



The United Nations
University

WIDER

World Institute for Development Economics Research

Research for Action 31

**Why Humanitarian
Emergencies Occur**

Insights from the Interface of State,
Democracy and Civil Society

Claude Ake

Research for Action

UNU World Institute for
Development Economics Research
(UNU/WIDER)

Research for Action 31

Why Humanitarian Emergencies Occur

Insights from the Interface of State, Democracy and Civil Society

Claude Ake

This study has been prepared within the UNU/WIDER project on the Wave of Emergencies of the Last Decade: Causes, Extent, Predictability and Response, being co-directed by Professor E. Wayne Nafziger, Senior Research Fellow, and Professor Raimo Väyrynen, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA.

UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution to the project by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)

A research and training centre of the United Nations University

The Board of UNU/WIDER

Harris Mutio Mule

Sylvia Ostry

Jukka Pekkarinen

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Chairperson

George Vassiliou

Ruben Yevstigneyev

Masaru Yoshitomi

Ex Officio

Heitor Gurgulino de Souza, Rector of UNU

Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Director of UNU/WIDER

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) was established by the United Nations University as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)

Katajanokanlaituri 6 B

00160 Helsinki, Finland

Copyright © UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)

Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER

Printed at Hakapaino Oy, 1997

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University of any of the views expressed.

ISSN 1239-6761

ISBN 952-9520-47-6

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	v
IN MEMORIAM	vii
ABSTRACT	ix
I INTRODUCTION	1
II STATE-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES	3
III THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY	5
IV THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY	8
BIBLIOGRAPHY	10

FOREWORD

This paper by the late Professor Claude Ake is part of an effort he began to explain why complex humanitarian emergencies have been so substantial in the 1990s. The analysis is multi-disciplinary, drawing on insights from history, politics, and economics. Ake concludes that humanitarian emergencies are less likely to occur in a truly democratic society where there is the rule of law, equal opportunity, accountability of power, and a leadership sensitive to social needs.

The study is a part of UNU/WIDER's research project on the political economy of complex humanitarian emergencies, co-directed by E. Wayne Nafziger, Senior Research Fellow at UNU/WIDER, and Raimo Väyrynen, Professor at the University of Notre Dame. The research project seeks to use economic analysis, as well as political analysis, to explain the causes of humanitarian emergencies. Ake's thoughtful analysis of how failures of democratization and the lack of development of a civil society contribute to an increased incidence of humanitarian emergencies is one of the initial efforts by researchers associated with the project to analyse humanitarian disasters. The paper will also serve as a part of Professor Ake's legacy on the subject of democratization and the prevention of humanitarian disasters. I strongly recommend this paper, one of the final contributions of Professor Ake to his many colleagues, students, and friends.

Giovanni Andrea Cornia
Director, UNU/WIDER
January 1997

**IN MEMORIAM
PROFESSOR CLAUDE AKE**



The death of Professor Claude Ake in an airplane crash near Lagos, Nigeria on 7 November 1996 was a profound shock to Africanists, social scientists, and his friends world wide. His death is a great loss to the 40 colleagues he met with at the 6-8 October 1996 United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) conference on 'The Political Economy of Humanitarian Emergencies' held in Helsinki, Finland. Professor Ake's essay, reprinted here, was the initial draft of a contribution to UNU/WIDER's research project on the political economy of complex humanitarian emergencies. The research project seeks to use economic and political analysis to explain the causes of humanitarian emergencies.

All of us at the Helsinki conference will remember Professor Ake's passion, clarity, and skill in examining the origins of complex humanitarian emergencies and their relationship to authoritarianism, ethnicity, and the state. Professor Ake's investigation of the political economy of emergencies at the Helsinki conference, like his other speeches and writings, had a moral dimension. His analysis of colonialism, multinational capital, dependent capitalism, the centralization of power, and corrupt and authoritarian Third World elites combined careful scholarship with prophetic insight. At the same time, Professor Ake was known for his political activism and courage in defending democracy and human rights in Nigeria and Africa generally. In 1995, he resigned from a commission appointed by Shell Oil Company to study the ecology of the oil-producing Niger Delta in coastal Nigeria. Professor Ake resigned to protest the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, novelist and political activist who had led opposition to the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta region and the exploitation of the Ogoni people.

Africa has lost a most insightful political economist, a scholar who spoke critically to those elites who used power capriciously and repressively. The *New York Times*, in its obituary, quotes George Bond, Director of the Institute of African Studies at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs about Professor Ake: 'He was one of the pre-eminent scholars on African politics and a scholar-activist concerned with the development of Africa. His concern was primarily with the average African and how to improve the nature of his conditions.' This concern is exemplified in the essay of Professor Ake here. In this essay, he argues that democratization is the most salient factor in addressing ethnic conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Indeed, 'it is only democratic politics and participatory development which can reverse the degeneration of development as an exercise in self-alienation.'

One of Ake's major legacies, an important contribution to our understanding of Africa's political economy, is the book, *Democracy and Development in Africa*, published by the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, in 1996. In this book, Ake observes that: 'For most Africans, incomes are lower than they were two decades ago, health prospects are poorer, malnutrition is widespread, and infrastructure and social institutions are breaking down.' The book then traces the evolution and failure of Africa's development policies. Yet despite Africa's widespread authoritarianism and stagnation, the roots of which Professor Ake analyses, he concludes with hope, stating that: 'The struggle over the political framework that will enable the development project to finally take off is now in progress, and the prospects for development are promising.' If he is right, it will be in no small measure due to the political courage of visionary Africans like himself.

E. Wayne Nafziger and Raimo Väyrynen
Research Project Co-Directors
UNU/WIDER
January 1997

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a beginning toward explaining why humanitarian emergencies have been so substantial in the post-cold war era, a period expected to be less violent. The humanitarian emergencies of the contemporary period tend to be state-centred, focus on identity claims, and occur in developing countries facing the contradictions of capitalist modernity. State-making in developing countries is the political equivalent of primitive accumulation in a capitalist economy; to create a state requires conquest and subjugation through the appropriation and monopoly of the means of violence. State building involves both vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (ethnic) articulations. Civil society can aid in preventing humanitarian emergencies, but only when civil society is associated with democratization. Indeed democratization is the most salient factor for addressing humanitarian emergencies. In a truly democratic society where there is the rule of law, equal opportunity, accountability of power, and a leadership sensitive to social needs, primary group identities will be less appealing. In such circumstances, humanitarian emergencies are less likely to occur.

I INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian emergencies are not specific to the contemporary world. They have occurred with uncanny inevitability in every historical epoch. However in this era, they have acquired a singular significance by their incidence, spread and intensity. And also by their poignancy in a post-cold war world which was reasonably expected to be less violent.

How do we explain this rash of humanitarian emergencies and their tragic enormity? Clearly, humanitarian emergencies are complex phenomena which are highly differentiated and thus difficult to explain. However, a close look at recent instances reveals commonalities suggestive of explanations, at any rate, heuristic devices.

First, the humanitarian emergencies of the present era are state-centred. They tendentially occur as a result of hostile interactions within states rather than between states. Students of conflict agree on this. According to K. J. Holsti, there were 58 wars and armed conflicts between 1945-89 of which 47 were engendered in the domestic realm. In much the same vein, Rudolph Rummel in *Death by Government* (1994) estimates that of the approximately 169 million people who died between 1900 and 1987 from armed conflicts, approximately 130 million of them died from genocide committed by the state, while less than 30 million died from inter-state wars. It would appear that humanitarian emergencies are not only state-centred, they are associated with the use of state power.

Second, with minor exceptions, humanitarian emergencies tend to be associated with identity claims and identity solidarities if only as ideological representation. The identities involved are not usually the partial identities of associational life such as occupational identities but primary or primordial identities which tend to be cultural and totalistic. This is why humanitarian emergencies are so readily taken for ethnic conflicts or cultural clashes.

Third, humanitarian emergencies tend to occur in developing countries especially those which are facing, in an acute form, the contradictions of capitalist modernity such as dislocations in power, economic, and status hierarchies, failed development projects, intensifying poverty amidst rising expectations, anomie, identity anxieties, and the adjustments and frustrations of coping with an intrusive technocratic capitalist culture which is increasingly enamoured of its own universal validity.

What explanation do these commonalities suggest? In order to address this question, it is necessary to explore briefly, the role of the state in developing societies. The state in

developing countries is burdened with onerous responsibilities which it is hardly in a position to fulfil. In particular, it is supposed to undertake economic development in the face of a weak or non-existent entrepreneurial class. Along with that daunting challenge, it is also expected to undertake state-building, nation-building and political integration. The problem is that these are tasks which presuppose the absence of the state or its rudimentary existence. Somewhat incongruously, a fledgling state is expected to tame the anarchy of complex heterogeneities and their immanent centrifugalism when it is ludicrously weak. Quite clearly, this is an improbable proposition.

Nonetheless, these states contrive determinedly to turn their nominal claim to statehood into a substantive claim. For it is clearly in the interest of those who control them to do so given the prestige, material resources and political leverage which come from international recognition. Acknowledging this interest, they invariably proclaim a project of state-building, all the more so because they are locked into this role by the international norm of the inalienability of judicial statehood.

State-making is perhaps best understood as the political equivalent of primitive accumulation, except that it is more violent still. It entails conquest and subjugation – conquest, because the state power which is projected in the process is arbitrary power since those on whom it is projected originally owed no political allegiance to the state makers. State making entails revoking the autonomy of communities and subjecting them to alien rulership within a bigger political order, laying claim to the resources of the subordinated territory including claims over the lives of those who live there. To effect these claims, the state must appropriate and monopolize the means of violence.

Of course state making is not undifferentiated in its dynamics and impact. For instance, in post-colonial societies, especially Africa, state-building has a very high conflict potential. Charles Tilly's explanation of the particularly high cost of state-building in Europe namely, the fact that they started amidst highly decentralized societies which were also peasant societies, applies to many contemporary post-colonial societies in Africa. In Africa, the trauma is compounded by a high degree of social heterogeneity as well as hostilities between autonomous communities arising from colonial strategies of domination.

II STATE-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

Against this background, it is easier to explain humanitarian emergencies in the contemporary world. They have to do with the interface of the state-building project with the contradictions of capitalist modernity at a special historical conjuncture. To understand this interface and its relation to humanitarian emergencies, it is necessary to see how the state project and civil society interact.

The process of state-making may be seen from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of the centralization of power, that is, the imposition of political dominion over discrete social formations which were not previously part of one polity. These processes of centralization, we call vertical articulations. They include the imposition of a chain of command, the extraction of political allegiance and taxation, the making and administration of law, the transformation of the subject social formations into a coherent polity and economy and the breakdown of centres of resistance to the centralizing nucleus. Vertical articulations, started since colonial times, continue today with only modest achievement in state-building.

They have instigated, by their threatening character, related processes which we call horizontal articulations. These processes include the renewal of primordial identities and solidarities as a defence against the coercive incursion of central power, and competition among the subject communities to access central power and if possible capture it, competition to capture the economic resources and opportunities accruing from economic development, strategies for evading the state's demands and coercive sanctions, alliances and projects for local empowerment, the cultivation by groups of identities and solidarities, manoeuvres for forms of exclusivity by which elites of particular groups and communities attempt to disable or to disenfranchise potential competitors.

Extrapolating from the history of Europe, we tendentially assume that state-building is occurring in the developing countries. But in many of them, especially in Africa, what is happening is precisely its negation. Threatened with violence by a state which is perceived as illegitimate, and in the context of deep social cleavages, the absence of an objective force to mediate conflict and a rudimentary development of the rule of law, the communities, ethnicities and nationalities which the new state seeks to unite tend to drift further apart even when some coercive unity is achieved. People tendentially retreat into primary groups which become the beneficiary of their residual loyalty. This centrifugal tendency is enhanced by changing international attitudes towards the necessity of state building and the sanctity of the state. The international community is giving stronger support to human rights, minority rights and democratization in full knowledge that such support affects the stability and viability of states. There is more tolerance of the prospects of state disintegration after the cold war when the strategic interests of the

great powers and the conditions of global stability have been redefined. The process of globalization especially economic transnationalization and regional integration and the new telecommunications technologies have created a situation in which the state no longer looks like the inevitable political organization of humankind.

III THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

That is not to say that the state withers away. It remains in so far as it enjoys judicial statehood nationally and internationally. It remains as long as it can launch and manage collective projects, however perfunctorily, monopolize force and command obedience. But many third world states are not *respublicae*, the incarnation of corporate political identity. The postcolonial state in Africa, for instance, is typically an enormous power resource, as beneficial to those who control it as it is dangerous to those who are in no position to control it. Political society is a contested terrain where alien social groups go to fight for the appropriation of state power or to limit their exposure to its abuse.

The anxieties arising from vertical articulations in civil society are compounded by the state's lack of autonomy which means that it is unable to mediate the conflicts arising from vertical articulations, an inability which becomes a major source of anxiety rendering the struggle for the appropriation of the state more Hobbesian still and increasing the prospects of civil wars, systemic breakdowns, and humanitarian emergencies.

There is an interesting reversal of popular conceptions of the significance of civil society in this context. Before going into this, it is well to note that the application of civil society to developing countries especially those with highly limited penetration of capitalism is problematic. For civil society is ideally a phenomenon of industrial capitalism. That is why the classical theorists of civil society notably Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, David Hume, Max Weber, Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx understood it as bourgeois society. If civil society is ideally a capitalist phenomenon, it is not exclusively so. The essence of civil society is difference, diversity and autonomy. In the most sophisticated treatment of civil society (Hegel's *Philosophy Right*), civil society is the moment of particularity mediating between the unity of the family and the universality of the state in the sphere of ethical life. In civil society, individuals and groups are in dedicated pursuit of self-interest amidst some order and cooperation rendered by the coincidence of self-interests.

Civil society is so taken for granted as the very kernel of democratic society that it is no longer easy to reconnect with the fact that the concept was pressed into this service as a result of the devalourization of democracy, especially the rejection of the classical idea of democracy as popular power. Civil society was popularized in the redefinition of democracy from active direct participation in rulership, in individual and collective self-determination to the modest privilege of protection against the power of the state. This is the concept of democracy which underlies the protectionist theory of democracy. By this theory, democracy is no longer about the exercise of sovereignty, active participation or the expression or withholding of consent. It is merely about the

possibility of being shielded from the oppressive power of the state, that is to say, the possibility of negative freedom.

Somewhat paradoxically, in the course of a rising tide of conservative revisionism, civil society has become the incarnation of democratic possibilities. To serve this purpose of redefining democracy, the content of civil society which received emphasis was particularity, diversity, autonomy and countervailing forces. In this sense, the concept of civil society may be applied to societies in which the development of commodity relations is still rudimentary. In the context of developing countries, the elements of civil society are a mixture of secondary and primary groups. Primary groups especially, ethnicities, nationalities, kinship groups, communal groups, language groups and religious sects tend to be very influential in such societies.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, civil society is extraordinarily vibrant in developing countries. This is partly because of extremely threatening influences especially state-building and the push for development. They come with threats of changing power and status hierarchies, the intrusion of an aggressive technocratic capitalist culture, massive and ubiquitous change, anomie, and orientational upheaval. These anxieties ignite a frantic search for security including identity security. For developing countries under these pressures and anxieties, there is a tendency to focus on holistic cultural identities, for the simple reason that this is the requisite solidarity for dealing with treats that are cultural ubiquitous and multifaceted.

Unfortunately, such identity solidarities are typically primary group solidarities characterized by exclusivity. They define their elements culturally and make totalistic claims on them. When such identify groups engage in conflict, it is invariably intense, because their claims tend to be categorical and exclusive. More importantly, conflicts involving such identities are intense because when such cultural and holistic identities are threatened, their members usually feel that their very being and way of life are at stake. Humanitarian emergencies are largely identity-related conflicts associated with the vibrancy of civil society in response to vertical and horizontal articulations.

If humanitarian emergencies are in this sense a manifestation of the vibrancy of civil society, then the virtues of civil society in ensuring democratic stability is ambiguous, or at any rate the relationship between civil society and democracy is problematic: It may well be that autonomy, diversity, plurality of power centres and competition underlie the democratic society. Nonetheless, it is also the case that the interaction of these elements can produce significant political pathologies.

Conventional treatments of civil society have been misleading by their uncritical emphasis on how civil society sustains democracy while largely ignoring the impact of democracy on civil society. The relationship between democracy and civil society is reciprocal. Civil society can express and sustain democracy but only to the extent that

civil society itself is already tamed by some democratization, however rudimentary. It is precisely because civil society is dissociated from democracy that it manifests pathologies such as humanitarian emergencies.

IV THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY

By its effect on civil society, democracy is rendered a very important aspect of the explanation of humanitarian emergencies. While the dynamics of state/society articulations amidst the contradictions of capitalist modernity may underlie humanitarian emergencies, circumstances associated with lack of democracy are the trigger mechanisms of these emergencies. Therefore, democratization is the initial, and, arguably, the most salient factor for addressing humanitarian emergencies.

This may seem odd. It certainly runs in the face of conventional wisdom which tends to see democratization in developing countries as a major cause of the rising tide of violent conflicts. It has been argued that the opening of democratic space throws up many groups pulling in different directions, that it causes demand overload, systemic breakdown and even violent conflict. But the logic of this argument is uneasy. Surely, it is not the opening of democratic space which brings out groups to demand rights, roles, justice, autonomy, etc. Rather, it is the making of these demands especially the demand for rights, justice and incorporation, which brings about the opening of democratic space.

Admittedly, democratization may be said to have some conflict potential since it entails redistribution of power which is invariably resisted by those in power. Again this is misleading. Why should the burden of causing conflict lie on those who are engaged in emancipatory struggles for participatory politics and a just order? Why should it not rather lie on those who aggressively, and often violently, deny others their entitlements?

Democracy is not without contradictions but it would appear to be the appropriate focus for addressing humanitarian emergencies. To underscore this, it is important to recall the salient elements of these emergencies. The elements are the coercive ecumenicism of state-building breeding insecurity, fear and a Hobbesian power struggle compounded by the contradictions of modernity including orientational upheaval, identity crisis, and retreat to primary group solidarities. Democracy offers the rule of law, accountability and immunity from arbitrary power which are the elements needed to banish the insecurity spawned by aggressive state power. It is only democratic politics and participatory development which can reverse the degeneration of development as an exercise in self-alienation.

Finally, more than anything else, it is democracy which can reduce responsiveness to ethnic appeal and the belligerence of primary group identity affirmation. For in most developing countries where people respond to ethnic ideologies, they do so because state power is privatized, arbitrary and oppressive. In the worst of them, all but a few citizens encounter the state as ruthless tax collectors, boorish policemen, bullying

soldiers, corrupt judges and insensitive officialdom. Everyday, they encounter the state as a maze of regulations through which they have to beg, bribe or cheat their way. In a truly democratic dispensation where there is the rule of law, equal opportunity, accountability of power, a leadership sensitive to social needs because its power depends on consent, and attentive to all interests because every vote counts, primary group identities will be less appealing. In such circumstances humanitarian emergencies are less likely.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdulai, N. (ed.) 1994. *Genocide in Rwanda: Background and Current Situation*. London: Africa Research and Information Centre.
- ActionAid. 1994. 'Understanding Conflict: A Report from an ActionAid Workshop. Jinja, Uganda, 17-23 July 1994.' London: ActionAid.
- Adekanye, J. B. 1995. Structural Adjustment, Democratization and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa. *Development and Change* 26 (2): 355-74.
- _____. 1995. *Rwanda/Burundi: 'Uni-ethnic' dominance and the cycle of armed ethnic formations*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).
- Africa Watch. 1993. *Beyond the rhetoric: Continuing human rights abuses in Rwanda*.
- African Rights. 1994. *Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance*. London.
- Amnesty International. 1995. *Rwanda: Crying out for Justice*. London.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. 1992. The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective. In *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, edited by Brian Job. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Banton, M. 1983. *Racial and Ethnic Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1983. *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State*. New York: Praeger.
- Burton, J. 1979. *Deviance Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Chipman, John. 1993. Managing the Politics of Parochialism. *Survival* vol. 35 (1).
- Chretien, J. P. 1994. Violence et ethnicite au Rwanda et au Burundi. *Peurs et strategies. Croyance et foi* 72.
- _____. 1993. Pluralisme democratique ethnismes et strategies politiques. In *L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique*, edited by Conac; p. 139-47.
- _____. 1992. La crise politique rwandaise. *Geneva-Afrique* Vol. 30 (2): 121-40.
- Chretien, J. P. and G. Prunier (eds). 189. *Les ethnies ont une hisoire*. Paris.
- Clignet, R. 1990. Conflict and Culture in Traditional Societies. In *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by J. Montville. New York: Lexington Books: 65-79.
- Cohen, Y., Brian R. Brown and A. F. K. Organski. 1981. The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order. *American Political Science Review* vol. 75 (4).

- de Gaay, F. B. 1994. *Sitting back in horror: Intra-state conflict in a global context*. The Hague.
- de Nevers, Renee. 1993. Democratization and Ethnic Conflict. *Survival* vol. 35 (1).
- de Waal, A. 1994. The genocidal state: Hutu extremism and the origins of the 'final solution' in Rwanda. *Anthropology* July 1994.
- de Waal and Rakiya Omaar. 1993. Doing Harm by Doing Good. The International Relief Effort in Somalia. *Current History: A World Affairs Journal*. May.
- Destexhe, A. 1994. *Rwanda: Essai sur le genocide*. Brussels: Editions complexe.
- _____. 1995. *Rwanda and Genocide in the twentieth century*. London, East Haven, Connecticut: Pluto Press.
- Duetsch, M. 1991. Subject features of conflict resolution: Psychological, social and cultural influences. In *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, edited by R. Väyrynen. London: Sage.
- Duffield, M. 1994. *Complex Political Emergencies: An Exploratory Report for UNICEF with Reference to Angola and Bosnia*. Geneva: UNICEF.
- _____. 1994a. The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer and the Internationalisation of Public Welfare in the Horn of Africa. In *Wars of Hunger*, edited by Macreaj. London: Zed Press.
- Dupont, P. 1994. *Conflicten in Sub-Saharan-Afrika. Een Zoektocht naar verklaringen*. Brussels: Federale Diensten voor Wetenschappelijke, Technische en Culturele Aangelegenheden.
- Ellias, R. and J. Turpin. 1993. Conflict and Power. *Peace Review* 5/4: 387-89.
- Elster, J. 1984. *Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in Rationality and Irrationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1989. *Solomic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1992. *Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farah, A. Y. and I. M. Lewis. 1993. 'Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation, Peace Making Endeavours of Contemporary Lineage Leaders -- A Survey of Grassroots Peace Conferences in "Somaliland"'. London: ActionAid.
- Freire, P. 1972. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London; Penguin Books.
- Galtung, J. 1987. Peace and the World as Inter-Civilizational Interaction. In *The Quest for Peace*, edited by R. Väyrynen. London: Sage Publishers.
- Gottlieb, Gidon. 1993. *Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty*. New York, NY: Council on foreign Relations Press.

- Gurr, T. R. 1995. Transforming Ethno-Political Conflicts: Exist, Autonomy or Access. In *Conflict of Transformation*, edited by K. Rupesinghe. New York: St. Martins Press: 1-30.
- Horowitz, D. L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California.
- _____. 1990. 'Community Conflict: Policy and Possibilities'. Coleraine, Centre for Study of Conflict, University of Ulster.
- Human Rights Watch/Arms Project. 1995. *Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwanda Genocide*. Washington DC.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa. 1994. *Arming Rwanda: The arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan war*. New York.
- Holsti, K. J. 1992. International Theory and War in the Third World. In *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, edited by Brian L. Job. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Holsti, J. Kalevi. 1991. *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kamukama, D. 1995. *Rwandan Conflict. Its Roots and Regional Implications*. Fountain Publishers.
- Jagers, Keith. 1992. War and the Three Face of Power. War Making and State Making in Europe and the Americas. *Comparative Political Studies* vol. 25 (1).
- Lema, A. 1993. *Africa divided: The creation of 'ethnic groups'*. Lund: Lund University Press.
- Lemarchand, R. 1995. *Rwanda: The rationality of genocide*.
- Markakis, J. 1993. *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism*. Institute of Social Studies. Colorado: Macmillan.
- Medani, Khalid. 1993. Sudan's Human and Political Crisis. *Current History: A World Affairs Journal* May.
- Montville, J. H. (ed) 1991. *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Noble, B. Kenneth. 1994. Democracy Brings Turmoil in Congo. *New York Times* 31 January.
- Newbury, C. 1988. *The cohesion of oppression: Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1978. Ethnicity in Rwanda: The Case of Kinyaga. *International African Institute* 48 (1).
- Omaar, Rakiya. 1993. Somalia: At War with Itself. *Current History: A World Affairs Journal* May.

- O'Neil, William. 1993. Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy. *Current History: A World Affairs Journal* May.
- Phadnis, Urmila. 1990. *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Percival, V. and T. Homer-Dixon. 1995. *Environmental scarcity and violent conflict: The Case of Rwanda*. Toronto: University of Toronto/American Association for the Advancement of Science.
- Roosens, E. 1989. *Creating ethnicity: The process of ethnogenesis*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Rupesinghe, K. 1992. *Internal Conflict and Governance*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Samuels, D. 1995. At Play in the Field of Oppression: A Government-Funded Agency Pretends to Export Democracy. *Harpers Magazine* March: 47-54.
- Sklar, R. L. and M. Strege. 1992. Finding Peace through Democracy in Sahelian Africa. *Current History: A world Affairs Journal* May.
- Smith, D. A. 1983. *State and Nation in the Third World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. (ed) 1975. *The Foundation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Navari, C. 1981. The Origins of the Nation-State. In *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics*, edited by Leonard Tivey. Oxford, UK: Martin Robertson.
- Una-Uk. 1994. An Agenda for Peace: Summary of the Secretary General's Proposals. UN and Conflicting Briefing Papers. London: UN and Conflict Programme.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 1993. Contested Meanings: India's National identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety. *Deadalu* vol. 122, no. 3.
- Vidal, C. 1985. Situations ethniques au Rwanda. In *Au coeur de l'ethnie*, edited by Amselle and M'bokolo.
- _____. 1973. Colonisation et decolonisation du Rwanda, la question Tutsi-Hutu. *RFEA* (91).
- Volkan, V. 1991. Psycho Analytic Aspects of Ethnic Conflicts. In *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by J. Montville. New York: Lexington Books: 81-92.
- Woodhouse, T. 1991. 'Conflict Resolution and Ethnic Conflict'. Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University.
- Young, Crawford. 1983. The Temple of Ethnicity. *World Politics* vol. 35, no. 4.

Research for Action Series RFA

- RFA1** Hunger and Entitlements by Amartya Sen, January 1988 *out of print*
- RFA2** Lessons of the Golden Age of Capitalism by Stephen A. Marglin, April 1988
- RFA3** Conditionality: Facts, Theory and Policy by Dragoslav Avramovic, July 1989
- RFA4** The World Economic and Financial Crisis by Celso Furtado, Lal Jayawardena and Masaru Yoshitomi, November 1989 *out of print*
- RFA5** The Affinity between Ownership and Coordination Mechanisms. The Common Experience of Reform in Socialist Countries by János Kornai, January 1990
- RFA6** Towards a Peaceful Sri Lanka. Six Introductory Seminars for University Students by Carlo Fonseka, October 1990
- RFA7** Gender, Development, and Policy: Toward Equity and Empowerment by Valentine M. Moghadam, November 1990
- RFA8** Foreign Resource Flows and Developing Country Growth by Lance Taylor, March 1991
- RFA9** A Global Environmental Compact for Sustainable Development: Resource Requirements and Mechanisms by Lal Jayawardena, August 1991
- RFA10** Privatization and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: The Gender Dimension edited by Valentine M. Moghadam, January 1992
- RFA11** Aid and Development Policy in the 1990s by Arjun Sengupta, February 1993
- RFA12** The Potential of Development Contracts and Conditionality: Towards Sustainable Development Compacts by Lal Jayawardena, February 1993 *out of print*
- RFA13** Gender and the Development Process in a Changing Global Environment. Results of the UNU/WIDER Research Programme on Women and Development by Valentine M. Moghadam, July 1993
- RFA14** The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security by Björn Hettne and András Inotai, February 1994
- RFA15** Economic Reform and Its Interpretations in Russia by Ruben N. Yevstigneyev and Arkady M. Voinov, May 1994
- RFA16** Structural Adjustment in Africa. A Performance Review of World Bank Policies under Uncertainty in Commodity Price Trends: The Case of Ghana by Tetteh A. Kofi, June 1994 *out of print*
- RFA17** Russian Transition - Chinese Reforms: A Comparative View by András Blahó, June 1994 *out of print*
- RFA18** Internationalization of Finnish Firms and their Response to Global Challenges by Reijo Luostarinen, December 1994

RFA19 Impacts of Africa's Growing Debt on its Growth by Siddig A. Salih, December 1994

RFA20 Trends in International Cooperation and Net Resource Transfers to Developing Countries by Krishnalekha Sood, January 1995

RFA21 Habitat II and the Urban Economy: A Review of Recent Developments and Literature by Pii Elina Berghäll, April 1995

RFA22 Restructuring of Peripheral Villages in Northwestern Russia by Eira Varis, February 1996

RFA23 The Urban Challenge by Reino Hjerppe and Pii Elina Berghäll, March 1996

RFA24 Development, Aid and Conflict: Reflections from the Case of Rwanda by Peter Uvin, September 1996

RFA25 The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies by Raimo Väyrynen, September 1996

RFA26 Welfare Changes in China during the Economic Reforms by Lu Aiguo, September 1996

RFA27 The Banking System and Monetary Aggregates Following Financial Sector Reforms: Lessons from Indonesia by Anwar Nasution, September 1996

RFA28 Dealing with Capital Inflows: Are There Any Lessons? by Carmen M. Reinhart and Steven Dunaway, September 1996

RFA29 A Russian Puzzle: What Makes the Russian Economic Transformation a Special Case by Vladimir Popov, September 1996

RFA30 Tree Plantations in the Philippines and Thailand: Economic, Social and Environmental Evaluation by Anssi Niskanen and Olli Saastamoinen, October 1996

RFA31 Why Humanitarian Emergencies Occur: Insights from the Interface of State, Democracy and Civil Society by Claude Ake, January 1997

For price and order information, please contact UNU/WIDER Publications at the address given below.

UNU/WIDER Publications
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B
00160 Helsinki
Finland

Telephone (+358-9) 6159911
Facsimile (+358-9) 61599333
Telex 123455 unuei fi
E-mail wider@wider.unu.edu