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Regionalization in Southern Africa

Bertil Odén

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLNS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South African Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAS</td>
<td>Centre for Southern Africa Studies (University of the Western Cape)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>UN Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMS</td>
<td>Environment and Land Management Sector (SADC unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERG</td>
<td>Macro Economic Research Group (ANC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>The Multilateral Monetary Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialized Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rand Monetary Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACCAR</td>
<td>Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAE</td>
<td>Southern Africa Economist</td>
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<td>SAFER</td>
<td>Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALC</td>
<td>Southern African Labour Commission</td>
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<td>SALDRU</td>
<td>Southern African Labour Development Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPEM</td>
<td>Southern Africa Political Economy Monthly</td>
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<td>SAPES</td>
<td>Southern Africa Political Economy Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARCCUS</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of Soil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARTOC</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Tourism Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>Union Economique et Monetaire de Ouest Afrique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMOA</td>
<td>Union Monetaire de Ouest Afrique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNU/WIDER</td>
<td>World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki</td>
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<tr>
<td>WNLA</td>
<td>Witwatersrand Native Labour Association</td>
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This study has been carried out within the framework of a research project 'New Regionalism, Implications for Global Development and International Security', launched two years ago by UNU/WIDER. The aim of the project was to explore the concept of 'New Regionalism' and its consequences on economic development; ecological sustainability; and conflict resolution.

What is 'new' in the 'new regionalism' concept? New regionalism should be understood as a comprehensive process that drives a change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity. The process is a multidimensional one, encompassing economic, political, social and cultural aspects that go beyond the 'common market' idea. Nowadays, regionalism is extrovert rather than introvert which reflects a deeper interdependence of a region with the world economy.

The study uses this general framework to analyse the experience of southern Africa. The paper analyses the regional integration attempts from 'Pan Africanism', that inspired the wave of independence which occurred in the continent at the beginning of the 1960s, to the most recent efforts towards the formation of the 'African Economic Community' which would take place at the outset of the new millennium. The author of the study suggests that the pattern of regionalization in southern Africa will depend less on intergovernmental-political action than on non-governmental economic forces. Achieving regional cohesion, which would help to prevent the outburst of strong regional imbalances, depends both on the political will and on the capacity of the state to avoid counter-productive developments which have afflicted the region in the past.

I welcome the publication of this report in UNU/WIDER's World Development Studies and hope that it will contribute to the discussion on the issues affecting economic and human development in southern African.

Giovanni Andrea Cornia
Director, UNU/WIDER
September 1996
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Falling within the category of state of the art, the paper aims at reviewing the literature on regionalization in southern Africa. As it is a part of the UNU/WIDER project on 'The New Regionalism. Implications for Global Development and International Security', the review of the general regionalization theory is kept brief and functions as a framework to categorize the literature on existing regionalization schemes in southern Africa, which are the focus of the text.

The main aim of the literature review is to facilitate the answering of the following questions:

i) Which of the main regionalization models is the most relevant as analytical tool for research on regionalization in southern Africa?

ii) Which of the existing regional organizations has the best potential to develop into a successful instrument for such a regionalization?

Tentative conclusions regarding these two questions lead to suggestions for relevant areas of future research.

I am grateful for constructive comments from Professor Björn Hettne, Hans Abrahamsson, Anders Nilsson and Joakim Öjendal at PADRIGU, from Thomas Ohlson, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala and from Dr Jerker Carlsson, who was the discussant when the thesis was presented at the Peace and Development Research Institute, Göteborg University, PADRIGU.

The study covers events and material published up to the end of 1994 and the analytical work was finalized in March 1995.

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Uppsala
ABSTRACT

This state of the art paper reviews literature published up to the end of 1994 on economic, security and environmental regionalization in southern Africa. In the field of economic regionalization a distinction is made between three main integration models, trade integration, neofunctional integration and development integration. Furthermore, the concept of new regionalism, which is in focus for the UNU/WIDER project 'The New Regionalism. Implications for Global Development and International Security' is used. Existing main regional organizations are categorized in accordance with these regionalization concepts and the conclusions from the literature analysing their records as regionalization instruments are summarized.

The study offers a number of conclusions as to the relevance for southern Africa of the various regionalization models. Both theory and experience show that the trade integration model is badly equipped to be the basis for regionalization in Africa, as the production structure of most African countries contradicts the assumptions on which the model is based. With South Africa finally included, a regional complementary pattern emerges, which may change the southern African situation in this respect. Still the problem of strong regional imbalance has to be handled. It should also be noted that weak financial institutions and lack of foreign exchange in a number of countries in the region will continue to constrain the intra-regional trade. The impact of the present international doctrine of openness towards the rest of the world is also discussed.

The neofunctional integration model is compatible both with the existing integration pattern in the region and a reluctance among the governments in the region to become part of supra-national institutions. Strong players in the economic market have an obvious interest in this type of regionalization which can take place without much political negotiation.

The development integration model is especially interesting as a potential instrument for change in a region like southern Africa, where history has created a strong regional imbalance due to the South African dominance. One of the main difficulties in the implementation of the model is often lack of necessary political commitment leading to political decisions at an early stage of the process. It remains to be proved that governments in southern Africa, including South Africa, have this commitment.

The concept of new regionalism as conceived in the UNU/WIDER project is closer to development integration than to the other integration models. It is, however, a still broader concept, in which the perspective of 'development from within and below' is more emphasized and including also security and environmental perspectives.

The security concept is used in it broadest definition, far from the classical realist one. In southern Africa the benefits of handling potentially destabilizing issues both to increase mutual confidence in the military sector and to contain factors such as
competition for water resources, uncontrolled migration flows and organized cross-border criminality from developing into local or even inter-state armed conflicts.

When it comes to regional environment co-operation southern Africa follows the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa in that most environmental activities are discussed, planned and sometimes implemented at the national level. The main exception is water management, where inter-state cooperation regarding development of river basins occur. and a more comprehensive regional perspective is needed.

The development in southern Africa since 1990 suggests that the most dynamic regionalization forces are to be found among actors (private and public) in the economic field. They act quicker than intergovernmental forces, who will negotiate over long periods before they possibly come to conclusions as to how regional integration and cooperation shall take place. The capacity of state structures to implement regional integration, including creating regional structures, is weak. The resulting regionalization pattern will therefore depend less on inter-governmental action than on non-governmental forces with their own benefit as main aim. To this shall be added that many governments' political will to integrate is much weaker than their pro-regional rhetoric.

The regionalization process in southern Africa will not follow one single model. However, one factor has to be especially focused when choosing analytical instruments, namely the asymmetrical structure of the region. This means that features from the development integration and new regionalism models have to be included. It also means that governments in the region have to attend to regional issues and both the political will and the state capacity have to improve in order to use the dynamics of the market forces in a way that avoids contraproductive developments.
I INTRODUCTION

Pan Africanism\(^1\) was an important ideological element during the decolonization struggle in Africa and regionalism has been on the African agenda since the wave of independence in the beginning of the 1960s. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)\(^2\) was formed in 1963, based on strong pan-African feelings and with one important aim being the creation of a common African front to avoid neocolonialism and fragmentation.\(^3\) President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana was one of the main spokesmen for pan-Africanism at the time, strongly influencing the agenda of the OAU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).\(^4\) Two scholars from the USA, working a number of years in Nkrumah's administration, published a book that became influential as a basis for the concept of economic collective self-reliance, which can be looked upon as the economic side of pan-Africanism (Green and Seidman 1968). Neither did the political nor the economic component of pan-Africanism immediately lead to very successful results, but the ideal of political, economic and security regionalism remained.

With increasing economic difficulties, the ideal of continental economic cooperation became attractive again at the end of the 1970s and the Lagos Plan of Action was formed in 1980 (OAU 1980) aiming for a common African economic market and strategy towards the rest of the world. When the implementation of the Lagos Plan lagged far behind schedule, a new effort was made with the Abuja decision 1991 on the Treaty Establishing an African Economic Community (OAU 1991), using existing sub-regional organizations and suggesting six stages to reach the objective by 2025.

The perspective of southern Africa as a sub-region in Africa and part of a pan-African integration scheme plays an important psychological \textit{cum} rhetorical role in the regionalization debate. In this perspective the regionalization projects and organizations in southern Africa can be compared with those in other parts of Africa, notably ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), CEAO (Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) and UMOA (Union Monétaire de Ouest Afrique) which in 1993 merged into UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire de Ouest Afrique), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), UDEAC (Union

\(^{1}\) An easy introduction to the history and development of Pan Africanism until the formation of OAU, including references to some of the basic literature, can be found in Colin Legum's \textit{Pan Africanism} (1962). A later discussion can be found in Ajala (1973).

\(^{2}\) The OAU Charter and the main Conventions and Resolutions adopted by the organization, including the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, are collected in Naldi (1992).

\(^{3}\) One study of the first ten year of the OAU is Cervenka (1975).

\(^{4}\) Some of Nkrumah's speeches are collected in the volume \textit{Africa Must Unite} (Nkrumah 1963).
douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale), the CFA franc zone, EAC (East African Community) and UMA (Arab Maghreb Union).

1.1 The aim and organization of the paper

Falling within the category of state of the art, this paper aims at reviewing the literature on regionalization in southern Africa. As it is part of the UNU/WIDER project on 'The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security', the review of general regionalization theory is kept brief and functions as a framework to categorize the literature on existing regionalization schemes in southern Africa, which are in the focus of the text. The literature review leads us to tentative answers to the following two questions:

i) Which of the regionalization models is the most relevant as an analytical tool for research on regionalization in southern Africa?

ii) Which of the existing regional organizations has the best potential to develop into a successful instrument for such a regionalization?

The paper is organized in the following sections:

I Introduction;
II Regionalization theory-different models;
III A brief history of regionalization in southern Africa;
IV Economic regionalization;
V Security regionalization;
VI Regionalization and ecological sustainability;
VII Conclusions on regional models and organizations in southern Africa; and
VIII Questions for future research.

Regionalization in other parts of Africa than Southern Africa is outside the scope of this study. However, for some background analysis on regional integration and cooperation in West Africa focusing on ECOWAS, see for instance Asante (1980 and 1985), Ezenwe (1983), Robson (1983), Okolo (1985), Okolo and Wright (1990) and Gambari (1991). A brief review of the four groupings, focusing on ECOWAS is given by Ogunbadejo (1991). An overview of the regionalization projects in all African sub-regions is given in Thissen (1988) and in Barbier (1993) which also cover functional cooperation outside the organizations. A brief overview also including regional financial institutions is given in Robson (1990). ECOWAS and ECCAS is briefly dealt with in Lancaster (1991). The economic cooperation within the CFA zone has recently been analysed in Vallée (1993) and the devaluation of the CFA in Gaud (1994). Various payment mechanisms are discussed in Aly (1994). It also contains a strong critique of most African regionalization schemes, but then suggests new ones of a kind which introduces the question of how they can avoid falling in the same trap as previous plans that have failed.

The literature on the East African Community is vast, written both during the period of EAC's existence and later, when one main issue is to explain why it failed. For post-EAC literature, see for instance Kisanga (1991), Hazlewood (1979, 1985 and 1988) and Mugomba (1978).
1.2 The southern African setting

While the pan-African perspective and the idea of continental regionalization can be seen at least as a rhetorical framework for some of the regional schemes in southern Africa, the main factors behind the regionalization efforts taking place during the past 35 years are of a sub-regional nature. Some sub-regional factors have also been linked to forces at the global level, especially the superpower competition during the cold war period.

At least since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, regional development in southern Africa has been strongly affected by the conflict between apartheid South Africa and the rest of the region under decolonization or independence development. From a regionalization perspective, this period can be divided into three sub-periods:

i) The decolonization period, ending in 1980 with the independence of Zimbabwe, which strategically changed the region as apartheid's geographical buffer zone further contracted. Regionalization prior to and until the end of this period was mainly motivated by settler or colonial power interests;

ii) The 1980-90 period of South African destabilization of the region and South Africa's increased international isolation. Regionalization efforts were mainly looked upon as instruments in the main regional conflict;

iii) The period of gradual transformation, opening up renewed regionalization efforts as the isolation of South Africa gradually was reduced and eventually abolished. For the first time since decolonization, South Africa was now a legitimate part of the region.

This coincided with the changes in global political economy, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. Superpowers lost interest in efforts to include the region as part of their global competition. Market economy and multi-party policy were unchallenged by the international development agenda. The on-going marginalization of Sub-Saharan Africa, including southern Africa, in the global economy continued.

Changes at the global level have strongly affected the framework for sub-regional development. Reduced external interest is increasing the potential of regionalization forces to act, as economic liberalization, e.g. in the form of structural adjustment programmes, strengthens the vertical links between individual countries in the region and the North.

6 Of course it can be argued that this period already ended with the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 but with the independence of Zimbabwe, the South African plans to create a Constellation of Southern African States had to be abandoned, and confrontation and destabilization became the apartheid strategy. The 1980 is therefore a better cut-off point due to the changing regional behaviour of the apartheid regime from that time.

7 The relation between global changes and the scope for regionalization in Southern Africa is discussed in e.g. Martin (1992), Martin and Inegbedion (1994), Odén (1994) and Wallerstein (1993).
1.3 Definitions

Some definition issues have to be settled.

The first issue is the region of southern Africa which I define as the eleven SADC countries – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. As Ohlson states, this definition is problematic. The borders of a region vary depending on whether geographic proximity, economic relations or political cooperation is used as the principal variable. Angola and Tanzania belong to the region in a political sense (the historical development of the front-line states). They are also member states of SADC. However, in terms of economic interaction they can also be categorized as part of West and East Africa, respectively (Ohlson 1993). In the case of Tanzania, this is also suggested in ADB (1993a) and Baregu (1993). I argue, however, that I have chosen the most logical definition for this case based on geographical proximity, common membership in a recognized international organization and historical links.

The second issue is the concept of regionalization. Regionalization, as in the case of other terms such as integration and cooperation, is often implicitly used to discuss economic issues. For instance, the regional organizations mentioned in the first section of this introduction are mainly economic. In this paper, however, the discussion will be separated under the headings economic regionalization, security regionalization and regionalization and ecological sustainability. The dominance of the economic aspects reflects the dominance of literature in this field.

Regionalization can also be used to identify the width and depth of regional cooperation irrespective of field. Used in this way, regionalization has the broadest definition, covering regional cooperation and integration at different levels. Regional integration refers to a certain level of cooperation which includes supra-nationality at least to a degree and a regional organizational and institutional structure which is at least partly autonomous from the national ones. Finally, regional cooperation is used to cover cooperation between national players without supra-nationality. To take examples from the industrialized world, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a cooperation project while the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), is a regional integration project.

In southern Africa, economic integration has been the basis for three of the main efforts – Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA), and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) – and regional cooperation for one of them, Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

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8 Which became a member only on 29 August 1994.

9 For more detailed discussions on the concept of region, see for instance Hettne (1992b) and Russet (1967a). Hettne discusses five levels at which a region can be defined i) as geographical and ecological unit; ii) as social system; iii) as organized cooperation in cultural, economic, political or military fields; iv) as regional civil society; and v) as an acting subject with distinct identity. For the purpose of this paper, it is, however, not necessary to pursue the discussion further than is done in the text.
(SADCC), while the suggested schemes for post-apartheid, post-cold war southern Africa, such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), aim at far-reaching regionalization in various fields, but with focus on economic integration.

I also distinguish between regionalization to indicate the process either as implementation of a strategy or as the result of more spontaneous forces, and regionalism to indicate the general phenomenon. Strategies aimed at economic and social development and the creation and distribution of resources within the region will thus be referred to as regionalization; the visions, values and objectives that supervise these strategies will be referred to as regionalism.

The third definition is on the use of the concept hegemon. There is vast literature on hegemonic stability, originally closely associated with the realist school of international relations. Krasner (1983) has defined an international hegemonic regime as one which guides and constrains state behaviour through a set of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures. Other schools have developed as a result of critique from various sources. I use the term in a sense close to the definition suggested by Hettne in a recent publication:

Hegemony on the level of the world order can thus be described as a form of world governance, i.e. a set of rules backed by the authority (and credibility) of the hegemon. Hegemony is thus a special kind of power, based on different but mutually supportive dimensions, fulfilling certain functions (Hettne in Hettne and Inotai 1994:4).

The term benevolent hegemon is proper in this case because in the long run, the issue is the interest of the regime as a whole; this, among other things, means being the guarantor of the provision of collective goods in a manner useful to all within the regime and not only in the national interest of the hegemon itself.

Literature on the advantages, disadvantages and possible necessity of an hegemonic regime has mainly dealt with the USA at the global level. The term regional hegemon is at times used to define a force – mostly external and normally a superpower – that directs the regional activities undertaken by a number of countries in a specific geographic area, for instance USA and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). I use the term for another concept, namely to identify one dominating country in the region itself; South Africa being a potential hegemon in southern Africa.

The final issue of definition is that I distinguish between sustainable (ecological) development and sustained (economic) development. This specification has to be included as many economists do not make a clear distinction here and sometimes use the term sustainable in connection with economic development.
II REGIONALIZATION MODELS

The aim of this section is to create a basis for the classification of on-going and suggested regionalization schemes in southern Africa in accordance with theoretical models or strategies on regionalization.10

The section does not contain an elaborated theoretical discussion of regionalization, but gives a brief overview of the various theories relevant for existing regionalization efforts in southern Africa. For a slightly more elaborated review of the three main traditional economic integration models, trade integration, neofunctional integration and development integration, I refer to Tom Østergaard's handy overview including his references (1993).

The market integration theory was originally developed by Jacob Viner in the 1950s, mainly as a theory for customs union (1950). Trade integration was in focus, and it contained the well-known stages of free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union or community and finally political union. The theory mainly addressed economic integration in industrialized countries where markets for production factors, infrastructure, etc. were functioning. It concentrated on the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion.11

It has been argued by many scholars, among them Bela Balassa (1961), that the traditional theory of customs union is of little use for evaluating the desirability and possible consequences of integration among less developed countries. When used in connection with third world countries, it has to be adjusted inter alia to the lack of functioning factor markets and infrastructure. In the case of southern Africa, it also has to be adjusted to the strong asymmetry resulting from the economic dominance of South Africa. Some of these aspects are also discussed in Laursen and Hedegaard (1993).

The critique focuses on the following aspects:

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10 There is a certain confusion in the literature on the use of the three terms regionalization or integration theory, model and strategy, respectively. They are sometimes used synonymously, although it can be argued that trade integration is the only one which is based on a firm theoretical framework, namely static comparative advantage within the neo-classical paradigm of economics. I try to use the term regionalization or integration model to avoid a discussion of what requirements that have to be fulfilled to constitute a theory.

11 Very simply expressed, this means that the welfare results of a customs union depend on whether trade creation (the replacement of higher-cost domestic production by lower-cost imports from countries within the region) or trade diversion (replacement of lower-cost imports from third countries by higher-cost imports from within the region) dominates the trade pattern.
i) The static approach is not open to changes in complementarity and creation of new comparative advantages, as it insists on optimal resource allocation in the short-term perspective;

ii) The assumption that all factor resources are fully utilized and that they will be immediately absorbed into other parts of the economy if out-competed as a result of the integration;

iii) The assumption that physical and human capital are non-sector specific;

iv) The assumption that the trade between members of an integration scheme is rather balanced;

v) The assumption that there is full competition on the national markets for goods and production factors;

vi) The assumption that transfer costs for trade are low. All these assumptions are unrealistic in the case of southern Africa.

Carol Lancaster argues that most developing countries, particularly in Africa, have only limited potential for expanding trade with one another. More important is the stimulus that integration can provide for expanded investment. Increased trade may be the consequence of expanded investment but it is not the ultimate end of regional integration schemes. Lancaster argues that this has often been confused in discussions of regional integration among African countries (1991). Her comment is of interest in post-apartheid southern Africa.

Bela Balassa together with Ardy Stoutjesdijk have pointed out the importance of making a distinction between different classes of goods and services according to their mobility when discussing market integration (Balassa and Stoutjesdijk 1976). They classify goods and services in three categories: national, regional and international. Under the national category fall for instance perishables, construction, housing, retail trade, most government and private services which normally are not traded between countries. Electricity, roads, railways, water supply, education and research belong to regional goods and services. International goods and services may be procured on a national, regional or world market and comprise most agricultural, mining and manufacturing products.

If this categorization is applied to southern Africa, it can – together with neofunctional theory (see below) – serve as a theoretical explanation why SADCC, albeit not a market integration scheme, has focused on transport and communications and energy (regional goods) in its cooperation.

Benefits from the creation of free trade areas arise only when tariffs have been a major impediment to inter-territorial trade. In African countries, often at least as difficult to overcome are non-tariff obstacles; e.g. inefficient bureaucracy, licensing and payment systems together with other red tape create very burdensome obstacles to intra-regional trade in southern Africa, as pointed out in e.g. the Chr. Michelsen Institute Study on Intra-Regional Trade (CMI 1986).
The second regionalization model is based on a *neofunctional model*. Integration starts with cooperation in concrete areas where immediate benefits can be seen. Regional institutions should be established to promote such transnational functions and areas such as transportation, other infrastructure, energy (regional goods) and production are often mentioned. Once cooperation has been established in one sector, the assumption is that it will spill over into other sectors because of expanding expectations among other interest groups in the region such as industrialists, trade unions, etc.

One of the scholars behind the neofunctional concept is Ernst B. Haas (1958) and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s is a frequently cited example. It has been pointed out that in the neofunctional integration process, the important actors often are not the governments but various interest groups and technocrats involved in functional projects. This makes the use of the model more complicated when these actors are weak and/or rare, as is the case in most African countries.

Haas later became very critical of the regional integration theories for which he himself had been a strong proponent. In 1975 he wrote, 'In essence, I argue that the familiar regional integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent – though still useful – in the rest of the world' (Haas 1975). He also argued that regional theories had not recognized the new interdependence patterns transcending regions. These new patterns called for global theories and solutions, rather than regional ones. Palmer suggests that Haas' book recorded the end of the period of *old regionalism* (Palmer 1992).

A third regional integration model is *development integration*, based on political and administrative cooperation and conscious intervention by the regional governments to promote cooperation and interdependence and administratively handled distribution of benefits to the participants (Axline 1977). It is possible to combine some of the measures under this theoretical heading with market integration. Some instruments used under this approach are regional industrial development with sharing of investments, and regional banks for financing of infrastructural and industrial projects. SADCC (previously) and now SADC argue in their policy documents that this is the type of integration (to be) used by the organization. See, for instance, SADCC (1992a) and SADC (1993b).

While market integration has its own dynamics, the development integration model is based from the beginning on a strong political backing by all participating governments. It is therefore sensitive to concerns that benefits are unequally distributed to the various participants. One example is the East African Community, although it eventually collapsed because of political factors after Amin to power in Uganda. The issues of regional balance and equity are discussed in the SADC documents and awareness of their importance seems to be high within SADC.

Robert Davies starts from these three models and then discusses the *neoliberal variety* of market integration where integration is 'consistent with an outward oriented strategy
that promotes incentives which are neutral between production for the domestic market and export.\textsuperscript{12} This means that regional integration should not salvage failed import substitution industries, but be harmonized with on-going structural adjustment programmes. It also excludes high trade barriers against third parties. Rather, the ultimate objective is 'to create conditions which would allow the private sector to freely work, trade and invest across African borders'.\textsuperscript{13}

This perspective is similar to what is called \textit{open regionalism} in the context of East Asian development, and also recently in the Latin American context.\textsuperscript{14} What Davies calls neoliberal market integration is labelled \textit{new regionalism} by the World Bank (IBRD 1994). The main argument in the World Bank material is that all regionalization efforts should be outward-looking and a continuation at the regional level of what trade liberalization of the structural adjustment programmes is doing at the national level. This \textit{neoliberal / open / neoregionalism} should be regarded as a variant of market integration, rather than a separate integration theory.

Davies pursues his issue by trying to find an alternative to the neoliberal integration strategy which, according to him, was dominating the debate in the early 1990s, in spite of the fact that it is based on a number of highly questionable assumptions. He looks for a strategy that can restructure the regional economic relations and address the present problems of inequity and longer term unsustainability in the region. This would 'centre around a greater access for South Africa to regional markets and inputs in return for agreeing to cooperate with the rest of the region in key sector relations that both address existing imbalances and inequities and boost the income earning potential of other countries' (Davies 1992c:14). His strategy may be searching for an alternative to a neoliberal market integration strategy, but it takes many features from the development integration model.

Of the traditional integration strategies, development integration, especially in the variant by Davies, is the one closest to another concept of \textit{new regionalism}, as suggested by Hettne. In a recent paper, Hettne defines new regionalism in the following way:

\begin{quote}
The \textit{new regionalism} can be defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects. It is a package rather than a single policy, whether concerned with economics or foreign policy. The concept thus goes beyond the free trade market idea, i.e. the interlinking of several previously more or less secluded national markets into one functional economic unit. Rather, the political ambition of creating territorial identity and regional coherence is the primary neomercantilist goal. In
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} Para 2.08 in World Bank (1991), quoted from Davies (1992c:9).

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, Executive Summary, para 10.

this observation other differences between *old* and *new* regionalism are implied. New regionalism is spontaneous and from below, whereas the old type often was imposed on a group of countries in the interest of superpower strategy. Thus, the new regionalism belongs to a new global situation characterized by multipolarism. (Hettne in *Hettne and Inotai 1994:15*)

*New regionalism* as a concept thus is not independent of various *old regionalisms* although it goes beyond them and is based on regionalism *from within*. While the three traditional regional integration models mainly have an economic and developmental perspective, new regionalism is a broader concept. Partly the differences may be related to changes in the world order. The main difference between the World Bank's and Hettne's use of the term is that Hettne's concept is an alternative to pure globalization of the world economy, while the World Bank uses it as part of globalization. Hettne's concept is much more political and *from below* and more *inward looking* than the World Bank's which is limited to trade and trade-related issues. In the World Bank's perspective, there is room only for the three main trading blocs which should be *outward-looking*. In Hettne's perspective there is also room for weaker regional blocs in the periphery as permanent components in interregional discussions and negotiations.

In the analysis of potential regional development in southern Africa, a few other scholars have also used the term *new regionalism*. Thus, William Martin in an article on the post-apartheid development of the region labels one of his scenarios as new regionalism:

> This alternative revolves around the continuation of *centre-hinterland relationships*, but without South Africa as the dominating centre of gravity. Neoregionalism presupposes a negotiated regional regime. Accumulation from below would take precedence from accumulation from above. Neoregionalism, to be meaningful, would have to be conceived as transcending national goals and interests. The states of the region will have to *act* and *think* regionally (Martin 1991:120-1).

Obviously inspired by Martin, André du Pisani more recently wrote an article in which he further develops Martin's three regional scenarios, including new regionalism. He refers to the change in apartheid South Africa in its policy towards the rest of the region in the late 1980s as a shift from *rampant realism* to *neorealism*. The latter is premised on the notion of South Africa as a regional power, but it recognizes certain limits to that power and relies more on non-coercive policy methods. Du Pisani includes security issues in the new regionalism scenario, constituting perhaps the main difference between him and Martin.

Both Martin and du Pisani seem to use the term *new regionalism* not so much as a new theoretical concept, but to label one of their alternative scenarios for the future development of southern Africa. Still their perspectives, although focusing on the intra-regional factors in the southern African region, can be interpreted as similar to Hettne's approach.
**BOX 2.1**  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA  
ACCORDING TO REGIONALIZATION MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.a. Based on market integration:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Southern African Customs Union (SACU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (replacing PTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Common Monetary Area (CMA) (After the entrance of Namibia renamed the Multilateral Monetary Area [MMA])</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Various 'common market' schemes suggested by mainly South African players</td>
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<tr>
<th>1.b. Based on neofunctional or sector or project cooperation:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The sector concept of the African Development Bank study <em>Economic Integration in Southern Africa.</em></td>
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<tr>
<th>1.c. Based on development integration:</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Southern African Development Community (SADC) (replacing SADCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- ANC-related suggestions for future regionalization.</td>
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<tr>
<th>2. SECURITY REGIONALIZATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>- The Front-Line States (FLS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Suggestions for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>- SADC's new sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security, which developed into Association of Southern African States (replacing FLS)</td>
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<tr>
<th>3. REGIONALIZATION TO ACHIEVE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY</th>
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<td>- Regional strategy for the environment and land management sector (SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<th>4. NEW REGIONALISM</th>
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<tr>
<td>- The very ambitious objectives of Southern African Development Community (SADC) may fall under this category</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The new regional and global situation has also affected the debate on *regional security*, which has moved from the traditional strategic studies paradigm in a realist tradition to a broader concept.

During the cold war era, the concept of security in the international debate was dominated by its political and military aspects. It was *power politics* in a realist mould within the discipline of strategic studies, resulting in vast literature (which I will not refer to here). As Carim for instance points out, the changes in the global economy and
world order from the mid-1970s – including the beginnings of détente between the superpowers, USA's economic decline relative to Japan and the European Community, financial costs of the Vietnam war and the OPEC oil price increases – influenced the broader security concept, especially among US scholars (Carim 1993). This trend developed very rapidly in the second half of the 1980s and is dominating the security debate in the post-cold war era. A major work strongly influencing the international debate and one which most scholars, including many of those writing on southern Africa, have used as a point of departure is *People, States and Fear* by Barry Buzan (1991). Especially relevant in this context is Buzan's discussion on regional security (chapter 5) where he also refers to other scholars such as Haas (1974) and Russet (1967b) who have analysed regional security, including the concept of security complex which he defines as follows:

A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan 1991:190).

In the case of southern Africa, this conception has been of relevance since 1990 because the overlay\(^\text{15}\) cold war conflict together with the main regional conflict over apartheid had blocked its usage during the previous period.

To facilitate systematization, the main existing and suggested regional organizations in southern Africa are grouped according to the various regionalization categories discussed in this section (see Box 2.1 above).

Before a review of these regionalization projects, let us turn to a brief historical exposé of regionalization in southern Africa.

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\(^{15}\) This concept is used by Buzan to describe a situation 'when the direct presence of outside powers in the region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security dynamics among the local states' (Buzan 1991:198).
Southern Africa is different from many other third world sub-regions in the sense that due to historical circumstances, it has been integrated in several fields for many decades. A number of regional organizations have been established and one, SACU, has links dating back to the end of the 19th century. These two features affect the on-going public debate on the potential of regionalization in the sense that it is empirical rather than theoretical, taking as its point of departure on how existing organizations can develop. Shifting between various theories, models and strategies, the debate is highly eclectic. Most of the literature is also part of a political debate on the future of the region and many contributions come from players in the various regionalization schemes.

The discussion on and the praxis of regionalization in southern Africa have mostly dealt with a region where South Africa has been dominant and where the government of South Africa or other South African players have been the driving forces. At times, during colonial or post-colonial periods, forces in neighbouring countries have reacted to or opposed the initiatives but South Africa's dominant role was never challenged.

This regionalization process was interrupted during a 10-15 year period after the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and especially after the independence of Zimbabwe and the formation of SADCC in 1980 until approximately 1990 when the dismantling of the apartheid system started. During this period, the perspective changed because regionalization had been used as an instrument in the conflict between apartheid South Africa and the neighbouring states. For them, the major aim of regional cooperation and/or integration was to reduce their dependence on South Africa. Organizationally the most important formation during this era was the SADCC and ideologically the Front-Line States' perspective played an important role. This is an example of regionalization striving to avoid regional dominance by a malign hegemon.

Starting from around 1990, the regionalization discussions reverted to the perspective which included South Africa, in spite of the fact that events after 1975 had induced certain changes that made it impossible simply to return to the pre-1975 position. The dominating role of South Africa will, however, have to be taken into consideration in any model. Its strength may be used to the benefit of the whole region according to a

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16 The concept of Front-Line States developed out of the cooperation between Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana in the 1970s supporting the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola. After the independence of these countries they joined the FLS, now with the main aim of supporting the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, which after its independence joined the group. The FLS cooperation never took firm organizational forms. It is further dealt with in the section on regional security.
certain benevolent hegemony scheme or it may be used according to an arrangement where the surplus in the regional periphery is siphoned to South Africa as the regional centre.

**BOX 3.1**
**BRIEF HISTORY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

- Southern African Customs Union (SACU) formed in 1910, but with roots as far back as 1889 or 1893, depending on definition. (SACU is discussed in section IV.)

- The expansion of the British South African Company (BSAC) in the region, 1890–1923. This can also be related to the construction of the railway network in the region in the beginning of the 20th century. See for instance Austen (1987), Parsons (1982), Phimister (1983) and Ranger (1968).

- The Rand mines common recruitment organization for migrant workers, most of the time called WNLA, which was formed as early as 1898. See for instance First (1983), Böhnig (1981) and Wilson (1972).

- Various unsuccessful attempts from 1911–63 by South African governments to incorporate what were then called the British protectorates (present day Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). See for instance Parsons (1982) and Shilton (1987).


- The Rand Monetary Area, formed in 1974. After renegotiations of the agreement in 1986 the name was changed to the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and in 1992 with Namibia's formal entrance it was changed again to the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA) (Briefly discussed in section IV.)

- The Vorster initiative in 1977 on a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) followed up by P. W. Botha until the scheme collapsed when Zimbabwe gained its independence with a ZANU government. CONSAS has mainly been perceived as a political scheme where increased South African economic penetration of neighbouring states should be used as an instrument to make them more dependent on South Africa and therefore less interested in supporting liberation movements. The security aspect of this scheme was thus important. Replaced by Association of Southern African States (ASAS) in 1995. (Discussed in section V.)

- The Front-Line States' (FLS) cooperation, from the early 1970s to the independence of Namibia in 1990. (Discussed in section V.)

- The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) from 1980 and transforming into the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in 1993. (Discussed in section IV.)

- The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). It was formally inaugurated in 1982 and decided in 1993 to transform it into the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). (Discussed in section IV.)

A chronology of main regionalization efforts with selected references for those not discussed in this paper is given in Box 3.1. In addition to the regionalization or integration projects listed, regional cooperation in specific sectors between various countries has resulted in the formation of many other organizations, such as Southern
African Labour Commission (SALC), Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR), Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC), Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of Soil (SARCCUS) and the SADCC sector coordination units. However, they will not be dealt with in this context.

The following three sections deal with different types of economic regionalization as they have evolved in the region.
IV ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION

Since around 1990, the debate and research on regionalization in southern Africa has been based firstly on the assumption of a democratic or post-apartheid South Africa as the important or dominant force in the region, and secondly a post-cold war international framework, including global hegemony for market system solutions. The perspective of regional armed conflict has been replaced by one of cooperation, even though the concept and creation of a possible regional security arrangement is still very vague. Remaining major concerns relate to South Africa's strong dominance, possible new national conflicts triggered by the demise of the regional overlay conflict and increasing competition between the existing regional organizations.

Most of what is published on post-apartheid regionalization follows a standard format. They normally start with discussions of southern Africa in the post-cold war international political economy, followed by comments on possible regional effects of a post-apartheid South Africa. Then three regional scenarios are sketched; one is often in the category of fragmentation, one is based on either increased bilateral, South Africa-driven regional development along a de-apartheidized CONSAS model and the third in the category of development integration with strong political involvement to reduce inherited regional imbalances. Usually, literature also contains some discussion of the possible roles for SACU, the SADC and the PTA/COMESA, the main existing regional organizations.

So far most literature on this issue is in the form of journal and magazine articles or conference/seminar papers, and most books are edited collections of such papers. Theoretically they are mostly eclectical and sometimes the terminology is not very well established.

Another general feature in the discussion of post-apartheid regionalization is to consider South Africa and South African based forces as the motivating factor to which the rest of the region reacts – partly reflecting the fact that an increasing number of scholars and observers from South Africa participate in the debate. This may create the false impression that the SADC countries (governments and economic units) are passively waiting for South Africa to make its move, an impression compounded by the fact that outsiders had little information for a long period on the philosophy of SADC. However, a part of this lacuna was filled with the publication of a booklet in 1993 on some of the issues that have to be dealt with in the future SADC-South Africa relations (Chipeta and Davies 1993). The Harare-centred SAPES (Southern Africa Political Economy Series) research network and its magazine SAPEM (Southern Africa Political Economy Monthly) have been the main forum outside South Africa for discussions on the future of southern Africa. There are also a number of important contributions by other individual scholars from the region and a significant number from scholars in the North.
The benefits of regionalization for post-apartheid southern Africa are generally acknowledged in recent literature. The ADB study states, 'The evidence suggests that all the countries of southern Africa have much to gain from various forms of regional cooperation' and lists three principal sources: i) cost savings resulting from coordinated investments, ii) benefits from trade liberalization, and iii) externalities which increased competition generates' (ADB 1993a).

Maasdorp and Whiteside, focusing on the potential to use regionalization as an instrument to avoid marginalization in the world economy, argue as follows:

There can be little doubt that southern Africa needs a credible institutional structure for regional economic interaction. The reason for this is not so much that economic integration is a good thing but that southern Africa is part of a continent which is becoming increasingly marginalized in the eyes of the international investor community, if not in the eyes of the world at large. Yet, southern Africa should be the part of Africa which is best equipped to escape this marginalization. It has the most developed country in Africa, i.e. South Africa, a long standing economic integration and monetary arrangement (SACU plus CMA) with a sophisticated financial infrastructure; a reasonable industrial structure in Zimbabwe; significant untapped potential in the energy sector; and significant unexploited resources in Angola and Mozambique. It is a region which also seems to have forged a feeling of common identity thanks to the various economic groupings in existence (Maasdorp and Whiteside 1992a:44-5).

A number of other scholars have enumerated the benefits that theoretically could be expected from regional cooperation and/or integration in SSA. Berg, for instance, lists five types of benefits that should be derived in the short to medium term:

i) Expanded trade, in accordance with normal trade integration theory;

ii) Joint facilities to serve the regional market, such as integrated manufacturing industries, joint services such as airlines, railways, insurance and banking;

iii) Better resource management, for instance in the fields of hydro-power and locust control;

iv) Better and cheaper services and cost effectiveness based on regional research and training centres, provision of regional technical services and common standards and regulations;

v) Increased bargaining power in negotiations with outside agencies, institutions and companies (Berg 1988, referred to in IDM 1992).

It can be argued that Berg's list is a theoretical construction far from African reality. This impression is strengthened when compared to Kayira on factors explaining why regionalization efforts in SSA have fallen far short of expectations:
Economic and trade policies have been inward-looking, and there has been limited political commitment to implement economic policies, designed to expand intra-regional trade;

Lack of private sector participation in the integration efforts;

Although progress has been made on reduction of tariff barriers, the non-tariff barriers have remained rigid;

Colonial patterns of industry location and infrastructure system still persist;

The organizations established for integration have had weak capacity;

Overvalued exchange rates, weak monetary management and inadequate banking and financial systems (Kayira 1993).

Kayira is supported by Foroutan, who arrives at similar conclusions in his review of trade regionalization in SSA. He argues that there are two sets of reasons why trade integration among SSA countries has failed:

First, based upon their current structure of production, the SSA countries are not each others' natural trading partners. Second, if indeed integration could have played a role in changing this structure it has not succeeded in doing so because the failure to dismantle trade barriers among partners has prevented any meaningful integration of SSA's goods market from taking place. The reason lies mainly with import-substitution policies, revenue constraint, the skewed distribution of net benefits of integration among the partners, and inadequacy of compensation mechanisms (Foroutan 1993:260).

While both lists are open to argument, together they exemplify some of the challenges that need to be overcome for successful southern African regionalization which has to shift from 'Kayira' towards the direction of 'Berg'.

Robert Davies suggests that, 'In the case of southern Africa, potentially all countries in the region could benefit from closer economic cooperation in the post-apartheid era' (1991:2). He particularly emphasizes the role of South Africa: its technology is more appropriate for African countries in numerous areas, neighbouring countries can supply South Africa with a range of inputs, the bargaining power of all countries in the region with the outside world can be strengthened. The last argument again is related to the discussion of how to avoid being marginalized in the world economy.

The suggested regionalization models fall either within market integration with two main subgroups, a traditional trade integration model and a more open, neoliberal variant, or within neofunctional integration thinking, or within development integration. Concern over the risk of a deterioration in the existing regional imbalance often leads to suggestions for a development integration approach. This is the traditional integration model closest to the new regionalism strategy, although the latter is more firmly based in a bottom-up perspective and also is used for a broader concept of regionalization,
while development integration is related mainly to economic development. As was
noted in the introduction, some observers also use the term *new regionalism*
 synonymously with, or at least very closely to, *open regionalism*. One of the most
enthusiastic representatives of this view is Stephen R. Lewis Jr:

\[\text{... there is the strong possibility that South Africa could emerge as an} \]
\[\text{engine of growth within the region, if it follows an outward-looking} \]
\[\text{strategy and uses its access to international capital markets to finance not} \]
\[\text{only its own growth but also a sustainable growth of trade-led} \]
\[\text{development within the entire region (1994:249).} \]

Many players and observers, for instance Erich Leistner (1992a), as well as the SADCC 1992 Theme document and the ADB study argue for an eclectic approach instead of strict adherence to one integration model.\(^{17}\) This view is further strengthened as literature often not only covers economic integration or cooperation but also deals with a broader perspective, including security issues.

In the rest of this section, the major regionalization efforts in southern Africa are discussed under the theoretical categories suggested in Section II and summarized in Box 2.1. Each starts with a brief historical review, followed by a summary of the on­
going, post-apartheid based discussion.

4.1 Market integration

African countries seem unable to surmount the associated difficulties that
have arisen in all their attempts at economic integration of the type that is
supposed to end with the formation of a customs union – whether the
defunct East African Community, or any of those still in existence, such as Ecowas, the Mano River Union, the Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'ouest (CEAO), the Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale (UDEAC) or the PTA. The precise structure and details of the actual schemes being promoted have been unrealistic in light of the costs and sacrifices that African governments and their citizens seem willing to bear (Johnson 1991:3).

Two of the main regionalization efforts in the region are based on neoclassical forms of market integration, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) and its envisaged successor, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The Common Monetary Area (CMA) should also be under this heading, as a complement to SACU for four of the five SACU members (Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa).

\(^{17}\) 'In many ways, the real question is not whether some form of regional integration arrangements will be attempted in southern Africa, but rather on what principles and terms; and the extent to which the people of the region will be involved in shaping them' (SADCC 1992a, Executive Summary, para 1.2).
The pre-history of the 1910 Customs Union Agreement between South Africa and the then three British High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland is briefly dealt with in Kumar (1991) who refers to Krueger (1965) and Hudson (1979). The discussion of this arrangement already from the beginning focused on some of the main issues of trade integration between unequal partners. In the case of SACU the shares of revenue from the common revenue pool, the disadvantages for the less advanced members of the union and their special needs for development, and the lack of provision in the agreement for consultations led to a unilateral interpretation and manipulation of the agreement by South Africa (Kumar 1991:91-2). The territories tried to get the agreement renegotiated, but neither the British colonial office nor the government of South Africa was interested. The renegotiations had to await the independence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries), and resulted in the SACU agreement in 1969 (South Africa 1979), in which some of the concerns of the BLS states were taken into consideration. A compensation clause giving them larger than proportional share of the customs revenue pool and certain stipulations that were intended to protect new investments in the BLS countries on an infant industry model were included in the 1969 agreement which in 1976 was also amended with a stabilization factor in the revenue sharing scheme.

Discussions since 1969 have to a large extent focused on whether the revenue compensation was fair compared to the losses suffered by the BLS countries, resulting from their lack of influence over the common tariff structure and the industrial and tax policy. An intense debate between various researchers went on for years simultaneously as the governments of the BLS countries made their own evaluations and succeeded in including a stabilizing factor in 1976. Several participants in the debate have endeavoured to carry out a cost-benefit evaluation. While outside observers and scholars from the BLS countries often concluded that the compensation was too small or were ambiguous on the matter, policy makers have tended to be sceptical about leaving SACU, an uncertain option.

This debate and the factors explaining the contrast between academics and decision makers are well summarized by Isaksen (1993) who has also analysed the issues from the viewpoint of Namibia at the time of independence (Isaksen 1992). The pro and con arguments are summarized in Maasdorp (1982). Several of the main issues including the political background, protection of infant industries, agricultural protection, the implications for BLS of South Africa's import policies, South Africa's regional policy and BLS, fiscal harmonization, revenue sharing and alternatives to fiscal compensation, are discussed by Walters (1989).

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18 An immediate review of the 1969 agreement is that of Landell-Mills (1971). An intense debate, especially focusing on the degree to which the BLS countries were compensated for losses of their own fiscal and industrial policy, took place in *World Development* in the late 1970s. See Landell-Mills (1979); Mosley (1978 and 1979); Robson (1978) and Cobbe (1980). See also Guma (1985), Hall (1980) and Hudson (1981).
After the 1976 amendment and the unilateral decision in the early 1980s by the apartheid government to include the so-called independent bantustans in the scheme, the South African Ministry of Finance complained that the SACU agreement was too expensive for the country. The conception not accepted by the BLS states, South Africa subsequently signed bilateral treaties with each bantustan, giving them the same compensation as the BLS states and, from 1990, Namibia. Up to 1990 it was in the interest of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs to keep the agreement, as it could be used as an example of the benevolent attitude of the apartheid government towards its immediate neighbours.

Prior to 1990, discussions on SACU had not included the issue of costs and benefits for the BLS countries of trade integration versus other integration models. The customs union was taken for granted and the only alternative available for the BLS countries was to leave the union, not to reshape it according to some other integration model.

Since 1990, the debate on SACU has focused on the role of a customs union in the post-apartheid southern Africa and the organization has featured as one instrument to develop the new region. Most observers assume that with a new democratically elected government in South Africa, there will be a renegotiation of the SACU agreement. A new round of preparatory talks between member states has been going on since mid-1993 and various options have been discussed. While some scholars, such as Reginald Green, rule out the SACU-option altogether (1991), most assume that cooperation will continue in the form of either a minimum solution or some type of maximum solution, as they are labelled by Jan Isaksen (1993). There have been discussions to broaden the union by including more members while, on the other hand, also reducing the level of integration. Another suggestion has been to supplement the present SACU core with peripheral countries which will gradually increase their degree of integration. Scholars writing on this are Kumar (1991) and Maasdorp and Whiteside (1992b).

Sisulu et al. (1994) contains papers on the analysis of some of the issues which have to be settled in the renegotiated SACU agreement as well as a discussion of the implications for the SACU countries of the Uruguay Round agreement in GATT.

Formal negotiations on a reformed SACU agreement between the new democratic government in South Africa and the governments of the BLNS countries were started during the second half of 1994.

4.1.2 The Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA)

The other main organization based on the market integration model is the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) but its history and degree of integration differ from SACU's. PTA is very much a creation of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and one observer traces its origin back to 1965, although nothing evolved from the discussions at that time. The formation of the East African Community (EAC) in 1967 shelved the PTA project for a decade until the collapse of the EAC in 1977 when the initiative was revived (Anglin 1983). In 1978 a declaration of intent was signed by twelve states and PTA was formally inaugurated in 1982 (PTA
In accordance with the market integration concept, it started with gradual reduction of tariffs, albeit restricted to a number of products and with several members getting waivers from the agreed tariff reduction scheme. Originally the intra-tariff reduction to zero was to be implemented by 1990 but implementation soon lagged behind schedule. Subsequently it was revised and the year 2000 was established as the new target not only for zero tariffs between member states, but also for the creation of a common market with common external tariffs.

Despite its name, the PTA concept is more extensive than a pure trade integration model. This broader concept was underlined already in the inaugurational address to Ministerial Council of PTA by Adebayo Adedeji, the first executive secretary.\(^\text{19}\) The same theme is emphasized in a recent interview with the present executive secretary Bingu wa Mutharika.\(^\text{20}\) Still the organization's first decade has been dominated by various schemes to gradually reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers between member countries. Some of the recent PTA policy or strategy documents are PTA 1991a, 1991b and 1992a.

In the case of PTA (as well as for SADCC), observers have come to different conclusions regarding its level of success. Independent literature assessing the PTA is much more limited than that on the SADCC. Laursen and Hedegaard (1993) found only five titles; namely, Kisanga (1991) (which mainly deals with the East African Community), Kumar (1989), Martin (1989) and Takirambudde (1991). To these can be added Ofstad (1993), Takirambudde (1993), Sinare (1989), Carrim (1994) and Bøås (1994).

While PTA representatives point to practical improvements such as the reduction of customs tariffs for selected goods, the facilitation of customs procedures, the PTA clearing house as a payment system for intra-trade and the PTA travellers checks, others are less impressed. Takirambudde, for instance, argues that 'the material basis for a motivation to establish and implement a genuine regional preferential arrangement, as envisioned by the (PTA) treaty, is patently lacking.' Arguing that the practical experience of the PTA has been a far cry from the theoretical propositions, he harshly concludes, 'Overall the PTA has been a failure' (Takirambudde 1993:154). Whatever success occurred has largely been political rather than economic. He suggests that, 'The search for solutions should focus on institutional forms that can address the fundamental weakness of the PTA: lack of concrete common interest, flexibility, breadth, activism, firm timetables and non-enforceability of commitments' (Takirambudde 1993:155).

An interesting approach is used by Bøås (1994) who suggests eight geographic, political and economic variables that may affect the implementation of the PTA agreement. He

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\(^{19}\) This is reported in Anglin (1983).

\(^{20}\) Interview in \textit{SAPEM} (April 1993) by Fernando Gonçalves, in which wa Mutharika refers to the PTA Treaty that stated that the aim of PTA is 'to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural resources, and monetary affairs with the aim of raising the standards of living of its people and of fostering closer relations between its member states.'
concludes that the two main factors behind the slow implementation are the lack of a regional hegemon and the tendency among governments of the member countries to put more emphasis on relative gains than on absolute gains. The latter issue is related to how the state defines its own interests and the time perspective used.

In 1993 PTA decided to transform itself into the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) with the aim of achieving deeper integration than previously (PTA 1993b). This should be viewed in light of the on-going competition between that organization and SADC. The issue at stake is determining which organization will be the main instrument for regionalization in post-apartheid southern Africa – and the answer may be neither one. However, the transformation of PTA into COMESA is, among other things, indicative of the ambition to further develop, in addition to trade integration, new aspects of the PTA treaty.21

Takirambudde, in a recent article referred to above, summarizes in a number of lessons his conclusions from the experience with PTA (1993):

i) Bilateral, or when feasible, minilateral trade agreements among a smaller number of states in Eastern and southern Africa are more likely to be successful as opposed to the ambitious and unwieldy multilateralism of the PTA treaty;

ii) Integration should, in the main, be motivated and driven by economic rather than non-market issues and considerations;

iii) Trade liberalization agreements must take into account national structural adjustment commitments;

iv) Specific and manageable commitments as well as an approach of variable geometry flexibility must be set;

v) A phased injection of competitiveness in the trading area should be used to meet government concern over short-term adjustment costs.

vi) Trading arrangements must seek to liberalize the movement of labour and capital that could compensate for chronic trade deficits.

These lessons could form part of an outward-looking World Bank integration scheme, and are far from the original more inward-looking PTA concept. However, they also show some of the obvious weaknesses with the present PTA/COMESA scheme. According to recent statements by the organization’s executive secretary, the inward-looking concept has not been abandoned. In one interview in SAPEM, he refers to the entire PTA concept as one where 'regional economic cooperation and integration is based on the spirit of collective self reliance' (Gonçalves 1993).

Carrim (1994) systematizes the factors behind the limited success of the PTA, drawing heavily on Takirambudde (1991 and 1993) and Ofstad (1993). She also suggests the establishment of an Eastern and Southern African Forum primarily to determine the

21 A rather critical comment with the headline 'Lofty ambitions of COMESA' was published in the January issue of the magazine New African (Rake 1994).
economic needs of the region and the appropriate organizational forms. This effort should be seen against the difficulties of finding a solution on the roles of and relations between SADC and PTA/COMESA. It is however not very clear how a new forum would be able to solve the SADC – PTA/COMESA issue and what aspects could be discussed there that could not be introduced in either of the existing two organizations.

4.1.3 The Common Monetary Area (CMA)

The CMA is seldom discussed as a regionalization scheme *per se* because it is perceived as a by-product of SACU, a fact which is historically correct. From the end of the 19th century, South African currency was used in what now constitutes Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. After the independence of these countries, the arrangement was formalized in the Rand Monetary Area agreement (RMA) in 1974 with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland as members. Botswana, the fourth member of SACU, decided against joining the RMA and has followed an independent credit and currency policy since 1976. The RMA agreement was renegotiated in 1986 and renamed the Common Monetary Area (CMA). After independence, Namibia became a *de facto* and later – in 1993 – a *de jure* member of CMA which in this connection was renamed once again as the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA).

Discussions between the governments and central banks of the four member countries have focused mostly on technical issues concerning, for instance, the control over and compensation for foreign exchange which for a long time went directly to the Reserve Bank of South Africa.

Guma (1985) tries to analyse the CMA agreement from the theory of *optimum currency area*. There have also been debates of the *pros* and *cons* involved for the minor countries as to the benefits and costs of continued CMA membership. Most observers do not see any important advantages for the other countries, should they decide to leave the CMA. See for instance Collins *et al.* (1978) and Harvey and Hudson (1992) who, recognizing the important differences between the countries involved, are also reluctant to accept monetary integration as the main instrument for economic integration of SADC.

4.1.4 Neoliberal or open market integration

The neoliberal market integration model is advocated by the World Bank and by such consultants as Hawkins as well as by some business representatives in South Africa. The main documents on this issue are World Bank (1991), focusing on cross-border investment and trade issues and IBRD (1994). Main recommendations include the reduction of non-tariff barriers as part of general trade liberalization and the development of broad regional market integration together with a general reduction of trade protection. As stated earlier, this is similar to the concept of *open regionalism* in the South East Asian and, more recently, in Latin American debate.

The framework for such a market integration is improved by the on-going structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) – in which trade liberalization forms an important part.
– currently under implementation in six of the SADC countries. The World Bank report, however, also points out that unilateral liberalization (under SAPs) has in some cases reduced the scope for trade creation. Support for trade liberalization at the national level may not always be compatible with regional market integration. The same effect will most probably result from the agreement between South Africa and GATT in 1994, according to which significant reductions and restructuring of the South African tariffs will take place, albeit gradually over a rather long interim period. On-going changes at the national level thus improve outward-looking regionalization and reduce the scope for inward-looking schemes.

Hawkins argues strongly for general liberalization and the 'acceptance of the outward-oriented development imperative' by all SADC states (1992b:20). Without such a strategy the region will not receive the foreign investments which, according to Hawkins, are necessary for sustained economic development. He fears that the policy makers in southern African countries in spite of accepting structural adjustment programmes at the national level, still see a fortress southern Africa as the regional way ahead. In his various contributions, he strongly emphasizes that SADCC's experience during the 1980s highlights the dangers of excessive state intervention and the need to open up the enterprise sector which will be the driving force of integration. Hawkins' concern in this context is the need to secure a more equitable distribution of benefits within the region. This, according to Hawkins, cannot be achieved by a top-down dirigist approach, and the only option is the gradual increase of cooperation in various sectors (1992a).

On the market integration projects in SSA, Omotunde Johnson summarizes that in spite of the obvious theoretical benefits of increased and more efficient production and trade, there seem to be four main types of (perceived) costs that obstruct implementation:

i) loss of sovereignty over macro-economic policy to some union authority or body;

ii) consumption costs from protection, and hence trade diversion;

iii) the expectation of unequal distribution of gains and losses;

iv) the potential break-up of other valued economic relationships (Johnson 1991:4).

In the case of southern Africa, the dominance of South Africa makes the issue of unequal distribution of gains and losses especially relevant. The serious debt and economic crises in some countries make the others reluctant to develop supranational relations, which will be weakened by the membership of these crisis countries. The issue of what often is called political will is important here. To avoid disturbances in operational matters, Johnson suggests that once a trade integration scheme is launched, the highest decision-making organs should not include the political leaders of member states.
4.2 Neofunctional or project cooperation models

Contrary to the case of PTA, literature on SADCC is vast. First, the SADCC secretariat and all the sector units have produced a large number of documents which I am not including in this context. Prior to 1990, I refer only to those SADCC documents which deal directly with regional integration or cooperation and are relevant for this paper. One hundred and seventy-four reports and consultancy reports commissioned by SADCC and published before 1990 are listed in Lofgren (1990) which also contains references to more than 200 books and other reports. A more recent list is included in Mandaza and Tostensen (1994) containing 590 items (not all of them on regionalization) of which 90 are SADCC documents.

Second, during the 1980s, SADCC was the regional project; it was popular among aid agencies and governments, some of whom used support to the organization as a substitute for sanctions against apartheid South Africa (Mandaza 1987b). It was a point of focus for scholars both because of its project coordination concept, and because SADCC was considered by many to be an anti-apartheid organization. SADCC's role in the global cold war context is discussed by Mandaza (1987b) and Ching'ambo (1992b), among others.

SADCC has been perceived as mainly a project coordination organization by, for instance, Østergaard (1990) and Haarløv (1988). Others, as for instance Tostensen (1982), categorize it within the neofunctional integration model. This is understandable because project coordination in practice has been the organization's main activity with transport and communications as the main area of cooperation. But the Lusaka Declaration also contains more ambitious integration objectives. It suggests an approach different from common market integration, based instead on bilaterally negotiated annual targets and production lists as well as a restructuring of existing payments systems to facilitate increased intra-regional trade (SADCC 1980).

Various activities to achieve the intra-trade targets in the Lusaka Declaration were suggested in a consultancy study (CMI 1986). Many scholars are concerned with the low share of intra-regional trade both in SADCC and PTA. Trade statistics, albeit shaky, show that in both cases the share is around five per cent of the total, and that it has not shown any tendency to increase. This, for most countries, means that their trade with the core countries is dominant. South Africa is the major source of imports for the BLS countries. The 1980s did not change this general picture, and most observers assess the SADCC trade objectives to be unsuccessful for the same reasons that are argued in the evaluation of PTA. See for instance Haarløv (1988).

Criticism is often focused on the slow implementation of agreed reductions of trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff. However, as the starting point of SADCC was project

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22 Although this book was published in the beginning of 1994, it was originally written for the tenth anniversary of SADCC in 1990. It is updated by an editor in certain aspects but unfortunately the references are only occasionally modernized. This is not due to the authors, but to the editing which took a very long time and furthermore modified important parts of an originally sharp analysis.
coordination while that of PTA was the reduction of trade barriers, this critique weighs heavier in the case of PTA.

Another important point is to analyse the feasibility of the aim to significantly increase the intra-trade between countries with the present production structures of the PTA and SADC countries. This was, for instance, pointed out in the CMI study. If the restructuring of production structures is a prerequisite for significantly increasing trade between member countries, then the objective of substantially increased intra-trade cannot be expected by means of reduced trade barriers.

The project coordination concept enabled SADCC to develop without any supranational structures, and created discussion on the costs and benefits of this approach compared to the traditional market integration model. One of the first analyses which is still relevant a decade later is Tostensen (1982). Against an analysis of the dependency relations between individual SADCC countries and South Africa and a presentation of the development of the SADCC programme thus far, Tostensen discusses the past regional integration efforts in which SADCC countries had been involved, the problems of the heterogeneity of SADCC member states, the risk of restoring a colonial transport infrastructure of little use to regional integration, the possible response of sabotage and attacks by South Africa which he unfortunately predicted correctly, the danger of new dependencies on the aid donors, and the artificial region SADCC is economically without Namibia and South Africa, while at the time political factors blocked the economic rationale.

A more political perspective on SADCC has been used by Mandaza in several contributions. He sees the cooperation model chosen by SADCC as the result of a conscious policy by the North to keep the region under its control and to retard more independent regional behaviour (Mandaza 1993a). The project cooperation method suited donors well because it ensured that control remained in their hands. He has also argued that the origin of SADCC to a large extent can be found outside the continent. The view is not uncommon among African scholars in the SADC region that SADCC is a creation of the North and is being manipulated by them.

Referring to dependency literature and authors like Young, Krasner, Strange and others, André du Pisani argues that SADCC conforms to the definition of a regime and that 'regime theory offers some imaginative avenues for future research' (du Pisani 1992:175). According to du Pisani, SADCC

... 'hangs together' in terms of decision-making rules and procedures, shares some common attitudinal expectations and convictions – notably an abhorrence of apartheid and a belief in a future non-racial South Africa – as well as displaying patterns of dependence and interdependence (du Pisani 1992:176).

During the 1980s a number of publications were issued with the aim to present the main organizational and development features of SADCC with some brief comments on the degree of success and future potential. Issues in focus were mainly changes in the
dependence on South Africa especially as regards trade and transit transports, the effects of heavy reliance on aid financing and the lack of increased intra-trade. These were discussed among others by Thompson (1986), Zehender (1983) and contributors in Amin et al. (1987). Chitala's contribution points out the risks of the SADCC countries being overly dependent on aid donors in a situation where companies in imperialist countries own and control key sectors of their economies. Chitala also argues that, 'SADCC cannot succeed in achieving its strategic objectives if it becomes merely another project financing body, but only if it defines a long-term strategy and tactics capable of producing the types of restructuring envisaged in SADCC policy documents' (1987:35). A similar critical perspective is given in Lee (1989) which is a rather comprehensive review of the background and development of SADCC up to 1988.

Another critique in this field is exemplified by Mandaza. He focuses on the inconsistent behaviour of the many external forces supporting SADCC while at the same time they buttress the South African economy. He also points out that the SADCC objective to 'disengage economically from a country without whose economy, trade, and transport and communications infrastructure most of the SADCC member states are unlikely to survive' is inconsistent with a long-term perspective, 'it would be more cost-effective and also therefore in the interests of long-term regional economic cooperation in the sub-region if SADCC could currently include in its perspectives, plans and projects the probability that in the not too distant future South Africa will not only be part of it but the heart of it' (Mandaza 1987b:222-3). Mandaza is one of the few observers who in the 1980s looked at this inconsistency between the short-term and long-term perspectives of regionalization which should have been taken into consideration by SADCC but the issue was never discussed officially. The official line was to reduce dependence on South Africa and after 1990, SADCC maintained a stricter isolation policy towards South Africa than many of its member countries. (Some observers refer this attitude to the influence of the then SADCC/SADC executive secretary. See for instance an interview with the executive secretary in SAPEM [Mandaza 1991a]).

The theme documents to the annual SADCC conference in Maputo in January 1992 (SADCC 1992a) and to the annual SADC conference in Harare in January 1993 (SADC 1993b) together provide a better evaluation of the regionalization strategy adopted by the organization in the post-apartheid and post-cold war era than the SADC Treaty (SADCC 1992d) and Declaration by the Heads of State (SADCC 1992c) as they include more assessments and motivations. While the very ambitious objectives for the SADC integration are outlined in the Treaty and the Declaration, the theme documents show that SADC is aware of the complexities of the issues and potential shortcomings.

SADCC's own assessment of its first eleven years is summarized in one section of the theme document from 1992. It starts with positive achievements, stating that those have been commendable, particularly when seen against the national economic problems, the hostile international economic environment and the massive destabilization carried out by the apartheid South Africa. Despite this, SADCC

... helped to hold the region together, and scored successes particularly in agricultural research, energy, transport and communications. But more
than anything else, the greatest success has been in forging a regional identity and a sense of a common destiny among the ten member states (SADCC 1992a:3).

The document continues on a more self-critical note that in spite of these and other achievements, 'Progress towards the reduction of the region's economic dependence, and towards economic integration has, so far, been modest. SADCC has yet to become an effective instrument of economic transformation and integration...'. Among the reasons for the modest success the document mentions that project initiation, preparation and implementation have been weak, the failure to bring all sections of the region's societies into the mainstream of regional cooperation efforts and the inability to mobilize the region's own resources for development. Still another explanation is that regional cooperation is not a factor in the national development strategies of the member states (SADCC 1992a:4).

As in the case of PTA, it is possible to find observers who are very critical of the overall performance of SADCC. See for instance Ching'ambo (1991).

4.3 Development integration

The main proponents of the development integration strategy are SADCC/SADC and programme documents from ANC and the ANC-related Macro Economic Research Group in South Africa. In the SADCC theme document to the annual coordination conference in 1992, it was stated that '... the development integration approach, providing for investment, production and market or trade integration is appropriate for SADCC, and that it be accorded priority in the overall integrative framework' (SADCC 1992a:23). In all relevant SADCC and SADC documents, the issue of regional balance is emphasized. In the first theme document from the renamed SADC, this was very evident as can be seen from the following quotations:

For any integration project to be successful, it must be based on principles of balance, equity and mutual benefit.

and

... those participating member States who benefit most from aspects of the integration process should accept to compensate those who benefit least or not at all (SADC 1993b:5).

The SADCC and SADC documents, however, do not very clearly define the concept of development integration and also state that it should be combined with trade integration, although with some compensation schemes. In the SADC theme document 1993, the text also allows flexibility in the integration process, as is suggested by the ADB report, allowing for '... smaller groups of countries to move in some or all aspects of the process, at different paces'.

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A similar perspective is found in early ANC-related discussion documents on future regional cooperation. They have been collected in one handy document by the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of Western Cape (CSAS 1991a). They also underline the need to change South Africa’s existing domination and to develop a less exploitative form of cooperation. In a more recent ANC reconstruction and development programme, this is formulated in the following way:

In the long run, sustainable reconstruction and development in South Africa requires sustainable reconstruction and development in southern Africa as a whole. The democratic government must negotiate with neighbouring countries to forge an equitable and mutually beneficial programme of increasing cooperation, coordination and integration appropriate to the conditions of the region (ANC 1994:46).

Among individual researchers, the main proponent for the development integration model has been Robert Davies. He has also influenced the SADC and ANC philosophy or rather, the thinking of these two organizations makes it natural for them to include Davies in their group of consultant scholars.

Davies has published several articles and papers where he argues that the development integration model is the one that may create sustainable regional development but he has warned against uncompensated market regionalization and the risk of boomerang effects due to increased imbalances. See for instance Davies (1991, 1992b, 1992c and 1993) with very similar main features. Another South African scholar arguing for the development integration strategy is Jourdan. He discusses the mineral sector and sees significant potential for regional sectoral integration and higher level of beneficiation (Jourdan 1991b and 1992). In the 1980s Jourdan advocated this strategy for the SADCC countries. With South Africa included, his argument is further strengthened.

The most detailed report related to the ANC regional policy is a discussion document for the Macro Economic Research Group (MERG) prepared by a number of scholars, including Davies, at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape (CSAS 1993). The document underlines the mutual benefits of regionalization for South Africa and the present SADC countries and the necessity of regional cooperation as a response to the changing global economy. It focuses on the benefits of a balanced regional development also for South Africa and suggests that the country should seek membership in both SADC and PTA and work for the democratization of SACU. Of the three usual regional options, this is known as cooperative regionalism; it could also be called development integration.

The CSAS study is particularly interesting in its analysis of possible alternatives to the neoliberal strategy said to be the main option. It suggests a number of compensatory schemes but, at the same time, argues that a regional scheme cannot become merely a mechanism whereby weaker partners place demands on the stronger. The principle of mutual benefit is important and to include this in a regional programme, there must be commitment or political will from all partners.
The section on regional cooperation in the MERG report proper follows the same line. It states *inter alia* that it is imperative for South Africa to work together with neighbouring countries to reconstruct relations along new lines. It argues that in the on-going debate on regional policy, the issue at stake is the role of the state in the economy:

A regional programme needs to be driven by a strong positive commitment on the part of cooperating parties. It needs to consolidate statements of intent into a commitment that is both deeper (in the sense that it embraces a series of concrete actions in various sectors and areas) and wider (in the sense that it embraces a broader range of social forces and potential actors). This will not be achieved if the role of the state is seen merely as abandoning the use of certain instruments of international economic policy. It will require more effective positive action by individual states on agreed regional programmes, and a strengthening of regional organization and programmes (MERG 1993:279).

It should also be noted that ANC regional policy may not be the policy of the Government of National Unity in South Africa which may be more interested in advice from major companies and banks. In the new South African Government White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme, however, the ANC policy is still in place. Among the objectives for economic policy is 'develop a prosperous and balanced regional economy in southern Africa based on the principle of equity and mutual benefit' (RDP 1994:25). RDP also states, 'If South Africa attempted to dominate its neighbours it would restrict their growth, reducing their potential as markets, worsening their unemployment and causing increased migration to South Africa. If it seeks mutual cooperation, it can develop a large stable market offering stable employment and common labour standards in all areas' (1994:10).

Some scholars are sceptical that a democratic South Africa will be able to play the role of benevolent hegemon in the region. Although the ANC policy statements on its regional policy are seriously intended, the new government in South Africa in its post-apartheid realpolitik will have difficulties to make concessions to neighbouring states in order to develop new non-exploitative regional relationships. Tostensen, for instance, concludes discussion on this issue by stating that he 'is not at all convinced that an ANC-dominated post-apartheid government will deviate all that much from the economic policies of the present government towards the region. A rather narrowly perceived "national interest", however defined, is likely to carry the day' (Tostensen 1993: 52). This line of argument is also voiced by South African observers, especially those with close relations to the private sector. See for instance Leistner (1992b). Expressed harshly, it would mean that South Africa would continue as a malevolent regional boss, rather than as a benevolent hegemon.

SADC's approaches to integration are summarized in its 1993 theme document (SADC 1993b). For maximum coverage all three traditional integration models are mentioned:

Since southern Africa is a developing region, SADC has adopted a development integration approach which provides for continuing with
the functional cooperation of the last twelve years, to address many of the production, infrastructure and efficiency barriers, deriving from underdevelopment. In addition, there will be an active trade and market integration component, aimed at creating a unified regional market, by reducing the barriers to cross-border investment, trade in goods and services and the eventual free movement of labour (SADC 1993b:5).

Following this introduction, the approaches given are the following:

- Member countries must balance their own national interests and the collective interests of the group;
- For any integration to be successful, it must be based on principles of balance, equity and mutual benefit. Those members benefiting most, must accept to compensate those who benefit least;
- Freer movement of factors of production is central;
- Establishment of clear rules and procedures is required. The members have to accept that collective decisions are binding to all. This requires regional institutions. Regional cooperation must impact on the exercise of national sovereignty;
- The integration process for SADC shall be flexible, allowing smaller groups of countries to move at different paces in some or all aspects of the process.

These approaches are further elaborated in three documents to the 1994 SADC annual conference with the cooperating partners (SADC 1994 a, b and c). They discuss inter alia the membership of South Africa, the importance of a balanced regional development and a strongly felt concern that the institutional capacity to implement the community scheme will be difficult to achieve.

The SADC comprehensive agenda, also including security, foreign policy and environmental issues is a new feature in the history of regionalization in southern Africa. SADC most often calls it development integration, albeit with market integration included as well as the flexibility of multi speed and variable geometry features that are suggested in the ADB study (briefly elaborated in Section 4.5, below). Actually, the comprehensive SADC perspective can be categorized as new regionalism in the Hettne sense, provided it is seriously backed by all member governments. However, the signs are ambiguous on this provision.

### 4.4 The relations between SADC and COMESA

The competing relations between SADC and COMESA have already been referred to. They have existed since the formation of SADCC and PTA, the predecessors of the two agencies, but overlapping and competition increased significantly when the two further increased their ambitions regarding the level of integration they aimed for and to reflect this, subsequently changed their names.
The historical background to the disputes between the two organizations are well reviewed in Mandaza (1993a) and Mandaza and Tostensen (1994) and should not be elaborated here. However, a brief summary of the situation at the end of 1994 should be of interest.

Since the transformation of SADCC into SADC and PTA into COMESA the rivalry between the two agencies has increased, in spite of on-going negotiations since mid-1993 by representatives from both organizations to sort out the relations. In the beginning of 1994, several magazines and newspapers featured interviews with the executive secretaries of both agencies, each arguing his respective case. See for instance an interview with the PTA secretary general in Financial Mail (1994), SAE (1994) and Mwale (1994).

A joint committee of ministers was established by the two bureaux to find solutions on their future relations. The report of the committee was discussed at the summit meetings of SADC in August 1994 and of PTA in December 1994 when COMESA was formally established (PTA/SADC Joint Committee 1994). The report introduced six alternatives for handling the situation. The SADC summit decided that the PTA region should be divided into two sectors, one for the South comprising all the SADC countries and one for the North consisting of all non-SADC countries. But this option was not accepted at the PTA summit; instead, it suggested that the two groupings should form a consultative committee to 'pursue on a regular basis, the issues of harmonization, coordination and rationalization of the activities of the COMESA and SADC'.

It seems that in the medium-term perspective, the region will have to live with two competing and increasingly overlapping organizations. This causes some concern among the donor countries on which SADC in particular is heavily dependent. The situation also poses the question of how representatives for most of the SADC countries can take one stand when they meet within SADC and yet another when they meet as PTA.

The position of PTA relative SADC has been weakened by the fact that South Africa is a full-fledged member of SADC, but has only observer status in PTA despite clear invitations from the organization to become a member. Two magazine articles of interest published after the SADC summit are Gonçalves (1994) and Southern African Economist (1994).

4.5 Two major studies on regionalization in southern Africa

4.5.1 The SAFER study

A study on regional integration in southern Africa was commissioned in early 1991 by Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER) inviting scholars and consultants in South Africa and the region to write on a vast number of topics. The
material produced thus far was discussed at a regional economic integration conference in December 1992.

Researchers within the SAFER framework focus on a range of different subjects, making it difficult to categorize them. Topics range from a perspective where markets should be opened to investments as much as possible, as in Hawkins (1992b) and Maasdorp and Whiteside (1992a) to neofunctional public sector cooperation in areas such as water supplies (Pullen 1992) and labour, skills and migration (Pillay 1992).

The original ambitious goals of the SAFER project were never fulfilled and the only published paper so far is that of Maasdorp and Whiteside. A reader interested in a brief introduction to the regional impact of various issues can instead be referred to Venter (1994). This regional volume covers all the common issues such as regional organizations, trade, labour, security, etc., but also regional aspects on less common issues such as climate, health, gender, urbanization, the informal sector, etc. and is the third in a series of books produced by the Critical Choices Research Project, which previously has published two volumes on South Africa.

4.5.2 The African Development Bank study

Some of the SAFER documents seem to have a perspective close to that of the extensive African Development Bank study published in December 1993 (ADB 1993a, b and c). It proposes further integration, facilitated by new regional institutions, in a number of sectors through cooperation among players in the economic sphere. They are suggested to be different from the sector coordination units within the SADCC context in an important way, as they are supranational. This means they will – at least partly – be autonomous towards governments. They will focus on different tasks in different sectors; in the case of electric energy, for instance, they would provide a mutual platform for the other countries in the region for coordinated negotiations with South African ESKOM (the South African Electricity Supply Utility); in transport and communications, they would take care of policy issues and harmonization of legislation and other rules; in the mining sector, they would undertake to disseminate information on legislation, investment codes, prospecting and the potential for increased beneficiation. This part of the ADB study is the closest to a pure neofunctionalist strategy of all regionalization documents on southern Africa. It is combined with a trade integration component, indicating that there is clear complementarity between the import pattern of the PTA countries and South African manufacturing exports. The study subsequently argues that there is potential for increasing the already significant South African exports of manufacturing goods. The ADB study also argues that both the general liberalization of foreign trade which is part of the national structural adjustment programmes and the reduction of non-tariff trade restrictions are more important than tariff reductions. The main benefit from trade integration would go to South African exporters as they will get lower tariffs than their competitors from the OECD and NIC countries. If they take a share of the market from non-PTA producers, then the effect for the domestic producers will be neutral, but South African companies may also gain market shares from domestic producers. To avoid too abrupt changes, the ADB study
suggests some type of *transfer tariffs* to provide domestic PTA production some protection during the transfer period against South African imports.

The ADB study proposes 'multispeed coordination with variable geometry' so that cooperation/integration can be quicker in one sector than in another and that the constellation of countries to be involved is flexible. In other words, it is market-driven, instead of state-driven, as was the normal procedure of SADCC. The study will be important as a point of departure for many aid agencies. The main caveat of the study is the discrepancy between the concern expressed on the risks of further regional imbalances and the neofunctional recommendations put forth along the multispeed and variable geometry lines. Another critique against the study focuses on the risks for further entrenching of exploitative centre-periphery production structures, with high value added production in South Africa and low value added production in the rest of the region. See for instance Moyo (1994).
V SECURITY REGIONALIZATION

The conceptual debate on regional security will not be repeated here. It will suffice to recall the shift of the concept from realist political and military perspectives during the war and cold war eras to a broader definition, as was briefly discussed in section II. However, there is a definition problem involved with the broader concept as it involves economic, political, social, ethnic, environmental, etc. issues that are discussed in the section on economic regionalization. The difference is that these issues as part of the security concept are related to their conflict-creating or conflict-solving capacity but when discussed as part of new regionalism, their developmental aspects are in focus. At the same time new regionalism can be said to cover regional security, as a still broader concept. A couple of quotations from Buzan (1991) when he discusses the concept of security complex are illustrative:

In security terms, region means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other (1991:188).

A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (1991:190).

A security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of its relatively strong, inward-looking character, and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbours. Security interdependencies will be more strongly focused among the members of the set than they are between the members and outside states (1991:193).

A theoretical approach to security in southern Africa, focusing on the security regime and security community concepts, is taken by Booth (1994). Starting with Deutsch and others who generalize from the experience of North Atlantic nations, he suggests that a security community is created by mutual compatibility of values, strong economic ties and the expectation of more, multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions, a growing number of institutionalized relationships, mutual responsiveness and mutual predictability of behaviour. He then raises the question whether southern Africa, even with a democratic government in South Africa, is a community of insecurity rather than a security community because of 'an enormous range of regional problems'.
Booth also raises the issue whether the security dilemma notion is applicable in southern Africa.\(^{23}\) Robert Jackson has argued that this is not the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{24}\) The risk does not come from outside the region but from within the countries, threatening the forces controlling a weak state. Sovereignty is threatened more from inside than outside by ethnic or national organizations wanting to become states, for example. As a result of refugees, local political violence and other factors, there is also significant domestic instability as well. Booth challenges this perspective and warns that in the future the weaker states in the region cannot ignore the looming power of South Africa. This is also a strong argument for creating a security regime or a security community in the region.

Most literature on security in the pre-apartheid southern Africa region starts from two contrary perspectives – that of apartheid South Africa and that of the Front-Line States. Since decolonization of the region began, the cornerstone of the apartheid regional policy was the protection provided by the buffer states. But with the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and of Zimbabwe in 1980, this strategy was no longer possible.

The apartheid regime moved early in the shift from the traditional military security concept towards a broader security definition. This was apparent under Vorster in the CONSAS proposal in 1974 as part of his détente policy and its revival as part of P. W. Botha’s total strategy in 1979. This period is analysed in Davies and O’Meara (1985).

The background to CONSAS is discussed by Breytenbach (1980), Thomas (1980), Geldenhuys and Venter (1979 and 1980) and Vale (1987). The dialogue on regional security carried out by the apartheid regime in South Africa with documents such as the African Charter from the times of Malan, Verwoerd’s grand apartheid and Vorster’s and Botha’s Constellation of Southern African States, CONSAS, is recapitulated, for instance, by du Pisani (1991).

A review of the regional development from a broad strategic cum security perspective, including the issue of sanctions and counter sanctions, is given in Vieira and Ohlson (1992). Mandaza’s chapter in Hansen (Mandaza 1987a) and a number of chapters in the book by Amin et al. (1987) are typical examples of a cold war, anti-imperialist analysis of the strategies of the imperialist states in the southern Africa region.

The development of the Front-Line States (FLS) is analysed by Robert Jaster (1985). It starts with the informal cooperation and coordination of support by Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana to the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Angola, and continues with the support for the struggle in Zimbabwe, then with Mozambique and Angola as part of the

\(^{23}\) The term security dilemma is loosely used to describe the dynamics created by the ostensibly irreducible mistrust that states have for each other. It leads to defensive military preparations, which in turn create further uncertainty in neighbouring countries and sometimes a vicious circle of armaments and insecurity. See for instance Booth and Wheeler (1992).

\(^{24}\) See Jackson (1992).
FLS. A special feature is the detailed account of the strategic role of the FLS during the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 that led to the independence of Zimbabwe, as well as of the FLS involvement in the Namibia discussions up to 1985.

The FLS concept was unique as it had no formal organization and, as Jaster points out, no formal mutual decisions were made in advance, thus allowing for flexibility by the countries; an important fact during the Rhodesian peace settlement leading to the independence of Zimbabwe:

The Rhodesian Peace Settlement, from the Commonwealth summit in August 1979 until the Zimbabwe elections the following March, brought the Front-Line States to a new level of diplomatic and political cooperation. Their leaders put aside or muted their individual preferences for a particular group or a particular political model in the interests of bringing the war to a close and seeing a freely-elected majority-rule government installed in Salisbury. By and large they played a responsible, honest-broker role, and it is almost certain that the Lancaster House Settlement would have failed without vigorous Front-Line involvement (Jaster 1985:105).

Jaster also discusses the Front-Line States' role in the creation of SADCC. Here, compared to the opinion of other sources, his perception overstates the role of the FLS.

An analysis of the FLS in which four interrelated roles for the states are identified – the continental/pan-Africanist, the internationalist, the legitimizing/unifying and the bridge-building/intermediary – is given in Sesay (1985). Following development until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, Sesay reviews how the various perceptions of the main FLS affect OAU policy, support coordination and unification of liberation movements and build bridges between the white minority regimes and the liberation movements.

The development of the Front-Line States security cooperation is also discussed by Saasa (1991). They cooperated with and supported liberation movements by permitting military bases and transit routes as well as with material and political assistance. The Front-Line States also supported Mozambique in its efforts to protect projects and especially the Beira corridor against South African and Renamo attacks during the 1980s. The FLS cooperation however is not very extensively elaborated in the main literature on the South African destabilization of the region. See for instance Hanlon (1986), Johnson and Martin (1986 and 1989) and UNICEF (1989).

Since the Namibian independence in 1990, there has been no clear role for the FLS and the informal connections, partly based on strong personal links between the heads of states, have lost their importance. In a summit meeting in June 1994 attended by President Nelson Mandela, South Africa became the eighth member of the group. It was reported that the meeting adapted a new mandate for the Front-Line States as a 'meeting place to deal with conflict management and prevention' (Martin 1994).
Rugumamu briefly summarizes the security discussion progressing from the realist concept to a broader one and applies it in the context of southern Africa (1993). He lists the sources of insecurity both in the fields of politics and economics and somewhat questionably raises the role of southern Africa in the development of the Indian Ocean area. His first scenario is a nightmare in which the economic crises of the countries of the region – combined with surfacing ethnic and border conflicts, spillover effects of violence in South Africa, continuation of wars in Angola and Mozambique – result in an extremely conflict ridden and unstable area. The second scenario is the new South Africa as a bullish hegemon, and the third is the normative with regional security efforts ‘based on cooperative principles and development with South Africa behaving as a benevolent hegemony’, and possibly using some type of ‘conference for security and cooperation in southern Africa’ as an instrument as has been suggested by some scholars.

A more comprehensive discussion of the same issues is given in Ohlson (1993). Discussing in terms of security complexes, taken from Buzan, Ohlson outlines five possible scenarios for the region. In descending order of insecurity they are called annihilation, immature anarchy, hegemony, security regime and security community and are placed along an axis of possible outcomes. Ohlson’s conclusion is that the southern African regional security complex is most likely shifting towards the hegemony scenario and that there are no substantive indications that the region can or will move towards anything more secure than that. To achieve this, the basic regional conflict clusters must be addressed with the following components:

- Top priority must be given to end armed conflicts and to help insure against their recurrence;
- Domestic consolidation must be attained through the development of both capable states and thriving civil societies;
- Balanced regional cooperation in matters of socio-economic development and security must be expanded and institutionalized (Ohlson 1993:62).

Ohlson’s analysis of conflict factors at the national and regional level within the field of southern African security is the best I have come across. A brief and updated version of his outline is given in Ohlson and Stedman (1993). The same authors have also published a more profound analysis of security and conflict resolutions (Ohlson and Stedman 1994).

The current discussion on how regional security issues in southern Africa should be handled focuses on three alternatives. One is the scope for creating a security structure in southern Africa along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) but adapted to southern African circumstances. This has been discussed not only at a sub-regional southern African level but since late 1990, also African leaders have debated about a possible formation of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The Kampala Document (1991), a report from a conference in May 1991 outlining a detailed proposal for establishing the
CSSDCA has since been widely circulated. A conference on confidence and security building measures in southern Africa was organized in Windhoek by the UN Office for Disarmament in February 1993, where various suggestions based on the CSCE-model were discussed. Other suggestions such as creating a UN Regional Security Commission have also been aired, although not very convincingly. See Lunn (1993) and Bakwesegha (1993).

A second alternative is to make security an issue for SADC, as argued, among others, by Nathan in a paper to the Windhoek conference (1993a). This is in accordance with the new SADC Treaty which includes a security dimension. The Windhoek Declaration by the heads of state articulates that as war and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare, the region needs to establish the framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and to provide for mutual peace and security (SADCC 1992c). The decision at the SADC summit meeting in August 1994 to include such a sector opens the way for this alternative.

A third alternative is to develop the Front-Line States into a regional security organization in accordance with the FLS summit meeting in 1994. Since then, the SADC formation of a cooperation sector called Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security has come closer to implementation and it is probable that the FLS and SADC activities will merge.

The discussion on post-apartheid regional security has started rather recently and most literature is in the form of conference reports and articles. This is not surprising, taking into consideration that as Nkiwane states, 'In southern Africa regional security is still functionally non-existent. It is an idea still to be put into practice' (Nkiwane 1993:4). There are even scholars, e.g. Lupogo (1993) who have argued that as apartheid was the sole source of interstate insecurity, there is little need for regional confidence or security building when there is an ANC government in South Africa.

Ching'ambo, on the other side, looks for ways to create regional security and tries to find constructive solutions for handling the situation, 'Despite historical evidence which suggests that there is no chance for a collective defence alliance in the region, there is still a case for advocating some form of collective (regional) framework' (1992b:36). By redefining the common enemy in terms of nation-states, it could cover problems of mutual concern such as unemployment, illegal border jumping, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, etc.

The issue of collective security is also discussed in an article by Willie Breytenbach (1994), in which he identifies military and non-military conflicts and the measures to resolve them. Among potential transnational non-military conflicts of a regional nature, he mentions foreign fishing fleets plundering marine resources, competition for water, transport problems for land-locked states, refugee problems and cross-border problems of cattle-rustlers, poaching and smuggling. According to Breytenbach, there are several arguments for a regional security regime, although he does not take a stand on which model is the most suitable. He is also cautious as to the risks of South African internal conflicts spilling over into the neighbouring countries, a factor which also argues for
some form of collective security in the region. Since the elections in South Africa and the installation of a new government, many of the cross-border problems have come into focus with the media and gained priority on the political agenda. Migration issues will have to be handled through active regional cooperation to prevent them from developing into serious conflicts.
VI REGIONALIZATION AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY

Environmental issues have been high on the agenda in Africa. Some of the main concerns have been the degradation of drylands, destruction of tropical forests, urban pollution and other problems connected to rapid urbanization and the effects of increased water scarcity.

From an international political economy perspective, it is interesting to note that literature in general on ecologically sustainable development and environment issues deals normally with the national or the global level. The regional level is used only occasionally for an analytical perspective or the basis for organized environmental policy. An extensive bibliography in a book like Lewis and Berry (1988) contains very few works with a regional perspective. The link between population growth and environmental degradation in southern Africa is discussed in Kalipeni (1994), but also here the issue for the individual countries is reviewed at a national level and a regional perspective is lacking. A World Bank progress report on environment (World Bank 1992a) focuses on national environment plans and the 1992 World Development Report on Development and the Environment (World Bank 1992b) covers mainly the national and global (global commons) levels. The main exception to this tendency is river basin cooperation where organizations are sometimes set up as forums to negotiate more or less successfully on water resources distribution, environmental and other issues. Examples in Africa are the Kagera Basin Organization, the Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal, Lake Chad Basin Commission and in southern Africa, Zambezi River Authority and Komati Basin Authority.

Most literature in the field is published by aid or voluntary organizations rather than in an academic context. An EarthScan publication on the environmental threat to the coastal areas resulting from resource degradation and pollution, also discusses the area of Eastern Africa, including Mozambique (Hinricksen 1990). Data are frightening and the measures taken to avert further deterioration are very modest. An East Africa action plan under the auspices of UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme) was launched in 1985. The initial study phase has been concluded but only a few measures have been taken and the interest of the governments to undertake serious action seems to be limited; there is very little regional cooperation.

Environment issues have been increasingly noted by the Organization of African Unity, who has adopted one convention on the conservation of nature and natural resources in 1968 and one resolution and one convention against dumping of hazardous wastes and for transport control of such wastes within Africa in 1988 and 1991 respectively (Naldi 1992). The last two seem to have been successful in reducing the scope of unscrupulous international waste dumpers in most African countries.
Thus, so far regionalism has been scarcely discussed as an instrument to deal with existing or potential conflicts in environment issues or in the rivalry for scarce natural resources in Africa and southern Africa. With the present development pattern on the continent and in southern Africa, this can be of concern because the risk that potential problems may develop into open conflicts is real. Rivalry for the use of rivers and increased scarcity of fertile soils and fuel-wood are in focus.

Environmental programmes in SADCC have not been planned and implemented as integrated parts of a sustainable (in ecological terms) development strategy but as separate activities, mainly under the SADCC sector unit for soil and water conservation and land utilization. In 1992, the mandate of this unit was expanded and its name was changed to the Environment and Land Management Sector (ELMS). A policy document covering ELMS and seven other sectors (food security, agricultural research, animal production and livestock disease control, forestry, wildlife, inland fisheries, and marine fisheries and resources) was published in 1993 (SADC 1993a). Based on two previous policy documents, it provides a summary of common objectives. The ELMS work agenda consists of three management programmes, namely land, water resources, and environmental management monitoring and assessment. Planned and implemented as separate activities, there have been no attempts to integrate these programmes in a specific ecologically sustainable regional development strategy.

At the national level, some countries have recognized the importance of ecological sustainability at a policy level but the praxis does not necessarily follow policy. A summary of policies, legislation and institutions for environmental management of the individual SADC countries is included in the ELMS report. It shows clearly that although most countries have the legislation, it is fragmented; that it has been introduced in an ad hoc manner and that the implementation of many laws is far from perfect. The most comprehensive environmental profiles of the individual SADC countries can be found in Moyo et al. (1993) which also includes references for the individual countries.

None of the countries have a comprehensive development strategy aiming at ecological sustainability. It is therefore not surprising that such a strategy is lacking at the regional level. However, Moyo et al. claims in the introduction that SADC as a regional body is beginning to address these issues. He also states:

In the SADC region, particularly if South Africa is included in wider membership, the most significant resource shortfall is the provision of water. As individual nation-states share river basins there is need for urgent negotiation over riparian rights. Future capital investment in water resource development will require rigorous environmental analysis to ensure that supply meets demand, that regional scarcity is avoided and the fossil aquifers are not substantially depleted.

Significant environmental issues underlie the energy sector where the dominant mode of regional integration is likely to be the expansion of an international grid system. Such a strategy would provide electricity most
cheaply to new subscribers and would offer the opportunity for least-cost investment that accommodated a level of real environmental cost. It is important that this issue is taken seriously because future international trading will probably require evidence of environmental best practice and energy inputs will be closely monitored for their international impact – carbon emission and regional pollution (acid rain) – as well as local despoliation (Moyo et al. 1993:3).

In the case of South Africa, part of the ecological problems have been created by the apartheid system. There is intense debate on the ecological problems, all of which have not necessarily been caused by apartheid, and therefore some will remain even after apartheid is dismantled. A good introduction to these issues is Mamphela with McDowell (1991) which also contains references to the various issues relating to rural environment, urban environment, legal framework and restoration in the southern African region after apartheid destabilization and warfare. Neither South African mining nor its commercial agriculture has been known for its environmental considerations. Land distribution is important in this context. The large share of electric energy produced by coal plants further worsens the situation. But as is mainly the case in other SADC countries, environmental concerns in South Africa are handled independently from general development issues.
VII CONCLUSIONS ON REGIONALIZATION MODELS AND ORGANIZATIONS

After this review of existing literature, I have the following concluding comments on the relevance of the various integration models and existing regional organizations.

7.1 Market or trade integration

Both theory and experience from previous and on-going integration based on this model show that it is founded on a number of assumptions which do not exist in most African countries and is, therefore, poorly equipped to form the basis for regionalization in Africa. The foreign trade structure of most African countries is in contradiction to the one assumed in the model. Structural and institutional factors do not favour trade integration. Empirically this conclusion can be supported by the fact that in the three main African regionalization projects, PTA, SADC and ECOWAS, the intra-regional trade share has been stagnant at a level of around 5 per cent.

However, in the case of southern Africa both the theoretical and empirical conclusions may have to be amended if South Africa is included. The relative size and level of development of the South Africa's manufacturing sector and the potential total regional demand create a regional complementary pattern and a much stronger regional domestic market, especially for South African manufacturing sector. Trade integration may have a stronger impact than it has had in other African trade integration schemes. The overwhelming importance of imports from South Africa in the BLNS countries as well as the significant role it plays in countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique are empirical evidence for such a suggestion.

At the same time it points to one problem with trade integration in the region, but also in the rest of Africa, namely that the benefits fall strongly to the more developed economy such as Kenya and Zimbabwe in PTA, Zimbabwe in SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS. This has gone to the extreme in SACU but there a compensation is built into the allocation of the customs revenue pool. Unless there are compensation or corrective measures, any trade integration scheme that includes South Africa will give South African manufacturing companies an advantage over OECD and Asian competitors, with only few benefits to companies in the other participating countries. It will thereby further exacerbate the existing regional imbalance. This in turn will threaten other components of a regionalization project. Consequently, opening up the South African market to much more exports from neighbouring countries is one prerequisite for success.

It should also be noted that weak financial institutions and lack of foreign exchange in a number of SADC countries will continue to constrain the intra-regional trade.
The concept of open regionalism, or neoliberal market integration, is partly under implementation in the region through the trade liberalization schemes, forming part of on-going structural adjustment programmes in most of the SADC countries. The agreement between GATT and South Africa will also contribute to the process. This development is supported not only by the World Bank but also by many other countries in the North as well as by some regional players in the economic field, mostly from South Africa. Opposition may come from forces concerned with the risk of increasing regional imbalance. The issue of potential contradiction between globalization and regionalization has been a part of the discussions on regionalism since they started. My own opinion is that trade integration without compensatory mechanisms would work against regionalization in the comprehensive sense of the term. And furthermore if regionalization does not include any protective measures against the outside world beyond the region, what would be the purpose of it?

7.2 Neofunctional integration

This model is not the same thing as for instance the SADCC project coordination; the main difference is that project coordination does not contain any supra-national element while the neofunctional integration does. They are, however, similar and the border line between the two is sometimes difficult to identify. The existing integration pattern in the region with its strong links in transport and communication, mining, migrant labour makes it easy to develop this model further. It is further strengthened by the increasing interdependence between South Africa and various constellations of its neighbouring states in areas such as electric power, water supply, food supply, migration and tourism. The many areas in focus in this model are called regional goods and services in the Balassa-Stoutjesdijk categorization (Balassa and Stoutjesdijk 1976).

Strong players in the economic market have an obvious interest in this type of regionalization which can partly evolve without much political negotiation. The main aim of such negotiations is to create an enabling environment for market forces, and agree on possible rules to compensate for imbalances. The African Development Bank study firmly backs this strategy, combining it with modest trade integration.

7.3 Development integration

This model is especially interesting as a potential instrument for change in a region like southern Africa where history has created a rather high degree of integration in a number of sectors and a strong regional imbalance with strong South African dominance. Theoretically the model could contain a number of instruments to reduce imbalances, such as a development bank, industrial allocation schemes, transfer tariffs etc. Experience, for instance as in the case of the EAC, shows that the implementation of equalizing schemes is difficult, mainly due to the fact that they work against the market forces. (Similar experiences can also be observed in many industrialized countries.)
In reality the main difficulty in the implementation of this model is often the lack of political will and subsequent significant political inputs. It remains to be seen whether this political will exists in the individual southern Africa countries, including South Africa. Many observers are doubtful. Empirically, the effects of compensation schemes have often created controversies among members when the outcome is less advantageous than envisaged. Negotiations of such schemes also tend to be very time-consuming, while spontaneous integration in the form of trade and investments in neighbouring countries is more dynamic and has been very visible in southern Africa since 1990; perhaps more so in the case of investments than the flow of investment from the North to South Africa.

7.4 New regionalism

The concept is under discussion and many of its features can be found in the SADC Treaty, although it contains too much integration from above to fall entirely within the concept parameters. The ANC position as stated in the organization’s policy documents seems to be similar to that of SADC, although less elaborated. Of existing regionalization schemes, they seem to be closest to the neoregionalism concept reflecting its broad perspective, its focus on development of regional activities from within and the importance given to the issue of balanced regional development.

From a normative point of view, new regionalism as an alternative to globalization along the lines proposed by Hettne seems to be a relevant concept for southern Africa for a number of reasons. Firstly, because trade integration is not the driving force; secondly, because of its inside, from below perspective; thirdly, because its wide coverage also allows the inclusion of such obvious existing or potential conflict issues of the region as migration and utilization of water resources; fourthly, because the ‘SADC feeling’ to the extent it exists, can be utilized; and fifthly, the potential improvements of the position in the international division of labour.

As in the case of development integration, a crucial issue is whether sufficient political will and institutional capacity exist at the national level.

7.5 Security regionalization

Security in a broad sense will probably be among the sectors with best potential for regionalization, as it would obviously be in mutual interests to develop a stronger security complex by limiting the number of potentially destabilizing factors. In the military sector, these would include, for example, the lack of transparency, few direct contacts, over-sized military forces, and historical suspicions. Confidence building measures are probably the first step to reduce the risk in this field. The level of cooperation and the degree of confidence during this process will mutually strengthen or weaken each other.

Outside the military sector, other destabilizing factors are i) rivalry for water resources; ii) migration flows; and iii) arms and drug smuggling. There are potential conflict
factors at sub-national levels in many countries. A regional approach may be able to contain some of them and prevent their spill-over into neighbouring countries. In this regard, the new SADC sector Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security seems to be the most promising institutional initiative, particularly if future Front-Line States cooperation could be included.

7.6  Environmental regionalization

When it comes to regional environment cooperation, southern Africa follows the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa in that most environmental activities are discussed, planned and sometimes implemented at the national level. The main exception is water management where regional cooperation regarding development of river basins is the only alternative to serious future regional conflicts. Related to this is the issue of regional hydro-power energy cooperation. Apart from these specific topics, also here the SADC cooperation, in spite of its weaknesses, seems to be the most promising institutional framework.

7.7  Final comments

The development in southern Africa since 1990 suggests that the most dynamic regionalization forces are to be found among actors (private and public) in the economic field. They act more quickly than intergovernmental forces, who have been known to negotiate for long periods before arriving at possible conclusions on to how regional integration and cooperation shall take place. The capacity of state structures to implement regional integration, including the establishment of regional structures, is weak. The resulting regionalization pattern will therefore depend less on intergovernmental action than on non-governmental forces for whom the main motivation is their own well-being. To this should be added the fact that many governments' political will to integrate is much weaker than their pro-regional rhetoric. This further opens the field for economic forces.

Of course, the regionalization process in southern Africa will not develop along just one of the suggested models. Instead, there will be traces of all models, and an eclectical analytical approach will be necessary. I argue, however, that in the choice of analytical instruments, attention has to be focused on one factor in particular, namely the asymmetrical structure of the region, and any selected regionalization model has to include measures to prevent too strong regional imbalances. This means that features from the development integration and new regionalism models have to be included. Governments in the region will have to attend to regional issues and both political will and the state capacity have to improve in order to use the dynamics of market forces without counter-productive developments. The brief suggestion of issues for further research in the last section of this paper should be looked upon in this context.
VIII QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

i) One important issue for future research is determining which social, political and economic forces can be the agents for various forms of regionalization in southern Africa. Will regional organizations such as SACU, SADC or COMESA have the capacity and the political clout to develop into effective instruments for economic regionalization? The stated objectives of SADC and COMESA imply a very high level of integration, comparable to the European Union (EU). Many analysts are doubtful about the feasibility of such aims and would find the strategy suggested in the ADB study more realistic, where the main forces would be players at the economic market, both private and public. Economic interests would then be the dynamic force and the main role of the states and governments would be to improve the legal and institutional framework for such a development or at least not create new obstacles.

Research in this field can focus on identifying the main forces and their present regionalization plans, calculating possible benefits and their allocation within the region and discussing means to avoid increased regional imbalances.

ii) What prerequisites will have to be fulfilled at the national level to permit further regionalization in southern Africa? Does the national question have to be solved before governments are prepared to relinquish a part of what they perceive as the national sovereignty? In which fields and under what conditions are the SADC governments and the new South African government prepared to exchange national sovereignty for regional power?

iii) Based on a regional parallel to the global hegemony theory, one hypothesis may be that a necessary although not sufficient prerequisite for a successful regionalization in southern Africa is South Africa's willingness to adopt the role of benevolent hegemon. Is the new government in South Africa prepared to take up this role and would the neighbouring countries accept it? And do they have the institutional capacity? Such a development would imply, inter alia, that South Africa would be i) the driving force in creating a regional regime conducive to developmental, security and environmental regionalization; and ii) the main link to the global economic centre. Factors i) and ii) together would improve the position of the whole region in the global political economy or at least contribute to avoiding further marginalization.

It is interesting to note that this perspective of South Africa as benevolent hegemon is contrary to the sub-imperialist analysis of the region, with its pronounced negative effects for the rest of the region. Of course, the political scene has changed totally in the post-apartheid, post-cold war world, but material or economic links and structures are more or less the same. Or expressed differently: the same material conditions that twenty years ago were considered a threat are – in a different political context – now presented as a hope.
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