peace outcomes. To address this challenge, we have adopted two strategies. First, we made use of the fact that some household surveys include individual-level information on some characteristics of young people that could allow us to infer on the likelihood that these young people will engage in what we define as forms of *positive citizenship*—arguable a key factor in how peace is sustained in the post-conflict period. These forms of positive citizenship include the participation of young people in community social and political

⁸ See <http://ucdp.uu.se/>.

⁹ This analysis is not possible in the case of Nepal due to data limitations.

organizations, attitudes towards crime and pro-social behaviour, and perceptions of trust and cohesion. Second, we have matched information about the characteristics of young people collected at a certain point in time to the likelihood of violence onset in a future time period. This analysis has allowed us to infer whether communities that include young people (that exhibit certain characteristics, such as being unemployed) are more or less likely to experience violence in the future.

The empirical analysis provides a number of descriptive statistics and simple regression models that compare outcomes of interest across young women and men in conflict-affected areas, in comparison to young adults living in the same country but not exposed to the conflict. It is important to note that the results presented in this paper do not reflect any form of causality. Rather, the aim of the study is to provide only a first attempt at analysing empirically the impact of violent conflict on young people and identify current gaps in knowledge and data.

We selected four countries for which information from household surveys and on conflict incidence is available and suitable to address the two questions above. While a number of existing quantitative datasets allow the empirical study of the impact of violent conflict on a variety of individual outcomes,¹⁰ there are almost no micro-level datasets that allow us to address directly the second question in this report (i.e. the impact of youth characteristics and behaviour on sustaining peace). Therefore, the main criteria we took into consideration when selecting the most promising cases for this study was the ability to conduct the analysis for the two questions in the same case study. In this, one important consideration was the availability of longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional data across time. These two criteria resulted in the selection of four case studies: Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Nepal.¹¹

These four countries are very relevant for the study for two main reasons. First, the populations of all four countries include large numbers of young people. In Afghanistan, almost 64 per cent of the population is under 25 years of age,¹² while in Nepal just over 40 per cent of the population is aged between 16 and 40 year.¹³ Mexico has a smaller but still substantial proportion of its population (almost 18 per cent) aged between 15 and 24 years.¹⁴ In Colombia, 34.6 per cent of the population was aged between 10 and 29 years in 2005.¹⁵ These young people are likely to be living with the consequences of violence and conflict for many years to come, and are thus likely to be key players in how conflict and peace processes will evolve in their countries. Second, these countries represent four different conflict settings, which will allow us to analyse the role young people may play in different violent contexts. We discuss the case studies and datasets used in more detail below.

¹⁰ See survey in Brück et al. (2016) and the working paper series of the Households in Conflict Network (www.hicn.org), which includes almost 400 research papers on this subject.

¹¹ Other case studies, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and Uganda, among others, could have been potentially viable. However, time and resource constraints limited the scope of this study.

¹² <http://afghanistan.unfpa.org/node/15227>.

¹³ <http://nepal.unfpa.org/publications/nepali-youth-figures>.

¹⁴ <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/mexico-population/>.

¹⁵ <http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/colombia/>.

3.1 Afghanistan

Afghanistan has experienced one of the longest conflicts in the world. The longstanding armed conflict can be traced to the Saur Revolution in 1978, which followed a coup d'état by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Growing uprisings against the PDPA were followed by an intervention by the Soviet Union in 1979 to replace the government. This intervention was violently fought against by resistance forces (the *mujabideen*), often supported by the USA, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The Soviet Union eventually withdrew from the country in 1989 and the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan fell in 1992. Several insurgent movements took over parts of the territory, the strongest being the Taliban, who eventually established overall rule over the country. Violence in Afghanistan intensified again after the 9/11 events in the USA when USA and NATO troops invaded the country chasing al-Qaeda operatives believed to be supported by the Taliban. Taliban insurgent groups carried on fighting the fragile government established in Kabul and gained significant advances in 2006. Counterinsurgency interventions by international troops grew in size and geographic coverage and violence escalated substantially between 2007 and 2009 and through to 2011. The killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 led to the start of withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and levels of violence were reduced between 2011 and 2012. Violence intensified again in 2014 with almost 7,000 civilian casualties registered in that year (World Bank 2015). While the intensification of the conflict between 2009 and 2011 was motivated by the expansion of combat operations by international military forces, the increase in the conflict after 2012 was largely driven by the growing and more geographically spread clashes between the state military, the police, and non-state armed groups (World Bank 2015). Violence continues to be present in most parts of Afghanistan, even after the withdrawal of USA and European troops from the country in 2021.

The World Bank, in collaboration with the government of Afghanistan, and the US military collected detailed household-level and conflict event data across Afghanistan.¹⁶ Some of these data are difficult to access and, to date, there have been few studies on the impact of the conflict in Afghanistan on development outcomes among individuals, households, or communities.¹⁷ Some exceptions include Floreani et al. (2016), who examine the relationship between conflict and changes in poverty in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014. The study shows that poverty has remained particularly high in areas not affected by the conflict due to the deployment of troops and larger aid flows to conflict areas (see also Bove and Gavrilova 2014). Ghorpade et al. (2016) show, however, that conflict events across districts in Afghanistan have been associated with the probability of household using harmful coping strategies to deal with poverty shocks. Among these few studies, none have focussed on the development and welfare impact of the conflict on young adults. Quantitative studies on the role young people in peace and conflict dynamics in Afghanistan in recent years are also scarce. One important exception is the study by Berman et al. (2011), which tests empirically the link between (lack of) employment among young men and levels of violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. The study finds no statistically significant association between unemployment among young men and levels of violence (measured by the number of attacks against government and allied forces and by the number of civilian deaths in the three case studies).

The analysis of the Afghanistan case study is based on two main sources of data. The first is household- and individual-level data compiled in the Afghanistan Living Condition Survey

¹⁶ For a summary of relevant datasets, see for instance <https://esoc.princeton.edu/country/afghanistan>.

¹⁷ Available data has, however, allowed a growing number of studies on violence dynamics in Afghanistan. These studies have been compiled at: <https://esoc.princeton.edu/country/afghanistan#esocpapers23>.

(ALCS). These datasets were collected by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2007, 2011, and 2013. These repeated cross-sectional datasets contain detailed information on education, employment, and a variety of other socio-economic indicators for a representative sample of households at the province and district levels. One limitation of these datasets is the inconsistency of some of the questions across the different waves. However, we have been able to clean the data in ways that have allowed us to compare information across the three years on key variables. The second source of data is on violent events provided to us for the purpose of this study by the World Bank. This has allowed us to match each household in the ALCS to the number of violent events experienced in the district where the household lives. This conflict dataset contains aggregate-level information on the number of conflicts and civilian casualties that occurred in each district for each month (up to 12 months) before the data was collected. Table A1 in the online appendix presents the average number of conflicts and civil casualties that took place in the month before the data collection across each region of Afghanistan in 2007, 2011, and 2013. Conflict incidence was particularly high in that period in the South and Southwest regions of Afghanistan and increased in most regions since 2007.

To analyse the relationship between violent conflict and youth outcomes in Afghanistan, we merged the information above on the incidence of violence with household- and individual-level data included in the ALCS datasets. The analysis of the effect of violence is based on comparisons between individuals living in conflict-affected districts with others living in districts less affected by the conflict (since no region in Afghanistan has been free of violence in the period between 2007 and 2013). To this purpose, we define ‘high conflict districts’ as districts in Afghanistan that experienced in the year prior to the respective ALCS survey a number of violent events greater than the average number of conflicts in the surrounding province. Other districts are described in this section as ‘low conflict districts’. Young adults are defined (as per surveys in Afghanistan) as those aged between 15 and 30 years. Table A2 in the online appendix shows that young adults living in districts more affected by violence are more likely to live in larger households, are less likely to be the head of the household, are less likely to be married, and are part of economically better-off households, in comparison to those living in districts less affected by the conflict.

3.2 Colombia

The Colombian conflict has been ongoing for almost six decades. The conflict originated from a clash of interests in the 1940s between the two main political parties, the Liberal and the Conservative parties (Sanchez and Meertens 2001). This initial bout of violence—called *La Violencia*—resulted in over 200,000 deaths between 1948 and 1958. Violence receded with the establishment of the National Front, a power-sharing arrangement between the two main parties. This arrangement did not, however, take into consideration the demands of several left-wing political movements that had emerged in the 1940s to fight for the rights of excluded groups. These groups eventually gave rise to left-wing guerrilla groups during the early 1960s, of which the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, using its Spanish acronym) became the strongest and most influential. In the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of illegal drug trade intensified the conflict by providing financial resources to guerrilla groups, as well as leading to the creation of private paramilitary armies that protected the interests of drug barons and large landowners. Paramilitary groups grew in strength in the 1980s and led to a considerable escalation of the violence in the 1990s (Sanchez and Chacón 2006). Levels of violence and forced displacement declined in the early 2000s due to strong military intervention of the government and the demobilization of paramilitary groups in 2003.¹⁸ In 2016, the FARC and the Government of

¹⁸ Over seven million people have been displaced during the conflict in Colombia. See <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia>.

Colombia signed a historical peace agreement that has remained in place so far. Although pockets of violence remain in some areas in the country due to the actions of criminal bands and other small dissident groups, violence has been reduced substantially across the entire territory.

The Colombian conflict is probably one of the best documented conflicts in the world given the wealth of data collected by several academic institutions, NGOs, and civil society organizations in Colombia. There are a number of studies on the impact of the Colombian conflict on education, employment, and civic participation among young men and women. One relevant study is that of Rodríguez and Sánchez (2012), discussed in Section 2, who analyse the impact of armed conflict exposure among children aged 6 to 17 years on school drop-out rates and labour market participation. The results show that conflict exposure leads to higher rates of school drop-out and increased levels of child labour, especially among children older than 11 years (see also Ibáñez et al. 2013). Some of the literature on the effects of the Colombian conflict has also focused on education outcomes among displaced populations in Colombia. Oyelere and Wharton (2013) find evidence for a substantial ‘education accumulation gap’ among displaced children, when compared with similar groups that were not displaced. In terms of labour market effects, Calderón and Ibáñez (2009) report a large negative effect of forced displacement in Colombia on wages and employment opportunities available to displaced individuals, in particular low-skilled workers. Bozzoli et al. (2010) show that violent conflict (measured in terms of homicide rates at the municipality level and levels of displacement) are associated with reductions in self-employment. Fernández et al. (2011) find that exposure to violent shocks results in reductions in the amount of time affected households spend on farm work and intensifies the supply of household labour to off-farm activities, particularly among men. The impact of the conflict in Colombia on civic participation has been studied in detail in Gáfaró et al. (2014, 2022). These papers analyse the causal impact of the presence of violence and non-state armed groups across Colombian communities on individual civic participation. The findings suggest that the presence of armed groups (but not of violence) is associated with increases in overall individual participation in local organizations, particularly in political organizations. This effect, however, does not indicate a strengthening of civil society, but rather reflects how armed groups have captured local organizations during the conflict. Despite this wealth of evidence, few of the studies above have focussed on young adults.¹⁹ There is also a paucity of studies on Colombia that have examined the relationship between youth, conflict, and peacebuilding.

The Colombia case study examines the relationship between the armed conflict in Colombia (and more recent mutations into criminal activities) and young adults using data collected as part of the *Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana* (ELCA), conducted by the Universidad de los Andes in 2010, 2013, and 2016 in four regions and 17 municipalities. The sample is representative of four main regions in Colombia, of which two regions experienced high levels of conflict (Middle-Atlantic and Central East), and two registered low conflict intensity (Cundi-Boyacense and the Coffee region). Communities were chosen randomly within each municipality. The household questionnaire contains rich information about household composition and characteristics of household members. A survey was also conducted in each community (*vereda*) through focus group discussions with community leaders. Among others, the community questionnaire includes a detailed module on the presence of armed groups and the history of the conflict during the three years prior to the survey. This information is very valuable because it allows us to study the relationship between youth and conflict based on conflict incidence in the immediate environment

¹⁹ But see Millán-Quijano (2015), who shows how increases in homicides during the Colombian conflict have led to substantial increases in the probability of early motherhood among young women (under the age of 19 years) in Colombia.

where the young individual lives (their community).²⁰ One limitation of the ELCA dataset is that complete sets of responses are only available for the head of the household or his/her spouse. Hence, the analysis below will focus on individuals aged between 15 and 30 years in the first year of the survey that are the head of the household or his/her spouse.

We define conflict-affected communities in Colombia in two ways. First, a community (*vereda*) is considered to be affected by the conflict if it experienced the presence of an armed group (guerrilla or paramilitary) at least once in the three years prior to each survey. Second, we consider also the type of violence experience in each community in the form of robbery and hold-ups, homicides, presence of criminal gangs, sale or consumption of drugs, alcohol consumption in public spaces, and public space invasion. A community is considered to have been exposed to high levels of violence if it experienced at least three of the above forms of violence. Table A3 in the online appendix shows that the presence of armed groups across communities in Colombia has been declining since 2010. In 2016, the year of the peace agreement between the FARC and the Government of Colombia, 30 communities reported the presence of an armed group in their community, more than three times less than what was reported in 2010. Table A4 shows that non-state armed groups have been present in most regions of Colombia, with the highest concentration in the Pacifica, Atlantic, Oriental, and Central regions, traditional strongholds of both the FARC and paramilitary groups. In several instances, armed groups tend to stay for long periods of time in each community. Tables A5 and A6 outline similar patterns for different forms of violence across Colombian communities. Tables A7 and A8 show that individuals living in communities where armed groups are present in Colombia, or where violence incidence is highest, are slightly younger (though the difference in average age is very small), when compared with those living in communities with no armed group presence in the last three years or those living in communities with lower violence incidence. These individuals are also more likely to be members of a political party and their households are generally better-off. Communities where armed groups are present are likely to be perceived as less secure (Table A7).

3.3 Mexico

Mexico experienced a series of armed upheavals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and, more recently, an insurgency by the Zapatista movement in 1994. Since the early 2000s, the Mexican government has faced multiple challenges with illegal drug trade, with levels of violence rising dramatically after 2007. This rise in violence followed a decision, made in the mid-2000s, to address the growing problem of drug trafficking by the military targeting of cartel leaders. These actions resulted in the destruction of some of these groups and their operations but also led to an unprecedented rise in violence, as fragmented organized crime groups started to fight each other over the control of strategic areas (Rios 2013; Calderón et al. 2015; Dell 2015) and benefited from an increase in gun supplies (Dube et al. 2013). Homicide rates in Mexico almost tripled between 2007 and 2011—from an average of 8.5 homicides per 100,000 in 2007 to 24.4 in 2011 (Brown and Velásquez 2017). Non-drug-related violence (kidnappings, assaults, and theft) also increased in the same time period (Shirk and Wallman 2015). Mexico is a case that is thus neither a civil war nor an internal armed conflict, since the various armed groups have not attempted to contest (or directly fight) the state. However, the levels of violence from organized crime experienced since the mid-2000s are higher than many notable civil wars (for instance, Afghanistan, Iraq, or South Sudan). This case study allows us, therefore, to examine the effect of violent conflict on youth outside the context of a civil war (see Kalyvas 2015; Lessing 2015).

²⁰ The other case studies are based on conflict event information collected at higher levels of aggregation: district in the case of Afghanistan, state in the case of Mexico, and municipality in the case of Nepal.

There is a small but growing literature on the economic, social, and political effects of the rise in violence in Mexico on individuals and households, including on education (Márquez-Padilla et al. 2015; Brown and Velásquez 2017) and labour market participation (Robles et al. 2013; Velásquez 2015; Brown and Velásquez 2017). The results to date are mixed. Brown and Velásquez (2017) find a substantial negative effect of the violence on adolescents in Mexico (aged 14 to 17), who are also more likely to be employed. Robles et al. (2013) show that violence has led to increases in unemployment in Mexico, while Velásquez (2015) reports reductions in female (but not male) self-employment as a result of increased levels of violence. In contrast, Márquez-Padilla et al. (2015) find only a small and sometimes null effect of violence exposure on education and on employment. More recently, García-Ponce and Laterzo (2023) show that exposure of young people to the violence in Mexico has led to reduced levels of institutional and interpersonal trust.

This analysis of the Mexico case study focuses on the impact of violence caused by drug traffickers and paramilitary groups on young adults using data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) for the years 2002, 2005–06, and 2009–12. This is a comprehensive longitudinal dataset, which includes detailed information about the welfare and lives of individuals, as well as about individual attitudes, preferences, and pro-social behaviour across time. The MxFLS includes, in addition, a very detailed module on household exposure to violence and victimization due to conflict and crime. Additional data on violent events was extracted from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP),²¹ namely the number of deaths and which factions are involved in each conflict across several geographical locations.

The nature of the violent conflict in Mexico, caused by drug wars and fighting between paramilitary groups localized in specific areas, makes geographical location an important factor determining the impact of violence across the country. The distribution of violent events across states in Mexico is not homogenous, with some states highly affected by violence, whilst others have barely experienced any violence. Table A9 in the online appendix shows that the most conflict-affected state—Chihuahua—experienced 8,534 deaths caused by the ongoing violence. These violence incidence patterns are explained by how crime syndicates and paramilitary groups fight for the control of specific territories. The Juarez-Sinaloa was at the time the most violent group, having committed 547 violent events between 2000 and 2013 (own calculations based on UCDP data).

The individual-level data we use in the analysis of the Mexico case study was obtained from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) collected in 2002, 2005, and 2009. The timing of the waves of the MxFLS matches two distinct conflict periods: one characterized by low intensity violence (2002 and 2005), and another with very high levels of violence (2009). This structure of the data allows us to look at outcomes of violence among the same young men and women over time and assess the impact of violent conflict at the individual level. When doing this, we compare individuals living in conflict-affected states with individuals living in states not affected by the violence. Conflict-affected states are defined as states that experienced at least a violent event in the past two years. An individual is defined as being affected by conflict if s/he lives in a state that experienced at least one violent event in the past two years. Table A10 in the online appendix shows that young adults (aged 15 to 30 years in 2002) living in conflict-affected areas have an average age of 26.6 years, in contrast with an average of 23.4 years in areas not affected by violence. In addition, young adults in conflict-affected areas live in larger families, are more likely to be the household head, are more likely to be married, are slightly less likely to belong to an indigenous group, and are substantially more likely to be poorer than those living in non-conflict areas. There

²¹ Violent conflicts are defined as ‘incident[s] where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a specific date’. Conflict event data for Mexico is compiled in the UCDP dataset at the state level.

is no statistically significant difference in the gender composition of the young adult samples in conflict and non-conflict areas.

As mentioned above, the MxFLS includes valuable information on the exposure of individuals to crime and other forms of insecurity, sometimes (but not always necessarily) related to the ongoing drug-related conflict. This information is very useful because it allows us to compare later in the regression analysis the effects of violent events reported externally (in the UCDP dataset), with self-reported individual levels of victimization and own security perceptions. Table A11 in the online appendix compares levels of crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity among young adults in Mexico living in conflict-affected and non-conflict affected states. We use four measures of victimization: (i) ‘assaulted’, which indicates whether the individual has ever been assaulted, robbed, or been the victim of a violent incident outside their household, plot, or business; (ii) ‘scared’, which combines individual answers to two questions: ‘Do you feel scared of being attacked or assaulted during the day?’ And, ‘do you feel scared of being attacked or assaulted during the night?’;²² (iii) whether the individual feels less safe or not now in comparison to five years ago;²³ and (iv) the number of times each individual reports having been assaulted.²⁴ Interestingly, results show that a larger share of young adults in non-conflict states report having been assaulted and having experienced a higher average number of times assaulted than those in conflict-affected states. However, even though they report less assaults, young people in conflict-affected states feel more scared and less safe than those living in states not affected by the violence. Table A12 in the online appendix shows, in addition, that young males in non-conflict states form the largest share of victims of assaults. We do not find statistically significant differences between conflict-affected and non-conflict affected states in the share of young women assaulted, the number of times assaulted, or levels of fear. Both young men and women in conflict affected states are more likely to feel less safe at the time of the survey than five years before, reflecting the rise in violence and crime in Mexico in the time period of the surveys.

3.4 Nepal

Nepal is a classic example of a civil war between government forces and an insurgent Maoist group that contested the role of the state. The civil war in Nepal started in 1996 and ended in 2006, when the Maoists became the ruling party. The ten-year long civil war resulted in the death of approximately 13,000 people and the displacement of around 50,000 to 200,000 individuals (Shakya 2008). The origins of the conflict can be traced to a series of grievances expressed by the largely rural population against the ruling aristocratic elite (Murshed and Gates 2005; Do and Iyer 2010). Lack of political representation, gender and caste discrimination, suppression and exploitation, and economic inequality eventually fuelled an insurgent movement that led to the fall of the monarchy in Nepal at the end of the civil war (Murshed and Gates 2005; Shakya 2008). Violence decreased substantially across Nepal after 2006, and the country has been fairly stable since then. However, there is still a widespread perception of high levels of poverty and social exclusion, which often results in violent protests and general strikes (Shakya 2008).

²² Both questions have four possible answers: (i) very scared; (ii) scared; (iii) a little scared; and (iv) do not feel scared. We have constructed a variable named ‘scared’, which takes the value of 1 if the individual replied either (i) or (ii). The variable takes the value 0 otherwise.

²³ This question has three available answers: (i) safer; (ii) safe; and (iii) less safe. The variable we use here assumes value 1 if the individual answered (iii) to the question.

²⁴ This question in the 2005 questionnaire asks for the total number of assaults experienced by the respondent. In the 2009 wave, the question becomes ‘How many times (have you been assaulted) since 2005?’. The variable we use in this section considers the total number of assaults reported by the individual.

The analysis of this case study focuses on the impact of the 1996–2006 civil war between Maoists and the Nepalese government on young people. As with the other case studies, there has been some research on the effects of the civil war in Nepal on development outcomes. Existing studies have shown evidence for a positive effect of the Nepalese civil war on women’s labour market participation (Menon and Rodgers 2011) and on female and male education (but a negative effect of abductions), possibly due to the emphasis of the Maoist movement on the value of education (Valente 2014). These studies focus largely on young women. Some studies have also examined in detail the role of poverty, inequality, and geography in the Nepalese conflict with mixed results (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara et al. 2006; Do and Iyer 2010). To the best of our knowledge, almost no study to date has examined quantitatively the relationship between youth, conflict, and peace in Nepal.

The empirical analysis of the Nepal case study makes use of two main sources of data. Individual- and household-level data were extracted from the Nepal Living Standard Surveys (NLSS), a longitudinal survey conducted by the Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in 1996, 2003, and 2010. The NLSS contain valuable information on individuals before, during, and after the civil war, making Nepal an interesting case study for this analysis. Information on conflict incidence was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which contains data on violence in Nepal until 2009. This is useful because violence in Nepal did not completely halt at the end of the civil war in 2006. As with other case studies, we compare the characteristics of young adults in Nepal (aged 15 to 30 years) living in districts highly affected by violent conflict, with those living in districts less affected by the violence. A district is defined as a ‘high conflict district’ if it has an average number of conflict events in the two years before each survey year (1996, 2003, and 2010) greater than the average number of conflict events in its surrounding administrative zone in the same year. Table A13 in the online appendix illustrates the number of conflict events and casualties associated with those events in the five most and least affected administrative zones in Nepal between 1996 and 2009.²⁵ The table shows a high level of dispersion of the violence in Nepal, with the most conflict-affected administrative zone (Rapti) experiencing levels of violence five times greater than those observed in the least affected administrative zone (Dhawalagiri).

We compare also the characteristics of young men and women in Nepal in districts highly affected by the conflict with those living in less-affected districts. In order to conduct this analysis, we have merged information included in the NLSS on the socio-economic characteristics of individuals aged between 15 and 30 years with information on conflict incidence at the district level included in the UCDP dataset. The results of this analysis are presented in Table A14 in the online appendix. This table shows that young men and women living in districts in Nepal highly affected by violent conflict are more likely to live in smaller households that earn higher daily wages across all occupations and when employed in the agriculture sector alone (but not when employed in non-agriculture sectors), when compared with young men and women living in districts less affected by the conflict. These individuals are also more likely to be older (the mean age of young adults is 25.2 years in high conflict districts and 23.4 years in low conflict districts) and be the household head (possibly due to the age differences). There is no statistically significant difference in the gender composition or marriage status of the youth samples collected in high and low conflict districts.

²⁵ Before 2015, Nepal was divided into five development regions, 14 administrative zones, and 75 districts.

4 Effect of violent conflict on young adults: education, labour market, and civic engagement outcomes

We now turn to the analysis of the effects of exposure to violent conflict on youth outcomes using multivariate regression analysis, which controls for a range of variables that may simultaneously shape violent conflict and outcomes (education, labour market, and civic participation) in the four case studies.

The model estimates the following equation using a linear probability model for all four countries:

$$y_i = X' \beta_1 + Z' \beta_2 + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable y_{it} is a dummy variable accounting for either education, labour market, or civic participation outcomes (the latter for Colombia and Mexico only due to data availability).

The models estimate the impact of conflict on young adults aged between 15 and 30 years in the 2007, 2011, and 2013 in Afghanistan. The Colombia effects are measured for the period between 2010 and 2016. A Colombian is considered to be a young adult if s/he is between 15 and 30 years old in the first year of the survey (2010). The regression analysis in Mexico focuses on the impact of violent conflict as reported in the UCDP datasets, as well as of the impact of self-reported assaults, on outcomes among young adults in Mexico for the period 2002–13. An individual is considered a young adult if s/he is between 15 and 30 years old in the first year of the analysis in Mexico. The regression analysis for Nepal focuses on the period between 1996 and 2010. Since we are using a panel dataset and are thus able to follow the same individuals across time, an individual is considered to be a young adult if s/he is between 15 and 30 years old in the first year of the analysis.

The education variable is measured for Afghanistan, Colombia, and Nepal as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual is attending school in the year of the survey. The variable assumes value 0 otherwise. In Mexico, we focus on three key outcomes: (i) whether the individual is in school (the variable takes value 1 if the individual is attending school in the year of the survey), (ii) the maximum years of education attained by the individual, and (iii) the probability of the individual attending college.

Labour market outcomes are measured in Afghanistan with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual has worked in the month before the survey, if the individual is self-employed, or if the individual is engaged in family unpaid work. The variable takes value 0 otherwise. In Colombia, the variable assumes value 1 if the individual has worked at least one hour the week before the survey. In Mexico, the variable takes value 1 if the individual has worked in the 12 months before the survey (and is not in school). In Nepal, the dummy variable takes value 1 if the individual has worked at least six months in the year before the survey.

X_i is a set of covariates to control, in Afghanistan, for individual characteristics including age, whether the individual is the head of the household, gender, and marital status. In Afghanistan, the model further controls for household income in the year prior to the survey, whether the household lives in rural areas, and for ethnicity (i.e. whether the household is Kuchi, a nomad tribe of Afghanistan). In Colombia, X_i is a set of covariates that control for individual characteristics such as age, marital status, number of members in the household, gender, and whether the individual lives in rural area. The regressions in Colombia control further for household income in the year prior to the survey. In the regressions for Mexico, X_i includes individual's age, gender, marital status, and whether the individual is the head of the household, as well as number of

members in the household. Additional controls for Mexico include also personal and household income in the year prior to the survey in the education regressions, and household income in the labour regressions. In Nepal, X_i includes individual characteristics such as age, whether the individual is the head of the household, gender, marital status, number of members in the household, and personal and household income in the year before the survey.

Z_i is a set of covariates controlling for whether, in Afghanistan, the young adult lives in a district where the number of violent conflicts in the 12 months prior to the survey is greater than the average number of conflicts in the surrounding province where their district is located. In some specifications this variable is measured as the number of violent events experienced in the district. In Colombia, Z_i includes either the presence of armed groups in the community up to three years before the survey, or levels of violence incidence. In Mexico, Z_i is a set of covariates controlling for the number of violent conflicts in the state up to $t-2$ (up to $t-3$ in the labour regressions), or for the number of assaults reported by the individual. In Nepal, Z_i includes the number of violent conflicts in the district up to two years before the survey.

All models control for year and district fixed effects to account for unobservable characteristics specific to certain years and districts that may affect the results.

4.1 Afghanistan

According to the information included in the ALCS surveys (Table A15 in online appendix), less than 40 per cent of young adults in Afghanistan report being literate and having ever attended school. Around 67 per cent are currently attending school and well over 50 per cent of young adults have no education. Young adults living in the most conflict-affected districts in Afghanistan are, in comparison to those living in districts less affected by violence, more literate, more likely to have ever attended school, more likely to attend school at the time of the survey, less likely to have no education, and more likely to have primary and university education. On average, young women in Afghanistan have much lower levels of education than young men (Table A16 in online appendix). As with men, young women living in the most conflict-affected districts in Afghanistan are also more likely to be more educated than other young women living in districts less affected by the violence. In terms of labour market outcomes, 47.8 per cent of all young adults in the sample worked in the month prior to the survey (Table A16 in online appendix), but young women are much less likely to work than young men (Table A18). Most of workers (41.2 per cent of the total sample) were self-employed (Table A16). A reasonably high proportion of young adults in Afghanistan (28.2 per cent) report being unpaid family workers. Young adults living in highly conflict-affected districts are less likely to have worked in the month prior to the survey, but more young adults in high conflict districts were salaried and in self-employment and less were unpaid family workers.

The results for the regression analysis are presented in Table 1. Column (1) shows the results without controlling for the incidence of violence in the district. Column (2) introduces a dummy independent variable indicating whether the individual lives in a high conflict district. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the model separately for low and high conflict-affected districts, respectively. Column (5) shows the effect of the level of incidence of conflict in the past year. All coefficients have the expected sign. Overall, older individuals, household heads, women, married individuals, and married women are less likely to attend school. This result is observed across the whole sample and for high and low conflict districts, separately. Individuals living in economically better-off households are more likely to attend school, but this variable only matters in districts more affected by conflict. The effect of household income on education outcomes in districts less affected by the violence is not statistically significant. Households belonging to the Kuchi group are less likely

to attend school. This variable is only statistically significant in districts less affected by the violence. In terms of the effect of the conflict variable, Table 1 shows that the number of violent events (Column 2) and the level of violence (Column 5) experienced in each district have negative effects on the likelihood of an individual currently attending school, but these effects are not statistically significant.

In order to further explore the relationship between violent conflict and education among young adults in Afghanistan, we consider two additional educational outcomes: whether the individual has ever attended school and the number of years of schooling achieved by each individual in the sample. This analysis is provided in Tables A19 and A20, respectively, in the online appendix. Results are largely similar to those reported in Table 1 except that individuals living in districts highly affected by the conflict are more likely to have ever attended school (Table A19, Column 2), and more likely to have completed more years of education (Table A20, Column 2). Individuals exposed to higher levels of violence in the year prior to the survey are more likely to have ever attended school (Table A19). One possible explanation for this result may be the fact conflict events in Afghanistan have been particularly violent in urban areas where most of the schools are concentrated. Therefore, this result may not identify a positive effect of the conflict on education but simply the fact that violence is more likely to occur in areas where more educated populations are located. In addition, high conflict districts in Afghanistan have also attracted high levels of international aid, which may have also influenced these results. Although the regressions control for urban/rural location, it is still possible that underlying institutional or social variables (such as international aid) may explain both variables simultaneously.

The results for overall labour market outcomes in Afghanistan are presented in Table 2. Tables A21 and A22 in the online appendix show, respectively, estimates for self-employment and unpaid family employment among youth in Afghanistan, given the importance of these categories in the descriptive analysis above. In all these regressions, we control, in addition, for the sum of conflicts in the 30 days prior to the survey, due to the nature of the question asking about labour experiences in the month prior to the survey. Results show that older individuals, household heads, married individuals, and those living in better-off households are more likely to have worked in the month prior to the survey and are more likely to be self-employed. Women, particularly married women, are much less likely to have worked in the month prior to the survey and to be self-employed. Individuals living in rural areas and of Kuchi origin are more likely to have worked in the month prior to the survey, but less likely to be self-employed.

Results show no statistically significant association between levels of violence in the district in the 12 months prior to the survey (Table 2) and the likelihood of a young adult working in the past month or being an unpaid family worker (Table A21). The results show, however, a positive and statistically significant association between working in the past month or being an unpaid family worker and having experienced violence in the past month (Table A22). These results suggest that decisions about labour market participation among young adults react to short-term exposure to violence, which may perhaps have pushed other household members into the conflict or affected alternative occupations, such as schooling. These effects may, in turn, push young adults into the labour market, or into family livelihood activities. However, living in a high conflict district increases the likelihood of young adults in Afghanistan being self-employed (Table A21), but exposure to high levels of violence in the month prior to the survey reduces self-employment among these youth. The first result is likely to reflect the fact that conflicts may concentrate in areas where self-employment is more available to young people. In particular, the deployment of international troops to high conflict districts in Afghanistan discussed has led to the development of local markets (see Bove and Gavrilova 2014), a factor that may explain these results. The second result may well be a reaction against recent increases in violence, which may drive young people into (unpaid) family activities.

4.2 Colombia

Overall, there are no substantial immediate differences in education characteristics between individuals living in conflict communities in Colombia and individuals living in communities with no armed group presence (Table A23 in online appendix). On average, around 99 per cent of all young adults aged between 15 and 30 years in the ELCA sample have ever attended school, with around 11 per cent still in education. Education levels are generally higher among young men and women living in conflict-affected communities. Less of these individuals report having primary education because most have moved into higher levels of education. Less than 1 per cent of all individuals in conflict communities and 2.4 per cent of all individuals in communities not affected by the conflict report having no education. Table A24 illustrates similar information disaggregated by gender. Results are also similar when measuring conflict using information on violence exposure.²⁶ In terms of labour market outcomes, over 65 per cent of all men and women aged between 15 and 30 years report being in work at the time of each survey (Table A25 in online appendix). There are few statistically significant differences in the employment status of young adults living in communities with and without armed group presence, but individuals living in communities with armed group presence are substantially less likely to work for their family with no pay, and more likely to own their company (i.e. being self-employed), when compared to individuals in non-conflict communities. These individuals are also much less likely to work for the government. This is not surprising given that armed groups in Colombia tend to move into communities where state institutions are weak or non-existent (Gáfaró et al. 2014, 2022; Justino 2018a; Justino et al. 2019; Ibáñez et al. 2023). Table A27 reports the same information disaggregated by gender, with very similar results. Results using violence exposure show also similar results (Table A26 and A28). Taken together, these results suggest a positive overall association between youth labour market participation and conflict incidence in Colombia.

Regression results are presented in Table 3. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results of the benchmark model for the whole sample and by conflict exposure, respectively. Columns (4), (5), (6), and (7) present the regression results where the presence of armed groups per year is taken into consideration. The results show that, on average, older individuals and those living in larger households are less likely to attend school. Women and individuals living in better-off households are more likely to attend school (but only in conflict communities). Overall, there is no statistically significant association between school attendance and conflict incidence in Colombia. In order to explore these results further, we examine also the relationship between armed group presence and levels of school attainment (years spent in school) among young adults in Colombia (Table A29 in the online appendix). The results again show no statistically significant association between the presence of armed groups in a given community in Colombia and the level of youth school attainment. There is also no statistically significant association between education outcomes and violence incidence in Colombia (Table 30 in the online appendix).

In terms of labour market outcomes, Table 4 shows that older individuals, men, and those living in better-off households are more likely to be in employment at the time of the survey. Women and individuals living in larger households are less likely to be in employment. There are few differences between individuals living in communities with armed group presence and those without. The main difference has to do with school attendance: individuals who have ever attended school in non-conflict communities are less likely to be in employment. In contrast, individuals who have ever attended school in conflict communities are more likely to be in employment. It is not clear what may cause this difference in results but it is possible that this may have to do with

²⁶ These tables are not shown in order to reduce space, but are available upon request.

either patterns of armed group recruitment or displacement in Colombia. More research is needed to better understand this result. We note also that the presence of armed groups in communities across Colombia has limited influence on the labour market participation of young adults, but there is a positive association between armed groups that have been present in the community for at least two years and the probability of a young adult working. This result is, however, only statistically significant in the last column.

We explore further the results discussed in Tables A31 and A32 in the online appendix, which disaggregate the regression results above by type of employment, notable individuals employed in government institutions, and those who own their company, respectively. The tables show that young adults living in communities with armed group presence in years prior to the survey are less likely to work for the government (Table A31, columns 4 and 5) and more likely to own their company (Table A32, columns 4 and 5). This may reflect the fact, discussed above, that armed groups in Colombia tend to take over more remote communities where state institutions are weak and opportunities for employment outside family-owned business or rural activities may be scarcer. This is, nonetheless, an interesting result that may merit more detailed analysis in future research. Tables A33, A34, and A35 in the online appendix illustrate the same regression results when conflict is defined by the level of exposure to violent acts in each community. There is no statistically significant association between patterns of labour market participation and violence exposure, but we observe a positive relationship between employment of young adults in own company and violence incidence, as before (Table A34).

In addition to education and labour market outcomes, the data for Colombia allows us also to analyse the relationship between exposure to violent conflict and the engagement of young men and women in civic organizations in their community.²⁷ The Colombian case study is particularly suited to conduct this analysis given the richness of the information on individual levels of civic engagement included in the ELCA surveys across time. The surveys include also detailed information about individual voting behaviour, which we also explore in the tables below.

We consider two types of information on civic engagement in Colombia. Tables A36 and A37 in the online appendix describe the type of community organizations in place across Colombian communities. Tables A38 to A41 in the online appendix illustrate the level of participation among young men and women in those community organizations. In line with the study conducted by Gáfaró et al. (2014), the results show that communities where armed groups are present and communities exposed to more violence are more likely to have a larger number of community organizations. In some cases, these organizations are formed as a means to resist armed groups. In other cases, these are organizations imposed by the armed groups themselves to better control the community (Gáfaró et al. 2014, 2022). There are few statistically significant differences in civic engagement and voting behaviour between young adults living in communities with and without armed group presence in Colombia. However, young adults living in communities with armed group presence are less likely than others to participate in their community action boards, or in other organizations. They are also less likely to have voted in the less local elections. Individuals in communities more affected by violence are also in general less likely to belong to a community organization but are more likely to report selling their vote in local elections. Results are similar when disaggregated by gender.

²⁷ The organizations considered are religious, community action board (*Junta de Accion Comunal*), charity, community/neighbour, ethnic, cultural or sport, educational, environmental, security, union, political party, and others.

Table 5 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the outcomes above. Overall, older individuals are more likely to participate in community organizations. Individuals living in rural areas are also more likely to participate in community organizations, but this effect is only statistically significant in communities where armed groups are not present. Interestingly, there is a positive and statistically significant association between being a woman and participating in community organizations. This effect is only statistically significant in communities with no armed group presence.²⁸ It is also important to note that the presence of armed groups in communities for at least two years prior to each survey is strongly associated with larger levels of civic engagement among young adults in Colombia (columns 6 and 7 in Table 5), contrary to the simpler descriptive results analysed above. Table 6 shows no statistically significant association between civic engagement among young adults and levels of violence. Taken together, these are interesting results suggesting that it is the presence of armed groups (but not necessarily levels of violence) that spurs civic engagement among young adults in Colombia.

4.3 Mexico

Table A42 in the online appendix illustrates the educational characteristics of young adults by conflict incidence. The results show a mixed picture. The share of young adults currently attending school is smaller in conflict-affected states, where we also observe a smaller share of individuals who have ever attended school. In contrast, young adults in conflict-affected states spend, on average, more time at school and are more likely to be enrolled in college education. The share of young adults working while being in secondary education, in high school, and at university is smaller in states affected by violent conflict. Progression rates to high school are lower in conflict-affected states, but progression rates to university are higher in these states. Repetition rates are generally lower in conflict-affected states. Table A43 presents similar information broken down by gender. Tables A44 and A45 show descriptive statistics for labour market outcomes. We observe that a larger share of young adults in conflict-affected states (in comparison to those in states not affected by the violence) have worked the year before the survey. These, however, declared a lower personal income over the last 12 months than those living in states not affected by violence. The share of young adults in conflict-affected states that has ever worked is smaller than in non-conflict states, but they earn less than their counterparts when they are employed or are business owners. There are no statistically significant differences between conflict-affected and non-conflict-affected states with respect to the share of young adults with a secondary job and in the average of hours per week the respondents worked. There are also no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of young women in conflict and non-conflict states having worked the year before the survey or in the number of hours per week spent at work. We observe higher annual wages from main and secondary jobs and higher income from the main business for both males and females in conflict states.

We now turn to multivariate regression analysis in Table 7. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results of the benchmark model, for the whole sample and by conflict incidence, without the inclusion of the conflict and assault variables. Columns (4), (5), and (6) present the results of the model with the inclusion of the assault variable. Columns (7) and (8) present the results of the equations accounting for violent conflict one period and two periods, respectively, before the survey. The results confirm that older individuals are less likely to be enrolled in schools. Women overall, married men and women, and individuals living in larger households are also less likely to be enrolled in school. In addition, individuals with higher personal incomes are less likely to be in

²⁸ A large amount of civic engagement among these women may be related to peace activities that aim to negotiate with armed groups for better conditions in their communities and the safety of their members (see Justino et al. 2012, 2018; Gáfaró et al. 2014; Justino 2018c).

full-time education, but overall household income has the opposite effect. This may indicate that young people that are able to earn more are less likely to be in full-time education. However, better-off households are more likely to keep their young members in school. In terms of the effect of violent conflict, results show that individuals that reported having been assaulted are much more likely to be currently enrolled in full-time education. Being in a state that experienced violent conflict in the two years prior to the survey (but not one year) also has a positive impact on schooling enrolment.

To better understand these results, we have analysed two additional measures of education. Table A46 in the online appendix shows the correlation between violent events and reported assaults on the maximum years of education attained by young adults,²⁹ while Table A47 correlates violence exposure with the probability of a young adult attending college. All results in Table A46 are very similar to those reported in Table 7, with the exception of the conflict event variables, which are no longer statistically significant. The results in Table A47 are slightly different (but not unexpected) with respect to the correlation between individual economic and social characteristics and the probability of attending college: older individuals, women, individuals with higher incomes, and individuals living in wealthier households are more likely to attend college. Household heads, married women, and individuals living in larger households are less likely to attend college. The correlation between being a victim of assaults and attending college is the same as before (positive). However, living in a conflict-affected state that experienced conflict in the past two years has now a negative coefficient—but the coefficient is small and only just statistically significant at the 10 per cent level of significance. The coefficient for a violent event in the past year remains positive.

The results reported in the tables above with respect to conflict are unexpected and suggest that exposure to violence in their state and direct victimization have a positive impact on the probability of the individual attending school. The simple regression analyses conducted in the tables above do not allow us to fully understand the reasons underlying these findings. However, in a previous study of education in Mexico (albeit focusing on younger children), Brown and Velásquez (2017) discuss how parents that feared violence may have perceived schools as safe heavens and were therefore more likely to ensure their children stay in school. It is possible that the young adults in our sample feel in the same way. It is also possible that the results above, despite the use of panel fixed effects, may reflect reverse causality, i.e. that being educated is a marker for being assaulted or exposed to violent events. More research is needed to better disentangle these results and better understand the motivations that keep young adults in school and allow them to achieve higher education levels in conflict-affected states in Mexico.

Table 8 shows the relationship between violent conflict and individual labour market outcomes. In addition to the conflict measures used in Table 7, this model also accounts for the exposure of the state to violent conflict in the three years before the survey, given that the survey asked whether the individual was in employment in the 12 months before the survey (and thus up to one year before). Table 8 shows that older individuals, individuals that are heads of household, and married individuals are more likely to have worked in the 12 months prior to the surveys. Women overall, married women, poorer individuals, and individuals living in less well-off households are less likely to be employed. In terms of the relationship between violent conflict and employment, we observe no statistically significant effect of conflict exposure at the state level on the probability of an individual being employed. However, individuals that report having been assaulted are more likely to have been employed in the 12 months prior to the survey. This result may be interpreted in two

²⁹ We excluded from this analysis young adults that have been to college due to the structure of the questionnaire, which does not indicate the number of years an individual has spent at college. Table A46 therefore includes individuals that are not currently attending school but may have been enrolled in a college.

ways. On the one hand, it may indicate that victimization leads individuals to search for jobs, perhaps because this has reduced their levels of income. On the other hand (and more plausibly), the result may indicate that employed individuals are more likely to be assaulted.

As with Colombia, the data for Mexico allow us also to assess the effect of violence on the engagement of young adults in civic organizations. Because the MxFLS does not include information on this variable, we conducted this analysis using information collected in the *Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas* (ENCUP), a cross-sectional survey implemented in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2012. The analysis in this section focuses only on variables that are comparable across the five waves and considers young adults as individuals aged between 18 (the minimum age of respondents included in the surveys) and 30 years in the year of the survey. As before, conflict-affected states are defined as states that have experienced at least one violent conflict in the last two years.

Table A48 in the online appendix presents the main descriptive statistics by conflict incidence. The results show there are few differences (across the new datasets) between young adults living in conflict- and non-conflict-affected states in terms of their average age, gender distribution, and student status. There are also few differences in terms of civic engagement of young adults. The main exceptions are participation in charities, professional organizations, political organizations, and cooperatives. Participation in each of these civic associations is substantially higher in conflict-affected states. These results seem to suggest, in line with some of the literature discussed in Section 1, that young adults in conflict-affected states in Mexico engage more than their counterparts living in states not affected by the violence in active forms of political and professional participation.

Table A49 in the online appendix reports the same information disaggregated by gender. The results show only small statistically significant differences in age across conflict- and non-conflict-affected states for both female and male young adults, but we observe a larger share of young female students in conflict-affected states. The table also shows that, even though women have slightly smaller civic participation rates, both young men and women in conflict-affected states tend to participate more in charities and professional and political organizations than those in non-conflict-affected states. The disaggregated data by gender now also show a statistically significant stronger engagement of both young men and women living in conflict-affected states in farming organizations. Young men, but not young women, in conflict-affected states participate more in religious associations than their counterparts in states not affected by the violence.

Table 9 presents the results of a probit model and is organized as follow. In columns (1)–(3), the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual is, or has been, a member of one of the following organizations: professional, political, civil, or member of a trade union. In columns (4)–(6), the dependent variable takes value 1 when the individual is, or has been, member of a trade union or of a political organization. Finally, columns (7)–(9) present the results for individuals that are or have been members of a trade union, political organization, and political party. This separation is due to the fact that this last question was introduced from the second wave onwards (which also explains differences in sample size across the columns in Table 9). Table 10 presents the results of the same model but with the dependent variable taking value 1 when the young adult is member of few selected organizations as follows: in columns (1)–(3), the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual is, or has been, a member of a political party. Columns (4)–(6) present the results for individual members of a trade union. Columns (7)–(9) present the results for individuals that are or have been members of a political organization.

The control variables in Table 9 have the expected signs: older individuals and those that are students are more likely to be engaged in a civic organization in their community. Women are less

likely to participate in civic organizations. In terms of conflict exposure, the table suggests that there is no statistically significant association between civic participation of young adults and conflict incidence in their state. This stands in contrast with the descriptive results shown before indicating that the previous results may have been driven by individual and state characteristics that are not controlled for in the regression analysis. However, when we consider the incidence of violent events in the past five years (last row in Table 9), we observe a negative correlation between civic engagement of young people and conflict exposure. This result suggests that young people may make decisions to remove themselves from participating in civic organizations based on their long-term exposure to violent events. These decisions seem to apply to civic engagement overall, rather than to specific organizations, given the lack of statistically significant results in Table 10.

4.4 Nepal

This section analyses the empirical relationship between violent conflict exposure and education outcomes among young adults in Nepal between 1996 and 2010. Table A50 in the online appendix shows the results of this analysis. Levels of education are generally low in Nepal. Among all 15–30-year-old individuals included in the sample, only 42.8 per cent have ever attended school in high conflict districts. An even lower percentage—37.2 per cent—has ever attended school in low conflict districts. The percentage of young adults attending school at the time of each survey is lower in high conflict districts (23.6 per cent) than in low conflict districts (27.3 per cent), possibly due to the higher average age of individuals living in districts more affected by the conflict. The table shows, in addition, that even though more young adults have attended school in high conflict districts than in low conflict districts, less of them are literate or have ever attended secondary school. Individuals in high conflict areas also pay substantially more fees to attend school (almost double) than those in low conflict areas. These results point to lower schooling progression among young adults in high conflict areas, which may be due to the concentration of these districts in more remote and rural regions. Education outcomes are generally lower among young Nepalese women than young Nepalese men (Table A51 in online appendix), reflecting the patriarchal nature of society organization in Nepal (Menon and Rodgers 2011). For instance, only 31.9 and 28.1 per cent of all young women in high and low conflict districts, respectively, has ever attended school. The percentages for young men are 55.8 and 48 per cent, respectively. Young men in high conflict districts are more likely to have ever attended school than their counterparts in low conflict districts, but are less likely to have progressed beyond primary school levels. They are also less literate. There are, however, almost no statistically significant differences in education outcomes among young women living in high and low conflict districts, with the exception of literacy levels being lower among young women living in high conflict districts (36.9 per cent) than those living in low conflict districts (41.8 per cent). Table A52 in the online appendix shows that young adults in high conflict districts, when compared with their counterparts in low conflict districts, are employed in more jobs, are more likely to have worked in the entire 12 months prior to the survey, and earn more on average when employed in the agriculture sector but less when employed in non-agriculture sectors. They also work less hours per day and less days per month. It is unclear what factors may be driving these differences in labour market outcomes, but it is possible that these reflect an improvement in labour conditions in Maoist-held rural areas in Nepal. Table A53 examines the same associations disaggregated by gender. In general, young women are less likely to participate in the labour market in Nepal than young men but the differences are small, particularly in relation to the gender differences observed among education outcomes. This may well reflect the positive effects of the Nepalese civil war on female labour market participation reported in Menon and Rodgers (2011). Differences across conflict exposure disaggregated by gender largely replicate the findings presented in Table A52.

Table 11 presents the results for the model above. Column (1) shows the results for the entire sample, whereas columns (2)–(4) account, respectively, for conflict incidence at the time of the

survey, conflict incidence one year before the survey, and conflict incidence two years before the survey. All regressions include district and year fixed effects in order to control for unobservable characteristics across each district and time trends that may affect education outcomes among young adults in Nepal. As it would be expected, older and married individuals are less likely to attend school. There is also a negative association between levels of personal income and education attendance, suggesting that individuals that are economically better-off are less likely to attend school in each of the survey years. This result is, however, only statistically significant at the 10 per cent level of significance. Table 11 shows no statistically significant association between school attendance and any other control variable. The relationship between conflict exposure and school attendance among young adults in Nepal is positive, as reported also in Valente (2014) (with the exception of the incidence of conflict two years before the survey in column 4), but not statistically significant.

Results in Table 12 show that few socio-economic characteristics of young adults in Nepal explain their labour market participation outcomes. However, women (but not married women) seem more likely to have been in employment in the six months before each survey. In terms of conflict exposure, the incidence of violence in the year before the survey is associated with an increase (by 2.7 per cent) in the probability of a young individual being employed in Nepal. This is in line with the results discussed in Menon and Rodgers (2011). However, the accumulation of exposure to conflict over two years is associated with reductions in the participation of young adults in the labour market, suggesting a longer term negative effect of the conflict. Several reasons may explain these seemingly contradictory results. On the one hand, there may be an incentive for young men and women to join the labour market at the time of the conflict in order to compensate for household welfare losses (Menon and Rodgers 2011; Justino 2012a). However, accumulated exposure to violence may reduce labour market participation due to fear, uncertainty, market disruption, and violence targeting. More research is needed to understand this difference between shorter and longer term results and the underlying mechanisms that may shape these different outcomes across time.

5 Do young people cause more conflict?

As discussed in Section 2 and in the introduction to this paper, few studies have directly examined the effect of actions taken by young adults on peace and conflict processes. This is true of the four case studies, where available data will not allow us to directly assess whether and how young adults may affect peace processes in their community. As a second-best approach, we examine instead the effect of young adults on the onset of future conflict in the areas where they live.

5.1 Afghanistan

To address the question above in Afghanistan, we analyse the relationship between the sum of conflicts experienced in the 12 months *after* each survey in each district and the share of young adults in each district. Following the results discussed in Berman et al. (2011), we also examine the relationship between future incidence of violent conflict and the share of young employed and unemployed adults over the total population in each district and the share of young employed and unemployed adults over the total young population in each district. The idea is to analyse whether a higher share of young (employed or unemployed) adults in a specific district might predict (or not) the occurrence and level of violent conflict in the future. This is in effect a way of testing the ‘youth bulge’ hypothesis discussed in previous sections of this study from a micro-level perspective.

The results for this analysis are presented in Table 13. The table shows that districts that have a higher number of young adults are *less likely* to experience violent conflict in the next 12 months. The same is true for districts with a larger share of employed young adults: the results indicate that these districts are also *less likely* to experience violent conflict in the next month (this is the reference period used for the employment questions). There is no statistically significant association between the share of young unemployed adults in Afghanistan and the future occurrence of conflict. These results are only simple correlations and would need much more scrutiny than what is possible within the constraints of this study. However, they suggest that the youth bulge hypothesis may not be relevant in the context of districts in Afghanistan affected by conflict.

To probe this result further, we have in addition analysed characteristics exhibited by young adults in Afghanistan that may proxy for their engagement in either peaceful or conflict-related activities. We focused on three specific factors that have been put forward in the literature as potential proxies for pro-social behaviour among individuals. The first factor relates to perceptions about security, since feelings of insecurity may affect the likelihood of an individual participating in conflict (or peace) processes (Justino 2009). This effect may have two opposite theoretical directions. On the one hand, individuals that feel insecure may choose to participate in armed groups in the expectation that these may protect them and their families against further violence (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). But insecure households may also choose to either leave their communities or resist against armed groups in order to ensure peace in their communities (Kaplan 2017). This would be the case of communities with high levels of social cooperation (Justino 2017, 2018b, 2019, 2022b). We measure the effect of this variable among Afghanistan youth using the following question: ‘How do you rate the security situation in this district?’. The second factor is trust in and satisfaction with state institutions. Perceptions about state institutions have been shown to be key determinants for why individuals join protests (Justino and Martorano 2018, 2019; Iacoella et al. 2021; Justino et al. 2023) and riots (Gupte et al. 2014; Aghajanian et al. 2020; McCulloch et al. 2022). It is, therefore, possible that perceptions about state institutions may affect how young adults in Afghanistan make choices about their participation in conflict (or peace) processes. We focus on perceptions about the state police, an important factor in the Afghanistan conflict in recent years, as discussed above. The survey question we use asks: ‘To what extent are you satisfied with the police in this district doing their job of serving and protecting the people?’. The final factor has to do with economic expectations, which has been shown to considerably affect individual decisions in conflict-affected contexts (Justino 2009). We measure this variable using the following question: ‘How would you compare the overall economic situation of the household with one year ago?’.³⁰ In the ALCS surveys, all questions above were asked separately to one male respondent (usually the head of the household) and to one senior female member of the household (generally, the head of the household if female, or the spouse of the head of the household).³¹ Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we disaggregate the results according to whether questions were answered by the male head of the household or by the main female respondent.

Descriptive statistics for the relationship between the three variables above and conflict incidence are presented in Table 14. The table shows that perceptions about security, levels of satisfaction with the state police, and economic expectations are quite similar between young men and women. In terms of differences between high and low conflict districts, the results indicate that both young

³⁰ The first two questions (about security perceptions and perceptions about the state police) were only asked in the last two waves of ALCS (2011 and 2013). The last question (about economic expectations) was asked in all waves.

³¹ Respondents in the female questionnaire may also be the ‘most active and important female member’. It is not, however, possible to distinguish between these three categories of female respondents.

men and women living in high conflict districts feel more secure, but are less likely to be satisfied with the state police, in comparison to those living in districts less affected by the conflict. This is an unexpected result but may suggest that the high presence of international troops and large flows of aid in districts experiencing high levels of violence, discussed above, may result in individuals feeling more secure than in low conflict districts—which still experience violence but have access to less international protection. The presence of international troops may also explain why individuals may feel less satisfied with the state police in high conflict districts. Table 14 shows no statistically significant differences in how individuals experience their economic situation in high or low conflict districts.

Tables 15 and 16 provide a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between conflict and the three perception variables above using multivariate regression analysis. Columns (1)–(3) show the results for the security perception variable. Column (1) presents the baseline results, column (2) adds a variable indicating whether the respondent is a young adult (aged 15–30 years), and column (3) adds another variable that interacts whether the individual is a young adult with living in a district highly affected by the conflict. The same information is provided for the police satisfaction variable in columns (4)–(6) and for the economic expectations variable in columns (7)–(9). We discuss the results below separately for each perception variable.

Security perceptions. Perceptions of security among male respondents are higher among households that are economically better-off and lower among rural and Kuchi households. Young men are more likely to feel secure (but the coefficient is only significant at the 10 per cent level). There is no statistically significant effect of the interaction between young adults and conflict on perceptions of security among the male sample. Among the female sample (Table 16), perceptions of security are higher among older women and women that are not married. As with the male sample, perceptions of security among women are higher among households that are economically better-off and lower among rural and Kuchi households. Young adult women are more likely to feel secure. As before, there is no statistically significant effect of the interaction between young women and high conflict on perceptions of security.

Satisfaction with the state police. Table 15 shows that levels of satisfaction with the state police are higher among married individuals and better-off households. Levels of satisfaction, as reported in the male sample, are lower among rural and Kuchi households. There is no statistically significant association between being a young male in a high conflict district (compared with the overall sample of young males) and levels of police satisfaction. Table 16 indicates that older female respondents in better-off households are more likely to feel satisfied with the state police. The opposite result is observed among married female respondents in rural and Kuchi households. In contrast with the male sample, young female respondents are more likely to report being satisfied with the state police (column 5), particularly if they live in high conflict districts (column 6).

Economic expectations. Table 15 indicates that older men in rural and Kuchi households are less likely to think that their economic status is better now than one year ago. In contrast, male respondents in better-off households think that their economic situation has improved since the previous year. Similar results are observed among female respondents (Table 16), with the exception of those living in rural households (the coefficient is not statistically significant in Table 16). There is again no statistically significant association between being a young male in a high conflict district and economic perceptions (compared to the overall sample of young males) (Table 15, columns 8 and 9), but there is a strong positive association between being a young female and reporting a better economic situation now than one year ago (Table 16, column 8).

Overall, the analysis above finds only weak links for a relationship between being a young male adult in Afghanistan and perceptions of security, satisfaction with the state police, and economic

expectations. However, young women in Afghanistan seem to feel more secure, exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with the state police, and are more likely to think that their economic situation has improved. It is unclear at this point why we observe such disparate results between young men and women. However, these are interesting results that merit further in-depth research as they may predict an important role for young women in Afghanistan in sustaining peace, which however is being undermined by current Taliban policy. The results also emphasize the need to better understand what drives different perspectives among young men and what the consequences of this will be in the future.

5.2 Colombia

Similar to other case studies, the Colombia datasets do not provide direct information on the role of young adults in peacebuilding activities in their communities. We focus instead on a number of important relationships outlined in Table 17. The first is between the share of young adults in each community and the probability of armed groups being present in the community in the next three years. We observe that this coefficient is positive and statistically significant. However, based on prior knowledge about the conflict in Colombia, it is unlikely that this result shows evidence for the presence of a ‘youth bulge’ effect in Colombia. It is important to note that the proxy we use in this table for the incidence of armed conflict in Colombia is the presence of armed groups, and it is therefore likely that this result simply reflects the fact, as discussed above, that armed groups target young men to join their ranks or as targets of violence.

The second relationship is between the share of young adults in each community engaged in forms of civic participation and the probability of future armed group presence. This result is shown in column (2) of Table 17 and is not statistically significant. We re-ran the same regression in column (3) using the share of all individuals in ELCA engaged in civic organizations, and the result remains statistically insignificant.

We have also examined the relationship between employment among young adults in Colombia and the probability of future conflict. The results are not statistically significant (column 6). However, there is a statistically significant and positive association between unemployment among all (older) community members and future armed group presence. There is also a negative association between employment among young adults in Colombia and future presence of armed groups in the community. More sophisticated econometric analysis will be necessary to determine whether these are causal associations and what mechanisms may explain these different results.

5.3 Mexico

Again, we use information included in the *Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas* (ENCUP) conducted in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2012 to analyse the effect of young adults’ civic engagement on the probability of conflict taking place in the future. Conflict states are defined here as states that will experience at least one violent event in the one or two years after the survey. Non-conflict-affected states are those that did not experience any violent conflict in the two years prior to the surveys. Table 18 presents the main descriptive statistics for young people living in states where violent conflict erupted in the year after the survey, whereas Table 19 accounts for conflict events that took place up to two years after the survey. The tables show interesting results. States that experienced conflict one year after the survey have a larger share of young adults engaged in trade unions, religious organizations, neighbours’ associations, and other recognized organizations. However, states that experienced conflict two years after the survey have a substantially larger share of young adults in political parties and political and religious organizations, indicating a larger interest of young adults in active political participation in states that will experience violence in the longer term.

However, these results must be interpreted with great care due to the small sample sizes involved in each cell and the fact that these are simple descriptive statistics that do not control for any other variables that may affect simultaneously the probability of a young adult participating in civic organizations and the onset of violent conflict. We attempt to conduct a simple regression analysis to further explore these findings in Table 20. This regression models the effect of young adults on future levels of conflict by looking at whether states that have more young adults engaged in civic organizations (rows 1 and 2) or have a larger share of young adults (rows 3 and 4) are more likely to experience a violent event in 2015 (the last year for which we have conflict event data). Columns (1) and (3) present the results with the yearly sum of members of any association and sum of young adults by state. Columns (2) and (4) present the results with the sum of members and young adults for the whole time span of the analysis (2002–09). Table 21 examines the association between levels of employment and unemployment among young adults in Mexico and the incidence of future violent events in each state.

Table 20 shows no statistically significant relation between the share of young adults in each state engaged in civic participation and the occurrence of future conflict (rows 1 and 2). In fact, the table shows that states with more young adults overall (whether or not engaged in forms of civic engagement) are significantly *less* likely to experience violent conflict in the future (row 4). In addition, Table 21 shows that the association between levels of employment among young adults in Mexico and the future incidence of violent conflict is not statistically significant. There is a weak statistically significant association (only at the 10 per cent level of significance) between the share of unemployed youth in specific states in Mexico and the incidence of violent events.

In order to further assess the impact of young adults' behaviour on conflict outcomes in each state, we have also analysed whether young adults affected by the violence hold different expectations in relation to those not affected by violence or exhibit different forms of pro-social behaviour. These outcomes do not offer direct information on the role of young people in peace or conflict but provide important proxies that may shape future behaviours of young people. This information is presented in Table 22. Columns (1) to (3) show the results related to expectations by using the following question: 'Compared with your parents' standard of living, do you think you will be better or worse off when you have their age?'.³² This is an important question because it has been hypothesized in the literature that young adults with low levels of expectations about the future could potentially be more involved in violent actions in the future, such as during the Arab Spring events in the Middle-East (Campante and Chor 2012). Columns (4) to (6) model specific anti-social behaviours using answers to the following questions: 'How likely is it that you steal electricity from the public lines (illegally)?' and 'How likely is it that you do not return a wallet with \$500 pesos in it?'.³³ Columns (7) to (9) refer to perceptions about social norms related to the rule of law and social competition with others using two statements: 'Laws are made to be broken. Agree?' and 'The one who does not cheat, does not get ahead. Agree?'.³⁴

Table 22 suggests two important results. First, young people affected by violent events in their state or that report having been assaulted have much lower expectations than others that were not

³² The question has five possible answers: (i) much better, (ii) a little better; (iii), the same, (iv) a little worse, and (v) much worse. The dependent variable used in the model takes value 1 if the individual replied either option (i) or (ii).

³³ Both questions ask for the probability attached by the individual to that action. The dependent variable we use in the table takes value 1 if individuals indicate that probability to be greater than zero for either question.

³⁴ Both questions have five possible answers: (i) completely agree; (ii) agree; (iii) disagree; (iv) completely disagree; and (v) do not know. The dependent variable we use in the table takes value 1 if the individual agrees or completely agrees to either of the two statements.

affected by violence. Second, young people affected by violent events in their state are less likely than others to show lack of respect for the rule of law or trying to cheat others in certain settings. These results suggest that young people affected by violence may exhibit lower expectations about the future but show also higher levels of respect for the rule of law and for others. The results show no statistically significant correlations between exposure to violence and other anti-social behaviours. This is consistent with the result discussed in the section above.

5.4 Nepal

In line with the other case studies, few studies have directly analysed the relationship between the behaviour of young adults in peace and conflict processes in Nepal. Available data for Nepal also does not allow us to directly assess whether and how young adults may affect the sustainability of peace in the country. Therefore, in this section we adopt the second-best approach used in the other case studies, whereby we analyse the effect of the presence of young adults on the onset of future conflict in their district. To do that, we analyse the relationship between the sum of conflicts experienced in the 12 months *after* each survey in each district and the share of young adults in each district, as well as the share of employed and unemployed young adults in each district. Unfortunately, in contrast with the other case studies, the household survey data available for Nepal has not allowed us to further explore forms of pro-social behaviour among young men and women.

The results for this analysis are presented in Table 23. The table shows that districts in Nepal that have a higher number of young adults are *less likely* to experience violent conflict in the 12 months after each survey. The same is true for districts with a larger share of unemployed young adults: the results indicate that these districts are also *less likely* to experience violent conflict in the next 12 months. In contrast, districts with a larger share of employed youth (only in relation to the share of overall youth but not over the whole district population) are more likely to experience future conflict. It is unclear what may explain this result, which is likely to reflect the fact, as discussed above, that conflict in Nepal occurs more in districts where young people are more likely to be employed. This result may not, therefore, indicate any causal effect of youth actions on future occurrence of violent conflict and would need detailed scrutiny in future follow-up research to this study. Overall, and in line with the other case studies, these results suggest that the youth bulge hypothesis may not be of relevance in Nepal. Much more research is needed, however, to better understand the roles that young men and women in Nepal may have to play in processes of sustaining peace as the country moves towards a more established democracy.

6 Policy implications and ways forward

The main objective of this study was to assess empirically the impact of violent conflict on education, labour participation, and civic engagement of young men and women, and the role young adults have played in conflict and peace processes in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Nepal. This analysis is a tentative first attempt at generating rigorous comparable evidence on these two questions. The study yielded two main findings.

First, violent conflict causes immense destruction but is not necessarily only associated with negative development and human capital outcomes among young adults. In the cases of Afghanistan and Mexico, violent conflict is associated with higher levels of education and labour market participation (depending on the type of employment) among young men and women. In the case of Colombia, there is no statistically significant association between violent conflict and education but there is a positive association between the presence of armed groups in specific

communities for over two years and labour market outcomes among young adults. In the case of Nepal, there is no statistically significant association between violent conflict and education but there is a positive short-term effect of conflict on labour market outcomes. More research is needed to better understand the factors and processes underlying these findings. It is possible that these results represent only a correlation but not causation, suggesting that violent conflict happens to take place in areas where young adults are more educated and in employment. In the case of Afghanistan, the results may also be explained by the deployment of large amounts of international aid and military protection to districts mostly affected by the conflict. We have used a range of econometric techniques to control for several potential confounding factors, notably the use of fixed effect models and an extensive assortment of regression controls. But it is important that more sophisticated statistical analysis is conducted in the future to determine the causal impact of violent conflict on education and employment outcomes among young adults living in conflict-affected contexts.

Second, due to a remarkable lack of adequate micro-level data, the study was unable to assess the direct impact of young adults on peacebuilding in any of the case studies. However, using second-best approaches, the empirical analysis reveals two interesting patterns. First, the study found largely no or only weak statistically significant association in the four case studies between the presence of young people in specific contexts and the likelihood of that area experiencing violent conflict in the future. Taken together, these findings cast some doubts about the validity of the well-known ‘youth bulge’ hypothesis when analysed from a micro-level perspective. Second, with the exception of Nepal for which data is not available, the study in fact revealed that young people are more likely to be engaged in their community and have a more positive outlook on life and future perspectives in conflict-affected areas (in the case of Afghanistan this result is only observed among young women and not young men).

These results do not represent conclusive evidence about a positive role of young people in peacebuilding but are suggestive of the constructive role young men and women may have to play in their communities during and in the aftermath of violent conflicts. These benefits will not, however, be experienced until these roles are more clearly recognized. In particular, there is an urgent need for policy interventions to move from their current militarized and economic perspective—focussed on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes and job interventions—to acknowledging more explicitly the roles young men and women can play as citizens and in promoting active and positive forms of social and political engagement and leadership.

It is important to note that these conclusions are based on a limited evidence basis from four case studies, which have experienced violent conflict in different ways. The main findings of this study must therefore be interpreted with caution due to the simplistic nature of the analytical methods employed. Notably, there is still considerable scope for more rigorous regression analysis that may be able to identify causal relations (and not just correlations), as well as the causal mechanisms that may explain some of the findings discussed in the paper. For instance, in several places highlighted in the sections above, results could be explained by several, often competing causal mechanisms we were unable to identify. Some results, as discussed, may also be due to potential biases in the analysis caused by omitted variables and reverse causality. Disentangling these empirical challenges would require more research, as well as access to suitable data.

Even though there has been a recent surge in more and better micro-level datasets in conflict-affected countries, there are to date almost no datasets that allow the direct empirical analysis of the role of young adults (or other population groups) on peacebuilding processes. Future analysis using existing large survey datasets will necessarily have to rely on the proxies and more indirect analysis we adopted in this study. Direct empirical analysis of the relationship between youth and

peacebuilding efforts effects would require at the very least the introduction of specific ‘peace modules’ or ‘civic engagement modules’ into existing surveys—similar to the *Conflict Exposure Module* developed in Brück et al. (2013, 2016). In more ambitious terms, there is also a need to develop comparable and representative efforts of data collection among young adult populations in conflict-affected countries or countries affected by violence or at the risk of violence. This requires large investments in micro-level data collection. But not to invest in valuable empirical knowledge may also entail costs in terms of lost opportunities to understand and support the valuable and untapped role young people may play in sustaining peace and preventing violence worldwide.

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Tables

Table 1: Violence exposure and current school attendance in Afghanistan: probit results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Whole sample | Low conflict district | High conflict district | Conflict incidence last year |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.187*** (0.004) | -0.187*** (0.004) | -0.192*** (0.005) | -0.186*** (0.005) | -0.187*** (0.004) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | -0.464*** (0.048) | -0.464*** (0.048) | -0.504*** (0.064) | -0.450*** (0.076) | -0.466*** (0.048) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.332*** (0.019) | -0.332*** (0.019) | -0.372*** (0.026) | -0.294*** (0.027) | -0.331*** (0.019) |
| <i>Married</i> | -0.606*** (0.035) | -0.606*** (0.035) | -0.566*** (0.047) | -0.641*** (0.054) | -0.606*** (0.035) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.263*** (0.052) | -0.263*** (0.052) | -0.257*** (0.070) | -0.294*** (0.080) | -0.264*** (0.052) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.034*** (0.011) | 0.034*** (0.011) | 0.017 (0.016) | 0.052*** (0.017) | 0.034*** (0.011) |
| <i>Rural</i> | -0.266*** (0.035) | -0.267*** (0.035) | -0.206*** (0.055) | -0.306*** (0.046) | -0.267*** (0.035) |
| <i>Kuchi</i> | -0.416*** (0.098) | -0.418*** (0.098) | -0.500*** (0.133) | -0.260 (0.162) | -0.416*** (0.098) |
| <i>Conflict Affected District</i> | | -0.033 (0.028) | | | |
| <i>Sum of conflicts last year</i> | | | | | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Observations | 33,723 | 33,723 | 18,387 | 15,154 | 33,723 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.208 | 0.208 | 0.225 | 0.200 | 0.208 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Labour market participation in Afghanistan: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Whole sample | Low conflict district | High conflict district | Conflict incidence last month |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.050*** (0.001) | 0.050*** (0.001) | 0.047*** (0.002) | 0.054*** (0.002) | 0.050*** (0.001) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | 0.538*** (0.023) | 0.538*** (0.023) | 0.523*** (0.030) | 0.574*** (0.038) | 0.538*** (0.023) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.936*** (0.012) | -0.936*** (0.012) | -0.889*** (0.015) | -1.024*** (0.018) | -0.936*** (0.012) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.727*** (0.018) | 0.727*** (0.018) | 0.733*** (0.023) | 0.730*** (0.029) | 0.727*** (0.018) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.917*** (0.020) | -0.917*** (0.020) | -0.910*** (0.026) | -0.971*** (0.033) | -0.917*** (0.020) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.093*** (0.006) | 0.093*** (0.006) | 0.083*** (0.008) | 0.101*** (0.009) | 0.094*** (0.006) |
| <i>Rural</i> | 0.278*** (0.019) | 0.278*** (0.019) | 0.218*** (0.031) | 0.352*** (0.026) | 0.279*** (0.019) |
| <i>Kuchi</i> | 0.840*** (0.032) | 0.841*** (0.032) | 0.835*** (0.046) | 0.845*** (0.050) | 0.841*** (0.032) |
| <i>Conflict Affected District</i> | | 0.010 (0.015) | | | |
| <i>Sum of conflicts last month</i> | | | | | 0.002** (0.001) |
| Observations | 122,876 | 122,876 | 73,132 | 49,588 | 122,876 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.295 | 0.295 | 0.291 | 0.317 | 0.295 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Armed group presence and school attendance in Colombia: regression results

| | (1) Whole sample | (2) Community with no armed group present | (3) Armed groups present in community | (4) Armed groups present in current year | (5) Armed groups present last year | (6) Armed groups present last two years | (7) Armed groups present last three years |
|---|----------------------|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| <i>Age</i> | -0.021** (0.008) | -0.020** (0.009) | -0.025 (0.019) | -0.020** (0.009) | -0.021** (0.009) | -0.021** (0.009) | -0.021** (0.009) |
| <i>Rural</i> | -0.158 (0.279) | -0.193 (0.287) | 3.020*** (0.376) | -0.175 (0.286) | -0.179 (0.285) | -0.181 (0.285) | -0.183 (0.284) |
| <i>Female</i> | 0.393*** (0.078) | 0.394*** (0.088) | 0.384** (0.169) | 0.401*** (0.079) | 0.402*** (0.079) | 0.401*** (0.079) | 0.402*** (0.079) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.022 (0.151) | 0.039 (0.170) | -0.005 (0.333) | 0.010 (0.155) | 0.012 (0.155) | 0.008 (0.155) | 0.009 (0.155) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | 0.019 (0.173) | -0.041 (0.195) | 0.225 (0.385) | 0.030 (0.177) | 0.028 (0.177) | 0.027 (0.177) | 0.027 (0.177) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.078*** (0.022) | -0.075*** (0.025) | -0.097* (0.056) | -0.083*** (0.023) | -0.083*** (0.023) | -0.083*** (0.023) | -0.083*** (0.023) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.326*** (0.051) | 0.372*** (0.058) | 0.139 (0.100) | 0.350*** (0.052) | 0.349*** (0.052) | 0.349*** (0.052) | 0.344*** (0.052) |
| <i>Conflicts_t</i> | | | | 0.011 (0.093) | 0.059 (0.120) | 0.073 (0.120) | 0.083 (0.118) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | | | -0.086 (0.146) | 0.114 (0.188) | 0.124 (0.187) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | | | -0.253 (0.174) | -0.128 (0.200) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-3}</i> | | | | | | | -0.173 (0.125) |
| Observations | 3,299 | 2,636 | 638 | 3,234 | 3,234 | 3,234 | 3,234 |
| Region fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.142 | 0.156 | 0.110 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.146 | 0.146 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Armed group presence and labour market participation in Colombia: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (5) | (7) |
|---|----------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| | Whole sample | Community with no armed group present | Armed groups present in community | Armed groups present current year | Armed groups present last year | Armed groups present last two years | Armed groups present last three years |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.046*** (0.008) | 0.046*** (0.009) | 0.044** (0.018) | 0.047*** (0.008) | 0.047*** (0.008) | 0.048*** (0.008) | 0.047*** (0.008) |
| <i>Rural</i> | -0.306 (0.300) | -0.371 (0.323) | 0.044 (0.852) | -0.530 (0.330) | -0.536 (0.329) | -0.527 (0.330) | -0.531 (0.330) |
| <i>Attended School</i> | -0.208 (0.254) | -0.557** (0.259) | 1.371* (0.702) | -0.214 (0.252) | -0.217 (0.251) | -0.214 (0.252) | -0.211 (0.252) |
| <i>Female</i> | -1.698*** (0.092) | -1.713*** (0.107) | -1.767*** (0.183) | -1.686*** (0.092) | -1.688*** (0.092) | -1.688*** (0.092) | -1.691*** (0.093) |
| <i>Married</i> | -0.207 (0.180) | -0.295 (0.199) | 0.075 (0.469) | -0.214 (0.180) | -0.214 (0.180) | -0.209 (0.180) | -0.212 (0.180) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | 0.140 (0.193) | 0.181 (0.214) | 0.030 (0.494) | 0.129 (0.194) | 0.130 (0.194) | 0.125 (0.194) | 0.129 (0.194) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.051*** (0.019) | -0.042** (0.021) | -0.076 (0.047) | -0.055*** (0.020) | -0.055*** (0.019) | -0.055*** (0.019) | -0.054*** (0.019) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.263*** (0.045) | 0.278*** (0.052) | 0.202** (0.082) | 0.255*** (0.046) | 0.254*** (0.046) | 0.256*** (0.046) | 0.255*** (0.046) |
| <i>Conflicts_t</i> | | | | -0.066 (0.088) | -0.026 (0.111) | -0.041 (0.112) | -0.027 (0.113) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | | | -0.074 (0.139) | -0.269 (0.183) | -0.272 (0.182) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | | | 0.263 (0.165) | 0.378** (0.192) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-3}</i> | | | | | | | -0.156 |
| Observations | 2,629 | 2,042 | 587 | 2,567 | 2,567 | 2,567 | 2,567 |
| Region fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.257 | 0.257 | 0.283 | 0.257 | 0.257 | 0.258 | 0.258 |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Armed group presence and civic participation of young adults in Colombia: regression results

| | (1) Whole sample | (2) Community with no armed group present | (3) Armed groups present in community | (4) Armed groups present current year | (5) Armed groups present last year | (6) Armed groups present last two years | (7) Armed groups present last three years |
|---|---------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| <i>Age</i> | 0.049*** (0.008) | 0.054*** (0.009) | 0.044** (0.020) | 0.052*** (0.008) | 0.052*** (0.008) | 0.052*** (0.008) | 0.047*** (0.009) |
| <i>Rural</i> | 0.881* (0.468) | 1.334** (0.635) | -0.320 (0.781) | 0.878* (0.477) | 0.894* (0.477) | 0.917* (0.478) | 0.627* (0.371) |
| <i>Attended School</i> | 0.270 (0.234) | 0.441* (0.263) | -0.394 (0.478) | 0.267 (0.234) | 0.271 (0.233) | 0.276 (0.233) | 0.423* (0.217) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.036 (0.064) | -0.064 (0.072) | 0.069 (0.152) | -0.029 (0.065) | -0.029 (0.065) | -0.027 (0.065) | -0.073 (0.066) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.072 (0.115) | -0.026 (0.132) | 0.440* (0.249) | 0.056 (0.117) | 0.053 (0.117) | 0.053 (0.117) | 0.107 (0.111) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | 0.281** (0.137) | 0.280* (0.156) | 0.389 (0.307) | 0.284** (0.139) | 0.289** (0.139) | 0.291** (0.140) | 0.156 (0.137) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.001 (0.018) | 0.012 (0.020) | -0.053 (0.045) | -0.006 (0.018) | -0.006 (0.018) | -0.006 (0.018) | -0.032 (0.020) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.036 (0.040) | -0.018 (0.045) | -0.101 (0.089) | -0.033 (0.040) | -0.031 (0.040) | -0.030 (0.040) | 0.017 (0.038) |
| <i>Conflicts_t</i> | | | | 0.036 (0.089) | -0.064 (0.119) | -0.078 (0.121) | -0.151 (0.124) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | | | 0.169 (0.136) | -0.143 (0.191) | -0.194 (0.187) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | | | 0.407** (0.163) | 0.505*** (0.168) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-3}</i> | | | | | | | -0.132 (0.116) |
| Observations | 3,091 | 2,462 | 629 | 3,027 | 3,027 | 3,027 | 2,995 |
| Region fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0696 | 0.0742 | 0.134 | 0.0708 | 0.0713 | 0.0735 | 0.0676 |
|------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Violence exposure and civic participation of young adults in Colombia: regression results

| | (1) Whole sample | (2) Low violence community | (3) High violence community | (4) Violence incidence |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>Age</i> | 0.038*** (0.008) | 0.033*** (0.011) | 0.054*** (0.014) | 0.039*** (0.008) |
| <i>Rural</i> | 0.573 (0.366) | 5.710*** (0.308) | | 0.754* (0.434) |
| <i>Attended School</i> | 0.553** (0.221) | 0.511** (0.233) | | 0.531** (0.225) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.070 (0.064) | -0.100 (0.084) | -0.082 (0.114) | -0.084 (0.066) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.098 (0.111) | 0.059 (0.149) | 0.127 (0.174) | 0.102 (0.112) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | 0.242* (0.135) | 0.159 (0.178) | 0.403* (0.219) | 0.231* (0.137) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | 0.008 (0.018) | 0.030 (0.023) | -0.035 (0.032) | 0.002 (0.019) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.007 (0.036) | -0.056 (0.049) | 0.063 (0.060) | -0.000 (0.037) |
| <i>Violent_t</i> | | | | -0.008 (0.099) |
| Observations | 3,084 | 1,725 | 1,169 | 2,918 |
| Region fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0648 | 0.0608 | 0.0629 | 0.0632 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Violence exposure and school attendance in Mexico: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Non-conflict state | Conflict state | Assaulted | Assaulted in non-conflict state | Assaulted in conflict state | Conflict event last year | Conflict event last two years |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.110*** (0.003) | -0.115*** (0.004) | -0.100*** (0.005) | -0.114*** (0.004) | -0.122*** (0.005) | -0.095*** (0.007) | -0.110*** (0.003) | -0.110*** (0.003) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | 0.002 (0.058) | -0.077 (0.076) | 0.064 (0.081) | -0.100 (0.067) | -0.071 (0.084) | -0.133 (0.106) | 0.003 (0.058) | 0.003 (0.058) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.226*** (0.026) | -0.238*** (0.033) | -0.199*** (0.044) | -0.289*** (0.031) | -0.278*** (0.037) | -0.306*** (0.057) | -0.226*** (0.026) | -0.226*** (0.026) |
| <i>Married</i> | -0.428*** (0.060) | -0.437*** (0.091) | -0.409*** (0.077) | -0.343*** (0.076) | -0.366*** (0.103) | -0.341*** (0.111) | -0.428*** (0.060) | -0.430*** (0.060) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.529*** (0.079) | -0.682*** (0.115) | -0.374*** (0.104) | -0.672*** (0.098) | -0.694*** (0.128) | -0.586*** (0.147) | -0.529*** (0.079) | -0.531*** (0.079) |
| <i>Personal Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.086*** (0.003) | -0.098*** (0.004) | -0.067*** (0.005) | -0.094*** (0.004) | -0.101*** (0.005) | -0.082*** (0.006) | -0.086*** (0.003) | -0.086*** (0.003) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.020*** (0.003) | 0.017*** (0.004) | 0.023*** (0.005) | 0.014*** (0.003) | 0.012*** (0.004) | 0.017*** (0.006) | 0.020*** (0.003) | 0.020*** (0.003) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.081*** (0.005) | -0.076*** (0.007) | -0.085*** (0.009) | -0.075*** (0.006) | -0.068*** (0.008) | -0.086*** (0.011) | -0.081*** (0.005) | -0.081*** (0.005) |
| <i>Times Assaulted</i> | | | | 0.177*** (0.028) | 0.187*** (0.035) | 0.172*** (0.048) | | |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | | | | | 0.006 (0.009) | -0.008 (0.011) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | | | | | 0.009** (0.004) |
| Observations | 26,759 | 13,720 | 12,928 | 18,798 | 10,950 | 7,780 | 26,759 | 26,759 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.335 | 0.336 | 0.274 | 0.352 | 0.345 | 0.313 | 0.335 | 0.335 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8: Labour market participation in Mexico: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Non-conflict state | Conflict state | Assaulted | Assaulted in non-conflict state | Assaulted in conflict state | Conflict event last year | Conflict event last two years | Conflict event last two years |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.037*** (0.002) | 0.043*** (0.003) | 0.033*** (0.002) | 0.040*** (0.002) | 0.046*** (0.004) | 0.035*** (0.003) | 0.037*** (0.002) | 0.037*** (0.002) | 0.037*** (0.002) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | 0.694*** (0.031) | 0.697*** (0.052) | 0.681*** (0.038) | 0.633*** (0.039) | 0.655*** (0.061) | 0.613*** (0.051) | 0.694*** (0.031) | 0.694*** (0.031) | 0.694*** (0.031) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.827*** (0.022) | -0.864*** (0.030) | -0.798*** (0.031) | -0.919*** (0.028) | -0.951*** (0.036) | -0.894*** (0.044) | -0.827*** (0.022) | -0.827*** (0.022) | -0.827*** (0.022) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.257*** (0.031) | 0.422*** (0.055) | 0.198*** (0.039) | 0.406*** (0.048) | 0.501*** (0.073) | 0.340*** (0.065) | 0.257*** (0.031) | 0.256*** (0.031) | 0.256*** (0.031) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.866*** (0.038) | -1.114*** (0.064) | -0.751*** (0.050) | -1.061*** (0.055) | -1.200*** (0.082) | -0.959*** (0.076) | -0.866*** (0.038) | -0.866*** (0.038) | -0.866*** (0.038) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.004** (0.002) | 0.004 (0.003) | -0.010*** (0.003) | -0.000 (0.002) | 0.004 (0.004) | -0.006 (0.004) | -0.004** (0.002) | -0.004** (0.002) | -0.004** (0.002) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.009*** (0.003) | 0.001 (0.005) | -0.016*** (0.005) | -0.001 (0.005) | 0.007 (0.006) | -0.009 (0.007) | -0.009*** (0.003) | -0.009*** (0.003) | -0.009*** (0.003) |
| <i>Times Assaulted</i> | | | | 0.138*** (0.027) | 0.117*** (0.035) | 0.143*** (0.043) | | | |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | | | | | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.005) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | | | | | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-3}</i> | | | | | | | | | -0.004 (0.003) |
| Observations | 26,729 | 12,689 | 14,038 | 17,689 | 9,593 | 8,096 | 26,729 | 26,729 | 26,729 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.228 | 0.239 | 0.225 | 0.251 | 0.258 | 0.253 | 0.228 | 0.228 | 0.228 |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9: Civic participation of young adults in Mexico: probit results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Female | -0.102** (0.044) | -0.102** (0.044) | -0.103** (0.044) | -0.308*** (0.056) | -0.309*** (0.056) | -0.309*** (0.056) | -0.261*** (0.057) | -0.261*** (0.057) | -0.262*** (0.057) |
| Age | 0.031*** (0.006) | 0.030*** (0.006) | 0.030*** (0.006) | 0.044*** (0.008) | 0.044*** (0.008) | 0.044*** (0.008) | 0.052*** (0.008) | 0.052*** (0.008) | 0.051*** (0.008) |
| Student | 0.397*** (0.066) | 0.394*** (0.066) | 0.393*** (0.066) | 0.277*** (0.085) | 0.273*** (0.085) | 0.273*** (0.085) | 0.323*** (0.085) | 0.326*** (0.085) | 0.320*** (0.085) |
| $\sum_{i=1}^2 Conflicts_{t,t-i}$ | | -0.002 (0.001) | | | -0.002 (0.002) | | | 0.001 (0.001) | |
| $\sum_{i=1}^5 Conflicts_{t,t-i}$ | | | -0.003** (0.001) | | | -0.006*** (0.002) | | | -0.002 (0.002) |
| Observations | 4,583 | 4,583 | 4,583 | 4,581 | 4,581 | 4,581 | 3,483 | 3,483 | 3,483 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0815 | 0.0820 | 0.0822 | 0.0741 | 0.0746 | 0.0759 | 0.0580 | 0.0582 | 0.0583 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: author's calculations based on ENCUP and (UCDP) datasets.

Table 10: Civic participation of young adults in Mexico: probit results per type of organisation

| | Political party | | | Union | | | Political organization | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Female | -0.062 (0.070) | -0.061 (0.070) | -0.062 (0.070) | -0.430*** (0.064) | -0.429*** (0.064) | -0.430*** (0.064) | -0.072 (0.073) | -0.073 (0.073) | -0.073 (0.073) |
| Age | 0.051*** (0.010) | 0.052*** (0.010) | 0.051*** (0.010) | 0.047*** (0.009) | 0.046*** (0.009) | 0.047*** (0.009) | 0.036*** (0.011) | 0.036*** (0.011) | 0.036*** (0.011) |
| Student | 0.377*** (0.102) | 0.383*** (0.103) | 0.376*** (0.102) | 0.274*** (0.098) | 0.268*** (0.098) | 0.271*** (0.098) | 0.364*** (0.102) | 0.362*** (0.103) | 0.364*** (0.102) |
| $\sum_{i=1}^2 Conflicts_{t,t-i}$ | | 0.002 (0.002) | | | -0.003 (0.002) | | | -0.001 (0.002) | |
| $\sum_{i=1}^5 Conflicts_{t,t-i}$ | | | -0.001 (0.002) | | | -0.009 (0.006) | | | -0.002 (0.003) |
| Observations | 3,432 | 3,432 | 3,432 | 4,583 | 4,583 | 4,583 | 4,408 | 4,408 | 4,408 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0594 | 0.0601 | 0.0595 | 0.0888 | 0.0899 | 0.0910 | 0.0813 | 0.0815 | 0.0814 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: author's calculations based on ENCUP and (UCDP) datasets.

Table 11: Violence exposure and current school attendance in Nepal: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Conflict incidence current year | Conflict incidence last year | Conflict incidence last two years |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.115*** (0.018) | -0.116*** (0.018) | -0.117*** (0.018) | -0.116*** (0.018) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | -0.102 (0.335) | -0.098 (0.334) | -0.106 (0.332) | -0.117 (0.333) |
| <i>Female</i> | 0.215 (0.171) | 0.214 (0.171) | 0.204 (0.171) | 0.204 (0.172) |
| <i>Married</i> | -0.771*** (0.211) | -0.748*** (0.211) | -0.742*** (0.210) | -0.759*** (0.210) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.327 (0.294) | -0.338 (0.293) | -0.336 (0.293) | -0.327 (0.293) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.031 (0.030) | -0.028 (0.031) | -0.030 (0.030) | -0.030 (0.030) |
| <i>Personal Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.070* (0.037) | -0.070* (0.037) | -0.072* (0.037) | -0.072* (0.037) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.041 (0.030) | -0.042 (0.030) | -0.043 (0.031) | -0.042 (0.031) |
| <i>Conflicts_t</i> | | 0.018 (0.017) | 0.012 (0.023) | 0.018 (0.023) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | | 0.007 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.015) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | | -0.073 (0.093) |
| Observations | 1,152 | 1,152 | 1,152 | 1,152 |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.433 | 0.434 | 0.435 | 0.436 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 12: Labour market participation in Nepal: regression results

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|--------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Whole sample | Conflict incidence last year | Conflict incidence last two years |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.015 (0.009) | 0.014 (0.009) | 0.015* (0.009) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | 0.137 (0.165) | 0.139 (0.165) | 0.120 (0.166) |
| <i>Female</i> | 0.441** (0.176) | 0.434** (0.177) | 0.431** (0.177) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.228 (0.158) | 0.233 (0.158) | 0.217 (0.159) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.383* (0.221) | -0.376* (0.222) | -0.369* (0.223) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | 0.026 (0.024) | 0.026 (0.024) | 0.024 (0.024) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | -0.024 (0.020) | -0.025 (0.020) | -0.024 (0.021) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-1}</i> | | 0.015 (0.009) | 0.027*** (0.010) |
| <i>Conflicts_{t-2}</i> | | | -0.129** (0.052) |
| Observations | 1,152 | 1,152 | 1,152 |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.197 | 0.198 | 0.201 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 13: Share of young adults and future violent events per district in Afghanistan

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next month | Conflict incidence next month | Conflict incidence next month | Conflict incidence next month |
| Share of young adults | -61.868* (31.726) | | | | |
| Share of young employed adults on total population | | -7.366*** (2.658) | | | |
| Share of young employed adults on total young population | | | -1.767** (0.821) | | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total population | | | | -5.284 (12.590) | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total young population | | | | | 0.257 (3.896) |
| Observations | 1,068 | 1,068 | 1,068 | 1,068 | 1,068 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 14: Security perceptions, perceptions about state institutions and economic expectations among young adults in Afghanistan³⁵

| | Male | | | | | | Female | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|--------|---------|------------------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|--------|---------|
| | High conflict district | | Low conflict district | | Diff. | P-value | High conflict district | | Low conflict district | | Diff. | P-value |
| | Obs. | Mean | Obs. | Mean | | | Obs. | Mean | Obs. | Mean | | |
| Security perceptions | 3235 | 0.658 | 5195 | 0.726 | -0.069 | 0.000 | 3811 | 0.650 | 6396 | 0.713 | -0.063 | 0.000 |
| Satisfaction with state police | 3239 | 0.683 | 5202 | 0.732 | -0.049 | 0.000 | 3813 | 0.686 | 6394 | 0.713 | -0.027 | 0.003 |
| Economic situation compared to year ago | 3231 | 0.274 | 5202 | 0.282 | -0.009 | 0.381 | 5444 | 0.205 | 9056 | 0.212 | -0.007 | 0.317 |

Source: author's calculations based on World Bank and ALCS datasets.

³⁵ All questions are coded on a scale 1 to 4 where 1 is 'much better', 2 is 'moderately better', 3 is 'better', and 4 is 'worse'. We use 1 and 2 in this analysis.

Table 15: Results model security, police satisfaction and perceived economic situation in Afghanistan, males

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Security | Security | Security | Police satisfaction | Police satisfaction | Police satisfaction | Economic situation | Economic situation | Economic situation |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.000 (0.001) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.003* (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.120 (0.168) | 0.125 (0.169) | 0.119 (0.168) | 0.298** (0.130) | 0.301** (0.130) | 0.297** (0.130) | 0.244 (0.154) | 0.244 (0.154) | 0.244 (0.154) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.107*** (0.020) | 0.108*** (0.020) | 0.107*** (0.020) | 0.073*** (0.019) | 0.074*** (0.019) | 0.073*** (0.019) | 0.426*** (0.019) | 0.426*** (0.019) | 0.426*** (0.019) |
| <i>Rural</i> | -0.501*** (0.067) | -0.502*** (0.067) | -0.501*** (0.067) | -0.354*** (0.059) | -0.355*** (0.059) | -0.355*** (0.059) | -0.112** (0.049) | -0.112** (0.049) | -0.112** (0.049) |
| <i>Kuchi</i> | -0.735*** (0.107) | -0.737*** (0.107) | -0.735*** (0.107) | -0.660*** (0.099) | -0.661*** (0.099) | -0.661*** (0.099) | -0.377*** (0.093) | -0.377*** (0.093) | -0.377*** (0.093) |
| <i>Young</i> | | 0.073* (0.039) | | | 0.035 (0.036) | | | -0.002 (0.032) | |
| <i>Young conflict district</i> | | | -0.022 (0.043) | | | -0.022 (0.040) | | | -0.021 (0.037) |
| Observations | 16,734 | 16,734 | 16,734 | 19,057 | 19,057 | 19,057 | 20,296 | 20,296 | 20,296 |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.343 | 0.343 | 0.343 | 0.322 | 0.322 | 0.322 | 0.196 | 0.196 | 0.196 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 16: Results model security, police satisfaction and perceived economic situation in Afghanistan, females

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Security | Security | Security | Police satisfaction | Police satisfaction | Police satisfaction | Economic situation | Economic situation | Economic situation |
| <i>Age</i> | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.001** (0.001) | 0.001* (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.002** (0.001) | -0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) |
| <i>Married</i> | -0.143*** (0.047) | -0.128*** (0.047) | -0.145*** (0.047) | -0.109** (0.043) | -0.097** (0.043) | -0.102** (0.043) | 0.001 (0.032) | 0.017 (0.032) | 0.004 (0.032) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.055*** (0.012) | 0.056*** (0.012) | 0.055*** (0.012) | 0.074*** (0.012) | 0.075*** (0.012) | 0.075*** (0.012) | 0.283*** (0.009) | 0.285*** (0.009) | 0.284*** (0.009) |
| <i>Rural</i> | -0.627*** (0.047) | -0.627*** (0.047) | -0.627*** (0.047) | -0.471*** (0.042) | -0.471*** (0.042) | -0.471*** (0.042) | 0.025 (0.029) | 0.024 (0.029) | 0.025 (0.029) |
| <i>Kuchi</i> | -0.899*** (0.067) | -0.901*** (0.067) | -0.899*** (0.067) | -0.832*** (0.063) | -0.833*** (0.063) | -0.833*** (0.063) | -0.115** (0.047) | -0.115** (0.047) | -0.115** (0.047) |
| <i>Young</i> | | 0.072*** (0.025) | | | 0.063*** (0.023) | | | 0.073*** (0.019) | |
| <i>Young conflict district</i> | | | -0.029 (0.032) | | | 0.073** (0.030) | | | 0.031 (0.025) |
| Observations | 37,712 | 37,712 | 37,712 | 39,552 | 39,552 | 39,552 | 60,068 | 60,068 | 60,068 |
| District fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.317 | 0.317 | 0.317 | 0.245 | 0.245 | 0.245 | 0.118 | 0.118 | 0.118 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 17: Share of young adults and future violent events per community in Colombia

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years | AGP next 3 years |
| Share young adults in community | 1.814*** | | | | | | | | |
| | (0.280) | | | | | | | | |
| Share young adults engaged in civic organizations | | -0.043 | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.079) | | | | | | | |
| Share of community members engaged in civic organizations | | | 0.547 | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.519) | | | | | | |
| Share young adults members of trade unions | | | | -0.059 | | | | | |
| | | | | (0.602) | | | | | |
| Share young adults engaged in political organizations | | | | | -0.182 | | | | |
| | | | | | (0.533) | | | | |
| Shared unemployed young adults | | | | | | -0.033 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| | | | | | | (0.023) | | | |
| Shared of all unemployment community members | | | | | | | 0.648** | | |
| | | | | | | | (0.281) | | |
| Share of employed young adults | | | | | | | | -0.037** | |
| | | | | | | | | (0.015) | |
| Share of all employed community members | | | | | | | | | 0.224 |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.199) |
| Observations | 2,049 | 296 | 296 | 296 | 296 | 2,049 | 1,503 | 2,049 | 1,503 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0519 | 0.00156 | 0.00531 | 0.00005 | 0.000632 | 0.00698 | 0.00330 | 0.00170 | 0.0108 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: AGP stands for armed group presence.

Table 18: Civic participation of young adults one year before conflict onset in Mexico

| Civic engagement characteristics | Conflict state | | Non-conflict state | | Diff. | P-value |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-------|--------------------|-------|--------|---------|
| | Obs. | Mean | Obs. | Mean | | |
| Female | 386 | 0.573 | 4292 | 0.560 | 0.012 | 0.637 |
| Student | 337 | 0.122 | 3154 | 0.113 | 0.009 | 0.639 |
| Charity | 385 | 0.039 | 4192 | 0.052 | -0.014 | 0.250 |
| Union | 385 | 0.088 | 4190 | 0.062 | 0.026 | 0.042 |
| Political party | 346 | 0.058 | 3128 | 0.072 | -0.014 | 0.330 |
| Professional organization | 385 | 0.031 | 4189 | 0.027 | 0.004 | 0.687 |
| Political organization | 384 | 0.049 | 4191 | 0.037 | 0.012 | 0.231 |
| Religious organization | 385 | 0.229 | 4191 | 0.139 | 0.090 | 0.000 |
| Civil organization | 384 | 0.076 | 4187 | 0.081 | -0.005 | 0.700 |
| Neighbours' association | 346 | 0.150 | 3128 | 0.112 | 0.039 | 0.032 |
| Cultural organization | 346 | 0.055 | 3131 | 0.070 | -0.015 | 0.284 |
| Other recognised organization | 357 | 0.020 | 3576 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.098 |
| Cooperative | 385 | 0.055 | 3532 | 0.059 | -0.005 | 0.689 |
| Farming organization | 67 | 0.015 | 1606 | 0.018 | -0.003 | 0.838 |

Source: author's calculations based on ENCUP and UCDP datasets.

Table 19: Civic participation of young adults two years before conflict onset in Mexico

| Civic engagement characteristics | Conflict state | | Non-conflict state | | Diff. | P-value |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-------|--------------------|-------|--------|---------|
| | Obs. | Mean | Obs. | Mean | | |
| Female | 1063 | 0.537 | 3615 | 0.568 | -0.031 | 0.073 |
| Student | 540 | 0.113 | 2951 | 0.114 | -0.001 | 0.952 |
| Charity | 1049 | 0.057 | 3528 | 0.050 | 0.008 | 0.346 |
| Union | 1050 | 0.071 | 3525 | 0.062 | 0.010 | 0.266 |
| Political party | 1012 | 0.082 | 2462 | 0.066 | 0.016 | 0.090 |
| Professional organization | 1051 | 0.028 | 3523 | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.969 |
| Political organization | 1051 | 0.058 | 3524 | 0.032 | 0.026 | 0.000 |
| Religious organization | 1051 | 0.188 | 3525 | 0.134 | 0.054 | 0.000 |
| Civil organization | 1048 | 0.086 | 3523 | 0.079 | 0.007 | 0.476 |
| Neighbours' association | 1010 | 0.123 | 2464 | 0.112 | 0.010 | 0.394 |
| Cultural organization | 1013 | 0.060 | 2464 | 0.072 | -0.012 | 0.203 |
| Other recognised organization | 1002 | 0.012 | 2931 | 0.011 | 0.001 | 0.721 |
| Cooperative | 950 | 0.073 | 2967 | 0.055 | 0.018 | 0.040 |
| Farming organization | 909 | 0.085 | 1903 | 0.078 | 0.007 | 0.532 |

Source: author's calculations based on ENCUP and UCDP datasets.

Table 20. Impact of civic engagement and number of young adults on future conflict in Mexico: OLS regressions

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| | Whole sample | Whole sample | Whole sample | Whole sample |
| 1. Number of young people that participate in civic organizations (yearly) | -0.137 (1.029) | | | |
| 2. Number of young people that participate in civic organizations (total) | | -0.048 (0.164) | | |
| 3. Number of young people (yearly) | | | -0.399 (0.328) | |
| 4. Number of young people (total) | | | | -0.135*** (0.041) |
| Observations | 157 | 157 | 157 | 157 |
| R-squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.005 | 0.008 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 21: Employment of young adults and number of violent events per district in Mexico

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year |
| Share of young employed adults on total population | | -1.505 (20.653) | | | |
| Share of young employed adults on total young population | | | -0.017 (6.032) | | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total population | | | | 21.276* (12.577) | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total young population | | | | | 5.554* (3.255) |
| Observations | 113 | 113 | 113 | 113 | 113 |
| R-squared | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.025 | 0.026 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 22. Expectations, pro-social behaviour and trust levels of young adults affected by violence in Mexico: probit regressions

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Expectations | Expectations | Expectations | Behaviour | Behaviour | Behaviour | Trust | Trust | Trust |
| <i>Age</i> | -0.021*** (0.001) | -0.023*** (0.002) | -0.023*** (0.001) | -0.002* (0.001) | -0.003** (0.001) | -0.002* (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.005*** (0.001) |
| <i>Household Head</i> | -0.063 (0.040) | -0.068* (0.040) | -0.066* (0.040) | 0.016 (0.048) | 0.008 (0.049) | 0.012 (0.049) | 0.093** (0.041) | 0.096** (0.041) | 0.087** (0.041) |
| <i>Female</i> | -0.085*** (0.032) | -0.086*** (0.032) | -0.082** (0.032) | 0.077* (0.043) | 0.073* (0.043) | 0.073* (0.043) | 0.219*** (0.036) | 0.221*** (0.036) | 0.217*** (0.036) |
| <i>Married</i> | 0.181*** (0.043) | 0.181*** (0.043) | 0.183*** (0.043) | 0.054 (0.052) | 0.049 (0.052) | 0.051 (0.052) | 0.130*** (0.043) | 0.132*** (0.043) | 0.126*** (0.043) |
| <i>Female Married</i> | -0.134** (0.053) | -0.138*** (0.053) | -0.140*** (0.053) | 0.043 (0.067) | 0.034 (0.068) | 0.041 (0.067) | -0.052 (0.057) | -0.048 (0.058) | -0.058 (0.057) |
| <i>Personal Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.007** (0.003) | 0.006* (0.003) | 0.007* (0.003) | 0.005* (0.003) | 0.005* (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| <i>Household Income_{t-1}(ln)</i> | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.011*** (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) |
| <i>Number Members hh</i> | -0.019*** (0.005) | -0.019*** (0.005) | -0.019*** (0.005) | -0.007 (0.006) | -0.007 (0.006) | -0.007 (0.006) | -0.004 (0.006) | -0.004 (0.006) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| <i>Young</i> | | -0.052 (0.040) | | | -0.062 (0.052) | | | 0.026 (0.044) | |
| <i>Young conflict area</i> | | | -0.072* (0.039) | | | -0.048 (0.052) | | | -0.087** (0.044) |
| <i>Young assaulted</i> | | | 0.068 (0.062) | | | -0.079 (0.090) | | | 0.041 (0.079) |
| <i>Young less safe</i> | | | -0.087** (0.036) | | | 0.017 (0.054) | | | -0.013 (0.046) |
| Observations | 13,932 | 13,932 | 13,932 | 18,517 | 18,517 | 18,517 | 18,768 | 18,768 | 18,768 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0459 | 0.0460 | 0.0465 | 0.0154 | 0.0156 | 0.0156 | 0.0197 | 0.0197 | 0.0200 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 23: Share of young adults and number of violent conflicts per district in Nepal

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year | Conflict incidence next year |
| Share of young adults | -53.756*** (12.620) | | | | |
| Share of young employed adults on total population | | 10.565 (15.249) | | | |
| Share of young employed adults on total young population | | | 26.994*** (4.153) | | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total population | | | | -93.124*** (14.934) | |
| Share of young unemployed adults on total young population | | | | | -27.038*** |
| Observations | 171 | 171 | 170 | 171 | 170 |
| R-squared | 0.097 | 0.003 | 0.201 | 0.187 | 0.193 |

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.