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Research for Action 32

**Zaire after Mobutu**

A Case of a Humanitarian Emergency

Kisangani N. F. Emizet

Research for Action

UNU World Institute for  
Development Economics Research  
(UNU/WIDER)

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**Kisangani N. F. Emizet**

This study has been prepared within the UNU/WIDER project on the Wave of Emergencies of the Last Decade: Causes, Extent, Predictability and Response, which is co-directed by Professor E. Wayne Nafziger, Senior Research Fellow, and Professor Raimo Väyrynen, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA.

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To  
Patrice Lumumba  
and  
Dag Hammarskjöld

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANACOZA	All North American Conference on Zaire
ANEZA	Association Nationale des Entreprises Zairoises (National Association of Zairian Enterprises)
AR1	First-order autoregressive process
CELZA	Cultures et Elevages du Zaire
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DW	Durbin-Watson
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	Foreign direct investments
GDP	Gross domestic product
GECAMINES	Générale des Carrières et des Mines
GNP	Gross national product
HCR	High Council of the Republic
HCR/PT	High Council of the Republic/Parliament of the Transition
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRSA	Immigration and Refugee Services of America
ITS	Interrupted times-series
LDCs	Less developed countries
LM	LaGrange multiplier
ML	Maximum likelihood
MNCs	Multinational corporations
MPR	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Popular Movement of the Revolution)
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary least squares
SNC	Sovereign National Conference
TSP	Times series processor
2SLS	Two stage least squares
UDPS	Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social

UMHK	Union Minière du Haut Katanga
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNU/WIDER	United Nations University/World Institute for Development and Economics Research
US	United States
USOR	Union Sacrée de l'Opposition Radicale

## FOREWORD

The end of the cold war has rekindled ethnic conflicts and challenges to political legitimacy that threaten the stability of many former superpowers' clients. The net result is the proliferation of human tragedies associated with war, hunger, disease, and man-made crises. The timing of this publication reflects an increasing interest in economic and socio-political correlates of these humanitarian emergencies. The analysis of Zaire presents a significant step toward systematic analysis of humanitarian emergencies, a subject where empirical evidence is scanty. Emizet has made an effort to sketch some of the determinants of humanitarian emergencies in Zaire.

The aims of the study are: i) to review the historical context that shaped the current predicament in Zaire; ii) to examine economic and socio-political sources of vulnerability; and iii) to present a general statistical analysis that provides the best predictors of humanitarian emergencies. This monograph addresses an extremely complex human tragedy. Although Emizet follows the inductive approach, the statistical analysis and theoretical conclusion can be generalized to fit other locales. In doing so, he considers the existing institutional arrangements and their vulnerability in responding to new challenges. By tracing the roots of humanitarian emergencies in Zaire back to the colonial period, Emizet is able to show how the need to build a strong state by concentrating power in the hands of one person, destroyed the economic bases that could have sustained state-building after independence. His conclusion is that state sovereignty should not be an excuse to sacrifice human life, dignity, and freedom. The international community, he contends, is responsible for finding the means to prevent humanitarian emergencies.

This publication evaluates the sources of vulnerability in Zaire on three levels of analysis. Both state and individual levels of analysis help to point out the broad outlines of macro-level social processes that provide the context for people's actions and beliefs, and how and why they change. The systemic level provides the context within which regional actors in Central and East African regions interact. As Emizet points out, given the volatility of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, Zaire remains a critical case in Central Africa. The deteriorating situation in Rwanda and Burundi raises the stakes of the importance of Zaire's stability in keeping the region stable. He contends that the international community must avoid all steps which might threaten Zaire's shrinking capacities. A fragmented Zaire will complicate any effort for a lasting peace in Central and East Africa.

Giovanni Andrea Cornia  
Director, UNU/WIDER  
February 1997

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Kisangani N. F. Emizet  
Kansas, February 1997

## ABSTRACT

The recent history of Zaire presents a unique opportunity to understand and explain humanitarian emergencies. This monograph follows an inductive approach in analysing the trajectory of state-building in Zaire as a significant explanatory variable of humanitarian emergencies. By tracing the sources of vulnerability to the colonial legacy, this study shows that Mobutu's rentier state was a vulnerable institution, providing little foundation for a strong state. The concentration of power in the hands of one man weakened the economic base of state-building. The end of the cold war with its democratization wave only accelerated the demise of the rentier state. The analysis suggests that the ruling elite in Zaire saw the democratization process as a threat to its power, social status, and retirement security and was therefore willing to see the remains of the state be totally destroyed rather than bailed it out. By opening up the political system, democratization increased political demands that overloaded the system. The result was a breakdown of the social system and a rise of humanitarian emergencies. Although the statistical analysis is confined to Zaire, the implications of the study's findings extend beyond this particular country. The findings first suggest that the inability of a political regime to adapt to new challenges is a major source of humanitarian emergencies. A social system needs to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, a growing economy that enhances regional integration and rural productivity as well as sound policies that minimize elite polarization and state economic intervention are likely to decrease the chance of humanitarian emergencies. Third, mass mobilization, in the absence of adequate institutional arrangements to handle increased demands, tends to polarize the society and increase the chance of humanitarian emergencies in plural societies. Fourth, political sources of vulnerability indicate that state penetration and the capacity to protect territorial boundaries should reduce humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, political instability is also a major political source of vulnerability in cross-regression.

Zaire remains a critical case in Central Africa, given the volatility of Burundi and Rwanda. The international community must avoid all steps that could threaten its shrinking capacities. A fragmented Zaire would complicate any effort for a lasting peace in Central and East Africa. The international community should now direct considerable attention and resources toward strengthening the African civil society, and increasing recognition and respect for basic human rights and freedom. Still, solutions must come from within and be Zairian mandated to have lasting effect. Grassroots solutions should constitute the first preventive tool to avert humanitarian tragedies, because a lasting peace is possible only if it is embedded in local values. Nonetheless, the international community has a moral obligation to protect human life by making state leaders who violate human rights accountable for their actions and by promoting grassroots organizations capable of monitoring government performance. National sovereignty should no longer be an excuse to sacrifice human life, dignity, and freedom.

## I INTRODUCTION

The growth in the number of humanitarian emergencies has drastically increased in Africa since the end of the cold war. In 1990, there were some 2.4 million refugees and less than 100,000 internally displaced people in Africa (US Committee for Refugees 1991). Five years later, the number of refugees and internally displaced people had increased to 5.2 million and 12 million respectively (US Committee for Refugees 1996). Humanitarian emergencies refer to situations of profound social crises in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while others may benefit from them (Väyrynen 1996:23). According to Gelb (1994:5) '... the core problem is wars of national debilitation, a steady run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations.'

Zaire has not escaped this wave of violence since President Mobutu liberalized his political regime in April 1990 under a desperate internal socio-economic crisis and an international constellation that sharply lowered foreign support. Three trends have heightened the potential for a large-scale conflict in Zaire and the possibility of humanitarian emergencies that may even complicate relief efforts by the international community. First, a total erosion of public institutions has undermined the bases for political accommodation (Morrison 1995). The ruling group has shown its inability to govern and the result has engendered political instability. Second, political parties and electoral procedures have been discredited by the uncompromising positions of pro-Mobutu forces and opposition parties. Third, the declining economy has exacerbated ethnic tensions as citizens compete over scarce resources.

The corrosion of state institutions and the worsening economy have been accompanied by widespread ethnic and regional polarization. The result is an increase in the number of displaced people from 32,000 in 1990 to more than 1.2 million in 1996. The number of people killed in ethnic confrontation and government abuses is also on the rise. In 1996 alone, more than 10,000 were killed as the result of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict that triggered political instability in the eastern Zairian regions of North Kivu and South Kivu. Zaire is now a potential case of a complex humanitarian emergency, as its regions are becoming more and more ungovernable.

In mid-November 1996, Canada volunteered to lead an international force into eastern Zaire to protect more than 1.2 million Hutu refugees displaced by fighting among the different ethnic groups and governmental forces in the regions of North Kivu and South Kivu. The international community has continued to discreetly avert its attention from events that are happening in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Meanwhile, the conflict in the area is assuming an international dimension. Late in January 1997, the Zairian government confirmed that its armed forces were under attack by Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian troops deployed on three fronts in the eastern part of the country. It

reiterated its determination to win back the territories which had fallen into enemy hands. There is now reason to fear a conflagration throughout the entire region, in which non-combatant Zairians and refugees will pay the price.

The crisis in eastern Zaire is the result of an attempt by Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire at national consolidation on an ethnic basis (Zartman 1996). There is a sense of urgency as Zaire moves toward total chaos that might complicate the restoration of a lasting peace in the region of the Great Lakes. Although Zaire's attempt at political transition explains the country's political disintegration, the long economic crisis since the 1970s is one of the major contributing factors in the collapse of state institutions.<sup>1</sup> All that remains are those 'segments of the state realm crucial to its survival and minimal production -- the security agencies, the presidential staff, the central bank, the diplomatic cadre... Overall the state has suffered a loss of its probity, competence, and credibility' (Young 1994:262-3). Faced with collapsed state institutions, private Zairians have moved increasingly to the parallel economy, the religious sphere, and ethnic associations for support and services. To date these spheres offer some refuge, but remain nascent and vulnerable as soldiers keep looting, stealing, and robbing citizens even in remote villages.

The US, France and Belgium have, since 1990-91, failed to set up a unified organized blend of humanitarian, diplomatic and military action that could prevent full-fledged disaster. The three countries have effectively ceded to President Mobutu a continued mandate to dominate events, while offering no credible threat of enforcement should he fail to comply with the terms of transitional agreements (Morrison 1995). After six years of engagement in Zaire's vacillating transition, these countries are tired. Having lost the will to act, the three countries have become resigned and passive and have allowed events in Zaire to dictate responses in Washington, Paris, and Brussels. Is Zaire too far gone for novel preventive measures to be of much use? What events explain the rising tide of humanitarian emergencies? Should the international community be more involved in efforts to avert a worse scenario such as the balkanization of Zaire and the civil war that might ensue? Can the international community assert its will on the different Zairian elites to avoid humanitarian emergencies that may be too costly for the international community to handle? How can the international community in the future safeguard preventive diplomacy from suffering a deflation of its own?

These are the questions this paper intends to answer by outlining some preventive solutions that might help the international community in building policy instruments capable of preventing humanitarian tragedies associated with wars, hunger, and malnutrition. The argument is that 'when a country is on the razor's edge of disintegration, the international community should be more forthright in combating the instruments of hate that encourage violence' (Rosenblatt and Thompson 1995:101). Although the current situation in Zaire casts a shadow on the viability of successful

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<sup>1</sup> According to Zartman (1995:1), state collapse 'refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart... On the other hand, it is not necessarily anarchy...[W]hen the state collapses, order and power (but not always legitimacy) fall down to local groups or are up for grabs. These ups and downs of power then vie with central attempts to reconstitute authority. For a period, the state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is gone.'

international intervention and preventive diplomacy in averting humanitarian emergencies, preventive diplomacy remains an invaluable policy tool that needs a committed military option to make it more successful and credible.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the Zairian historical context. The democratization process is the object of the third section. The fourth section is a brief statistical analysis that explains humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. Concluding remarks then follow.

## II CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW BEFORE DEMOCRATIZATION

### 2.1 The colonial legacy

Zaire or Congo emerged in 1885 as the Congo Free State. The Congo Free State became a Belgian colony on 8 November 1908 and was known as the Belgian Congo until 30 June 1960 when it achieved political independence. From 1960 to 1971, the country was known as the (Democratic) Republic of Congo and since 1971 it has been the Republic of Zaire.

To understand the present Zairian crisis requires a brief analysis of its colonial legacy, which continues to shape the socio-economic context in which political interactions are taking place. First, the colonial state erected a centralized administrative system that encompassed small-scale and localized political groupings in defiance of any cultural criterion. By grouping hundreds of ethnic clans, Belgians divided their colony into small administrative entities along arbitrary tribal lines in order to keep social order. Identity cards were issued to delineate these lines. In addition, the colonial system created ethnic groups where none had existed. For example, Young (1965) describes how Belgian officials first made use of the term 'Ngala' in the nineteenth century to distinguish the people dwelling alongside the Congo River and later extended the term to include people from the riverain area who migrated to the capital city of Kinshasa. The label came to describe Africans who were recruited from this area for the service of the state and who clustered around the mission and state outposts (Young 1965). The Ngala group could not have developed ethnic identity without the spread of urbanization.

The second colonial legacy, urbanization, explains the consolidation of ethnic identity in Zaire. Towns were the first source of frustration as African migrants confronted an impersonal urban environment. The migrants created ethnic associations for mutual support; these associations became the first instrument to promote the cultural values of the group and to build ethnic solidarity. In Kinshasa, Kongo and Ngala ethnic groups were the first two polarized groups claiming Kinshasa as their territory and that they had a natural prerogative for social leadership (Young 1976). The social duality of Kinshasa served to consolidate the Ngala identity, and migrants from this group found themselves within a social field where their cultural commonalities were further enhanced by competition over resources such as jobs and education. The competitive response to modernization opportunities engendered very serious tensions in the urban centres (Young 1965). In the post-colonial setting, African ethnic groups faced deep ethnic division along clan and regional lines in urban areas. These divisions provided ethnic leaders a way of consolidating their position at the centre of the decision-making process by promoting ethnic and political interests.

Third, the colonial system also shaped ethnic identity through its discriminating policies of development. Some regions, especially mineral-rich areas, received more resources

from the colonial government than the non-endowed regions. This legacy set up a differential rate of access and a degree of adaptation to modern social roles for some ethnic groups at the expense of others. Some ethnic groups were able to adapt and gained easy admittance to modern jobs. Ethnicity as a political determinant became entwined with social class formation. The colonial period also crystallized ethnicity and favoured organizations along tribal lines that neither interfered with the colonial rule nor challenged it. Furthermore, the colonial system had some positive and negative stereotypes vis-à-vis the different African groups. For example, the Luba in the Kasai region were viewed by early European settlers as superior to others because of their willingness to accept new challenges. In the colonial period, Europeans relocated a number of Luba from Kasai to work the mines in Shaba (then Katanga province). These newcomers became better adapted than the local Lunda to new colonial roles and soon dominated key administrative and business positions at the expense of the local population. Therefore, ethnic groups with access to modern sectors developed self-consciousness and were able to capitalize on this access to modern roles (Sandbrook 1985). This favouritism unleashed political conflict as ethnicity became politicized in the post-colonial period.

The fourth colonial legacy was the integration of Zaire into the world economy. The penetration of Belgians into the countryside drew Africans irreversibly into production for world and local markets. As the Belgian agricultural policy succeeded in maintaining cheap labour, cheap land, and cheap prices for agricultural products, it made farming less productive and less attractive for Africans. To control cheap labour, the colonial state pursued a paternalistic policy that encouraged a strong interventionist state in the social realm. This colonial policy 'required an aggressive expansion in social and economic fields, with political advance postponed until some undefined threshold of maturity has been reached' (Young 1965:60). Belgians ruled their colony under the assumption that Africans were children who needed to be taken care off. In the words of Moutouille (1946:5-4), 'The colonizer must never lose sight of the fact that Negroes have the souls of children, souls which mould themselves to the methods of the educator.'<sup>2</sup> This paternalism introduced an expansion in social programmes without an equivalent educational and political emancipation. Political advancement and education were postponed until Africans had some political maturity. Consistent with their belief of being 'Father of Africans', Belgians followed a system of gradual socio-economic, educational and political development. This system consisted of raising the living standards and the educational level of a whole generation rather than elevating rapidly a small elite to whom power could be transferred (Hoskyns 1965). In other words, Belgians regarded themselves as guardians who held the Congo in trust for Africans. Like the Belgians, President Mobutu also became the 'Father of the Nation' but unlike them, he had no policy of development.

The first colonial policy objective was to make the colony self-financing. In the process, the colonial state had to lay the ground-work for accessing mineral reserves and exporting cash crops (Sandbrook 1985). By the end of the 1920s, the colonial

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<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Young (1965:61).

state had a highly effective administrative and coercive apparatus. The colony was under the control of the Belgian political authority, supported by European investors and Roman Catholic missionaries. With this structure in place, the role of the state was to provide cheap labour to foreign investors through taxation schemes that forced the male population to seek employment. The colonial state also promulgated the 1917 law that introduced forced cultivation to ensure 'adequate production of both export crops and low-cost food supply for the local market' (Leslie 1993:13). The post-colonial setting followed this policy of discrimination against rural communities by creating state marketing boards, which diverted agricultural surplus to urban areas to satisfy a coalition of powerful interests. The net result was political polarization along the rural-urban divide.

If the colonial state was paramount in shaping ethnic relations by setting up regional boundaries, the church was instrumental in the education of Africans. Education emerged as the new basis for social stratification, and was limited to primary schooling; secondary schooling was denied until the late 1940s. The University of Lovanium, the first institution of higher educational opportunities, was created in 1954.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, those few Africans who were granted education beyond the primary level, were the first to challenge the colonial system. This group, called *evolués* (civilized Africans), insisted on better education for all. Socially, the *evolués* were between the Europeans and the masses and were conscious of their elevated status. By the end of World War II, the number of *evolués* was large enough to constitute a distinct social group. Since the colonial system prohibited organizations with political overtones from operating, the *evolués* formed cultural organizations that had some ethnic connections. These ethnic associations began making pleas for self-government in the mid-1950s, which ultimately resulted in the creation of political parties. The Belgians responded to the African appeal for self-governance by introducing political reforms that culminated in legislative elections in May 1960.

The subsequent legislative elections were divided along ethnic lines because of the embryonic nature of nationally-based political parties.<sup>4</sup> As Leslie (1993:22) points out, 'The electoral campaigning opened up the prospect of political self-determination for all ethnic groups for the first time, and it is in the campaigning that the seeds of regionalism were sown'. Ethnic politics in the late 1950s evolved in Zaire's major towns. For example, ethnic politics meant the Kongo clans versus the Ngala people in Kinshasa; Lulua versus Luba in Kananga; Mongo versus Ngombe in Mbandaka, and Kasaian versus authentic Katangan in Lubumbashi (Young and Turner 1985:143). Because no party received a majority in the legislative elections in May 1960, political coalitions were necessary to form the first government. Legislators reached a compromise whereby Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu became the prime minister and the president respectively.

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<sup>3</sup> The late development of secondary schools should not obscure the fact that before 1940, the sole avenue of secondary school and higher education was through the seminaries (Young 1965:198). By 1961, the Congo had 500 African priests and four bishops. These numbers represented more priests than any other independent African country in 1961 (Young 1965:199).

<sup>4</sup> Two political parties were able to dominate the Congolese map, the *Mouvement National Congolais* (National Congolese Movement) and the *Parti National du Progrès* (National Party of Progress).

A major hurdle was the fact that most Africans had no experience in running the large-scale state bureaucracy because the colonial system had restricted Africans to the lower ranks of civil service. At the time of independence on 30 June 1960, there were no African officers in the armed forces. The underlying assumption in Belgium during the 1950s was that Europeans would remain in the new independent state as administrators and military officers to train Africans in running state affairs. What the Belgian leaders had been unable to foresee was the tension caused by the appointment of Africans from lesser civil service ranks to ministerial positions, whereas non-commissioned African officers received no promotions.

Four days after the proclamation of independence, the armed forces rebelled and the government of Patrice Lumumba appointed Mobutu as the chief of staff of the newly created Congolese Armed Forces. Several hundred non-commissioned officers were also promoted to officer level. Despite this quick Africanization of the armed forces, mutinies spread in major military camps of the new state. The rich mining region of Katanga (now Shaba) seceded on 11 July 1960 and this was followed by Kasai (Bakwanga). The Belgian government intervened by sending its troops to protect foreigners. This was seen by the new government as an act of aggression and the government requested for UN peacekeeping forces in an effort to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 14 July, calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for providing UN military assistance to the country. Guinean, Tunisian, Moroccan and Ethiopian troops flew into Zaire on 16 July 1960.

In September, tension mounted between the president and the prime minister. The new government, headed by Patrice Lumumba, was not ready to handle the inherited colonial state structure nor the institutional problems of the division of power which arose between President Kasavubu and the prime minister after independence. In the absence of an independent court system to rule on the constitutionality of the law, the president dismissed the prime minister and nominated Joseph Ileo in his stead on 5 September 1960. Lumumba, on the same day, also dismissed the president. Two days later, the Lower House annulled the two dismissals and on 8 September, the Senate voted 41 to 2 with 6 abstentions to support the government of Patrice Lumumba. The president, however, declared the votes of both houses void on the grounds that decisions by the chief of state were not subject to parliamentary approval. A joint session of the parliament once again fully endorsed Prime Minister Lumumba and conferred on him full powers, but the president suspended the parliament on 14 September 1960.

The ensuing legitimacy crisis between the prime minister and the president resulted in a coup d'état by Colonel Mobutu on 14 September 1960 in an effort to neutralize Lumumba, who was perceived by the West as pro-communist (Kalb 1982). Mobutu returned power to the president in February 1961; Patrice Lumumba was murdered during the same month in the Katanga region. Political instability followed as opposing ethnic groups struggled for the control of central government. Two central governments – Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and Stanleyville (now Kisangani) – each claimed legitimacy. UN reconciliation efforts resulted in a rapprochement between the two and

ended the dual central governments in 1961. Meanwhile, the UN was fighting the secessionist province of Katanga. In 1964, a rebellion broke out but was defeated early in 1965 by the Congolese army assisted by mercenaries. On 24 November 1965, Mobutu became president following a bloodless coup d'état endorsed by the West.

The UN mission to the Congo lasted four years. More than 93,000 men from 35 states served in the UN forces and contributed a total of 675,000 man-months at a cost of US\$ 411.2 million (Lefever 1966). The UN achieved its objectives of maintaining territorial integrity, preventing external intervention, and restoring peace in the Congo. But the death toll of non-combatants from 1960 to 1965 is estimated to be more than 100,000 (Sivard 1993:21), and the number of displaced people well above the million mark. In addition, political instability cost the life of the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, when his plane crashed during a personal mission to the area in 1961. The exact events surrounding the incident remained a mystery until 1992 when the *Guardian* published a letter by C. O'Brien and G. Smith, which stated that Hammarskjöld's plane was shot down by mercenaries employed by Americans and by Europeans who owned the Katanga copper mines and who sponsored the Katanga secession because they feared that the left-leaning government of the newly independent Congo would threaten their holdings (Rourke 1995:367).

The first five years of independence clearly highlight the fact that the colonial structure was not designed for African self-rule. The colony had been the private property of Belgium to be used for economic exploitation and religious conversion. Colonial paternalism provided a framework to realize this dual objective and did not take the idea of African self-rule into consideration. Therefore, the political entity that emerged in 1960 with a land, a government and a population was a 'non-state colonial setup' (Holsti 1996:6). International support to sustain its boundaries, sovereignty and order has been paramount since 1960. Congo – currently Zaire – began its existence with 'crippling defects' (Jackson 1990), which minimized post-colonial efforts toward state-building and economic development.

## **2.2 Post-colonial economy: from prosperity to disaster<sup>5</sup>**

The colonial economy, highly extractive, was based on the export of primary commodities. From 1921 to 1959, the Belgian Congo was one of the few European colonies to achieve relatively fast economic growth, especially in the post-World War II era, as a result of an increased demand for raw materials in the world markets. An accelerated programme to provide decent housing, primary education, and hospitals took place before World War II. A survey by the European Common Market indicated that by 1958, the colonial medical infrastructure in the Belgian Congo was 'the best in tropical Africa' (Brausch 1961:8). After independence, the country's leaders maintained the colonial infrastructure and were able to sustain it despite the early years of political turmoil. By the end of 1996, however, there were no operational hospitals, no adequate schools, and no adequate roads. What went wrong?

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<sup>5</sup> This part on economic performance relies heavily on information from Emizet (1987) and Young and Turner (1985).

Five major periods characterize the Zairian post-colonial economy up to recent years: 1960-66, 1967-73, 1974-80, 1981-89, and the 1990s. The first period, from 1960 to 1966, was an era during which economic growth declined substantially as the result of political instability. The GDP, which in 1959 was US\$ 1,268 million (1958 prices) fell to US\$ 1,196 million in 1964 (Congo 1967:36). In 1965, commercial agricultural output was only 64 per cent of the corresponding figure for 1959. Price levels and trade deficit were on the rise. Despite two devaluations (1961 and 1963), monetary and exchange policies were a total failure (Dupriez 1968:71-99).

Then, in an effort to rebuild the economy, Mobutu initiated several laws redefining property rights. The first was the Bakajika Law in 1966, which stipulated that 'all public land was a domain of the Zairian nation-state, and formally extinguished all grants and concessionary powers delegated by the colonial state' (Young and Turner 1985:288). The second move was to nationalize the giant conglomerate UMHK (thereafter GECAMINES), which had been created in 1906 to exploit mineral resources in the Shaba region. Although this nationalization had no impact on the profitability of the new company for almost seven years, operating costs increased drastically as a result of the rapid Africanization of its executive personnel, which rose from 251 in 1970 to 5000 in 1985. By 1980, GECAMINES was the largest employer after the state, and a major source of state revenue, providing on the average 51 per cent of total revenues during Mobutu's self-rule.

The economic reform of June 1967 was another effort to correct the economic imbalances inherited from the first republic. President Mobutu embarked on a huge monetary reform to restore the confidence of foreign partners and to lay the foundation for long-term development. The centrepiece of the reform was a 300 per cent devaluation, which realigned the new currency, the zaire (Z), to its parallel market value at the exchange rate of 1.00 zaire per 2.00 US dollars.<sup>6</sup> The net result of the 1967 monetary reform was positive; inflation rate fell to 2.5 per cent and economic growth rate increased from negative growth in 1967 to 8 per cent in 1968. This success contributed to the credibility of the Mobutu regime, 'which appeared to possess both the authority and the competence to carry off a difficult and delicate operation' (Young and Turner 1985:280). A critical test of this credibility was the decline in public finances, which remained in relative balance for six years.

From 1967 to 1973, the economic model pursued by Zaire seemed to work relatively well. The economy expanded at an average rate of 4.9 per cent per annum in real terms. At the same time, bank borrowing by the state was minimal and deficit financing averaged only 2 per cent of the total annual government expenditures (Emizet 1987). Despite this apparently strong economy in the early 1970s, economic indicators began showing signs of decline from 1972 onward (Emizet 1987:176-200).


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<sup>6</sup> Other measures that formed parts of the IMF package included the elimination of the dual exchange rate, a sharp increase in taxation of foreign trade, a promise of 40 per cent public sector and legal minimum wage rise, the end of import licensing, and the freeing of profit remittances (Young and Turner 1985:279).

The third period, from 1974 to 1980, reflected the weakening economy and was characterized by economic instability. In 1972, the trade balance indicated a deficit of US\$ 124 million (61.8 million Z), the first deficit since 1968. The current account had the largest deficit since 1966, a total of US\$ 658 million (329 million Z). For the first time in five years, the real exchange rate also declined drastically by almost 21 per cent in 1972. At the end of 1979, the zaire had lost 100 per cent of its value relative to the US dollar.

The commodity terms of trade in Figure 1 summarize the result of these external imbalances. The terms of trade declined from 100 in 1970 to 65 in 1972 and never recovered to the 1970 level. Real wages also started declining in 1972, and according to Figure 1, the real wage of the average worker had dropped to zero by the late 1980s. Figure 1 also shows that the food production index per capita never recovered from the 1972 downfall.

FIGURE 1  
TERMS OF TRADE, REAL WAGES, AND FOOD INDEX <sup>a</sup>  
(1970=100)



Source: For terms of trade and food index, refer to data sources (34; 35) in Appendix; real wages. refer to data sources (36; 37; 38; 39; 40) in Appendix.


Note: <sup>a</sup> Computed by the author to base 1970 = 100.

The economic shock in 1972 was so severe that despite an 8 per cent growth rate in 1973, the downward trend continued after 1974. During the 1974-80 period, the growth rate experienced an average negative rate of -2.2 per cent per year. The growth of the public sector was another symptom of the crisis during this period. Government expenditures as percentage of GDP increased by almost 45 per cent in 1978, while state

revenue hardly increased during the same period. Government expenditures continued to rise throughout the 1980s and beyond.

This deterioration of the economy, which started in 1972, also coincided with the increase in foreign involvement in Zaire. Foreign debt, which had been quite modest before 1972, jumped to US\$ 4 billion by 1979, and almost US\$ 9 billion by 1989 (Figure 2). The growth in foreign debt did not correspond to foreign direct investments (FDI), which remained quite modest in the 1970s and continued to decline throughout the 1980s to zero by the end of the decade. Loans, on the other hand, have remained slightly above the FDI.

FIGURE 2  
FOREIGN ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN ZAIRE



Source: Refer to data sources (23; 32; 34; 35) in Appendix.

Unlike the colonial system that had had a vision of economic growth based on exports of raw materials, Mobutu had no clear idea of economic development when his government started external borrowing. The rise in foreign debt meant lavish consumption patterns and large-scale investments in projects that turned out to be 'white elephants' (Péan 1988; Willame 1986). These projects had neither upstream nor downstream links with socio-economic life in Zaire.

The Inga-Shaba project, costing US\$ 1.5 billion in 1983 or 20 per cent of the Zairian foreign debt, is a typical example of one such project (Kwitny 1984). The plan called for the construction of a hydroelectric dam that would supply electricity to the cooper mining region of Shaba located 1800 kilometres away in the south-eastern part of Zaire. Unfortunately, to furnish power for many of the villages along its extensive power transmission line was not the objective of the project. According to Kwitny (1984:21),

special engineering technique ensured that it would be difficult or impossible to siphon electricity from the line before it reached its destination. What Kwitny (1984) failed to report was the fact that many villages through which the line would run were located in regions that had been very hostile to the Mobutu regime since 1974.

Also, Mobutu wanted the power line as it would make the Shaba mining region totally dependent on a source of energy that he could easily control. The main security risk of the 1800-kilometre line became apparent in 1980 as village blacksmiths along its route started tearing down the pylons for scrap metal to make beds, hoes, machetes, and other metal outputs (Filed Log 1991-92). Several studies have indicated that the mining industry could have got the necessary energy far more cheaply without resorting to such lengths to bring it in (Kwitny 1984; Willame 1986; Young and Turner 1985). In other words, a new dam in the Shaba region at a cost of US\$ 65 million could have supplemented the existing 520 megawatts with another 250, thus meeting the immediate needs of the mining company (Young and Turner 1985:300). But, the construction of the line provided contracts to American firms in return for US support of the Mobutu regime (Kwitny 1984:21).

The fourth period, from 1981 to 1989, was a period of adjustments. The Zairian economy experienced some hesitations and lapses but the growth rate of GDP remained positive. However, economic decline restarted in 1989, the initial year of the fifth period. Efforts to redress the economy in the early 1990s failed because of a succession of short-lived governments, as Mobutu attempted to outmanoeuvre the opposition. As Mobutu hangs on to power, public expenditures since 1989 have become unmanageable, and have reached 3.58 billion Z in 1993 against revenues of 1.1 billion Z (World Bank 1995:345).

The deterioration of the economy since 1972 is mainly a result of the drop in construction, manufacturing, mining production, and agriculture. But as mining represented more than 15 per cent of the GDP, the decline of this sector contributed to the weakening of the economy more than any other sector since 1972. The agricultural sector, another important area, deteriorated as the result of government policies that included fixed prices to producers and the nationalization measures announced by Mobutu in November 1973.

Prices to producers have remained low since 1972 and have provided little incentive to producers. For example, in the case of maize, farmers were receiving only two cents per kilo (Young and Turner 1985:312). Impact of the fixed price policy on the peasants is also apparent in cotton, coffee, and other agricultural exports. According to Young and Turner (1985:312), at a price of 12 cents per kilo of cotton in the early 1970s, yields averaging 200 kilos per hectare, and an average plot size of half a hectare, a peasant could expect a return of US\$ 12 for 125 days of family labour committed to cotton production.

The zairianization or nationalization of small and medium-sized foreign businesses – commerce, plantations, small industries, construction firms, transportation, and property-holding enterprises – on 30 November 1973 was another policy with disastrous

effects. Although the policy was a reflection of the African trend in the 1970s toward economic independence, zairianization itself was a unique experience in the Sub-Sahara because it 'was the most sweeping and comprehensive set of nationalizing measures yet undertaken in independent Africa' (Young and Turner 1985:361). Also, the aim of these nationalization measures was to give Mobutu a pre-eminent leadership role in Africa.

In addition, nationalization was motivated by the need to cement Mobutu's patrimonial system. All nationalized businesses were handed over to the ruling group in Zaire and their families. The take-over by *acquéreurs* (new owners) occurred within a month of the announcement of these measures. On 26 December 1973, Mobutu urged a plenary session of top political elite to address the issue of allocating zairianized businesses. Three hundred eighteen members from the Political Bureau, Council of Ministers, and Legislature attended the meeting. Most of those who attended the session as well as the regional commissioners (governors) emerged as major beneficiaries of the November 1973 measures.

Despite popular indignation, the ruling group emerged as the winner, particularly people close to the president and their families.<sup>7</sup> A close relationship with the ruling group was paramount in gaining access to the spoils. Official letters were sent to the new beneficiaries with simple statements such as 'The State authorizes you to take possession....', 'You are now the owner of ...', 'Plantation of ... has been allocated to you...' or 'For your loyalty to the Guide of the Revolution Mobutu Sese Seko, you are the owner...'.<sup>8</sup> The new owners only had to show citizenship and a bank account to take possession of a zairianized business. A law was also passed in 1973 making it difficult for foreigners to claim compensation. A freeze of the bank accounts of former owners prevented them from sabotaging the zairianization policies. Any expatriate interfering with these policies faced a fine of US\$ 5,000 to US\$ 10,000 and a two-to-three year prison term. The state also required all foreigners to renew their work permits every two or three years if they wanted to work in Zaire.

Compensation to former owners was to take place within ten years, from profits accumulated by the new owners. But zairianized businesses were given to the ruling group as 'free goods' and the compensation over a ten-year period was only hypothetical (Young and Turner 1985:337). In other words, zairianization was a simple state confiscation of small and medium-sized foreign businesses in agriculture, light industry, and commerce, which transferred property rights to the ruling class who had so far enjoyed only political power. However, several big foreign enterprises, especially Belgian-owned firms, were spared from zairianization. These included transport


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<sup>7</sup> For example, Bisengimana, a Tutsi and chief of staff in the office of the president, received several coffee plantations in Kivu; Paluku Denis (member of Political Bureau from North-Kivu) also got plantations and drugstores; Kitima bin Ramazani received most of the holdings in South Kivu; Nendaka (an old member of the political establishment close to Mobutu) also received several plantations in Upper Zaire and Equator regions. Some foreigners, if married to Zairian women, managed to save their businesses.

<sup>8</sup> For more information on this redefinition and transfer of property rights by the state, refer to Callaghy (1984), Lukombe (1979), Young and Turner (1985), and Leslie (1993).

companies, petroleum works, mines, metallurgy enterprises, hotels, printing shops, textile mills, breweries and soft drink processing plants as well as private foreign banks.

FIGURE 3  
OFFICIAL EXPORT EARNINGS FROM AGRICULTURE



Note: Computed from several sources that include Bezy (8), Brixhe (9), Congo (10; 11) and Zaire (36; 37; 38; 39; 40). See data sources in Appendix.


A rough estimation of the nationalization measures indicated that top party members in the Political Bureau, Council of Ministers, and Legislature received 75 per cent of zairianized businesses (Field Log 1991-92). President Mobutu was at the top of the list of new owners as he acquired several plantations and ranches in every region of the country, except in Western Kasai (Kasaï Occidental). All his newly acquired businesses were grouped into a conglomerate called CELZA. In 1976, CELZA handled 13 per cent of the country's palm oil, 23 per cent of its cocoa beans, 26 per cent of its rubber, 15 per cent of tea, and 13 per cent of cattle holdings (Young and Turner 1985:180-1). Furthermore, CELZA employed 25,000 persons, which made it after the state and GECAMINES the third largest employer in Zaire (Young and Turner 1985:179). Since zairianization, the fortunes of many members of the Zairian ruling group have been a matter of speculation.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Mobutu, for example, has accumulated wealth since 1970. His estimated wealth in the 1980s was US\$ 9 billion, compared with the 'US\$ 6.00 he had at the end of 1959 when his third child was born' (Monheim 1963:36). But his lavish lifestyle leads to speculation that his total wealth has been drastically reduced in the absence of any attempt to invest. By 1995, it was possible to point out that Mobutu's wealth was less than what he had in the 1980s because of diminishing state sources of revenue and the cut-off of the financial pipeline from the US, France and Belgium.

The result of zairianization was a breakdown in distribution and a decline in agricultural production. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the overall impact of the government's agricultural policies. According to Figure 3, these policies caused a drastic fall in the official agricultural export earnings, which declined by 23 per cent in 1973-74 to 12 per cent of total export earnings, the lowest since the end of World War II. Despite some improvement efforts in 1976 and again in 1986, the agricultural sector since Mobutu took power in 1965 has contributed less than 18 per cent of export earnings. This is a real paradox given the fact that 63 per cent of Zaire's population remains rural.

The zairianization policy also caused a sharp decline in tax revenues on trade. Figure 4 indicates the distribution of the sources of state revenues. In 1974, taxes on trade declined drastically and never recovered from the nationalization policy. Despite an increase in taxes on income to compensate the fall in foreign trade taxes, the increase was inadequate to pay for the added spending of the Mobutu regime. Therefore, to compensate for declining taxes on foreign trade, the state had to rely on other forms of taxation such as fixed prices to producers and overvaluation.

FIGURE 4  
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE



Source: Data sources (36; 37; 38; 39; 40) in Appendix.

Another effect of zairianization was the fate of the Zairian employees who had worked for the former foreign owners (Schatzberg 1980). Although under legal obligation to

keep all existing personnel, the new owners manned their businesses with friends and relatives, adding to the number of unemployed. Because the state could neither employ these people nor provide them with any means of survival, the newly unemployed had to find refuge in the informal economy. The informal economy refers to ways of making a living outside the formal wage economy within national borders as an alternative to a formal wage or as a means of supplementing income earned within the formal sector (Hart 1973).

Mass indignation erupted in 1974 despite a slight improvement in the economy. But the number of bankrupt businesses and abandoned plantations was an indication of managerial disaster. Most of the new owners consumed their wealth by importing luxury goods such as Mercedes-Benz cars. In November 1974, Mobutu announced that Zaire had broken the record for imported Mercedes-Benz cars (Young and Turner 1985:350). At the end of the year, Mobutu announced 'radicalization measures' requesting all beneficiaries of the 1973 measures to turn their businesses over to the state. Three weeks later, Mobutu reversed his decision, stating that radicalization concerned only the businesses that had not been nationalized in 1973. More than 100 foreign companies were nationalized under the radicalization measures and placed under state ownership to be headed by *délégués généraux* (general delegates). Most of the delegates were from the old political establishment and their relatives.<sup>10</sup> This new wave of nationalization met with strong foreign opposition from Belgium when its major companies operating in Zaire were taken over by the state.

Relations between Zaire and Belgium were severed in early 1975 and on 25 November, Mobutu announced a 'retrocession' that provided a return of up to 40 per cent equity in radicalized or zairianized foreign-owned enterprises. Belgium rejected the terms of this new policy and, as a result, in September 1976 Mobutu announced the 'deradicalization' measure, which offered the former owners of nationalized enterprises up to 60 per cent equity with the remaining 40 per cent to come from Zairian buyers over a period of several years. The compensatory agreement between Zaire and Belgium stipulated that the Belgian government would compensate its nationals over a ten-year period and the Zairian government would reimburse an estimated US\$ 700 million to Belgium within twenty years.

In brief, the 1972-75 destabilization period is important in order to understand the current predicament of Zaire because it shaped all subsequent government policies and the attitude of the international community toward the country. This destabilization period was the result of five dichotomies:

First, the government's desire to finance the survival of the authoritarian regime, despite an inadequate and inefficient tax base; second, the willingness to restore the profitability of the exporting sector while

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<sup>10</sup> The delegate of the newly nationalized cement factory was Kayintekore, a cousin of Bisengimana (see footnote 7). Another typical example was Nendaka (an old politician close to Mobutu in the early 1960s) as general delegate of the state marketing board in charge of buying and selling coffee. His nephew Tapatondele was nominated general delegate of the marketing board in charge of commercializing cereals

maintaining an overvalued exchange rate; third, the desire to give the old ruling political order control over all small businesses, while implementing the policy through inappropriate distribution and without due consideration of the managerial background of the new acquirers; fourth, the desire to promote a huge public sector, while freezing its prices; and finally, the eagerness to attract foreign capital, while nationalizing small foreign businesses (Emizet 1987:183).

Given these dichotomies, President Mobutu was forced by the IMF to embark on a stabilization programme in 1976. The programme was initiated four years after signs of economic trouble emerged in 1972 and also constituted the first stabilization measure in nine years. From 1976 to 1991, the Zairian government and the IMF agreed on the adoption of 14 stabilization programmes in order to achieve internal and external stability.<sup>11</sup> Operationally, the objective of these programmes was quite simple: to bridge the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply as well as to create favourable conditions for market operations. The usual measures were market-oriented policies, wage freezes, monetary and fiscal restriction policies, financial reforms, and devaluation.

The goal of market-oriented policies was to reduce state involvement in the economy. These policies included price decontrols and marketing schemes intended to provide incentives to producers. Market liberalization was also designed to reduce state monopoly power and to ensure that trading in primary commodities was dispersed among numerous small producers or traders who lacked the power to demand an increase in producer prices. By emphasizing a limit on credit expansion, monetary policies aimed at lessening the discrepancy between the growth of the money supply and the growth of output. Fiscal policy focused on controlling government expenditures by increasing taxation and controlling wages. Food subsidies were usually eliminated to achieve fiscal balance. Financial reforms aimed to liberalize the credit market. The IMF draws on the works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) who argue that less developed countries (LDCs) are financially repressed and a rise in interest rates should encourage savings, promote investment and economic growth. Finally, exchange rate adjustment aimed at 'switching of resources to tradables' (Streeten 1989:3), thus making national exports more competitive in world markets. How successful were these stabilization programmes?

The period of belt-tightening in Zaire varied with each stabilization measure. On the average, wage freezes in the public sector lasted from six months to more than a year. In addition, the IMF had requested the government to downsize the public sector. This last policy recommendation completely overlooked the fact that the state was Zaire's largest employer. The first indicator to evaluate these programmes was the price level. By targeting external balance, the 1976 stabilization measures resulted in a 'devaluation-inflation spiral' in subsequent years. The Zairian currency was devalued several times in


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<sup>11</sup> Stabilization or adjustment programmes have engendered theoretical debates over the years. For theoretical debates on the issues of 'why' and 'how', refer to Mundell (1962), Kemp (1966), and Levin (1962).

relation to the currencies of its main trading partners. Figure 5 indicates that the IMF's success with respect to prices was quite modest up to 1980. This decline of inflation in 1980 was entirely the result of demonetization in December 1979.

To implement this deflationary policy, Zaire closed its frontiers on Christmas Day 1979. Also, flights over Zairian territory were forbidden by President Mobutu until 31 December 1979. All bank accounts were frozen. Under the change, 5 and 10 denomination zaire banknotes were replaced with new notes. Private citizens could exchange old bills for new notes up to a maximum of 3,000 Z (or 1,500 old ones); small and medium businesses up to 5,000 Z and major companies up to 10,000 Z. By closing the airports and frontiers, the government hoped that zaire banknotes held abroad would be prevented from entering the country during the three day operation. This deflationary policy was devastating for the majority of the population who had no knowledge of the operation and lost the life savings they had kept in pillows, mattresses, and jars (Emizet 1987). The beneficiaries of the operation were the bank managers and members of the ruling group who had no limit on the exchange of notes.

FIGURE 5  
CHANGES IN PRICE INDEX AND PERCENTAGE OF DEVALUATION <sup>a</sup>



Source: Price level (34; 35) and devaluations (Emizet 1987; I; 4). See data sources in Appendix.

Note: <sup>a</sup> Price changes computed by the author.

One year after the deflationary policy, prices started their upward trend. This, in turn, required more drastic measures and above all another devaluation leading to a further devaluation-inflation spiral. In general, a devaluation may cause output contraction and tight money may cause price rises, leading to another devaluation (Taylor 1989).

Figure 5 supports the neo-structuralist argument that IMF programmes tend to produce a spiral of inflation-devaluation instead of reducing inflation (Taylor 1989; Williamson 1985). Devaluations do not distinguish between essential and luxury imports. Inflation may be caused by higher import costs and a nominal increase in the prices of food, which, in turn, may unleash demands for higher wages in the different sectors. When the state is the largest employer, the demand for higher wages is usually granted and may result in another devaluation. This devaluation-cum-inflation spiral looms behind most adjustment programmes and is difficult to control once started (Sonko 1994:107).

Indicators of credit expansion and fiscal performance were also selected to assess the performance of the different policies that formed the IMF package because credit ceilings and fiscal targets were usually emphasized more than other economic performance criteria. For example, credit ceilings to the government are the most important component of stand-by and extended fund facility programmes and '...in most cases, observance of these ceilings is the most serious hurdle the government must surmount in order to retain access to the credit in question' (Killick 1984:234). The emphasis on the public sector also merited watching because government failure to adhere to the IMF guidelines was probably the most important reason for the breakdown of IMF programmes (Killick 1984; Reichmann and Stillson 1977).

Table 1 displays the economic indicators of stabilization performance in the public sector and other criteria related to such IMF instruments as devaluation and debt rescheduling. Devaluation aims at making the export sector more competitive by setting the exchange rate compatible with the rate of the unofficial economy. In addition, devaluation is usually a guarantee for rescheduling foreign debt, which tends to help a country retain a portion of its export earnings for domestic purposes (Killick 1984). Table 1 shows that IMF programmes have failed to stabilize the Zairian economy between 1976 and 1991. Government deficit, reaching a record high in the 1980s, was almost 25 per cent of GDP in 1987. Despite a decline in the deficit and in real government spending in 1988, the upward swing continued in the 1990s.

Credit to the government has remained more than 70 per cent of the total credits since 1978 and was close to 100 per cent in 1991 (column 6). With the exception of the years 1978-79 and 1982-83, the current account also showed no signs of improvement. Furthermore, Zaire presently has a huge overhanging foreign debt, which has been rescheduled more than ten times. In fact, from 1975 to 1985, several multilateral negotiations were able to reschedule US\$ 3.6 billion of the Paris Club debt and US\$ 0.4 billion from commercial banks. The most important negotiation was the Paris Club 'Toronto Terms' agreement that consolidated US\$ 1.63 billion covering the period of 30 June 1983 to 23 June 1989. This consolidated amount represented an annual net cash flow saving of US\$ 26 million and a decrease in the present value of the scheduled debt service of US\$ 197 million (World Bank 1993). In addition, under the Toronto Terms agreement, concessional debt was rescheduled at concessional terms with a 25-year maturity and a grace period of 14 years. Total debt consolidated since 1976 is given in column 7 of Table 1.

TABLE 1  
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES, 1976-91

	Deficit as % of GDP	Change <sup>(a)</sup>	Real GE <sup>(b)</sup> (1976 prices)	Growth of credit <sup>(c)</sup>	Credit to government <sup>(d)</sup>	Current balance <sup>(e)</sup>	AC <sup>(f)</sup>
1976*	22.0	.41	1200	56	67.9	-932	1700
1977	11.0	-.18	787	42	68.3	-1604	-
1978*	11.0	.15	602	38	72.3	311	-
1979*	5.0	-.46	601	31	72.2	158	-
1980**	0.8	-.22	687	22	70.2	-559	402
1981*	4.0	1.83	817	43	75.5	-851	276
1982*	4.4	1.33	790	87	80.6	-751	-
1983	2.0	1.89	820	44	79.9	-522	1,475
1984*	15.0	1.89	945	139	86.3	-498	64
1985*	20.0	1.89	1002	53	88.7	-488	446
1986*	22.0	1.89	1210	65	86.8	-598	490
1987	24.8	1.89	1305	113	86.3	-864	817
1988**	8.0	1.88	1392	110	89.1	-806	-
1989	14.0	69.45	2343	0	80.1	-887	1,629
1990*	14.0	.15	678	349	92.2	-860	-
1991	14.0	6.63	3210	520	98.4	-	-

Source: Data are from IMF (18), World Bank (34), and Zaire (36; 37; 38; 39; 40) in data sources in Appendix.

Note: \* One stabilization programme.

\*\* Two stabilization or adjustment programmes a year.

(a) This column represents the amount of change in deficit over previous year (in billion of zaires where - represents a decrease and + an increase in the deficit).

(b) GE stands for government expenditures.

(c) Percentage change of total credit over previous year.

(d) This represents percentage of total credit.


(e) In million of US dollars

(f) AC stands for amount of consolidated debt in million of US dollars.

Despite these favourable rescheduling negotiations, the stabilization programmes were usually accompanied by a memorandum of understanding that required the Zairian state to take a portion of export earnings to service foreign debt. According to opponents of the stabilization programme, this stipulation took a lion share of export earnings that could have been used to import necessity items such as pharmaceutical products and the capital goods needed to improve people's lives (Sachs 1989).

Figure 6 shows that debt service represented a net transfer of resources averaging 20 per cent of exports annually in the 1980s.


FIGURE 6  
DEBT SERVICE AS PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS



Source: Data sources (32; 33) in Appendix.

The net impact of this transfer was a decline in economic growth because export earnings were not used for importing capital and inputs for local industries to sustain national production. This is evident in Figure 7, which represents GNP per capita. GNP per capita increased before the first stabilization programme in 1976 at a steady rate but abruptly declined thereafter. Despite an increase of almost 47 per cent in 1980, the GNP per capita has been falling since. This seems consistent with the opponents of IMF programmes who contend that these programmes hurt the poor (Honeywell *et al.* 1983). The World Bank (1989:1) also acknowledged failure of the adjustment programmes by stating that African countries 'need to go beyond the issues of public finance, monetary policy, prices, and markets to address fundamental questions relating to human capacities, institutions, governance, the environment, population growth and distribution, and technology.'

FIGURE 7  
GNP PER CAPITA




Source: Data sources (34; 35) in Appendix.

Related to the fall of GNP per capita is the issue that adjustment programmes contribute to political instability (Malloy *et al.* 1977; Feinberg and Kallab 1984). Feinberg and Kallab (1984) contend that economic growth creates conditions conducive to compromise, but when the economic pie shrinks, conflict tends to mount. Figure 8 presents weighted political instability and highlights the fact that political instability such as riots and demonstrations have usually followed IMF stabilization programmes.<sup>12</sup> Each time the government launched IMF programmes, Zaire has been racked by riots, strikes, and demonstrations, escalating to a record high in 1984-85, when the government undertook wage freezes and massive cuts in food subsidies. As Morrison, Lafay, and Dessus (1994:174) point out, 'most of the stabilization and adjustment measures run the risk of causing political troubles. Cuts in subsidies, tax increases, privatization of public enterprises or removal of commercial protection threaten the income and employment of either large numbers of people or of well-organized groups.' Nonetheless, the political instability in Zaire was not entirely caused by IMF programmes; other factors, such as student rioting to demand for more grant money, was at play as well.

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<sup>12</sup> Political instability is operationalized in terms of several variables that include communal instability (ethnic violence, rebellion, and civil war), turmoil (demonstrations, strikes, riots, terrorism, declaration of emergency), cabinet instability (reallocations, new appointments, resignations, and dismissals), and elite instability (assassinations, plots, and attempted coups d'état). For more detail on this operationalization, refer to the Appendix.

FIGURE 8  
WEIGHTED POLITICAL INSTABILITY



Source: Data sources (1; 2; 4; 20) in Appendix.


The negative impact of stabilization policies on the Zairian society is a reflection of the IMF's short-term view, which overlooks the sensitivity and vulnerability of many African countries to external shocks.<sup>13</sup> For the opponents of IMF programmes (Hicks and Kubisch 1983), failure should be attributed to the way the programmes were designed to focus on macroeconomic imbalances, which ignored the micro-level problems of the community. As pointed out earlier, the oil embargo cost the Zairian economy an estimated US\$ 12 million; the destruction of Benguela railway through which Zaire exported its copper cost the treasury US\$ 33 million (Emizet 1987). Zaire seems to be particularly sensitive, because its openness to changes in other countries tends seriously to undermine its ability to recover.

Furthermore, the decline in world market prices of Zaire's main export – copper – cost the economy an estimated US\$ 115 million (Emizet 1987:184). The Zairian economy is highly vulnerable to major costs imposed by external changes, even after state managers have adjusted their policies to accommodate the changes. Another way of evaluating this vulnerability is to use Mann's (1984) definition of infrastructural power. According to Mann (1984:189), 'infrastructural power is the capacity of the state to actually

<sup>13</sup> According to Keohane and Nye (1989:12), sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework: how quickly do changes in one country induce costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects? Vulnerability is defined 'as an actor liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered' (Keohane and Nye 1989:13).

penetrate society and implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.' To penetrate the society is also concomitant to the idea of extracting resources from the society. Both penetration and extraction are parts of the political capacity of a state (Organski and Kugler 1978:141-80). Two measures of penetration serve as proxies to measure sensitivity and vulnerability of the state infrastructural power: the ratio of direct taxes to taxes on trade and the ratio of non-tax revenue to taxes on trade. Less sensitive countries have an unusually high ratio of direct taxes to taxes on trade, averaging a low of 10 and a high of 36 (Snider 1988). As Figure 9 illustrates, the ratio in Zaire has averaged 0.89 throughout the 1970s and 1980s, thus indicating the country's sensitivity to external shocks during the period of adjustment programmes. The ratio of non-tax revenue to trade taxes suggests that Zaire is less prepared to manage external shock, because it lacks the national structures or surpluses to cushion domestic social structures against the consequences of adverse external changes.

FIGURE 9  
STATE SENSITIVITY AND VULNERABILITY <sup>a</sup>



Note: <sup>a</sup> Computed by the author from government data. Refer to data sources (36; 37; 38; 39; 40) in Appendix.

Among the different stabilization programmes, the 1978 one was unique in the sense that its objectives included not only the restructuring of the Zairian economy but also liberalizing the political regime as well. Both the IMF and the World Bank required the government of Zaire to work with a team of expatriates in all income-generating agencies of the state. Control of the activities of the central bank and the Ministry of Finance were to be under the supervision of the IMF, which appointed European experts to key positions in both institutions to stop Zairian politicians and the ruling elite from diverting foreign exchange for their personal use.

The IMF became the agency of restraint because Mobutu had dismantled all similar indigenous agencies by placing them under his control. An agency of restraint is 'an institution whose goal is to protect public assets from depletion, prevent inflationary money printing, prevent corruption, protect socially productive groups from exploitation, and enforce contracts' (Collier 1991:155). The central bank and the Ministry of Finance, which were to play a restraining role in the policy-making process in Zaire, became instruments of Mobutu's personal enrichment. Mobutu was the sole agent of restraint and there was no limit to his personal spending because all revenue-generating agencies were answerable to him. In the absence of an indigenous agency of restraint, the IMF became this agency with the objective to control state finances. Therefore, recommended measures to cut budget deficits seemed to be appropriate to control the spending that benefited the governing upper class to the detriment of the masses. In addition, the IMF programmes were sound policies in the absence of an alternative solution within the Zairian context.

Despite its role as an agency of restraint, the IMF and its technocrats had little success in the Zairian patronage system. In 1978 in violation of IMF guidelines, fifty private companies owned by the ruling class withheld funds abroad totalling US\$ 300 million (US Congress 1981:5). During the years 1977-79, Mobutu and his family alone withdrew US\$ 71 million, US\$ 65 million, and US\$ 95 million respectively (US Congress 1981:33; Field Log 1991-92). Zaire's sensitivity and vulnerability to external shocks and the unwillingness of Mobutu and his barons to respect budgetary constraints were the major obstacles to the implementation of IMF policies. The growing government deficit was a reflection of the authoritarian regime that Mobutu had installed in Zaire, a regime that consumed national wealth in the name of the people and borrowed from the international community on their behalf.

Erwin Bluementhal, head of the IMF team at the central bank of Zaire, resigned in frustration after two years because he was unable to curb the transfers of funds to the personal use of the ruling elite. Nonetheless, Bluementhal was able to accomplish in less than a year what many observers thought would be impossible in Zaire's corrupt-ridden political system. According to Emizet (1987:190), he managed to reduce imports in non-primary sectors, limit banking credit, force businessmen linked to the regime to pay up money owed to the banking system, and cut commercial debts.


Another method for evaluating the IMF programmes is to picture the Zairian economy without these measures to control the extravagance of the ruling group. In such a context, Zaire – assuming an annual spending rate of 7 per cent a year since 1972 – would have collapsed economically early in the 1980s. The Zairian state was captured by Mobutu and his coalition and became a predatory state that had no legitimacy because of its systematic exclusion of the majority of the people from access to resources and its monopoly over state resources. In the absence of the IMF, it is possible that the Zairian authorities would have created constraints similar to those of the IMF.

In brief, efforts to stabilize the economy were a failure due both to the short-term policies of the International Monetary Fund and the unwillingness of the Zairian

leadership to follow IMF guidelines. In 1991, economic growth was again negative and the price level, following the looting by soldiers in September 1991, increased at the rate of 250 per cent a month. At the same time, political instability combined with economic decline brought about the dramatic pauperization of the majority; as a result, the health sector has had to depend since 1991 for its functioning almost entirely on humanitarian aid and religious charities.

Devaluations and cuts in food subsidies increased the prices of foodstuffs in the major towns that relied on food imports. Because wage freezes also formed a part of the IMF package, the average state employee could no longer afford on his real income to buy the necessary foodstuffs to sustain a well-balanced diet. Thus, the centrality given to the balance of payments in the IMF programmes undermined the real issue in Zaire, that of falling real incomes. Calorie intake per capita illustrates the impact of falling real income on the average citizen in Zaire. As Figure 10 indicates, calorie intake per capita improved before 1976 but then started declining thereafter, never regaining the 1976 level of 2300 calories. As calorie intake measures energy consumed, a decline in the number of calories implies low productivity of the average citizen and less food nutrients consumed by pregnant women.

FIGURE 10  
DAILY CALORIE INTAKE PER CAPITA




Source: Refer to data sources (13) in Appendix.

The link between calorie intake per capita and infant mortality is obvious. If the mother does not have proper nutrition during pregnancy, the child has little chance of survival. As pointed out by Cornia (1987:37), 'The mother's health, nutrition, and reproductive behaviour very strongly influence the health and survival of the child, because of the biological link between mother and child during pregnancy and lactation.' The decline in

health expenditures, real incomes, and food subsidies as well as rising prices of pharmaceutical products and foodstuffs during adjustment periods contributed to the death of thousands of children, the most vulnerable group in society.

Figure 11 indicates the trends of infant mortality rate and the rate of people with access to clean water. Infant mortality rate is the number of children who die during a given year from birth to 12 months per 1000 live births during the same year. Infant mortality increased during stabilization years, leading to the conclusion that these programmes undermined the foundation of a healthy population for long-term economic growth. Therefore, Stewart argues (1987:147), 'An essential element of any strategy for adjustment with a human face is to ensure that ... the macro policies ... contribute directly to the improvement of the conditions of vulnerable groups.'

FIGURE 11  
 INFANT MORTALITY RATE AND RATE OF PEOPLE WITH ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER



Source: For infant mortality, refer to data sources (34; 35) in Appendix and for people with clean water, WHO (annual) and Field Log (1991-92).

An additional indicator of the failure of the IMF policies and the predatory nature of the Mobutu regime is the availability of clean water. To synchronize the graph with the infant mortality rate, the percentage of people with clean water was converted to indicate the corresponding number of people with clean water per 1000. After an increasing trend from 1972 onward, the number of people with clean water dropped

sharply in 1986, never to recover to its 1973 level. In brief, both the IMF and the Mobutu regime behaved without a 'human face.'<sup>14</sup>

By failing to control the spending of Mobutu and his barons, the IMF imposed an overwhelming burden and socio-economic costs on society. Therefore, to understand the Zairian economic crisis requires an analysis of the political context dominated by President Mobutu, who ruled Zaire with an iron fist from 1965 for more than 30 years. Five strategies, which created a personalized style of rule by concentrating power around the state and reducing intra-elite competition, dominated Mobutu's regime: i) institutionalization of violence or state terrorism, ii) constitutional amendments, iii) creation of party institutions parallel to state organs, iv) institutionalization of corruption, and v) policies retarding development.

The goal of the first three strategies was to eliminate the participatory institutions inherited from the first pluralist regime (1960-65). This process of impedance suppressed all institutions opposed to the Mobutu regime, but encouraged those which enhanced central leadership. The last two strategies tended to enlarge the existing bureaucratic structures. This process of facilitation created overlapping offices and confusion because it enforced the feeling that nobody was in charge of the day-to-day administrative matters.

### **2.3 Political economy I: policies of impedance in Zaire**

The first instrument Mobutu utilized to consolidate his power was fear and oppression through a nationwide network of secret police staffed at the top by people from his tribe. The government increased the size of its security personnel to administer state coercive force and to control the political attitudes of the people (Schatzberg 1988; Willame 1992). For instance, security service personnel rose from a mere 253 to 45,000 people by the end of 1989 (Field Log 1991-92). In addition, the size of the Zairian armed forces increased from 34,000 in 1966 to almost 70,000 by 1992.

Nonetheless, the growth of the armed forces and secret police was not matched by an adequate growth in the real wages of these groups. The real wage of the troops had decreased 99.9 per cent from 1970 to the end of 1980s, similar to the general decline in real wages (Figure 1). Not only was the regular military corps an instrument of terror, but it also contributed to the lawlessness in Zaire. For example, soldiers have been patrolling the towns since the 1970s, not for keeping the streets free of crime, but for robbing and holding people for ransom. Built as an instrument to support the authoritarian state, the military corps came to mirror anarchy and was the first state

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<sup>14</sup> UNICEF was the first to popularize the concept of 'adjustment with a human face' (Cornia *et al.*:1987). The editors point out that the standard of living of the poor and the nutritional status of children in the African countries that experienced significant progress as the result of adjustment programmes, Botswana and Zimbabwe, eroded as the result of exogenous shocks not attributable to IMF programmes. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that poverty has increased in many countries in their sample survey and alarmingly state that IMF programmes in their current form can neither sustain short-term economic growth nor improve the existing trend in the long-run in the present international environment.

force to undermine the legitimacy of the state managers. The Zairian armed forces became the occupying force, destroying and stealing private property. The apex of this behaviour was the massive pillage by the military that started in the capital city on 23 September 1991, and spread throughout the country. Since then, soldiers have taken citizens hostage, have harassed and killed innocent people, but have been helpless in defending the nation against external aggression.

President Mobutu also consolidated his power with several constitutional amendments that made him the sole authority without whom nothing could be decided. On 24 April 1967, seventeen months after he seized power, Mobutu promulgated a new constitution installing a presidential unitary regime with a two-party system (Article 4, Paragraph 2). But this constitution was modified several times to personalize his power. The first amendment to the 1967 constitution in December 1970 institutionalized the Popular Movement of the Revolution as the single political party in Zaire. The state became subordinate to the party and all organizations associated with the civil society became illegal if they lacked the party banner. The creation of a single party system gave Mobutu unlimited power and control over the state budget and all state marketing boards. By absorbing state structures, the party increased political pressure on the administration, which was expected to adhere to party guidelines.

Furthermore, the single party system meant that a career in the administration was no longer an avenue to social mobility since promotions would depend on individual party discipline and ethnic loyalties. Party leaders emerged as the new privileged group and developed corporate interests of their own. Party bureaucrats increased their control over resources and the closer to the president these party leaders were, the more state resources they controlled. Strategic upper level state posts were staffed with people loyal to Mobutu and his close relatives, who occupied the 'most sensitive and lucrative government positions' (Sandbrook 1985:91). Ethnic ties became a key factor of social mobility and in dispensing patronage among party leaders.

Another of Mobutu's moves was a constitutional amendment in August 1974, which institutionalized 'Mobutism', or the teaching of Mobutu's ideas. This law implicitly made Mobutu president for life and above the law. Mobutism became the main political philosophy which even the various Zairian churches had to follow. Mobutu opened a training school, *Institut Makanda Kabobi*, to teach party members Mobutism, which became the political messianism of traditional inspiration and was targeted against Christianity. The power of its founder, Mobutu, became unlimited and he was almost deified.<sup>15</sup> To reinforce his cult of personality, Mobutu always appeared in public with his magical emblems, a leopard-skin hat and a carved stick with a naked woman entwined around the shaft.<sup>16</sup> Called Guide, Saviour, Father, or Messiah, Mobutu became the epicentre surrounded by party members or Mobutists who constantly

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<sup>15</sup> At the height of his rule in the 1970s, Mobutu was shown every evening on television emerging from the clouds as he approached earth.

<sup>16</sup> In 1978, Mobutu dropped from public sight and the Zairian *radio trottoir* (sidewalk radio, the euphemism for rumour in Zaire) affirmed that his hat was stolen and his magic with it, so Mobutu did not dare venture forth. The truth was that the cult of personality was built within the office of the president where employees had to come up with stories which were given to the Zairian people as real information.

reaffirmed their faith in his wisdom, generosity, and fairness. By the end of 1972, Mobutu became less tolerant of criticism and 'anyone identifying policy flaws ran the risk of *lèse majesté*' (Young and Turner 1985:171). Mobutu's speeches across the country were the basis of Zairian laws, policies, and regulations.

In 1972, Mobutu banned all Christian names and nationalized the Catholic schools. This started the conflict between the Catholic church and the state, even though the church had worked with political and administrative authorities since the colonial period. Forbidding Christian names was known as 'authenticity,' a process that also extended to lifestyle. The message was *abacost* (the acronym for *à bas le costume* or down with the suit) which banned the three piece suit. Men had to wear a blend of a Mao-type jacket and western clothing.

The aim of the different constitutional amendments in the 1970s was to strengthen the state as an institution of authority and capabilities. Yet by placing Mobutu above the law, these state-building efforts to legitimize his rule, were also the first mechanism to weaken the Zairian state base and efficacy. As Mobutu seemed firmly in control in the mid-1970s, the opponents of the regime – *Front National de Libération du Congo* (National Front for Congo Liberation) – invaded the Shaba copper mining region in 1977 and 1978. The importance of Shaba was enormous for the Zairian economy. First, it provided more than 50 per cent of the country's export earnings following the collapse of agriculture from years of government neglect. Second, the region also produced 5 per cent of the world's copper and 50 per cent of its cobalt.

The first invasion on 8 March 1977 was carried out by less than 2,000 men trained by Cubans in Angola against 25,000 Zairian soldiers. The Zairian army was completely defeated by the invaders and had to be rescued by the West. The French government organized an airlift of Moroccan soldiers into the combat region, but the invaders were reluctant to face the new support forces and withdrew to their Angolan base.

The aftermath of the invasion was not a peaceful one for the population of the region. The Zairian armed forces, which had been helpless in stopping the invaders, turned against the local unarmed civilians, accusing them of being sympathetic to the intruders. More than 800 unarmed civilians were killed and the number of displaced people fearing reprisals exceeded 200,000 (Amnesty International 1979). The killings and the refugee outflow reflected 'the brutal nature of a reoccupation campaign by ill-disciplined armed forces' (Young and Turner 1985:257). A few months later when an obscure religious group in the Bandundu region turned against the government, Mobutu's soldiers were flown into the area; an estimated 2,100 people were slaughtered (Field Log 1991-92).

The same forces, which had invaded the copper region in 1977, attacked again in May 1978, seizing areas well as the main headquarters of the mining company. Although the skirmish was shorter than in 1977, the number of dead was much larger, estimated at 2,000 people. More than 250,000 either crossed the border or moved to other provinces. The invaders were driven out by French and Belgian paratroopers on 20 May 1978. The role of the US was limited to providing air transport and materials during the

paratrooper drop.<sup>17</sup> Unlike the first international intervention in the Congo during the first half of the 1960s when external actors had the license to shape the country's politics, the role of the West in the Shaba wars was to keep Mobutu in power because he had pledged to keep Central Africa free of Soviet influence.

Given the importance of the mining region, which provided a lion's share of state revenue, it was obvious that the two attacks were waged against President Mobutu, with the intent to overthrow him by weakening his regime. The invasions destroyed several copper refineries and caused 50 per cent cutbacks on pre-arranged deliveries and future contracts. In addition, these wars pointed out the paradox of the Zairian armed forces, which had been built to support the authoritarian system but which, at the same time, had become a burden. Although the number of soldiers had grown and the military budget increased, the Zairian armed forces were inept and unreliable in deterring the external invasion. By 1992, these forces had become an army of occupation, stealing property and harassing civilians.

The two Shaba wars highlighted the fact that the Zairian state had been maintained by the international community. In 1977-78, Western diplomats argued in favour of Mobutu's support because in Zaire there was no other viable alternative to Mobutu; the country needed a strong man to hold the 250 plus tribes together. On the day Mobutu's Moroccan allies blunted the insurgent advance, the IMF announced a US\$ 54 million loan to Zaire with certain economic conditions attached. In 1979, the IMF committed an additional US\$ 420 million in extended facility to Zaire, making it the largest amount ever allocated to a Sub-Saharan country. These commitments created an urgency to liberalize the Mobutu regime (Emizet 1987) and pressures from the West resulted in the constitutional reform of 1978, according to which the Legislative Council would become the organ vested with the power of control over the executive branch. For almost two years, members of the government were called before the Legislative Council to justify their spending and the running of their departments. In 1979, a parliamentary commission of inquiry found that the president had illegally withdrawn US\$ 150 million in foreign exchange for personal use from the central bank in defiance of the austerity measures linked by the IMF to its stabilization programme.


A year later, Mobutu again amended the constitution. Article 80 that had given the Legislature the power to control the executive branch of government and state enterprises was abolished, and Mobutu regained control of the state marketing boards and the state budget. This amendment of the constitution was followed by Law No 80/007 of 15 November 1980 that created a new party institution called the Central Committee, to which all 120 members were appointed by the president. The Committee took over most of the roles vested in the Legislative Council. To ensure their loyalty, Mobutu signed an ordinance granting committee members a salary ranging from US\$ 5,000 to US\$ 9,200 a month, while physicians and college teachers were getting

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<sup>17</sup> Fearing more invasions, a 'peacekeeping force' returned to the mining region of Shaba. This peacekeeping force was made of some 1,500 Moroccans and several detachments from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gabon, and Central African Republic giving the impression of a real inter-African force, although the bulk of the force was Moroccan.

less than US\$ 350 a month (US Congress 1981:8 and 52). Thus foreign intervention in Zaire had failed to liberalize Mobutu's repressive regime and had reinforced governmental irresponsibility and venality.

FIGURE 12  
VICTIMS OF AUTOCRACY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
(NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED)



Source: Refer to data sources (5; 6; 14) in Appendix.

The new revision of the constitution triggered strong opposition by 13 legislators within the Legislative Council and this resulted in an attempt to establish the first organized opposition party within Zaire called the *Union Pour La Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS). These legislators were stripped of their civil and political rights and exiled into the vast interior of Zaire. In 1982, the group was convicted of treason for its attempt to form a second political party in Zaire. A year later when Amnesty International (1983) published a critical analysis of human rights violations in Zaire condemning the regime for torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings of opponents, Mobutu reacted by granting a general amnesty to all political prisoners. Some political exiles accepted the offer, but many refused to return home. Many of the exiles who did return were arrested, tortured and executed. A year later, opposition to Mobutu intensified and a rebel army operating from Tanzania held the town of Moba in the Shaba province for two days in November 1984, before the Zairian armed forces regained it. Political instability continued as opposition forces within the country and abroad intensified their claims for the liberalization of the Mobutu regime.

Meanwhile, Mobutu strengthened his coercive apparatus to remain in power. According to reports from the field in 1991-92 and from former members of the Zairian military secret services, Mobutu ordered the killing of thousands of innocent people and opponents, some of whom were dropped from helicopters or dragged into the Congo (Zaire) River (ANACOZA 1996; Field Log 1991-92). In brief, extrajudicial killings and disappearances have been common in Zaire since Mobutu took power in 1965. Figure 12 provides an estimation of the people killed under the Mobutu regime for their faith, tribal origin, political conviction, or because Mobutu could not co-opt them into his political regime. (Note that the figure underestimates the numbers involved and relies on existing data and information from the individuals in charge of executions.)

#### **2.4 Political economy II: policies of facilitation in Zaire**

Corruption is the illegal use of public office for private gain (Theobald 1990:15). According to Huntington (1968), it is one of the several measures a developing nation can implement to delay political violence. In other words, corruption is a form of political co-optation aimed at strengthening the state. Nonetheless, private appropriation of public resources by one individual or by a clique can also undermine the legitimacy of the state. In fact, most of Mobutu's policies aimed to strengthen his power by co-opting different people and isolating those he could not.


The first instrument of co-optation was an 'elected position' in the Legislative Council but the legislative elections were neither free nor fair. Some candidates were already winners even before the polls had closed. Especially in early days of Mobutu's ascendancy, an important qualification for a candidate to be able to run for a legislative seat was loyalty to Mobutism. This changed in the late 1970s when, forced by external pressures, the Legislative Council was given the power to control government spending. Nevertheless, the creation of the Central Committee in 1980 ended this legislative independence. After 1980, the Legislative Council remained the seat of patronage; turnover of members was low and the Legislative Council was totally biased toward the pre-World War II generation. In the first legislative session under the Mobutu regime in 1970, there was only one legislator who was born after 1945. By 1976, the number of post-war legislators had increased to five out of 350. In the third legislature, the post-war generation was able to capture 7 per cent of the seats out of a total of 221, increasing its share from 12 per cent in 1982 to 23 per cent in 1986. The survival of the regime depended largely on Mobutu being courteous toward former colleagues with whom he had risen to power.

The major source of patronage, however, was a position in the executive branch. Mobutu's key strategy was the frequent reshuffling of the government, a strategy which inspired fear and insecurity among officials because retaining their posts depended neither on their effectiveness nor on their efficiency, but on Mobutu's willingness to keep them on the job. From 1965 to 1990, Mobutu reshuffled the government 43 times. This manipulation resulted in frequent embezzlements and mismanagement of the public domain. Fully aware of the insecurity of their jobs, the managers of state domains

were unwilling to work for the welfare of the public. Thus, state jobs became the means to personal enrichment.

A second strategy, illustrated by Figure 13, was a policy of 'musical chairs' that re-introduced disgraced members of the party to government posts. Approximately 315 individuals have headed the various Zairian ministries from 1965 to 1993. 'Old members' in Figure 13 represent ministers re-appointed at least once and 'new members' are ministers entering the government for the first time. Positive changes indicate government appointments and negative changes dismissals. The rate of turnover averaged less than ten new members per year, except in 1992-93 when two governments claimed legitimacy in Kinshasa. Mobutu's strategy consisted of bringing in new appointees by taking out a few old members. For example, the number of ministers decreased from 29 in 1972 to 19 in 1973. With this change Mobutu appointed four new government members as indicated by a rise in the dotted line. At the same time, he dismissed ten old members. In mid-1974, he dismissed some new members only to name additional new appointees in the three subsequent years. Then in 1977, Mobutu replaced all the new members with old members, as indicated by an upward move of the solid line. The turnover rate for both old and new members was almost the same throughout the years. Reluctant to have old and new appointees in the same government, Mobutu, with these frequent reshuffles, was able to avoid any power consolidation of people who could challenge his authority.

FIGURE 13  
TURNOVER IN THE GOVERNMENT (a)



Note: (a) Computed from data in Appendix, data sources (1; 4; 7; 20; 41).

Most public officials knew that regardless of their inefficiency and corruption, they could re-enter the government because Mobutu was a forgiving father. To head a government position required neither a sense of management nor good conscience. On many occasions, effectiveness was an obstacle to political advancement. Mobutu demanded absolute personal allegiance in return for all opportunities to accumulate wealth. The Mobutu regime is an example of 'sultanism', which is a system where '[S]upport is based not on a coincidence of interest between pre-existing privileged groups and the ruler but on the interests created by his rule, the rewards he offers for loyalty, and the fear of his vengeance. The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler become blurred' (Linz 1975:140). Therefore, Mobutu as the benevolent leader actually encouraged corrupt practices when in 1976, he eloquently urged his citizens to steal wisely: 'If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way, but if you steal too much to become rich overnight you will be caught. And if you have succeeded in stealing, please reinvest in our country the product of your theft. You become the republic's enemy if you transfer this product overseas' (Kabwit 1979:397).

Corruption became the 'system' (Gould 1980:xvii), because out of greed and fear for their own survival, those at the top institutionalized corruption and locked their subordinates into these practices in a systematic, normative way where wrong doing was the rule. By mid-1975, every public service was for sale as bureaucrats could barely survive on their meagre salaries. Sandbrook (1985:91) portrays Mobutu as an extreme version of a 'sun-king' who was orbited by members of the political party, e.i. the satellites. The closer the party leaders were to the president, the more resources they controlled. In the position of 'distant planets' were the thousands of middle-level bureaucrats, teachers, college professors and middle-level army officers whose opportunities for social mobility were limited without some ethnic or friendship ties to Mobutu or to the 'satellites'.

These ties were another instrument of co-optation. As pointed out earlier, Belgians created the term Ngala to describe riverain ethnic people, but this group became self-conscious of its identity during decolonization in the late 1950s. When Mobutu took power in 1965, he declared himself to be a Mungala (Ngala), thus automatically dissociating himself from the eastern Swahili regions. The clientelist networks Mobutu established with this Ngala association destroyed for many certain avenues of social mobility such as education, because regionalism became an important element in gaining access to the ruling group.

According to a memorandum of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Zaire, the distribution of certain top-level state positions was as follows: out of 148 members of the Central Committee, 19 per cent were from President Mobutu's Ngala region; as also were 49 per cent of the 37 army generals; 34 per cent of the 53 ambassadors; and all of the four heads of security service bureaux were from the Mobutu's tribe, the Ngbandi (Braeckman 1992; Field Log 1991-92). Field research in 1991-92 also indicated that more than half of these posts were predominantly staffed by western ethnic groups, mostly from the Ngala ethnic clans from Mobutu's region of Equator (*Equateur*). This dominance of the Ngala and particularly of the Ngbandi certainly did not reflect their proportional distribution of the Zairian population. The Ngala from the Equator region

represented less than 12 per cent of the population while the Ngbandi constituted less than 3 per cent (Morrison, Mitchell and Paden 1989; Vansina 1966), but they occupied the best paid positions and most sensitive jobs in the government.

Even Bakongo (people of Kongo tribe), who first were reluctant to accept the Ngala name have relied on this ethnic identity to share in the state spoils. To counterbalance this ethnic exclusivity, eastern Zairians identified themselves with the term 'Baswahili', which describes people from the eastern regions who speak any derivative of Swahili. In the 1960s, the term first referred to groups of students from the eastern regions who went to study at Lovanium University in Kinshasa. As employment became politicized in the early 1970s, it became apparent that Baswahili as a group needed to be contended with. When campuses became highly politicized in the mid-1970s, college students were also mobilized along the Baswahili/Ngala (east-west) lines to form coalitions of student government bodies.

The malleability of ethnic identity was also illustrated by the violence that erupted in eastern Zaire in 1996. The Banyamulenge had been considered Zairians until 1995. Having migrated from Rwanda to the fertile high plateaux above the shores of Lake Tanganyika at the end of 18th century, they became Zairians (then Congolese) in 1910 when European powers arbitrarily changed the Rwandan and Belgian Congo border. The Banyamulenge were successful in a number of lucrative mining and commercial ventures that opened these people to scapegoating by the local Zairian politicians from the region of South Kivu. In the early 1980s, politicians from other ethnic groups tried to persuade the Mobutu regime to strip the Banyamulenge of their Zairian citizenship. In 1995, the High Council of the Republic/Transitional Parliament (HCR/TP) voted to deny them citizenship. Since then, this group has been known as the Tutsi. In September 1996, the deputy governor of South Kivu requested this ethnic group to leave the country and go back to Rwanda.

One explanation for the recent redefinition of ethnic identity is the patronage system that has since collapsed. Ethnic conflict and regional polarization did not emerge or become salient in the 1970s and 1980s because of the stability and durability of the patronage system Mobutu institutionalized in Zaire. The collapse of patron-client ties has pitted one group against another as state spoils or patronage have almost disappeared. Patron-client ties refer to 'a more or less personalized, affective and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships' (Jözsa 1980:139). Accordingly, ethnicity as a group phenomenon had a strong stabilizing element in political relations in Zaire. Ethnic solidarities along regional lines fostered clientelistic ties on a nationwide basis, because these served as an avenue for specific ethnic groups to attain central positions of power.

But, Schatzberg (1980:182) indicates that ethnic politics are important when scarce resources are distributed among the members of the same class. His study encompasses field research in the northwestern Zairian town of Lisala where the beer industry reflects the class formation and consciousness. According to Schatzberg, political order and

authority have been institutionalized in Zaire through inequality, corruption, and decreasing social mobility. By looking at the development of bureaucracy to analyse class formation and the development of its consciousness, Schatzberg found that it was not possible to explain political processes with class alone. Thus, class and ethnicity are both dependent on the social and political context of the moment (Schatzberg 1980:173). His argument that ethnicity explains the distribution of resources among members of the same class provides an explanation of how the centralization of power and co-optation have encouraged class formation in Zaire. Nonetheless, class formation is related more to power relations than to production relations. Access to political power provided the means of being included in the ruling class while denying this access to others. In addition, co-optation created cross-cutting cleavages among the elite and delayed political polarization along ethnic or regional lines.

Because patronage was paramount for the survival of Mobutu's regime, the state had to extract funding from external sources and from society. Foreign aid and foreign debt provided an invaluable external source of patronage to the Mobutu regime. Internally, state managers relied on resources from the agricultural sector and channelled these to the capital city where competition for state spoils was fierce among Mobutu's clients. The peasants who represented the majority of the Zairian population were completely ignored by government leaders and all of Mobutu's policies were detrimental to rural development.

The neglect of the rural areas can be explained by several factors: long distance to the closest towns, the status of the region with respect to governmental favours, and the wretched condition of the roads. For example, a peasant living in the Lower Zaire region (*Bas Zaire*) or in the rural areas surrounding the capital city would have benefited more from the fairly decent infrastructure than his fellow man living in the remote districts. The isolation of the rural areas was linked to the events of the 1960s when the departure of the colonial administration destroyed the urban-rural links, resulting in a deterioration of the transportation network and a decline in legal trade. For example, Zaire in 1960 inherited from the colonial government more than 165,000 kilometres of roads but by the end of 1991, only 640 kilometres were operational (Field Log 1991-92). The deterioration of the national transportation network and the lack of policy for rural development by the central government resulted in a tremendous increase in illegal trade across the borders. It was much cheaper for business people to trade with neighbouring countries than with the Zairian hinterland.

Thus, smuggling across Zairian borders tied the different regions of the country to wider geographical areas, each with its own specific circuit of illegal trafficking. To the east, the region of Kivu was linked to Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and South-east Asia. To the west, Kinshasa and the region of Lower Zaire were linked to Angola, Congo, West Africa, and Europe. The region of Shaba in the southeast formed a part of the network that extended from Zambia to South Africa. The region of Equator in the north was tied to the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and through the system, to Nigeria.

The official government policy was low prices for agricultural products. Although small farmers obeyed this regulation for a short period, they developed market strategies to escape the state's total control by increasing either their cash crop production or their subsistence production. Since the government also required small farmers to sell their cash crops to the state marketing boards, they became ensnared by smugglers who offered prices far above the fixed official rates (Field Log 1991-92). For example, during the period 1973 to 1985, the Zairian state marketing board responsible for coffee was paying the peasants Z 0.23 per kilogram while the price paid by smugglers rose from Z 0.24 in 1974 to Z 1.79 in 1985 (Field Log 1991-92). In dollar terms, the fixed price declined from US\$ 0.46 in 1973 to almost US\$ 0.07 in 1985, compared to the US\$ 0.42 paid by the smugglers for several years. Captivated by the world market incentives of the 1970s, the small farmers acted accordingly. In some rural areas, the peasants exchanged their produce for salt, soap, sugar, or cooking oil instead of cash. This strategy was common mostly in the northeastern parts of Zaire.

State marketing boards bought cheaply from the rural producers and sold at competitive world prices, a system of rural surplus extraction that provided resources to the Mobutu regime. By 1992, most state marketing boards were out of business or running below their capacity, because they had nothing to sell either in Zaire or in the world markets. The demise of most state marketing boards resulted from mismanagement by the ruling group and the farmers' withdrawal from the official economy in protest to the fixed producer price policies.

The gold and diamond industry is another example that illustrates Mobutu patronage. In 1989-90 alone, seven shops in the gold business collected more than 2,669 kilograms of gold valued at US\$ 31.2 million and 22 diamond shops stockpiled more than 10 million carats worth US\$ 196 million (Zaire 1989; 1990a). The gold was sold at the world market price, which during 1988-90 averaged US\$ 410 an ounce. The diamonds at the world prices produced an estimated gain of US\$ 986 million. Yet, the gold and diamond industry employed only 325 people whose total earnings for the entire year were US\$ 50,000, or US\$ 12.8 a month per employee (Zaire 1992). Therefore, the efforts of the ruling group to increase their personal wealth had no impact on the welfare of the community in Kinshasa.


Figure 14 presents state-societal interactions in terms of rents captured by the ruling group and societal withdrawing strategies, which include both the informal economy and smuggling. Appendix provides operational definitions of rents, informal economy and smuggling. Rent is that part of a payment to the owner of resources which exceeds the value these resources would normally command (Buchanan 1980:3). In such a context, rent is the extra payment over the minimum needed to keep a public official on the job, or 'a receipt in excess of opportunity cost' (Buchanan 1980:3). As pointed out by Donahue (1989:52), this definition is regrettable because most people have another perfectly good meaning in mind for that word.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, as characterized by

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<sup>18</sup> Ricardo (1963) was the first to analyse rent in relation to farmland. Since a parcel of land cannot be moved, its alternative uses are limited to what can be grown or built on it. The plot has no perfect competitor sharing its attributes and location. Thus, the owner of a particularly fertile or well-located

Buchanan, rent-seeking on the part of public officials is behaviour in 'institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus' (Buchanan 1980:4).

FIGURE 14  
RENTS AND UNOFFICIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (a)



Note: (a) Computed from data in Appendix (see Operationalization).

According to Figure 14, the ruling class had captured 34 per cent of the GDP in 1988. This class, therefore, had managed since 1972 to control an annual average of 16.4 per cent of the GDP in the form of rents. But these had no positive effect on the society as a whole. In fact, most members of the ruling group invested their wealth abroad or in the Zairian commerce and transport services as well as in the gold and diamond businesses in the capital city of Kinshasa. These ventures, with a turnover capital of more than US\$ 640 million in 1991, represented 88 per cent of the economic activities of Kinshasa, but employed only 3,318 persons out of the city's active population of 2.5 million (Field Log 1991-92; Zaire 1992).


Since state employment in 1991 accounted for only 241,000 people out of Kinshasa's population, the remaining economically active residents of the city were living outside

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parcel of land can charge a premium price for its use, which corresponds roughly to what modern economists mean by rent. Unfortunately, this notion of rent is not the only one used here.

the official economy.<sup>19</sup> The situation was worse in regions where the state, although the largest employer, provided jobs for no more than 2 per cent of the economically active population. As the agricultural sector provided employment for 76 per cent of the economically active population in 1991, 22 per cent of the people were involved in the unofficial economy, particularly smuggling and the informal sector (petty trade).<sup>20</sup>

FIGURE 15  
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES



Source: Data are from Zaire (36; 37; 38; 39; 40), refer to data sources in Appendix.

Illegal trafficking averaged 15 per cent of the GDP a year over the period 1967-92; however, in 1988, this activity accounted for 71 per cent of GDP. Smuggling was the reaction to the predator state that failed to provide a favourable environment for development. The informal economy has also grown drastically since 1967, corresponding to the official GDP in 1990 when Mobutu decided to liberalize his political regime. Since then, the informal economy has responded to political instability.

<sup>19</sup> Several studies have documented the reaction of citizens to a predator state (De Soto 1989; Chickering and Salabdine 1991; Hyden 1980; Scott 1986). Citizens' retreat from the official economy includes passivity, subsistence agriculture, and involvement in the unofficial economy.

<sup>20</sup> The informal economy bears little resemblance to smuggling, which is a structure generated mostly in response to state interventions that create an excess of supply or demand of a particular product or factor market (Lindauer 1989:1877). Unlike operators in the informal economy, smugglers are likely to handle high value goods and readily transportable commodities that can be sold more profitably by evading state-regulated channels because: i) no export tax is paid; ii) sales can be made in currencies much more valuable than local ones; and iii) earnings are received abroad, where proceeds can be invested in either real estate or goods which are in high demand or short supply evading again the state takeoff in customs.

This supports previous studies, which indicate that the informal economy may be a response to political instability and economic scarcity (Azarya and Chazan 1987; Theobald 1990).

Nonetheless, the informal economy and smuggling may also represent two types of activities that exist 'not simply as solutions to household survival or individual subsistence problems, but rather as political options, co-opted by political discourse' (Redclift and Mingione 1985:4). In fact, Young and Turner (1985) have indicated that in the case of Zaire, unofficial economic activities have delayed political polarization along ethnic lines. In other words, as long as the unofficial economic sector provided citizens with some means of survival or accumulating wealth outside the state apparatus, political polarization was unlikely to occur.

The distribution of government expenditures – the Zairian president had personally spent more than 35 per cent of the budget since 1972 – is another factor that reflects his neglect of rural development. Key sectors like agriculture, which had top priority in the colonial period, were allocated less than 15 per cent of government expenditures. Consequently since 1968, agriculture, health care, public works, and other social programmes put together received no more than 18 per cent of total government expenditures. Government spending on education dropped drastically in 1989 and after 1991 was almost zero because all state institutions of higher education were closed (see Figure 15). Mobutu controlled 90 per cent of government expenditures during the period 1991-96.

The increase in government expenditures to support the regime and the decline in social programmes illustrate the paradox that many former colonial territories are confronting. African leaders are faced with problems of both state-building and economic development. State-building implies the creation of a political entity that accommodates centrifugal and contradictory interests, and economic development means the mobilization of resources to improve the well-being of the different societies that comprise the state. As pointed out by Ake (1996:2), 'the state in developing countries is burdened with enormous responsibilities which it is hardly in a position to fulfil. In particular, it is supposed to undertake economic development in the face of a weak or non-existent entrepreneurial class. Along with that daunting challenge, it is also expected to undertake state-building, nation-building and political integration.' The Zairian case indicates that these two objectives present the emerging new state with a trade-off in which state-building dominates economic development efforts. In order to legitimize the Mobutu regime, the attempt to create a strong state on a weak economic base required the incorporation of a small group of followers loyal to the ruling group.

However, by creating an atmosphere of intrigue and suspicion among his followers, Mobutu diminished their effectiveness on the job, hence sacrificing economic development which, in the long run, destroyed the foundation of state-building. Fischer and Lundgreen (1975) have indicated that in the concept of loyalty versus effectiveness, a dilemma which rulers have faced in their state-building efforts throughout history, the two virtues do not necessarily coincide in the short term. No government can survive unless it attains a minimum of both. Granting governmental posts according to political

and sub-national loyalties reduces the ability of the state to assign these positions on the basis of technical competence, but may increase the number of people who have a great interest in the state's survival.

## 2.5 Section summary

The purpose of this section is to highlight the economic and political setting of Zaire which shapes the country's current predicament. The colonial legacy remains a contributing factor to the current political crisis. Urban settlements, created to support the colonial administration, are still major pockets of political conflict because they represent the centres of the decision-making process and economic activities. Mobutu's policies of impedance and facilitation reinforced this urban bias. His goal was to create a domain consensus among the elite to share the spoils of the state through patronage. In the quest for recognition, Mobutu enacted the policy of 'zairianization' in November 1973, which gave the ruling group ownership of all small and medium-sized foreign businesses. This exogenous change modifying property rights was a disaster because most enterprises were handed over to politicians or their relatives who had no managerial experience.

Mobutu's own aggrandizement and personal rule were at the root of the zairianization policies. The economy, already weak in 1972, started to decline in 1974. All efforts by the IMF to assist stabilizing the economy were ineffective because the ruling group was unwilling to follow budgetary guidelines. Mismanagement of the public domain to induce personal gain has contributed to a decline in health standards and an increase in infant mortality.

Mobutu's policy on renewed property rights prompted smuggling in order to benefit from price differentials across national borders. By taking advantage of several endogenous changes such as new markets and price increases of cash crops in the world markets, Zairian traders were able to change the cost-benefit ratio associated with various social activities, which encouraged them to accumulate wealth outside the state apparatus. These changes, compounded by the state policies of economic neglect, created market links with neighbouring countries that increased regional integration and undermined internal economic cohesion.

This section also highlights the fact that Zaire or Congo is the product of the international community, which has supported the country's national survival since Zaire was incorporated in the international community in 1885. The assistance of the international community has been paramount in maintaining order and since UN's intervention in the 1960s avoiding the balkanization of the country into mini-states. The international support from the West was primarily motivated by the need to counteract the spread of communism in Central Africa and to secure crucial raw materials such as cobalt. International assistance was also a major factor for the survival of Mobutu in power, who used this support to perpetuate a patrimonial and centralized state in Zaire through fear and human rights abuses. Since Mobutu took power in 1965, a small group of people has been rotated in governmental positions. The government has consolidated

its power base around Mobutu and has become a class, which is now conscious of its own existence. This class has been shaped by power relations, not by production relations (Sklar 1979). Although access to education provided the means to acceptability, ethnic and friendship ties were paramount in gaining entry to the ruling class.

The concentration of power that characterized the Mobutu rule had severe consequences for the political regime and constitutional law. This power translated into the transcendence of political power and constitutional uncertainty. At the level of the political regime, the concentration of power created a 'monarchic republic' (Duverger 1974), a concept that Callaghy (1984:55-60) has so vividly developed by comparing President Mobutu to King Louis XIV of France. At the constitutional level, the concentration of power personalized Mobutu's power and created a personality cult by placing Mobutu above the law because he represented the myth of national unity. This resulted in constitutional instability and inefficiency. The constitution was no longer the mandate to limit and control political power, because this power had been organized around the executive branch so that every decision involved the president. The absence of checks and balances among the different branches of the government ensured that Mobutu had the power to allocate scarce economic resources as he pleased; most of his policies harmed socio-economic development.

By the end of 1989, internal and external pressures for political liberalization mounted, forcing Mobutu to amend the constitution. On 24 April 1990, the political configuration of Zaire rapidly changed from a single party to a multiparty system. Several political parties emerged and tried to mobilize the people with the unique goal of creating democratic institutions in Zaire.

### III THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL DECAY

#### 3.1 An overview

The end of the 1980s was also the end of the cold war that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The event was felt around the globe as superpowers contemplated the new era. Although Western pressure to liberalize the Mobutu regime started in the 1970s, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended Mobutu's game of playing the communist card to get Western support. Internal pressures, on the other hand, came mostly from the Catholic church; the bishops were highly critical of the Mobutu regime, believing it to be responsible for the corruption and moral decay in Zaire. Furthermore, the declining economy and corrupt practices motivated the withdrawal of the people from the official economy, thus depriving the Mobutu regime of the tax resources needed to consolidate his patronage system. The declining patronage led to the political polarization within the elite.

Both external and internal pressure at the end of the cold war era sparked political violence as citizens sought new institutional arrangements. In February 1990, the UDPS organized demonstrations in Kinshasa and three other towns to commemorate the anniversary of the 1961 murder of the first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. The demonstrators were violently dispersed by Mobutu's guards and several arrests were made. More riots and demonstrations followed throughout the country. In a last ditch effort to defuse tension, on 24 April 1990 Mobutu announced the end of his personal rule. He also announced the imminent 'depolicitization' of the armed forces, the security services and the administration in general, and introduced legislation that allowed political parties and free trade unions.

Further unrest followed in May 1990, as students staged protests in Kinshasa to demand larger study grants and Mobutu's resignation. These protests were followed by similar demonstrations at the Lubumbashi Campus in the Shaba region. On the 10th of May, Mobutu dispatched the special presidential guard headed by his brother-in-law, General Kpama Baramoto, to the restless Lubumbashi campus. On the night of 11 May, having cut off the electricity from the campus, the special guards attacked the students with bayonets and machetes. The password *lititi ya mboka* (herb from the village) was given to students from Mobutu's region to protect them from the guards. Chaos broke out as Mobutu's commandos went from room to room, massacring student leaders and sympathizers. The evidence uncovered in the field indicated that 297 students had been massacred by Mobutu's guards (Field Log 1991-92). Despite demands by the international community to visit the site, Mobutu refused to allow an independent international board to investigate.

Transition efforts since this massacre have been marked by successive bouts of violent confrontations and riots. The Zairian political situation has drastically deteriorated and the emerging democratization process partly explains the erosion of the political

institutions Mobutu created to institutionalize his personal rule. From 1990 to 1996, humanitarian emergencies have drastically increased as a result of both the political openness and the ethnic confrontations in eastern Zaire. For example, in 1993 the number of people killed in ethnic clashes alone was estimated to be over 10,000. Except for the new influx from Rwanda, the number of Zairian refugees has also increased in other African countries after 1990 when Mobutu proclaimed the liberalization of his political regime. The number of people internally displaced increased from a mere 2,100 in 1990-91 to 1.2 million in 1996. The country is in total disarray and the international community is tired after six years of faltering democratic transition.

The following section intends to shed some light on the democratization process after the cold war and the humanitarian emergencies that followed. An assessment of preventive diplomacy and an analysis of socio-economic decay is given thereafter.

### **3.2 Toward new institutional arrangements or toward total chaos<sup>21</sup>**

On 24 April 1990 when President Mobutu liberalized his personal rule, several political parties emerged and insisted on the organization of a national conference, which was to set up new institutional arrangements. Protracted struggles concerning the composition and format of the national conference followed, punctuated by periods of violent clashes between the opposition and state security forces. To set the stage for the conference, the National Assembly adopted several amendments to the existing constitution in late June 1990, whereby presidential control over the national executive council and foreign policy ended. At the same time, the assembly authorized the establishment of independent trade unions. In October 1990, Mobutu announced that a full multiparty political system would be established in Zaire, thereby reversing his decision to permit the existence of only three political parties. A month later, legislation was adopted to provide for the organization and operation of political parties. Popular unrest re-emerged in late November 1990 when an anti-government rally, organized by the UDPS, was violently suppressed in Kinshasa. Two hundred people were killed and many others wounded (Field Log 1991-92). The violence prompted the US, France, and Belgium to suspend all military and economic aid to Zaire and to request Mobutu to resume the democratization process.

In the following three months, more people were killed by government troops for opposing the Mobutu regime (Amnesty International 1991). In late February 1991, an estimated 20,000 people attended another UDPS anti-government rally aimed at forcing Mobutu to agree to the organization of a national conference. The clash between government forces and the crowd ended with 197 dead and hundreds wounded (Field Log 1991-92). Finally, in March 1991, Mobutu appointed a new enlarged transitional government and announced that a national conference would be instigated to set up new institutional arrangements for the third republic.

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<sup>21</sup> This part of the monograph relies on many sources of information from US and European newspapers such as *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Economist*, *Le Monde*, *African Research Bulletin*, and others sources of information from television news.

After several false starts, the national conference opened on 7 August 1991, but President Mobutu flooded the conference with his supporters, resulting in the walk-out by the opposition. For several weeks, tension mounted and on 23 September 1991, dissatisfied soldiers in Kinshasa mutinied and went on a looting spree that spread throughout the country. In the capital city alone, 187 people were killed and 523 wounded (Field Log 1991-92). The death toll of civilians in the regions was estimated at 459 (Field Log 1991-92). In Lubumbashi, for example, 54 people were killed and 102 wounded in an exchange of gunfire between the regular unpaid troops and members of the well-treated presidential guard, who were protecting the GECAMINES headquarters. In the wake of the looting, France and Belgium, aided by American military transport planes, sent 1,750 soldiers to Zaire to evacuate foreign nationals.

Although the pillage in the capital city can be explained by such factors as the stalled democratization process, the unpaid salaries of the soldiers and strong class tensions, field research indicated that the looting was well orchestrated by President Mobutu.<sup>22</sup> On the eve of the looting, the special presidential guard was dispatched to the diamond and gold shops owned by Mobutu and his close associates in the heart of the capital city to take the valuables for safekeeping. Another indication that Mobutu was behind the plunder was the speed with which the government compensated the ruling class for the losses incurred. By January 1992, the government had already paid US\$ 689 million out of US\$ 710 million in damages to the Kinshasa victims of the looting, most of whom were members of the political establishment (Field Log 1991-92; Zaire 1992). Despite arrears in debt services, the Mobutu regime was able to come up with millions of dollars to compensate the ruling group for their losses. Since then, Mobutu's strategy had been to create further chaos by following the policy of *après moi le déluge* (after me the deluge or chaos).

Under pressure from the West, Mobutu named his rival and the chief opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, from the unified opposition called Sacred Union (*Union Sacrée*), as prime minister in October 1991 to deal with the crisis that followed the military pillage of the country. For the first time in the 26 years of his rule, Mobutu had agreed to share power with the opposition. Nonetheless, a crisis emerged regarding the appointment of the person who would control the defence department and the armed forces. A week later, Mobutu dismissed the new prime minister who refused to swear allegiance on legal matters to Mobutu and the Zairian constitution. After dismissing Etienne Tshisekedi, Mobutu named another member of the opposition, Mungul Diaka, as the new prime minister to defy Western pressures. The US rejected the new prime minister in a strong-worded statement and requested Mobutu to set up a government headed by a prime minister with broad popular support.

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<sup>22</sup> Field researchers asked 384 people the following question two days after the looting: 'Some people have told us that the looting that started on 23 September 1991 in Kinshasa and spread throughout the country clearly indicates a total absence of political authority to maintain social order in Zaire. For others, these events were orchestrated by political authorities themselves (probe Mobutu). What do you think? The response could be classified as: i) 37 per cent agreed to the absence of political authority; ii) 52 per cent felt that the looting had orchestrated by political authorities or Mobutu; and iii) 11 per cent stated that they did not know or had no answer. Refer to Field Log (1991-92).

The increased opposition to Mungul Diaka forced Mobutu to appoint on 25 November 1991 another member of the opposition, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, as the sixth prime minister in 12 months. In mid-January 1992, Mobutu seemed to be firmly in control and the prime minister called off the national conference indefinitely on the grounds that dominance of the conference by the opposition was contributing to violence, and that the conference was costing the national treasury thousands of dollars a day.

Most members of the opposition felt that the suspension of the national conference re-enforced their premise that Mobutu had never planned to democratize his regime as promised in April 1990 (Field Log 1991-92). Furthermore, the suspension of the proceedings raised the issue that Mobutu had never intended for the conference to succeed and that he hoped to avoid any threat to his political hegemony by calling elections before the opposition could organize a campaign against him. The US, France and Belgium strongly condemned the conference's postponement. The European Union reacted by suspending all aid for Zaire, except for humanitarian emergencies, to protest the decision.

The suspension of the conference, coming after two months of relative calm, plunged the country once again into a state of tension and four days later, demonstrations took place in several Kinshasa districts. Then on 16 February 1992, the clergy organized a peaceful demonstration called the Christian March for the resumption of the national conference. More than 52 people were killed and several hundred wounded as Mobutu's presidential guards fired on unarmed civilians holding Bibles and rosaries (Field Log 1991-92). Despite Mobutu's efforts to suspend the national conference indefinitely, pressures from the West and the Catholic clergy forced him to reopen the proceedings on 6 April 1992. The conference, which was chaired by the Catholic Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, declared its own status and decisions which were binding to all Zairian citizens. The first act of the conference was to dissolve the National Assembly, the existing legislative body. To further strengthen their position, members of the opposition created the Sacred Union of the Radical Opposition (USOR).

From April to August 1992, the Sovereign National Conference (SNC), composed of 2800 delegates, convened and elected Etienne Tshisekedi, a Luba from Kasai, as the prime minister of the transitional government, voting overwhelmingly for the resignation of Nguza Karl-i-Bond, a Lunda from Shaba. This election matched the hopes of the West for a prime minister with large popular support who could restore confidence with foreign partners. The SNC approved in September 1992 a document, which articulated the main constitutional guidelines of the third republic, and laid down some procedures for the presidential succession. The transitional constitution stipulated that governmental power was to be divided among four separate institutions: the president 'who reigns but does not govern'; the High Council of the Republic (HCR) with legislative powers; the transitional government with full executive powers headed by an elected prime minister; and courts and tribunals.

The approval by the US, France, and Belgium of the new prime minister meant the renewal of cooperation with Zaire. But the nomination of the new prime minister, Etienne Tshisekedi, fuelled the ethnic animosity that underlies Zairian politics and the

expulsion of Nguza Karl-i-Bond sparked conflict in the Shaba region. The Luba clans of Kasai became the targets of harassment by the Lunda of Shaba, who supported Nguza's political party *Union des Fédéralistes Républicains Indépendants* (Union of Independent Republican Federalists). The clashes erupted in early September in response to Nguza's forced resignation after the national conference appointed Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister. According to Nguza, the conference was dominated by the Luba, but resentment among the two groups date back to the colonial period when Europeans brought the Luba to work the mines in the Lunda-dominated region of Shaba. As was pointed out earlier, the relocated Luba became better adapted than the local Lunda population to the new colonial roles and were able to dominate key administrative and business positions in Shaba.<sup>ef</sup>

As the ethnic conflict was unfolding in Shaba, the conference voted in mid-November to change the country's name, flag and currency, all symbols of the Mobutu regime. Enraged at these changes, Mobutu refused to approve the transitional constitution and recalled the defunct National Assembly to draw up a new one. In response, the Sovereign National Conference (SNC) dissolved itself in late 1992 and was succeeded by a 453-member High Council of the Republic (HCR), headed by Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo. The new body became the supreme interim executive and legislative body with the power to amend and adopt the new constitution as well as to organize legislative and presidential elections.

Immediately after Tshisekedi had assumed responsibility for the prime minister's post, he confronted Mobutu by seeking to assert control over the central bank and security forces. On 2 October 1992, accusing Nyembo Shabani, the governor of the central bank and a protégé of Mobutu, of flooding the market with banknotes, which were fuelling the already existent hyperinflation, the new prime minister sacked the governor. Mobutu sent his soldiers to the bank to guarantee access for the governor. Mobutu then suspended the transitional arrangement and the HCR rejected Mobutu's ordinance by reaffirming Tshisekedi as the prime minister.<sup>23</sup> This power struggle triggered massive riots by armed soldiers in the capital city and a series of strikes against the president, bringing the city to a standstill. This tense atmosphere was also inflamed by several days of testimony on the corruption of the Mobutu regime. The SNC compiled a list of 149 major embezzlers, including President Mobutu, army generals, leading businessmen, and other members of the inner circle.

On 11 December 1992, President Mobutu entrusted the task of running the current affairs of Zaire to two general administrative secretaries; he ordered his soldiers to seal off parliament in order to prevent the HCR from convening. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Willy Claes, summarized the Western warnings to Mobutu that military intervention would not be ruled out. Four days later, civil servants in many ministries rejected Mobutu's decree and blocked access for the general secretaries entrusted by Mobutu to handle the daily governmental affairs. The lay coordination committee, which organized the boycott, also declared that civil servants would resist any attempt to

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<sup>23</sup> These moves and countermove illustrate what is so typical of the Zairian elite. In fact, the same game of tic-tac toe dominated the first three months after independence (see above).

make them acknowledge the appointed general secretaries. Mobutu gave up. The barricades were lifted, and the HCR met for the first time on 15 December 1992. In mid-January 1993, the HCR declared that Mobutu, because of his mismanagement of state affairs, was guilty of treason, and threatened Mobutu with impeachment proceedings unless he recognized Etienne Tshisekedi as the prime minister elected by the SNC in late 1992.

In January 1993, Mobutu asked the governor of the central bank to introduce a 5-million zaire banknote worth less than US\$ 2.00 to cope with the country's hyperinflation of 8800 per cent. But merchants and traders obeyed Tshisekedi's call to refuse the banknotes. Despite this popularly supported move, Mobutu decided to pay the military with the new banknotes, and when the merchants refused to honour these, the soldiers went on another rampage on 28 January 1993 during which casualties totalled 1,800 killed, including Philippe Bernard, the French ambassador to Zaire (*New York Times* 1993a).

The US, France, and Belgium called on Mobutu to hand over executive power to Etienne Tshisekedi. Mobutu refused and announced that he had dismissed the prime minister. Mobutu also suspended the HCR and ordered the presidential guards to prevent the members of the HCR from convening. But the High Council of the Republic organized a parade through the capital city to elicit support and citizens responded enthusiastically. The US, France, and Belgium also backed the HCR. As a result on 4 February 1993, rival army factions composed of pro-Mobutu and pro-opposition forces battled in Kinshasa, leaving at least 1,200 people dead and many parts of the city in ruins. In March 1993, Mobutu called his supporters from the defunct National Assembly for a 'conclave of the last chance', and after two weeks nominated Faustin Birindwa as the new prime minister. This group became the Political Forces of the Conclave or Presidential Tendency. Birindwa was a former member of the opposition who was purged from UDPS for 'political truancy', the euphemism used in Zaire for selling out to Mobutu.

But the Birindwa administration was not recognized by the US, France, Belgium nor the European Union. The Clinton administration went a step further by announcing that its departing ambassador, Melissa Wells, would not be replaced (*New York Times* 1993). Then in April 1993, Mobutu's soldiers embarked on an intimidation campaign of opposition leaders and their supporters, killing hundreds of innocent people. Efforts by the US, France and Belgium to make Mobutu accept the directives laid down by the SNC proved ineffective. A stalemate ensued for more than a year (March 1993-June 1994) during which time dual governments claimed legitimate authority, but the executive power was in the hands of Mobutu as the commander-in-chief. In July and September 1993, the UN dispatched a special emissary, Lakhdar Brahimi, to diffuse tension. Brahimi and the chairman of the HCR, Monsignor Monsengwo, struggled to devise a compromise but had to give it up because of the unbending attitude of the opposition and pro-Mobutu group. The OAU also failed in its mediatory task to find a compromise between the two parties.

The entire twelve months of 1993 and the first six of 1994 were characterized by terror, chaos, and human rights abuses such as torture and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International 1994:321-4). In addition, Mobutu's supporters in the provinces were stirring up ethnic conflict in an attempt to discredit the opposition. In 1993 alone, thousands of casualties had occurred in the Shaba and North Kivu regions where hostilities, particularly in Shaba, were directed against the relocated members of the Luba ethnic group. This ethnic violence was linked to an anti-Tshisekedi campaign and to former Mobutu's collaborators. By the end of 1993, an estimated 500,000 Zairians were internally displaced and several thousand more had fled the country as the result of the confrontations in the Shaba region (US Committee for Refugees 1996:73). In addition to the Shaba crisis, another massive displacement of people occurred in the North Kivu region. From March to August 1993, ethnic clashes were fought against the Banyarwandan settlers on the issues of nationality and land rights, leaving more than 8,000 dead and 200,000 internally displaced (US Committee for Refugees 1994:73). Both Shaba and North Kivu ethnic conflicts resulted in the forced displacement of more than 750,000 people and thousands dead (US Committee for Refugees 1994).

Regional conflicts were intensifying, but so were the scenes of violent clashes between presidential guards and citizens in the capital city. The worst confrontation in September 1993 left more than 1,000 people dead as soldiers fired on unarmed civilians. Not only did Mobutu's soldiers attack unarmed civilians, but they also executed several members of the opposition. In a strong statement released at the time, the Zairian bishops condemned what they called 'state terrorism' against civilians and the rampant looting in towns and villages. They also condemned the policy of hatred and ethnic discrimination initiated by the political authorities and called upon the Presidential Tendency to let the democratization process continue. When the dialogue between the Presidential Tendency and the opposition resumed in September 1993, it was estimated that more than 26,000 people had been killed in Zaire and 1.3 million people displaced, as the result of political instability and Mobutu's reluctance to relinquish power to the opposition leader elected by the SNC.

After three weeks of negotiations, the Presidential Tendency and the opposition agreed late in September 1993 to a single constitutional text for the transition called Constitutional Document of the Transitional Period (*Acte Constitutionnel de la Transition*). In mid-January 1994, the USOR and the Presidential Tendency (Political Forces of the Conclave) signed political accords to create a unique legislative body that merged the defunct National Assembly and the High Council of the Republic (HCR) into the HCR/TP which was to be composed of 738 legislators. The new legislative body, chaired by Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo, met for the first time on 23 January 1994. This marked the end of the parallel legislative bodies in Zaire.

Despite the compromise, the new parliament was deadlocked until mid-March 1994 on the criteria for choosing a prime minister. Monsignor Monsengwo proposed that the candidate be chosen by the opposition, but that he would need to have the mandate of President Mobutu to be confirmed by the HCR/TP. Finally, on 14 June 1994, Mobutu agreed to an alternative solution with the appointment of Kengo wa Dondo to a fifteen-month term as the interim prime minister. Kengo received 332 out of 465 votes. The

members of USOR quickly rejected Kengo and disputed the constitutionality of his appointment. They also withdrew from the transitional parliament, pledging to boycott it.

Four days after assuming power, Kengo wa Dondo found himself host to nearly one million Hutu refugees from Rwanda who had abruptly entered Goma, a town in eastern Zaire. These refugees were fleeing a Tutsi rebel army that had seized power in Rwanda. Unable to overcome pressure from the radical opposition, Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo had little choice but to collude with Mobutu. On 6 October 1994, the members of USOR decided to rejoin the transitional parliament, thus ending their boycott of Kengo's government. The new prime minister strove to win acceptance from Mobutu in his efforts to control state finances and the security apparatus, hoping also to restore international support and to open the way for elections on 9 July 1995. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, made a brief visit to Kinshasa in late October 1994 in an effort to support the new prime minister and to resume financial cooperation in order to organize general elections in July 1995. A few months before the July 9th target, however, President Mobutu suspended the elections indefinitely and signed a decree extending the transitional government by another 24 months.

In July 1994, there was some rapprochement between the Presidential Tendency and the USOR trying to replace the new prime minister. This move provoked a division within the Presidential Tendency and fear among the diplomatic circles in Kinshasa of another major crisis. During the same month, the Presidential Tendency and the USOR pushed a petition in parliament signed by 510 deputies out of 738 for the resignation of the chairman, Archbishop Monsengwo, who then did resign in late January 1995 under pressure from both sides of the political spectrum.

Despite a few ethnic clashes, the year 1995 remained relatively calm, except for the refugee camps in eastern Zaire where armed Hutu militiamen posed a major problem for relief workers and international aid agencies. As a result, in April 1995 parliament demanded the forced repatriation of all refugees, and 15,000 people were forced by Zairian troops to return to Rwanda against their will. Violence erupted in July, killing more than 350 people in the North Kivu area and displacing more than 150,000 in the Masisi zone. Then in May 1995 after the HCR/TP voted to deny citizenship to Zairians of Tutsi origin living in the North and South Kivu regions, the Zairian government closed the Rwandan border to prevent a 'new influx of refugees'. Unlike 1995, the year 1996 was marked by violence, the death of thousands, and massive displacement of both Hutu refugees and several Zairian ethnic groups in the two regions.

Tension flared and local Zairian politicians used Hutu refugees to exploit rivalry over nationality rights between the Zairian Tutsi and other groups in the two regions. The Hunde and Nyanga ethnic groups in the Masisi zone of North Kivu fought to protect their holdings against the Hutu militia who also attacked the Banyarwanda living in the area in order to set up a 'Hutuland,' from which to launch attacks on Rwanda. The Banyarwanda are Zairians of Tutsi origin who migrated to the country in the 18th and 20th centuries. Although clashes between the different tribes in the Masisi area had

been common for the past 35 years, they have escalated since the influx of more than 500,000 Hutu refugees in 1994 shifting the balance in favour of the Hutu in the region.

The ethnic conflict that erupted in South Kivu was also the result of a parliamentary law denying the Banyamulenge their rightful nationality. The Banyamulenge are Zairians of Tutsi origin who migrated to the Mulenge area of South Kivu in the 18th century and were separated from their Tutsi countrymen living in present day Rwanda when European superpowers re-drew their colonial boundaries in 1910. Despite repeated callings for international mediation, the plight of the Banyamulenge was ignored. When the governor of South Kivu ordered that all Banyamulenge – 485,000 people – to leave or be deported, the Zairian army, aided by the Hutu, confronted the Banyamulenge. The fighting in North and South Kivu regions resulted in thousands of people killed and millions displaced. Local Zairians and Hutu refugees were trapped in the conflict. The Banyamulenge were able to control some areas of South and North Kivu, indicating how ineffective the Zairian army was. Later that year, Mobutu's undisciplined and incompetent armed forces put up little resistance when Tutsi soldiers helped the Zairian rebels headed by Laurent Désiré Kabila to seize the town of Goma and other eastern parts of Zaire.

The fighting between the Zairian forces backed by mercenaries has flared anew in February 1997 after the government launched a counteroffensive in late January. Meanwhile in late February 1997, the Zairian government and the rebel leaders have started peace talks at the urging of the President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela. Mobutu's nephew and security adviser, Ngbanda Nzambo ko Ayumba, and a representative of Laurent Kabila, Bizima Karaha, met separately with South African and American diplomats in Cape Town. George Moose, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and Suzan Rice, the president's special assistant on Africa, took part in the discussions. On 18 February 1997, the UN Security Council passed a resolution proposing a regional peace plan based on five points: an end to the fighting, the withdrawal of foreign forces, a reaffirmation of borders in the region, the protection of refugees, and an international conference on the conflict.

In brief, the Zairian state is no longer a viable political entity. As a 'quasi state' (Jackson 1990), its borders have been challenged and the government can no longer provide an 'effective legal control and authority throughout the territory, and a monopoly of coercive power' (Holsti 1996:12). The collapse of the Zairian state is the result of Mobutu's reluctance to relinquish power to an elected prime minister. The admonitions from the US, France, and Belgium to Mobutu since 1990 seem to have had little noticeable effect. The troubled transition has aggravated the polarization among the different Zairian political factions. At the moment, the Zairian political elite in the capital city is divided between the Presidential Tendency, grouped under the Political Forces of the Conclave, and the USOR. The presidential family is divided into Mobutists from the former single Popular Movement of the Revolution and various other opportunist groups. The radical opposition, USOR, is also deeply split into a fundamentalist tendency and a reformist group.

While political parties are fighting for control of the central government apparatus, the economic situation has increasingly deteriorated and political instability has aggravated an already fragile environment. Control over the military has been weakened by repeated instances of mutiny, rampage, and looting. The proliferation of gross human rights violations has been directed against ethnic communities as an instrument of mass manipulation. Private military organizations have also proliferated as opponents to the Mobutu regime try to protect themselves against kidnapping or assassination attempts. The transition has, therefore, exacerbated economic decline, the flight of capital, and political instability. Several policies initiated by the US, France, and Belgium have failed, plunging Zaire into deeper political and economic crisis. The following section highlights the different policies that the three countries initiated to control events in Zaire in the wake of political liberalization.

### **3.3 Failure of preventive diplomacy in Zaire**

Beginning in April 1990, Zaire entered a democratic transition that seems to have hastened the disintegration of the state itself. Since renegeing on the arbitral transitional solution that the SNC upheld in 1992, Mobutu reasserted his hegemony by blocking the route toward political pluralism. Mobutu's unwillingness to relinquish power resulted in a stalled democratic process. The US, France and Belgium failed to use their power to make Mobutu accept compromise and relinquish executive power to an elected prime minister. The different instruments of preventive diplomacy, which were to make coexistence possible between the different political antagonists in Zaire, have failed.<sup>24</sup> These instruments varied in time and despite several attempts by the international community to diffuse conflict between the opposition and Mobutu, the Zairian conflict escalated to the point of being intractable. Since 1990, different policies have been initiated by representatives of the US, France, and Belgium in an effort to bring the different parties together to negotiate the mechanisms for the transitory period. One dominant policy favoured by the three countries was to cut off all development and military aid after Mobutu suspended the SNC in January 1992.

Another diplomatic effort was made within the OAU, whose Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim publicly stated that President Mobutu had to accept democratic change. In November 1991, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs was sent to Kinshasa carrying a message from President Ibrahim Babangida, OAU Chairman, to negotiate peace and get the Zairian democratization process out of the impasse. The effort was unsuccessful. But the most concerted effort came from Abdoulaye Wade, the Senegalese Minister of State and opposition leader. He was able to convince the two parties to negotiate and

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<sup>24</sup> The following summarizes the efforts of the international community in dealing with Mobutu: the engagement of UN Special Emissary, the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur charged with mapping Zaire's evolving human rights environment, track II diplomacy involving a former US Assistant Secretary of State, the imposition of sanctions (an arms embargo, the denial of visas, the flawed freeze on assets of the Mobutu clan), the threat of more severe actions by the UN Security Council, regular monitoring of humanitarian conditions, bilateral and multilateral efforts to create linkages with indigenous human rights groups, the promise of a broad package of international aid once an interim arrangement was in place and functioning, electoral preparation assistance, multilateral support for economic reconstruction, and assistance for restructuring the military.

Mobutu appointed Nguza Karl-i-Bond to replace Mungul Diaka as the prime minister in late 1991. The suspension of the national conference in January 1992 by the newly appointed prime minister caused anger in Zaire and around the world, resulting in the breakdown of the compromise between pro-Mobutists and the opposition.

The first error in judgement in preventive diplomacy came on 6 February 1992 when the World Bank decided to release US\$ 30 million to the Zairian government to support social services. The second was the failure by the West to freeze billions of dollars in assets held by Mobutu and his barons in Europe and North America. Since then, preventive diplomacy has suffered problems of its own. The US, France and Belgium have given up. After six years of frustration, the French government announced on 25 April 1996 a partial resumption of cooperation with the Mobutu government and decided in July to renew full official aid relations with Zaire. The US has also renewed relations when the CIA Deputy Director George Tenant, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, and a group of advisers were sent to meet with President Mobutu in the spring of 1996. The goal of the visit was to curtail arms shipments to Hutu rebels through Zairian territory. Finally, Belgium decided in December 1995 to re-establish its indirect cooperation through NGOs since breaking-off Zairian collaboration in June 1990. Signs of normalization already began in mid-1996. In summary, the failure of preventive diplomacy was caused by the reluctance of the United States, France and Belgium to get rid of Mobutu by force, despite their eagerness to see him go.

An assessment of preventive diplomacy indicates that the US, France, and Belgium failed to carry out the threats of seizing the assets of Mobutu and his barons and were satisfied with the less severe option of freezing visas to this clan. Mobutu defied and confused the three major partners and played the same game of 'chaos after him' that he had used during the cold war. Once the West adopted the stand of letting Mobutu stay in power, it effectively ceded control to him (Morrison 1995). Preventive diplomacy failed because the West – when Zaire was on the edge of disintegration in the early 1990s – neither forced Mobutu out of the political scene nor combated the instruments of hate that encouraged violence.

Another factor, which contributed to the international community's disinterest and failed response, was the duration and depth of the Zairian crisis and the psychological impact this had on the external players (Morrison 1995). The long Zairian economic decline, which started in 1972, had become mundane by the 1980s. Predictions of Zaire's imminent collapse had been around since the beginning of the 1970s so that their credibility progressively diminished and with it, the impetus to take action. Psychologically, the crisis became deceptively unthreatening in diplomatic circles (Morrison 1995).

The failed international response was also caused by national politics in the West where there must first be compromise before a government makes a commitment. For example, the Belgian position regarding the Zairian crisis was complicated by its domestic political situation, in which a split has traditionally existed along the linguistic lines between Flemish speakers and French-speaking Wallons. Thus, the delicate coalition within the bilingual setting implied that any uncompromising position by the

government might fuel political cleavages that could have repercussions at the Belgium polls. In addition, the three partners had different foreign policy views toward Zaire that contributed to the perpetuation of the crisis. The US and France have taken contradictory positions, which have delayed international intervention that could have saved many lives. Washington sympathized with the Tutsi in Rwanda, whereas Paris maintained close ties with the Hutu and Zaire. These contradictory foreign policies fuelled fear in Rwanda of a French military intervention, while Zairians blamed the US government for not acting. Zairians and Mobutu were accustomed since 1960 to being bailed out by the US whenever there was a threat to the country's sovereignty. They were now stunned by the slow reaction of the United States to intervene in eastern Zaire where the Tutsi-backed revolt was gaining ground. In the words of Block (1996:A18), Zairians were now convinced of one thing: 'Bill Clinton is married to a Tutsi.'

What Zairians have forgotten is that their country has been heading for disaster since 1972. The Zairian socio-economic decay is the result of both the superpower rivalries during the cold war and the mismanagement of the public domain by the ruling class headed by Mobutu. As of early 1997, there is little hope that Zaire will solve its political and economic problems in the immediate future. The majority of Zairians are hoping to go to the polls in 1997. The transitional parliament on 1 July 1996 adopted a budget of US\$ 400 million for organizing general elections and a referendum in 1997. An additional amount of US\$ 300 million is expected from the international community. The bulk of the money should come from the USA, France and Belgium, all of whom are pushing for the resumption of full diplomatic relations to hold elections in July 1997. But there is fear among the Zairians that the current predicament dominated by a collapsed economic and political setting may unleash dormant ethnic rivalries that would prevent free and fair elections in the future.


### **3.4 System stability: economic crisis and democratization**

System stability is based on the assumption that legitimacy creates willingness on the part of the people to participate in the political process by securing their cooperation. Such legitimacy or regime support lies at the heart of the problem of the cohesion of the state. In that sense, legitimacy lowers the cost of extracting resources from the society. Thus, 'the strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty' (Rousseau [1762] 1950:6). A legitimate system is usually stable because it tends to meet the citizens' demands and is flexible enough to adjust to changing circumstances.

In 1990, the Mobutu regime was incapable of meeting the challenges of the democratization process. The social system became overloaded by demands for more openness. The result of this legitimacy crisis was a total collapse of state institutions. As the number of riots, demonstrations and strikes increased, social mobilization was also on the rise. After 1982, the Mobutu socio-political system lost its capability to fulfil the four basic requirements of social system stability – pattern maintenance, adaptation, goal attainment, and integration (Parsons 1951).


Figure 16 presents a general measure of system stability consisting of five major indicators weighed accordingly: social welfare, social mobilization, economic growth, extractive capability of the state, and state distributive capability (Duff and McCamant 1968:1130). Duff and McCamant (1968) measure these variables in terms of standard deviations. The choice of social welfare and mobilization stems from the argument that the 'higher the level of social welfare the better the prospects for political stability, while the higher the level of social mobilization ... the poorer the prospects for political stability' (Duff and McCamant 1968:1127-8). The second index is economic growth. The argument is that a poor economy creates people who have no commitments to any of the society's institutions and provides excellent potential followers for those who would overthrow the system (Duff and McCamant 1968). The third index is the distributive capability of the state or state's ability to extract resources in the form of taxes. This ability indicates the degree of support the state receives from its members and the extent of available resources the state has for the satisfaction of the demands of its members. The final index of system stability is the distributive capability of the system. Duff and McCamant (1968:1128) argue that 'a government that spends much of its resources on education, health, and housing for the general society will develop large long-term support'. Schultz (1968) has also stated that investing in human resources through education is probably the best way to promote sustained economic development. Appendix presents an operational definition of system stability and sources of data. Positive numbers imply the capability of the political system to fulfil its four basic functions.

FIGURE 16  
SYSTEM STABILITY



According to Figure 16, the Zairian social system remained quite stable before 1982. Signs of instability were apparent in mid-1982, and the system became totally unstable toward the end of the decade. The average system stability remains close to the zero threshold or  $-.689$  from 1982 to 1990. The democratization process that occurred in 1990 not only accelerated this system instability, but destroyed the fabrics of the social system itself, as the Mobutu regime became completely delegitimized by the democratization process. The Zairian state, as a colonial legacy, had collapsed. In 1990, Mobutu's aura of strength faded and the fissures in the regime he built from the colonial legacy to sustain his personal rule became salient. This legacy no longer provided peace and opportunity for individuals to pursue their own happiness. The remains of the colonial legacy became an instrument of chaos.

FIGURE 17  
NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE, 1972-96



Source: Refer to data sources (4; 26; 31) in Appendix.

Since Mobutu took power in 1965, political options open to those excluded from state spoils have been limited. If some of the most fortunate, educated Zairians have migrated, depriving the country of much needed skills, the least fortunate have been reduced to a silent acquiescence. Nonetheless, the exit option has also been predominant as the Mobutu regime and its concomitant legitimacy crisis forced many skilled Zairians to migrate. Mass exodus has paralleled system instability since 1960 and the number of displaced people had increased to almost 1.5 million in 1996. This is the highest figure ever registered in the history of Zaire after 1908 when it became a Belgian colony. Figure 17 indicates that as a result of socio-political conflict and economic decay, the

number of internally displaced people and Zairian refugees in adjacent African countries drastically escalated since the second half of the 1970s.

The number of refugees was quite stable throughout the first half of the 1970s, but the two Shaba wars in 1977 and 1978 increased the outflow of Zairians to 100,000. Although the number of internally displaced people remains unknown, a rough estimation in the field indicates that some 12,000 people became internally displaced every year to search for a better life or means of survival in other regions (Field Log 1991-92). There was some decline in these humanitarian tragedies in 1979, but the number of people displaced remained above its pre-1977 level. In 1993, more than 800,000 people were internally displaced as a result of ethnic confrontations. Despite a decline in 1995, the numbers increased again in 1996, reflecting the ethnic conflicts in the highly populated areas of North and South Kivu.

Regional security has been compromised in the region of the Great Lakes in 1996 as refugees were denied the right of protection. Up to 1991, Zaire remained a haven for nearly a half million refugees from other African countries (US Committee for Refugees 1995). But unsuccessful repatriation of the Hutus to Rwanda produced a volatile situation in 1996. Conflict in Rwanda spilled over into Zaire and the likelihood that the Zairian conflict will expand beyond its borders remains quite real. At the moment, the leader of the rebel army and Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, Laurent Kabila, seems to control several zones in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Upper Zaire, causing problems for the future of Zaire as a unified nation.

The rebel soldiers seem to have restored peace in Goma and other towns in eastern Zaire. They are now known as *Walinda Amani*, Swahili for peacekeepers. Not everyone is happy with Kabila's soldiers. Many businessmen have been angry that the rebel soldiers have confiscated all four-wheel-drive vehicles and sent them to the front. The rebel troops also angered the business community when they seized hundreds kilos of gold, tin, and papaya and tons of coffee in Goma and Butembo, and sold the booty to pay for the war effort. Many businessmen have fled to Kenya to escape reprisals or death. Despite these events, some members of the UDPS have already given their support to Laurent Kabila.

So far, the rebel army has spoken openly of a plan to control major Zairian cities such as Kisangani, the most important inland river port. Control of the town by the rebels means control over much of the Congo River, which has become the only link between major towns and the countryside. Rebel strategy also calls for the capture of the diamond region of East Kasai province, which currently provides more than half of government revenue. As the Zairian armed forces have not marshalled any effective resistance, the country may be heading toward another political disaster reminiscent of the 1960s.

In fact, the Zairian government has recruited more than 200 mercenaries in Europe and Africa whose goal is to set up a spearhead for the Zairian armed forces driven back by rebel forces of Laurent Kabila. This group of mercenaries is composed of former British elite troops and former French legionnaires as well as mercenaries recruited by a South African private company, Executive Outcomes (*Le Monde* 1997).

This is not the first time the Zairian authorities resort to mercenaries to restore peace in their country. In the spring of 1964, Mobutu, then commander of the Congolese (Zairian) National Army, was in a desperate military situation when Zairian central authorities found themselves up against three rebellions. Mobutu's troops were just a bunch of looters dispersed through the country and incapable to undertake any military operation. On the behalf of President Kasavubu, Mobutu recruited 800 mercenaries who retook the whole country in one year of bloody fighting. The American government provided logistic support, while the Belgian government discreetly managed technical operations.

However, unlike the 1960s when the superpower rivalries prevented secessionist tendencies, the 1990s are likely to favour them as American and European citizens are voicing their discontent against the 'good Samaritan' policies abroad and requesting their governments to focus on national issues.

### **3.5 Section summary**

The collapse of the Zairian state is illustrative of the defunct personalistic rule. Olson's (1965) theory of collective action suggests that a distributional coalition based on particularistic interests is more apt to develop when it has enough time within a stable environment to fortify itself. It can develop selective incentives for members and prevail over the diffuse interests of the majority. The Zairian ruling group has done just that and government policies have been at the expense of the majority. The mobilization potential of this minority is greatest when it is threatened with the relative deprivation of losing existing privileges (Gurr 1970). In this sense, the ruling class in Zaire has seen the democratization process as a threat to its power, social status and retirement security, and is therefore willing to see the remains of the Zairian state totally destroyed rather than attempt to bail it out. Since the democratization process, this attitude has increased the likelihood of massive humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. By opening up the political system, democratization increased political demands which overloaded the political system. The result has been the breakdown of the social system. As pointed out by Ake (1996:10), democratization has some potential for conflict since it entails a redistribution of power which is increasingly resisted by those in power.

To understand and predict humanitarian emergencies, the next section brings the different explanations developed above in a statistical analysis. The goal is to analyse systematically and reliably the means of preventing these disasters in the future. The following section also aims to empirically test propositions about factors that affect humanitarian emergencies and to add a quantitative dimension to the contextual overview developed earlier.

## IV STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

### 4.1 Theoretical argument from the case study

Nafziger (1996) and Väyrynen (1996) have identified three major sources of vulnerability that explain humanitarian emergencies: economic, socio-political and cultural sources. Table 2 presents some of these sources and their relationship to humanitarian emergencies. A negative sign indicates a reverse relationship, whereas a positive relationship means that the source of vulnerability tends to amplify humanitarian emergencies. Equation 1, for example, reveals that the relationship between regional integration and a humanitarian emergency is negative, whereas equation 6 shows a positive relationship between political instability and humanitarian emergencies. In other words, regional integration (equation 1) is likely to inhibit a humanitarian emergency, whereas political instability (equation 6) is likely to increase it. An additional theoretical argument is that the influence of the relevant explanatory variables is likely to vanish once 'system stability' is controlled for. Therefore, the lower the system stability is, the higher the level of a humanitarian emergency will be. Appendix presents operational definitions of the different variables listed in Table 2.

The first set of variables includes endogenous and exogenous economic sources of vulnerability, which are negatively correlated with humanitarian emergencies. In other words, the lower the level of economic sources of vulnerability the higher humanitarian emergencies will be. Improved economic conditions and good policy choices should decrease the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. On the other hand, rising foreign debt and policy of differential employment are likely to increase them.

Socio-political explanatory variables constitute the second set of sources of humanitarian emergencies. First is ethnicity. Young (1993) provides three perspectives to explain ethnic identity: the instrumentalist, the primordialist and the constructivist perspectives. According to Young (1993), the instrumentalist argument portrays ethnicity as an instrument for political and social competition in the pursuit of economic advantages. Political entrepreneurs and activists excluded from state spoils activate ethnic solidarities to gain access to power. Therefore, ethnicity is an ascriptive and backward phenomenon, which constitutes an obstacle to political integration. Ethnic confrontation in the Shaba region illustrates this instrumentalist argument where the Lunda elite group attempted to consolidate their bargaining position in the centre of the decision-making process.

However, according to the primordialist school, ethnicity is best understood as 'an extended form of kin selection', characterized more by instinct. Ethnicity is not rational but effective and emotional, and not explicable in purely material terms because it is in the subconscious of the people. Thus, the defence of one's territory is more a matter of ethnic survival, as the Banyamulenge have recently shown in the

South Kivu region. The constructivist, on the other hand, contends that ethnicity is a pure creation of the human imagination. This is illustrative of the Zairian setting where different groups who shared state spoils adapted their identities to existing ones or created new identities capable of challenging the power at the centre of the decision-making process. The two previous sections have indicated how Mobutu's ties with the Ngala ethnic group resulted in the creation of Baswahili as a distinct ethnic identity aimed at sharing state spoils. Because of its capacity to stimulate group awareness and existence, ethnicity articulates group demands. Unless these demands are satisfied, political instability may ensue. The result is ethnic confrontation and the possibility of humanitarian emergency.

The second social source of vulnerability is class. Social class refers to 'the manifestations of a process by which allied actors obtain or lose, open up or close off, become increasingly or decreasingly conscious of access to life and mobility chances' (Schatzberg 1980:27-28). In the Zairian case, the rise of *évolués* in the 1940s as a distinct group resulted in the demand for political independence. This group was located mostly in the urban centres where the colonial system had concentrated development efforts, 'leaving the majority of people in the rural areas neglected and with limited opportunity for advancement' (Chazan *et al.* 1992:117). Sklar (1979) relates class relations in Africa to the terms of power by stressing the basic conflicts of interest between the ruler and the ruled. Thus, antagonistic interests may fuel political systems as different classes clash over their interests, spurring political conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The Marxist variant of these emergencies is revolution.

The Zairian case study also relies on cross-cutting social cleavages between ethnicity and class to relate political conflict to a humanitarian emergency. By arguing that ethnicity explains the distribution of resources among members of the same class, Schatzberg (1980) provides an explanation of how the centralization of power by Mobutu encouraged class formation and diffused ethnic conflict. The expectation is that both class and ethnic ties exacerbate political tension resulting in humanitarian emergencies. When the ruling class is composed of people from different ethnic groups, class tends to moderate the polarizing effect of ethnicity. Interaction between class and ethnicity has in fact delayed the political polarization in Zaire along ethnic lines. Thus, cross-cutting cleavages between class and ethnicity will have the effect of minimizing political conflict, therefore decreasing the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies.

Unlike cross-cutting cleavages, social mobilization is likely to increase the chance of humanitarian emergencies. According to modernization theories, the social mobilization process may lead to participatory changes (Deutsch 1961; Lerner 1958). The result of these changes is to foster societal demands upon the polity as people become uprooted from their traditional ways through urban life and education. The shift from traditional attachment to modern urban life should result in new involvements in mass politics. (Kornhauser 1959). Political reforms are paramount to satisfying the new demands unleashed by modernization. The Zairian case study indicates that pressures to reform the political regime may have overloaded the political system, leading to the

instability of the social system. The lack of adequate institutions to handle demand pressures usually results in a highly polarized society capable of engendering humanitarian emergencies.

Table 2 also presents several political sources of vulnerability. First is political instability. The higher the level of political instability, the higher the level of humanitarian emergencies will be. Second is state power. There are two types of state power that minimize the occurrence of humanitarian emergencies: instrumental power and infrastructural power. Instrumental power is the capability of the political system to defend its borders against external aggression and neutralize any source of political authority capable of challenging the existing institutional arrangements. Infrastructural power is the capacity of the state to penetrate society and implement its preferences or decisions throughout the social realm (Mann 1984:189; Väyrynen 1996:8). The lower the level of these two types of power, the higher the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies will be.

Another political source of vulnerability uncovered in the Zairian case is the coercive nature of the state or policies of impedance, which consist of eliminating all forms of political compromise. Mobutu ruled Zaire by suppressing all political and civil liberties to elicit loyalty. A legitimate polity creates good conditions that propel citizens' willingness to participate freely. But a coercive polity is less likely to receive such support. Fein (1990:32) states that an authoritarian ideology is likely to practice terrorism on its own citizens to clear the way toward the control of state spoils. Accordingly, state coercion should result in a high level of humanitarian emergencies.

A final political cause of humanitarian emergencies that emerges from the Zairian case study is the international state system, which refers to the end of bipolarity. Since the end of the cold war in 1989, institutions built to sustain Mobutu patronage have been destroyed. The end of bipolarity has increased political instability, creating a conducive environment for the recurrence of humanitarian emergencies. Three dummy variables operationalize this historical event (see Appendix).

The analysis of stabilization programmes and preventive diplomacy has highlighted the fact that failed international responses have also contributed to the humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. One issue, which was raised earlier, was about the timing of the IMF intervention policies. Although the IMF seemed to have been an agency of restraint, it failed to stabilize the Zairian economy. The result was a wave of devaluation-cum-inflation, declining standards of living and worsening health care. The IMF intervened in Zaire in 1976, after signs of crisis emerged in 1972. The hypothesis is that an early intervention is likely to stabilize the economy and control the predatory nature of any ruling class. Dummy variables operationalize IMF/World Bank policies by arguing that failed responses are likely to increase humanitarian emergencies.

## 4.2 Operationalization of humanitarian emergencies

A complex humanitarian emergency refers to a situation of total social crisis with an extensive death toll and displacement of people by physical violence, hunger, disease, and refugee flows (Väyrynen 1996). According to Väyrynen (1996), an operational definition of a humanitarian emergency should use the state as the main unit of analysis because reliable data are more easily available at that level than at the lowest level of communities or individuals. The first indicator is politicides, which refer to the intentional destruction of political opponents either because of their faith or political conviction. An emerging consensus in social science is to include politicides as a form of genocides (Harff and Gurr 1995). Genocide is a 'sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim' (Fein 1990:23-5). Harff and Gurr (1995) argue that Zaire under Mobutu was one of the 45 cases of politicide in the post-World War II period. The number of people killed in such a fashion operationalizes politicide.

The next indicator is the number of non-combatants killed from political instability such as wars, mutinies, demonstrations, riots, and ethnic confrontations. The third variable is related to disease. The number of people without clean water per 1000 is a proxy for disease, because there are no Zairian time-series data on infectious diseases. The rationale for this indicator is that the absence of clean water will increase the likelihood of disease. The second proxy available is infant mortality at age one, that is, infant deaths per 1000 births. Disease and other forms of health problems first attack the weakest and the most vulnerable group in the population. (Note that there are no time-series data on child mortality rates.)

Hunger is the fourth indicator and is measured by calorie intake per capita. It is available in time-series. The last indicator is the number of displaced people. First is the number of Zairian refugees to other African countries per 1000 population. Refugees to developed countries are excluded from the sample. The assumption is that Zairian refugees to developed countries are the luckiest and probably better off. Second is the number of internally displaced people per 1000.

The operational definition of a humanitarian emergency is the sum of these indicators in standard deviations weighted accordingly. The standardized index eliminates major problems associated with the combination of variables that have different units of measurement. A different weight was assigned to the different indicators to assess the severity of the event, because the sample data on Zaire neither differentiate groups of people nor provide specific numbers on the victims within social categories. Any loss of human life should be of greater concern than human displacement. Therefore, politicides, victims of political instability and infant mortality are given the weight of 4 because they describe loss of life. The absence of clean water, displacement of people, and calorie intake per capita are given the weights of 3, 2, and 1 respectively. The Cronbach's (1951)  $\alpha$  of .76 was computed from unweighted indicators to assess the

reliability of the index.<sup>25</sup> An exclusion of any indicator from the index decreases Cronbach's  $\alpha$  by almost 20 per cent, meaning that all the indicators have to be included in the index of a humanitarian emergency.

### 4.3 Research design, methodological issues, and data analysis

The appropriate approach of this paper is inductive and uses time-series data from 1972 to 1993. A word of caution is warranted in using Zairian aggregate data. The different aggregate series have only 22 observations because of the lack of some data before 1972 and after 1993. Another issue relates to the reliability of the data. Although gathering information remains a challenging task in LDCs, scholars have relied on aggregate data provided by national and international agencies to assess government performance. Sources from international organizations and the Zairian government are used in the statistical analysis because there are no other sources of data available to explain humanitarian emergencies.

The use of time-series regression analysis is useful to explain and predict these emergencies. The advantage of time-series regression analysis is the possibility for both explaining the past and predicting the future behaviour of variables of interest. The functional relationship between the different variables and humanitarian emergencies is linear. In fact, other model specifications turned out to be inferior to the linear model analysed here.<sup>26</sup> The goal of the statistical analysis is to achieve unbiasedness, efficiency, and consistency of parameter estimates.<sup>27</sup>

Several assumptions underlying the error terms were tested for violation, especially the null hypotheses that the disturbances have uniform variance and are not correlated with one another (homoscedasticity and non-autocorrelation). The former violation does not usually occur in time-series studies, 'because changes in the dependent variable and changes in one or more of the independent variables are likely to be of the same order of magnitude' (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991:127). The main concern is about the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelation, because its violation implies that parameter estimates are no longer efficient, although they remain unbiased.

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<sup>25</sup> Cronbach's  $\alpha$  is based on correlations among different items on a single scale, therefore, it is a measure based on the internal consistency of the indicators. This statistic is the square of the correlation between the measured scale and the underlying factor. As pointed out by Nunnally (1978:214), 'the square root of  $\alpha$  is the estimated correlation of the test with errorless true scores.'

<sup>26</sup> Several functional forms (reciprocal, linear-log, and polynomial forms) were tested and evaluated. Based on statistical tests that included adjusted R<sup>2</sup>, t-tests, F statistic, variance of residuals, standard error of the regression, and Akaike information criterion, results of the linear specification form were better than others.

<sup>27</sup> Unbiasedness means that parameter estimates obtained are close to their true value, that is by repeating sampling an infinite number of times a correct parameter estimate can be obtained on the average. Efficiency requires that a parameter estimate obtained through regression exhibits the smallest variance. Because the sample is small, the assumption of consistency is added to assure that parameter estimates are asymptotically efficient.

TABLE 2  
HYPOTHESIZED MODELS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN ZAIRE

ECONOMIC SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY	Operational definition (Refer to Appendix)	Relationship
1. Economic endogenous variables		
Equation 1: Domestic causes		
Regional integration	Smuggling	-
Rural-urban links	Rural productivity (per farmer)	-
Growth	Economic growth	-
Equation 2: International causes		
Commodity terms of trade	TOT	-
Real foreign aid	Food aid (billion US\$)	-
2. Policy variables		
Equation 3: Domestic causes		
Access to financial institutions	Demand deposits (countryside)	-
Differential employment	Turnover in government	+
Patronage	Rents	-
Social policy	Social expenditures	-
Equation 4: International causes		
Openness	Openness	-
Foreign debt	Foreign debt (percent of GNP)	+
Foreign direct investment	FDI (percent of GNP)	-
POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SOURCES OF VULNERABILITY		
1. Social-cultural sources		
Equation 5: Social cleavages		
Ethnicity	Ethnicity (dummy)	+
Class	Class (business and political elite)	+
Interaction	Ethnicity x Class	-
Social mobilization	Social mobilization	+
2. Political causes		
Equation 6: Political legitimacy		
Degree of political stability	Political instability	+
Instrumental power	Military expenditures	-
Infrastructural power	Non-tax revenue	-
Coercive state capacity	Gastil's democratic index	+
3. International state system		
Equation 7: End of the cold war	Dummy variables	+
FAILED RESPONSES		
Equation 8: International response		
IMF stabilization programs	Dummy variables	+
INTERVENING VARIABLE		
System stability	System stability (in SD)	-

Assuming that the different equations presented in Table 2 are generated by first-order autocorrelation, Durbin-Watson-d (DW-d) is the first statistic to assess autocorrelation from OLS estimates and provides the first rule of thumb to test the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated error terms. A second rule of thumb is to accept OLS estimates for

the value of the sample first-order coefficient of autocorrelation ( $\rho = \rho$ ) to remain below .30. Griliches and Rao (1969) report from their Monte Carlo experiments that when the disturbance term is generated by a first-order autoregression process and whenever  $\rho$  is above .30 the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelation should be rejected. A final rule of thumb is borrowed from Hibbs (1974) who argues that because the possibility of having other error dependency processes at work exists, the researcher should calculate autocorrelation up to lag  $N/4$  where  $N$  is the number of observations or time points. Whenever statistical diagnostics revealed a first-order autocorrelation, two estimators were used as a correction: the Cochrane-Orcutt estimator (AR1) and the Beach-McKinnon estimator (full maximum likelihood or ML). The choice between the two depended on several criteria, among them the theoretical framework and the 'compatibility with a priori expectations' provided by Table 2.<sup>28</sup>

The statistical analysis also presents two dummy-equations or interrupted time-series (ITS) equations to assess the impact of the end of the cold war and failed responses on humanitarian emergencies. Equations 7 and 8 present these two sources of vulnerability. A final methodological issue was simultaneity between humanitarian emergency and sources of vulnerability. The Granger causality and Hausman specification tests were performed and economic growth turned out to be causally related to humanitarian emergency.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, Table 3 starts with a 2 stage least square (2SLS) estimator, which analyses the relationship between economic growth and humanitarian emergency. (Note that the order and rank conditions of simultaneity indicate that the system of equations is identified.) Rural productivity is eliminated from the equation because of being highly correlated with 'economic growth' (.89). Thus, this study employs OLS, AR(1), ML, and 2SLS estimators to discern the existence of any strong causal relationship between humanitarian emergency and the different predictors presented in Table 2. The goal in using the different estimators is to 'perform a marriage of theory and data' (Johnson 1984:4). The statistical results are from time-series processor (TSP) version 4.2B (Hall 1993).

Table 3 compares eight original equations and their respective alternatives controlled for system stability. Standard errors are reported to assess the statistical significance of parameter estimates. Economic growth and social mobilization are eliminated from their respective models (equation 1 and equation 5) once 'system stability' is controlled for because the two variables are indicators of system stability (see Appendix). Their respective correlations with system stability are -.79 and .95 respectively. Depending on the group of variables under consideration, all 8 equations explain at least half of the proportion of variation in humanitarian emergencies in Zaire, after controlling for the influence of the intervening variable system stability.

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28 See Griffiths, Hill and Judge (1993:342). Several other criteria were paramount in evaluating the two estimators: largest  $R^2$  and adjusted  $R^2$ , significant t-tests, and low Akaike information criterion, among others.

29 Granger test between economic growth and humanitarian emergency at two provided significant bloc F-tests. Furthermore, Hausman specification tests was also performed and indicated the need for a simultaneous equation between the two variables.

TABLE 3  
DETERMINANTS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN ZAIRE, 1972-93

	Original equation			Intervening variable included		
	Coefficient	Standard errors	others	Coefficient	Standard errors	others
<b>Equation 1</b>		<b>2SLS</b>			<b>AR1</b>	
Constant	2.192*	.96		-13.177	12.31	
Smuggling	-16.120*	8.52		-3.732	7.77	
Rural production				.570	.67	
Economic growth	-.937*	.41				
System stability				-6.310**	1.67	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.47//.41			.67//.61
Rho						.73
DW d			1.60			1.90
<b>Equation 2</b>		<b>AR1</b>			<b>ML</b>	
Constant	21.524*	8.81		-10.184	10.22	
Terms of trade	-.299*	.17		.230	.18	
Food aid	-.107**	.03		-.056*	.02	
System stability				-4.991**	1.30	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.49//.43			.71//.66
Rho			.04			.37
DW d			1.57			1.66
<b>Equation 3</b>		<b>OLS</b>			<b>ML</b>	
Constant	34.371**	4.82		26.248**	5.89	
Demand deposits	-25.434**	7.66		-14.811*	8.29	
Turnover in govern.	.263*	.14		.294	.21	
Rents	-103.363**	16.30		-103.933**	13.09	
Social spending	-319.820*	151.58		-191.620	139.69	
System stability				-6.284**	1.66	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.78//.73			.82//.77
Rho						-.32
DW d			2.00			2.00
<b>Equation 4</b>		<b>OLS</b>			<b>ML</b>	
Constant	5.097	4.64		10.031**	3.45	
Openness	-99.657**	26.49		-78.951**	20.52	
Foreign debt	11.527**	2.41		5.313	5.89	
FDI	1297.130**	338.78		1016.960**	96.29	
System stability				-7.487**	2.48	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.61//.54			.75//.70
Rho						-.28
DW d			1.99			2.01
<b>Equation 5</b>		<b>AR1</b>			<b>AR1</b>	
Constant	-26.135*	13.46		-13.031	12.29	
Ethnicity [E]	71.576*	35.68		95.785*	38.77	
Class [C]	802.239*	419.52		983.992*	455.55	
E x C	-2135.030*	1097.41		-3020.820**	1180.00	
Social mob.	18.262**	3.64				
System stability				-8.333**	1.68	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.75//.69			.75//.69
Rho			.61			.67
DW d			1.44			2.18

continued

Table 3 (continued)  
Determinants of humanitarian emergencies in Zaire, 1972-93

	Original equation			Intervening variable included		
	Coefficient	Standard errors	others	Coefficient	Standard errors	others
<b>Equation 6</b>	<b>OLS</b>			<b>OLS</b>		
Constant	-16.195	10.12		-.810	10.12	
Political instability	.740**	.08		1.158**	.15	
Milex	-58.061**	12.43		-42.171**	11.55	
Non-tax revenue	-11.215**	2.95		-6.812*	2.85	
Gastil's index	1.752*	.78		.166	.87	
System stability				3.741**	1.25	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.90//.88			.94//.92
DW		2.00				1.96
<b>Equation 7</b>	<b>OLS (ITS)</b>			<b>OLS (ITS)</b>		
Constant	5.256*	2.52		9.064*	4.21	
Dummy (slope)	-.752**	.25		-1.145**	.40	
Dummy (level)	-16.666**	5.70		-7.979	8.22	
Dummy (trend)	10.139**	1.59		5.212	4.16	
System stability				-4.256	3.20	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.73//.70			.76//.70
DW d		1.67				1.79
<b>Equation 8</b>	<b>AR1 (ITS)</b>			<b>AR1 (ITS)</b>		
Constant	-114.614	81.28		6.108	4.93	
Dummy	-4.477*	2.36		-2.666	2.47	
Dummy (slope)	10.691	8.91		-1.299	1.82	
Dummy (level)	11.263	8.79		11.251**	4.35	
Dummy (trend)	-6.263	7.73		-.614	1.83	
System stability				-8.634**	.96	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.62//.52			.82//.77
Rho		.86			.21	
DW d		1.51				2.06

\*p < .05 and \*\*p < .01 (all one-tailed test).

#### 4.3.1 Economic explanations of humanitarian emergencies

The first four equations in Table 3 present economic correlates of humanitarian emergencies. The different equations seem to explain at least 45 per cent of the proportion of variation in the dependent variable. Eight out of 11 economic sources of vulnerability have an inverse relationship with humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. Starting with equation 1, a decline in smuggling (or regional integration) and economic growth tend to increase the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies.<sup>30</sup> For example, a one unit decline in economic growth is likely to increase humanitarian emergencies by almost 94 per cent holding other variables constant. Similarly, declining terms of trade and food aid, as illustrated by equation 2, have an increasing effect on humanitarian

<sup>30</sup> The author obtained the following equation by running smuggling with rural productivity:

$$Y^* = 32.932^{**} - 17.601^* - 1.829^{**}$$

(12.91)    (9.16)    (.80)

Standard errors are in parentheses.

emergencies. However, the impact of smuggling and rural productivity (equation 1) vanishes once system stability is controlled for. This is also true of terms of trade in equation 2. Food aid, however, remains significant at .01 level even after controlling for system stability.

Equations 3 and 4 provide mixed results. First, the decline of all policy variables increases the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. Any access to financial institutions provides people in the countryside with a way to improve their economic activities and real income. Second, patronage is a way of co-opting the elite in a plural society. As a policy, it provides a way of sharing state spoils. A sharp decline in patronage tends to destroy the cohesion among elites and increases political instability, which may result in humanitarian emergencies. Social expenditures are paramount in the well-being of citizens. The coefficient of social expenditures indicates that, holding other variables constant, a cut of one million dollars in social expenditures is likely to increase humanitarian emergencies by almost 320 per cent. Third, equation 4 shows that a low degree of openness will increase humanitarian emergencies. In other words, openness allows a country to enjoy the benefits of comparative advantage by importing goods that cannot be locally produced efficiently and by exporting items that are produced efficiently. The impact of demand deposits and rents in equation 3 as well as the influence of economic openness and FDI remain statistically significant even after controlling for 'system stability.'

Three economic sources of vulnerability have, however, a positive sign: differential employment in the government, foreign debt, and FDI. A high turnover in the government, which indicates generational employment, seems to increase the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. In other words, discrimination against hiring new college graduates for highly paid jobs in the government usually leaves them with no option other than to exit the political system; hence, increasing the number of refugees. Finally, foreign debt tends to foster humanitarian emergencies. This finding supports previous studies which indicate that foreign debt in developing nations is harmful to long-term socio-economic development (Cohen 1989; Nowzad 1990).

The variable FDI has a wrong sign. The expectation was that a high level of FDI should lower the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. Direct foreign investments, formally defined as ownership of assets in one country by residents of another for purposes of controlling the use of those assets (Graham and Krugman 1995), measure the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). The impact of MNCs has been a matter of controversy in both home and host countries. Multinational corporations may promote development as much as they may impede it (Apter and Goodman 1976). MNCs have also assisted in promoting the emergence of free trade. Although the political role of the multinational corporations remains vague, the statistical analysis of Zaire indicates that MNCs have increased humanitarian emergencies by the fact that they may have made decisions over which the national governments had little control.

### 4.3.2 *Socio-political sources of vulnerability*

Equations 5, 6 and 7 behave quite well and explain more than half of the proportion of variation in humanitarian emergencies. Equation 5 indicates that both ethnicity and class tend to increase humanitarian emergencies. Ethnicity was defined as a dummy variable: 1 describes the dominance in the government of western ethnic groups and 0 otherwise. In other words, an additional member of the Ngala ethnic group in the Zairian government at the expense of a Baswahili inflames socio-political conflict, which in turn may result in humanitarian crises. As pointed out before, the elite from one specific ethnic group may use ethnicity to increase demands upon the political system. The politics of exclusion from state spoils creates a highly polarized society leading to high potential for humanitarian emergencies. In such a context, ethnicity becomes an instrument in the hands of the elite to share state spoils. The impact is similarly strong for class. But the interaction between ethnicity and class moderates the impact of ethnicity on humanitarian emergencies. People from different ethnic groups that compose the ruling class tend to coalesce and protect the status quo. Therefore, cross-cutting cleavages between ethnicity and class are unlikely to create a polarized society as the ruling class attempts to conserve its hegemony. Thus, class interests moderate the polarizing effect of ethnicity lowering the intensity of humanitarian emergencies. The result is quite strong even after controlling for system stability. Just like ethnicity and class, social mobilization is a major cause of humanitarian emergencies.

The results of equation 6 support Nafziger's (1996) and Väyrynen's (1996) argument that political instability is likely to increase humanitarian emergencies. This explains the Zairian case quite well. Political instability has resulted in the closing of hospitals and schools. Many parts of the country have been without power for years. The lack of energy caused by political instability means that there is no running water because there is no power for pumps. Zairian soldiers have heightened this political instability by daily looting, but have been unable to defend the Zairian territory from external aggression. The result of political instability has been a total destruction of the Zairian society and an increase in humanitarian emergencies. The impact of political instability remains quite strong in the presence of system stability. Nonetheless, system stability has the wrong sign and remains significant at .01 level. This is a puzzle because the stability of a system is likely to lower the probability of humanitarian emergencies. In the present context, it may be speculated that political instability and system stability overlap to create a highly destructive and explosive polity.

Another damaging correlate of humanitarian emergencies is the coercive nature of the political system, as indicated by Gastil's index. The Mobutu regime was highly coercive and the result was waves of refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Thus, the more coercive a polity is, the higher the potential for a humanitarian emergency will be. Nonetheless, two political factors tend to decrease its likelihood. First is military spending, which is a measure of instrumental power. Accordingly, a low level of military expenditures is associated with a high level of humanitarian emergencies. The interpretation of this negative relationship is as follows. The decline in military spending, especially salaries of enlisted men and women, seems to explain the rise of military looting, riots, and theft in Zaire. Zairian soldiers were paid erratically since the

1980s and were without pay for several months, especially in the regions where the Mobutu regime let soldiers fend for themselves.

Non-tax revenue has the same inverse impact as military expenditures. A low capacity of state penetration is likely to increase humanitarian emergencies. Penetration, argues LaPalombara (1971:208), is the 'conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority.' The degree of penetration in any state is the probability that governmental directives are carried out by lower levels of administrative hierarchies from the central government to village level. Therefore, penetration refers to whether the political elite can get what they want from the people over whom they seek to exercise power (LaPalombara 1971:209). The result of the statistical analysis indicates that a decline in infrastructural power has been highly destructive, in the sense that it resulted in the rise of humanitarian emergencies in Zaire.

A final equation in describing political sources of vulnerability is the end of the cold war. An ITS provides the impact of this phenomenon, which occurred in 1989. Equation 7 captures this change with a slope, a level, and a trend dummy variables (see Appendix for operationalization). All three dummies are significant at .01 level. The pre-intervention slope estimate indicates that humanitarian emergencies were in decline by 70 per cent a year prior to the end of the cold war. Nonetheless, the estimated annual rate of humanitarian emergencies after the end of the cold war increased by 1591 per cent [-.752 - (-16.666)], holding other variables constant. This is consistent with the level after 1989 or long-term trend that indicates an increase in humanitarian emergencies of 1000 per cent (10.139). System stability seems to have no statistical significance in this equation.

#### 4.3.3 *Failed responses*

Equation 8 explains the international response to the Zairian crisis. All the different dummies that describe ITS are not significant at .05 level. In other words, the impact of the IMF in 1976, the initial year of succeeding adjustment programmes, had no impact on humanitarian emergencies. Nonetheless, by looking at these stabilizations one at a time as illustrated by dummy policy (1 = IMF programme and 0 = no programme), the IMF programmes had some beneficial short-term effects in Zaire. The impact of this dummy vanishes once system stability is controlled for. The negative effect of the IMF stabilization programmes is likely to continue in the long-run as the level-dummy or long-term trend indicates.

#### 4.3.4 *Impact of past humanitarian emergencies*

Table 4 presents the results of regression analysis after controlling for past humanitarian emergencies and system stability. The table also presents the best predictors from Table 3. Thus predictors that were not statistically significant at .05 level were eliminated to avoid making a Type I error, that is to include a variable that has a zero coefficient. Whenever regression diagnostics reveal first order autocorrelation, a correction is made with AR1. Two additional statistics are reported: a Durbin's alternative h that Kmenta (1986) calls m and LaGrange Multiplier (LM). Both statistics provide tests of autocorrelation whenever a lagged dependent variable is an explanatory variable. The

LM is a general test for the presence of serial autocorrelation (Maddala 1988:85-6 and 137-8). Thus after running each equation, the two tests were computed and reported.<sup>31</sup> The m test follows a t distribution, whereas the LM can be tested on a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. The critical values of the chi-square with one degree of freedom at .05 level of significance is 3.84 and at .01 level is 6.635. In no case are the 'Kmenta m' and LM for all eight equations significant at .05 level. Therefore, parameter estimates are not only unbiased and consistent, but also efficient.

Economic sources of vulnerability that remain significant at .05 level after controlling for the impact of system stability and past humanitarian emergencies are food aid, rents, openness and FDI. Among social variables, social mobilization remains the strongest, while political instability, military expenditures and infrastructural power tend to explain humanitarian emergencies more than other socio-political sources of vulnerability. System stability was therefore eliminated from the political equation and replaced by social mobilization as a proxy given the correlation of .90 between the two variables.

TABLE 4  
IMPACT OF PAST EMERGENCIES ON HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES IN ZAIRE, 1972-93

	Intervening variable included		
	Coefficient	Standard errors	Others
Equation 1 (AR1)			
Constant	.807	1.22	
System stability	-3.551 **	.75	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.994 **	.23	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.72//.69
Rho			-.09
Kmenta m//LM			-.28//.12
Equation 2 (AR1)			
Constant	1.937	1.77	
Food aid	-.045 *	.02	
System stability	-3.349 **	.69	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.675 *	.28	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.78//.77
Rho			-.11
Kmenta m//LM			-.43//2.31
Equation 3 (AR1)			
Constant	13.802 *	6.30	
Demand deposits	-10.710	9.82	
Rents	-62.570 **	22.83	
System stability	-2.602 *	.94	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.420	.28	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.82//.77
Rho			-.17
Kmenta m//LM			-.62//.47

<sup>31</sup> All the h tests were calculated. LM is quite easy to compute and is done by regressing the residuals of the equation on all independent variables and the lagged residuals. Multiplying the resulting R<sup>2</sup> by the number of time points produces the LM which can be tested on a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.

Table 4 (continued)

Impact of past emergencies on humanitarian emergencies in Zaire, 1972-93

	Intervening variable included		
	Coefficient	Standard errors	Others
Equation 4 (AR1)			
Constant	6.025	4.09	
Openness	-61.306 *	31.76	
FDI	880.946 *	494.91	
System stability	-4.836 **	.96	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.394	.38	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.77//.71
Rho			-.29
Kmenta m//LM			-.89//.42
Equation 5 (OLS)			
Constant	-33.700 *	18.11	
Ethnicity [E]	88.679 *	49.81	
Class [C]	917.826 *	515.63	
E x C	-2801.810 *	1429.49	
System stability	-7.749 **	2.64	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.122	.39	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.75//.70
Kmenta m//LM			-.30//.21
Equation 6 (OLS)			
Constant	1.753	2.78	
Political instability	.616 **	.07	
Milex	-30.499 *	15.48	
Non-tax revenue	-5.499 *	3.14	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.419 **	.16	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.91//.89
Kmenta m//LM			.05//1.01
Equation 7 (AR1-ITS)			
Constant	2.616	3.73	
Dummy (slope)	-.405	.41	
Dummy (level)	-11.695	7.95	
Dummy (trend)	7.724 **	3.06	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.529	.45	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.45//.39
Rho			-.06
Kmenta m//LM			.13//.27
Equation 8 (AR1)			
Constant	.684	1.94	
Dummy	-2.574	2.39	
System stability	-3.519 **	.78	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.921 **	.26	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.74//.69
Rho			-.02
Kmenta m//LM			.05//1.04

\*p &lt; .05 and \*\*p &lt; .01 (all one-tailed test).

#### 4.4 Summary of the findings

Tables 3 and 4 have identified the most powerful sources of vulnerability explaining humanitarian emergencies in Zaire. From Table 4, the best economic preconditions of humanitarian emergencies are economic growth, food aid, rents, openness, and FDI. Economic growth is captured by system stability of which it is an indicator. On the socio-political side, the most powerful preconditions for humanitarian emergencies are social mobilization, political instability, military expenditures, and the proportion of non-tax revenue. Table 5 groups these variables into economic and socio-political variables as well as a cross-category regression that combines these two sources of vulnerability.

TABLE 5  
A SUMMARY OF BEST PREDICTORS OF HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

	Coefficient	Standard errors	Others
<b>Economic sources (AR1)</b>			
Constant	16.117 **	4.72	
Food aid	-.006 *	.002	
Rents	-65.475 *	29.49	
Openness	-68.654 **	26.00	
FDI	1066.730 *	452.00	
System stability	-4.799 **	.83	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.314	.39	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.86//.82
Rho			-.54
Kmenta m//LM			1.22//3.2
<b>Socio-political sources (AR1)</b>			
Constant	.408	2.72	
Mobilization	-5.146 *	2.58	
Political instability	.896 **	.15	
Milex	-31.695 *	14.47	
Non-tax revenue	-8.671 **	3.30	
HE <sub>t-1</sub>	.292 *	.16	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.92//.90
Rho			.21
Kmenta m//LM			.24//1.24
<b>Cross-Category Regression (AR1)</b>			
Constant	5.428 *	2.40	
Rents	-33.947 **	10.84	
Openness	-38.587 **	10.51	
Mobilization	.456	1.68	
Political instability	.725 **	.11	
R <sup>2</sup> //Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>			.95//.93
Rho			.25
DW-d			2.10

\*p < .05 and \*\*p < .01 (all one-tailed test).

Rents, openness, and FDI all remain significant at .05 level or better. First, rents indicate that a coalescent elite is paramount in minimizing the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. The uncompromising behaviour of pro-Mobutists and members of the opposition in Zaire supports this finding. Second, economic openness in the first and third models supports the neo-classical argument that comparative advantages should

benefit all but that FDI should be scrutinized because it tends to increase the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. Socio-political sources of vulnerability indicate that state penetration and capacity to protect territorial boundaries should lower humanitarian emergencies. Nonetheless, political instability remains the major political source of vulnerability in cross-regression.

## V CONCLUDING REMARKS

The statistical tests strongly support the idea that humanitarian emergencies are complex social phenomena that require a multi-dimensional analysis. The theoretical implications of the study suggest that the capacity of the state to fulfill its basic four functions – pattern maintenance, adaptation, goal attainment, and integration – is a powerful predictor of humanitarian emergencies. A social system needs to adapt to changing circumstances. The fact that the Zairian social system crumbled in the face of overloaded demands for more openness indicates that the political system created by Mobutu was highly unstable. To minimize the chance of humanitarian emergencies requires a political regime that cares enough to mobilize resources that sustain economic growth and the well-being of its citizens. Although ethnic identities tend to create a highly polarized society and increase the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies, the ruling elite from diverse ethnic backgrounds may create a stable system capable of minimizing humanitarian emergencies through accountability and transparency.

The Zairian case study indicates that humanitarian emergencies can be understood at three levels. At the state level, good and sound policies that foster market incentives and elite cohesion should minimize the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. At the systemic level, the international community needs to improve its instruments of preventive diplomacy to include military intervention whenever a society is on the razor's edge of disintegration. A quick response is likely to save lives. At the individual level, every member of the elite should work for the goal of the community because uncompromising behaviour that characterizes the competition for state spoils usually ends up as a zero-sum game. Therefore, community leaders must fashion programmes that reduce ethnic tensions by including different members of the community in the decision-making process. This strategy should create the cross-cutting cleavages so important for political stability. In addition, the elite should avoid mass mobilization unless there are appropriate institutional arrangements to satisfy increasing demands that may emerge from such mobilization. In other words, citizens need to be warned about self-proclaimed leaders wearing traditional symbols. This symbolism was at the root of the disintegration of the colonial economic legacy and the collapse of Zairian state institutions. Zaire is, in fact, poorer today than it was when President Mobutu seized power in 1965. The collapse of the Zairian state has been a negative sum game without any winner emerging to govern the state. Despite several efforts by the international community, preventive diplomacy in Zaire has been a total failure.

The failure of preventive diplomacy resides in a saturated political system that can no longer accommodate competing interests. When players believe that the winning situation is not as viable as the losing one, compromises are hard to come by. A decaying economy and an eroding social system tend to create a social setting that is inimical to compromise. The Zairian crisis is a crisis of the state and its incompetence. The state in this context has been associated with wealth and harassment. The state even attempted to influence how ordinary citizens ought to think. The Zairian society views

Mobutu's era as the continuation of the colonial culture of domination and exclusion. Because the state has lost its legitimacy, measures taken by the international community should aim to consolidate the churches' actions, and to support local private voluntary organizations and human rights groups to minimize the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies. To achieve this goal, the international community has to build a regionally based humanitarian coordination capacity in central Africa.

Zaire remains a critical case in central Africa given the volatility of Burundi and Rwanda. The deteriorating situation in Rwanda and Burundi raises the stakes of Zaire as instrumental in keeping stability in the region. Therefore, the international community must avoid any steps that might threaten its shrinking capacities. A divided Zaire will complicate any relief effort and hopes for a lasting peace in Central and East Africa. Preventive diplomacy remains an invaluable tool to build a lasting peace in the region, but this diplomacy needs a military option to deter those who control instruments of hate and violence. Among the many tools to strengthen regional security is the creation of local groups through church activism. With Zaire contemplating the post-Mobutu period, the church should no longer be passive in the presence of humanitarian crises.

Because Mobutu laid no foundation for a smooth transition, many fear that the post-Mobutu period will leave a dangerous vacuum, unleashing regional and ethnic forces that could split Zaire apart or spill beyond its borders. This fear is confirmed by the way the country's provinces have already set themselves up as small states, some with their own currency and others controlled by rebel armies. Five scenarios can describe the post-Mobutu setting in the light of current events: i) a military takeover that would favour Mobutu's clan given the fact that it dominates the military forces; ii) mass urban upheaval; iii) additional ethno-regional fracturing mobilized along secessionist ambitions; iv) a takeover by the rebel army of Laurent Kabila; and v) international intervention. Of these five scenarios, there is no viable option because they all result in some form of humanitarian tragedy.

First is a military takeover. Will Zairians let the military rule again? The Zaire that already goes largely ungoverned is now subject to a total vacuum of authority, which the military is finding hard to resist filling. But this scenario is unlikely because most generals are from Mobutu's tribe and if they were to seize power, they may unleash a period of violent turbulence beyond the political and ethnic confrontations of the early 1960s. Furthermore, a military takeover is not helpful, given the performance of the military in Zaire's history. The political history of Africa has shown the inability of soldiers to govern. Related to a military takeover is urban mass upheaval. The civilian elite may not tolerate seeing the military in power again. In such circumstances this elite is likely to mobilize the masses already on the edge.

The next scenario is the balkanization of Zaire into mini-states. Mobutu's long reign completely destroyed the colonial infrastructure. With nine states at its borders, Zairian regions have been trading with their neighbouring states more than ever. Since the late 1970s, business people have turned their sights toward these neighbouring countries for trade and other economic activities. Therefore, the possibility of Zaire becoming a region of mini-states should not be ruled out. The balkanization of Zaire may unleash

regional claims over border issues and subsequently the possibility of ethno-regional confrontations.

Another scenario is Kabila's take-over. According to McKinley (1997), Kabila's success on the battlefields has owed more to the sorry state of the Zairian army than to the fighting expertise of the rebels. Excluding the initial battles for Goma and Bukavu, most towns have been taken without a serious fight, because the Zairian forces have fled at the first rumour of a rebel attack. Laurent Kabila has also been using a revolutionary ideology to recruit followers. After a 10-day course of Kabila's revolutionary ideology, the new recruits are being sent as missionaries to spread the message of salvation. As this scenario is unfolding, it reminds some Zairians of Mobutism, another revolutionary ideology with a salvation overtone. It is unlikely that Laurent Kabila, the new strongman, will give up power and organize 'free and fair' elections without claiming himself president of his new 'Democratic Republic of Congo'. The Zairian case illustrates that strong leadership can be a catalyst for both state formation and state collapse.

Finally, international intervention seems to present some hope to millions of Zairians who are contemplating the new era. Some external guidance and support remain invaluable tools to creating strong political institutions. But the time for external solutions imposed by the West is gone. As the peace talks are unfolding, the international community must try to get the Zairian civil society and political parties – churches' leaders and some party leaders – involved in the peace process. To have a lasting effect, solutions must come from within and the salvation of Zaire is with the elite who are willing to set aside their personal and ideological differences as well as to compromise on institutional arrangements to govern the next republic. Democratization means compromise and tolerance but so far the Zairian elite has shown none of these qualities.

Without an understanding of democratic culture, Zaire has no hope of becoming a viable political and economic entity as old ethnic cleavages dormant during the cold war will re-emerge and become salient. Thus, the rising tide of rebellious movements trying to weaken the central authority has increased the number of non-combatant victims. A militant ethnic consciousness has re-emerged and 'old identities are redefining the standards of participation, distribution, and legitimacy' (Deng 1995). The structures and values of the nation-state system along ethnic lines are re-emerging undermining the viability of large colonial state legacies. As Boutros-Ghali (1992:9) points out, 'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed ... It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world'. To achieve this goal, the notion of absolute sovereignty must be redefined. The international community has an imperative moral obligation to protect human life by holding state leaders who violate human rights accountable for their actions. Reluctance to interfere in the national affairs of a sovereign state should not be an excuse to sacrifice human life, dignity, and freedom.

## VI APPENDIX

### OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA

This appendix operationalizes the different variables used in the statistical analysis and identifies at the end of the appendix the sources of data with numbers in parentheses. The first two variables are humanitarian emergency and system stability. The different sources of vulnerability then follow.

#### 6.1 Dependent variable: humanitarian emergency

Humanitarian emergency is operationalized as a composite index of politicides, victims of political instability, infant mortality, people without clean water, calorie intake per capita, and displaced people. Data on politicides and victims of political instability are from Amnesty International Reports (5), ANACOZA (6) and Field Log (14). Data on infant mortality, calorie intake per capita, and displaced people are from World Bank (34; 35), FAO (13), US Committee on Refugees (31) and UNHCR (26) respectively. Data on people without clean water are provided by World Health Organization (Annual [see references]) and Field Log (1991-92).

TABLE 6  
CORRELATIONS AMONG THE DIFFERENT INDICATORS

	A	B	C	D	E
A (Calorie intake)	1.000				
B (Infant mortality)	-.544	1.000			
C (Displaced people)	-.060	.139	1.000		
D (People without clean water)	-.115	.746	.438	1.000	
E (Politicides and victims)	-.256	.184	.916	.600	1.000

The lowest correlation is between displaced people and calorie intake, whereas the highest correlation is between displaced people and combined indicator of politicides and victims of political instability.

#### 6.2 Intervening variable: system stability

Duff and McCamant (1968) measure the different indicators of system stability in terms of standard deviations. The first indicator is social welfare. They operationalize social welfare score as the sum of GDP per capita (34; 35), literacy rate (25), percentage of population aged 13-18 in school (25), calorie intake per capita (13), daily proteins per capita in grams (13), doctors per 10,000 persons (24; 25), and hospital beds per 10,000 persons (24; 25). Calorie intake per capita was excluded from system stability because it is an indicator of humanitarian emergency. Duff and McCamant (1968) give the per capita GDP a weight of .5 on the combined welfare score because it represents the level

of goods and services available for distribution within the society (Russett 1965:112-4). Each of the non-GDP indices has an equal weight.

Social mobilization index is the second variable and is composed of newspapers delivered per 1000 persons (25), radio receivers per 1000 persons, television sets per 1000 persons, percentage of economically active population in labour unions, and urbanization rate. Three indicators are available for Zaire. These are newspapers delivered per 1000 persons, radio receivers per 1000 persons (25), and urbanization rate (34; 35). The difference between social welfare and social mobilization provides the first indicator of system stability. Duff and McCamant (1968:1132) posit that 'a measurement of the difference between the society's position on the two indexes produces the basic measurement of the effects in terms of prospective political stability.'

The second index is economic growth, which is operationalized as average annual growth (per cent) of GDP. Data are from World Bank (34; 35) and from the author's own estimates from 1989 through 1993 on the basis of data from Zaire (39; 40). The argument is that a poor economy creates people who have no commitments to any of the society's institutions. A poor economy provides excellent potential followers for those who would overthrow the system (Duff and McCamant 1968:1128). The third index is the distributive capability of the state or the state's ability to extract resources in the form of taxes. This ability indicates the degree of support the state receives from its members and the extent of available resources the state has for satisfying the demands of its members. The country can also turn to the international community for help. Therefore, the distributive capability of the state is the sum of two items: taxes collected by the government as a percentage of GDP on the one hand, and average annual disbursed loans from the international community as a percentage of GDP on the other. The sum of these two percentages in standard deviations represents total extractive capability. Data on taxes are from Zaire (36; 37; 38; 39; 40), while data on foreign loans are from OECD (23) and World Bank (32).

The final index of system stability is the distributive capability of the system. Duff and McCamant (1968:1128) argue that a government that spends much of its resources on education, health, and housing for the general society will generate large long-term support. Furthermore, Schultz (1968) has argued that investing in human resources through education is probably the best way to promote sustained economic development. Consequently, distributive capability is equal to total government expenditures on education as a percentage of GNP (36; 37; 38; 39; 40).

### **6.3 Economic sources of vulnerability**

*Regional integration:* Smuggling is the single variable to describe regional integration. The value for exports smuggled from Zaire are obtained by deducting the country's recorded exports from the corresponding imports of partner countries after correcting for freight, insurance, and other transport costs. The IMF (17) provides the usual allowance of 10 per cent. This method underestimates the size of unrecorded exports because the 10 per cent allowance is probably excessive for Zaire, a country that exports

primary commodities, some of them to adjacent African countries. An estimate of smuggled imports is obtained by applying this 10 per cent adjustment. Smuggling is computed as follows (see Simkin 1974):

$$S_x = (90\% \text{ of } M_w) - X_z$$

$$S_m = (110\% \text{ of } X_w) - M_z$$

where the M's, the S's, and the X's represent imports, smuggling, and exports respectively. The subscripts m, x, w, and z represent imports, exports, world, and Zaire. The operational definition of smuggling is the sum of the two components as a percentage of GDP. For data refer to IMF [17].

*Rural-urban links:* Two variables operationalize rural-urban links: rural productivity and informal economy. The operational definition of rural productivity is total production of cash crops in metric tons divided by the number of active population in the agricultural sector. The following cash crops were included: coffee, cocoa, jute, sisal, tea, and tobacco (13). The argument in using cash crops is that income derived from these provides rational calculations whether to stay or leave the village.

The informal economy is measured in terms of Gutmann's method. There are two reasons for the adoption of Gutmann's approach; it is easy to use and employs available aggregate monetary data, which most African countries publish. In addition, this method does not rely on the tax auditing material utilized by other approaches. There are no tax auditing data in Zaire. Therefore, this study adopts Gutmann's approach because of its simplicity and the availability of the data that compose his formula. Gutmann's approach can be expressed by the following formula:

$$IGNP_t = \frac{GNP_t}{DD_t \times LR} (M_t - DD_t \times LR)$$

The different aggregates are defined as follows:  $GNP_t$  represents reported gross national product at time t;  $DD_t$  is demand deposits at time t;  $M_t$  is narrowly defined money supply at time t; LR defines the lowest ratio of currency to demand deposits in a specific period; and  $IGNP_t$  represents informal gross national product at time t. LR is .3739, which represents the 1979 ratio, when the ratio of currency to demand deposits was the lowest, implying minimal informal economic activities. This study considers the informal economy as a percentage of GDP. Because of a high correlation of .92 between informal economy and economic growth, the first variable (rural productivity) was used in the regression analysis given its modest correlation of .45 with economic growth. All the data are from Zaire (36; 37; 38; 39; 40).

*Economic growth:* Economic growth is operationalized as average annual growth rate (per cent). Data are from World Bank (34; 35) and from my own estimates from 1989 through 1993 based on data from Zaire (39; 40).

*International causes:* Two such sources of vulnerability exist: commodity terms of trade (34; 35) and foreign aid (23; 30) as well as FAO (annual) in references.

*Policy variables:* The first policy variable is *access to financial resources*. This variable is operationalized in terms of demand deposits in the regions over total demand deposits (36; 37; 38; 39; 40). A high level of demand deposits in the region is an indication that the countryside has easy access to financial institutions. *Differential employment* is measured in terms of turnover rate in the government (1; 4; 14; 20; 22; 41). *Patronage* is measured in terms of rents. The rent-seeking literature provides a way of computing patronage (Gallagher 1991:89-93). An absolute monarchy or an authoritarian regime like Zaire's will experience the greatest rent-seeking activities because there are no institutional mechanisms for controlling political power. However, a democratic polity will experience relatively little rent. Overall rents were from the following five types of economic activities: trade protection, foreign exchange, agriculture, foreign grants, and presidential expenditures.

Because patronage is an index, the following lines provide how it was captured using aggregate data. First, rents from trade protection are computed by multiplying the rate of effective tariff (tariff revenues/total imports) by the total value-added of manufacturing. This is rent A. The assumption made here is that only the manufacturing industry receives much of the protection. This measure of rents is quite understated since it involves only total imports rather than dutiable imports. Some goods are free of duties or have smaller duties than others. For instance, total tariff revenues in Zaire for the year 1989 in constant 1970 prices were 75.3 million zaires and total imports were 324 million zaires. Dividing the two numbers yields a tariff rate of 20 per cent, a rate that is multiplied by total value added of manufactured goods in the same year. This yields a rent of 93 million dollars for that year. Data are from Zaire (36; 28; 40; 41; 42).

The second type of rents is derived from discrepancy between official and parallel exchange rates. This premium is multiplied by the amount of exports in US dollar terms. To find out the amount of rents, the rent rate is multiplied by total exports. This is rent B. The rent rate is equal to:

$$1 - (\text{official rate}/\text{parallel market rate}).$$

Data on the official exchange rate and exports are from IMF (18; 19) and World Bank (34; 35) respectively. Parallel exchange rate is provided by Cowitt (12).

The third category of rents is from agriculture. Jaeger and Hymphreys (1988) have analysed the way price distortions in LDCs provide state marketing boards a mean of capturing rents. The nominal protection coefficient (npc) is calculated as the ratio of prices paid to farmers in Zaire (14) to the international price of the agricultural export (18; 19) at current official exchange rates after adjusting for international and domestic transport and marketing costs (usually 10 per cent allowances). The rents from agriculture is  $(1-\text{npc})$  multiplied by the value of total agricultural exports (36; 37; 38; 39; 40). This is Rent C.

Another item to include in the measurement of rents is foreign debt. Several scholars studying foreign investments in LDCs have argued that most big development projects in these countries neither take into account the viability of the project nor the long-term social benefits created by economies of scale (Willame 1986). These so called 'white elephant projects' (Willame 1986) have contributed to an increasing debt trap in LDCs. Péan (1988) and Willame (1986) document these diverse foreign investments and provide a way of calculating different commissions pocketed by the different leaders in LDCs. According to Péan (1988:20), these commissions are limited to 5 per cent of total package to African leaders and 7.5 per cent for other countries outside the OECD. Therefore, another component of rent is equal to 5 per cent of annual disbursed debt. This represents Rent D.

An additional component is foreign grants that have never reached the people they were intended to help. Most if not all foreign grants to Zaire have ended up either in private hands or in Swiss bank accounts. This part of rents is taken as presented by official documents from the OECD in millions of US dollars. This is Rent E. The final component is somewhat controversial and is a function of specific characteristics of every country dominated by one man's rule. In such an autocracy, budgetary constraints are quasi non-existent. In the case of Zaire, two methods were used to compute this last item. The first method consisted of taking an average of US\$ 100 million a year following the secret report of Blumenthal, who was the World Bank's envoy to the Zairian Central Bank between 1979 and 1981 (Dungia 1992:136-55). According to this report, the Zairian authorities usually took an average of US\$ 100 million a year in personal spending money. Another method is to take the government expenditures attributed to President Mobutu after adjusting for miscalculations or false reporting from official data. Both methods provide almost the same amount over the years. This is Rent F. Patronage is operationalized as the sum of six sources of rents divided by GNP.

Finally, the operational definition of social policy is total governmental expenditures on education and health over total expenditures.

*Policy variables - international sources:* Three variables describe these sources. First is the degree of openness of the country. This is the sum of total exports and imports divided by GNP. Disbursed outstanding debt in millions of dollars is the second source of vulnerability. Third is FDI in billions of dollars. All data are from World Bank (34; 35).

#### **6.4 Socio-cultural and political variables**

*Ethnicity:* The Zairian population is divided into the following groups: Central Bantu, Mongo type, Luba type, Kivu Cluster, Azande-Mangbetu type, Ngandi-Ngbaka group, and 'others'. The different groups represent 36 per cent, 16 per cent, 12 per cent, 9 per cent, 7 per cent, 6 per cent, and 17 per cent of the populace respectively (22). 'Others' as an ethnic group was merged with Luba, Kivu, and Azande-Mangbetu cluster to represent the East of Zaire. The West represents the other ethnic groups. The expectation is that the East should have 45 per cent of government seats most of the

time. This distribution does not apply to executive related agencies. Therefore, if the East represents less than 45 per cent of the government, it is coded one, otherwise zero. For the ethnic background of members of the government, refer to Mabi (21) and Field Log (14). Note that some tribes in Zaire do not comfortably fit this dichotomy as the crisis which erupted in late 1996 shows. The Banyamulenge are in the Swahili lingua franca zone but share little affective affinity with their Bantu neighbours.

*Social class or upper class:* The first proxy to measure 'social class' is Gini's index of inequality. However, this variable is a constant for the period under investigation. According to the field work and other sources, 50 families have controlled the Zairian national income since 1975 (Field Log 1991-92). This represents .0002 per cent of the population. This measure also turns out to be a constant. Another operational definition of social class is 'occupational composition'. Unfortunately, there is no time series data on occupational composition, categorizing people in classes in Zaire. Therefore, the number of public employees categorized as 'sous-status' (under central government status), legislators, and cabinet members were the first group to include in 'upper class' (1; 14; 20; 36; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41). The second group is composed of Zairians who own medium and large businesses as reported by ANEZA (14). The sum of these two groups of Zairians as a percentage of the total economically active population represents 'upper class'.

*Social mobilization:* Refer to system stability above.

## 6.5 Political variables

*Political instability:* First, communal instability includes ethnic violence, rebellion, and civil war. These events have different weights because they have different degrees of severity in human and non-human casualties. Communal instability represents a weighted sum of the number of civil wars, rebellions, and inter-ethnic conflicts (1; 4; 14). The weights are respectively three, two, and one, respectively. Second, plots and attempted coups capture elite instability (1; 4; 14). The weights of the two events are three and one. The third measure is mass instability, which includes riots, strikes, and demonstrations (1; 4; 14). All these events have the weight of one. The index of political instability is the sum of these three weighted groups of events.

*State coercion:* Gastil's index of democracy measures the coercive capacity of the state to control dissent and free expression (14; 15; 16). Gastil (1989) has provided annual ratings of nations from 1972 to 1989 on two dimensions. The first is labelled 'political rights' assesses the right to vote, election meaningfulness, multiple political parties, opposition power, and government independence from foreign or military control (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; 904). The second is labelled 'civil liberties' covers the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion and freedom from terrorism or blatant inequality (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; 904).

*State power:* Two variables describe state power: instrumental and infrastructural power. Instrumental power is military expenditures as a percentage of GNP (27; 28; 29).

Infrastructural power is measured in terms of non-tax revenue as percentage of GDP (36; 37; 38; 39; 40). This is a proxy measure for direct taxes, given a high correlation between military expenditures and direct taxes.

*End of the cold war:* The slope dummy counters for time from 1972 to 1993 (1 to 22). This is the slope of the equation before the end of the cold war. The second dummy describes the level of the equation after the end of the cold war. It represents a dichotomous dummy variable scored zero for observations before 1989 and 1 thereafter. The last dummy measures the trend of the end of the war. It measures zero before 1989 and 1 through 4 since 1989. It is the long-term trend.

## 6.6 International failed responses

The first variable is a dummy scored 1 for every stabilization year and 0 otherwise. The second group of dummies represents interrupted time series. The slope dummy counters for time from 1972 to 1993 (1 to 22). This is the slope of the equation before the first stabilization program in the 1970s, that is before 1976. The second dummy describes the level of the equation after 1976. It represents a dichotomous dummy variable scored zero for observations before 1976 and 1 thereafter. The last dummy measures the trend, scored zero before 1976 and 1 through 13 thereafter. It is the long-term trend.

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