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Intervention, aid, and institution-building in Iraq and Afghanistan

A review and critique of comparative lessons

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Abstract

Since 2001 international attention has focused on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and specifically on the question of whether external intervention can assist weak or fragile states in successfully making the transition to stable democracies. Despite their differences, Iraq and Afghanistan are often considered together in analyses of state-building, and multiple observers have explored the lessons of one for the other. Yet Iraq and Afghanistan are not the first cases of US military intervention and occupation for the purposes of transforming a foreign regime. This paper provides a review and critique of the literature on why some of these interventions were more successful than others in building robust and effective state institutions.

Keywords: military intervention, state-building, democracy promotion

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Acronyms

ORHA   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

CPA   Coalition Provisional Authority

SCAP   Supreme Command of the Allied Powers

1   Introduction

Following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in May 2003, the United States occupied Iraq with the goal of rebuilding the Iraqi state along democratic lines. The Bush administration's initial post-war strategy envisioned an occupation structure, led by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), that would be minimal in scope and temporary in duration, although this organization was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which assumed responsibility for a greater range of governance functions. The CPA made a series of decisions that resulted in the dismantling of the Iraqi state, including the decisions to disband the regular military and to 'debaathify' the state ministries and the management of state-owned enterprises. The weakening effects of these decisions on the Iraqi state were compounded by the widespread looting and disorder that followed the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, which gutted many core Iraqi public institutions such as the state ministries, hospitals, police stations, and universities. The result, according to political scientist John Mueller, was the creation of an 'instant failed state' (Mueller 2005).[1]

In the post-war occupation of Japan beginning in 1945, the United States pursued a very different strategy to transforming the Japanese state. To convert Japan into a stable liberal democracy, the United States established an extensive occupation structure under the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP), led by General Douglas MacArthur. The SCAP agenda included not only framing a new constitution and organizing elections, but a wider array of institutional and economic reforms aimed at creating the conditions for a sustainable liberal democracy and pluralist society. These directives were implemented and administered through the Japanese national bureaucracy, which the United States allowed to remain intact despite the Japanese defeat. Full sovereignty was not transferred to an elected Japanese government until the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco, which formally ended both the occupation and the Second World War. The result, according to a 2003 RAND study, was an occupation that 'set standards for postconflict transformation that have not yet been equalled' (Dobbins et al. 2003).[2]

In both Japan in 1945 and Iraq in 2003, the United States attempted to use military intervention, occupation, and reconstruction assistance to build democratic states that could survive the withdrawal of external support, but produced very different outcomes. Why was US armed state-building more successful in Japan than in Iraq? Many governments, international organizations, and NGOs are interested in assisting weak and fragile states develop more robust and durable state institutions, but the question how external actors can best accomplish this objective—and the relative effectiveness of different policy tools— remains poorly understood. In particular, the scholarly and policy literatures remain divided over whether foreign military intervention can be an effective mechanism for building durable institutions in fragile states, and under what conditions this strategy is most likely to succeed. With many in the international community calling for intervention in the conflict in Syria and elsewhere, a better understanding the consequences of these types of interventions is critical.

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[1]   For journalistic accounts of the US failures during the first few years of the US occupation of Iraq, see Gordon and Trainor (2006); Ricks (2006); Woodward (2006); Chandresekaran (2006); and Packer (2005). On US decision-making during the occupation, see also Dyson (2013); Dobbins et al. (2009); Byman (2008); and Bensahel (2006).

[2] See also Dower (1999).

This paper investigates this question by comparing the impact of US military interventions coupled with foreign aid on the scope, strength, and regime type of targeted states in three cases: Japan beginning in 1945, Afghanistan beginning in 2001, and Iraq beginning in 2003. Examining the US experience in using intervention as a mechanism for building robust institutions in fragile states is useful for several reasons. The United States has employed this strategy to a greater extent than any other state, engaging in over two dozen imposed regime change operations over the past century.[3] US military interventions have often been followed by large aid programmes aimed at reconstructing the economy and political institutions of the occupied state. During the military occupation of Germany beginning in 1945, the United States spent approximately US$29.3 billion (in 2005 dollars) in total assistance (Serafino et al. 2006: 2). Similarly, over the past decade the United States has contributed approximately US$60 billion to humanitarian and reconstruction programmes in Iraq (SIGIR 2013: 57).

Several conclusions emerge from this comparative analysis. First, the United States has been more successful when preserving existing state capacity than when attempting to build state strength where it did not previously exist. In Japan, the US occupation preserved the strength of Japanese national institutions, and channelled this capacity towards supporting a series of liberalizing reforms. In Iraq, by contrast, the US took decisions that substantially undermined the scope and strength of the Iraqi state, and struggled to fill to ensuing vacuum of political authority. Second, the level of US aid spending played a limited role in explaining state-building success. Instead, US reconstruction assistance may have undermined state capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan by creating a perverse set of incentives for their national leaders. Third, the prospects for successful state-building via intervention are substantially constrained by prior conditions in targeted states, such as low levels of economic development or a lack of prior experience with democratic rule. The evidence from these cases suggests it may be difficult to for external interveners to overcome these unfavourable conditions, no matter how well-intentioned the effort or how large the resource commitment.

Understanding the factors that shape successful post-intervention state-building is important for several reasons. Persistent state weakness and failure can be a source of chronic violence, insecurity, and economic stagnation. The development of robust state institutions may also be an important precondition for stable democratization. As Samuel Huntington (1968) first argued in *Political Order and Changing Societies*, elections and the rapid expansion of political participation in the absence of strong state institutions can lead to a greater risk of instability and political violence. Holding elections without effective constitutional limits on power and a stable rule of law can also exacerbate ethnic and nationalist violence, as leaders are both compelled to rely on sectarian appeals to build electoral strength and do not face limits on their power when elected (Zakaria 1997; Mansfield and Snyder 2005).

This paper is organized as follows. The second section defines state-building and discusses the concepts of regime type, state scope, and state strength. Section 3 describes the impact of US intervention and occupation on state-building in Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Section 4 reviews and critiques the literature seeking to explain the differential effect of US

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[3] Specifically, the United States has engaged in foreign-imposed regime change in 28 cases between 1900 and 2003. In approximately half of these cases (15), the United States forcibly removed the primary leader of a government and placed a different individual leader in power, but did not attempt to alter the wider political institutions of the state. In the other 13 cases, the United States both removed the primary leader and attempted to change or rebuild state institutions (Downes and Monten 2013). See Appendix 1 for a list of these cases.

interventions across these three cases. Section 5 discusses what this analysis might suggest for the research programme on state fragility and foreign aid.

2   Defining state-building

In the US context, state-building has referred to attempting to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that can survive the withdrawal of external support (Brownlee 2007).[4] In President Bush's formulation with regard to Iraq, the goal of US policy has been to create a state that can 'govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself (Bush 2006). In assessing the effectiveness of military intervention as a mechanism of external state-building, three aspects of the state-building process are relevant: the scope of state institutions, the strength of state institutions, and a state's regime type. 'State-building' can therefore refer to either the creation of new state institutions (state scope), or the strengthening of existing ones (state strength). In the context of US military interventions, the United States has often pursued a third aspect of state-building: creating or strengthening political institutions that are legitimated by democratic control. This section defines each of these dimensions of state-building.

2.1   The scope and strength of the state

Although frequently conflated in the literature on state strength, the process of state-building can be divided into two distinct concepts.[5] First, the scope of the state refers to the range of governance functions taken on by the state. At minimum, this involves possessing a monopoly of organized force in a territory and providing a minimal framework for public order. More extensive state functions include the provision of public goods such as education, healthcare services, and basic macroeconomic stabilization. 'Maximalist' states extend further into roles such as economic redistribution, welfare programmes, or social policy (Fukuyama 2004). States can therefore vary in the scope of functional areas they enter, independent of how well they accomplish these functions.

Second, state strength refers to the capacity of the state to effectively create, implement, and enforce decisions and policies in the functional areas it enters. According to Francis Fukuyama (2004: 9), state strength includes the ability to 'formulate and carry out policies and enact laws; to administrate efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain a high level of transparency and accountability in government institutions; and, most important, to enforce laws'. At the core of a state's institutional capacity is often a professional bureaucracy, run by a civil service that is capable of effectively carrying out governmental policies, autonomous from political pressure or special interests, and broadly free from corruption or politicization in the administration of state functions. Most broadly, strong or well-functioning states are those in which political institutions are comparatively authoritative and effective, and can thus implement and enforce decisions across a range of policy fields. Weak or fragile states do not command a monopoly of political authority in a territory, are unable to consistently carry out state policies, and are

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[4]   Pie et al. (2006) similarly define 'nation-building' as instances in which the United States: (i) deploys military power to remove the leadership of a foreign state; (ii) assumes temporary sovereignty and responsibility for the administration of the state; and (iii) US political objective includes creating a democratic government that can survive the withdrawal of external support.

[5]   This distinction builds on Fukuyama (2004). See also Evans et al. (1985) and Huntington (1968).

vulnerable to capture by societal interests or predatory rent-seeking. While the degree of institutional strength can vary across states, institutional strength can also vary across agencies and institutions within a specific state.

Based on these two dimensions, external state-building operations can vary in terms of whether they target the scope of the state, the strength of the state, or both. In some cases of states targeted for intervention, state weakness stems from a failure to provide minimal state functions such as security or the inability to implement or enforce laws and policies over the entirety of the territory under its formal control (e.g., Somalia in 1993 and Afghanistan in 2001). In these interventions, external actors attempt to build both the scope and the strength of the state where it did not previously exist, focusing on minimal functions such as restoring the state's ability to maintain order. In other cases of intervention, the scope of the state sector is large, but institutional fragility stems from inefficiency, corruption, or a lack of legitimacy resulting from the abuse of state power (e.g., Iraq in 2003). In these cases, interveners may attempt to reform or strengthen pre-existing state functions, or even roll back or place constraints on the state in some areas.

2.2   State-building and democracy

Regime type, in contrast, refers to the method determining how this state apparatus is controlled and legitimized. Democracies are those states in which political leaders are held accountable to the public through mechanisms such as regular, free, and fair elections. 'Liberal democracy' refers to a wider set of practices that go beyond electoral accountability, including the rule of law, protection for human rights and civil liberties, pluralistic values, and constitutional limits on the power of the state (Zakaria 1997; Schmitter and Karl 1991). Political systems can therefore be distinguished by both their regime type and by the strength and scope of state institutions.

Although distinct concepts, democracy and state strength can be related. In the literature on democratic transitions, a number of scholars have argued that the lack of legitimacy afforded by regular elections in non-democratic or partially democratic states can be an element of weak governance (Carothers 2007). From this perspective, introducing democratic reform can be an important first step in building or re-building robust and stable political institutions in weak states. Another line of argument in this literature suggests the opposite: that the development of democracy in the absence of strong state institutions can result in chronic institutional dysfunction and weakness. According to Huntington, 'The most important political distinctions among countries concern not the form of government but their degree of government'. In many developing states, therefore, the 'formula that governments should be based on free and fair elections … is irrelevant. Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations' (Huntington (1968: 1,7). Introducing democratic elections before the development of strong public institutions can also raise the risk of instability and violence. According to Zakaria (1997), for example, 'The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step ... Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply be inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war'. For these scholars, the immediate

problem in weak states is not a lack of political democracy, but a low degree of institutional capacity and the inability to provide core state functions.[6]

3   US State-building operations in comparative perspective

In Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the United States sought to build democratic institutions and practices through military occupation and reconstruction that could survive the withdrawal of US support, but produced very different outcomes. A focused comparative analysis of these three cases is useful for two reasons. First, many analyses of external state-building, particularly of Iraq and Afghanistan, focus only on cases of failure. We therefore cannot know based on these studies alone whether the causes of failure they identify are also present in cases of success (Tarrow 2010; George and Bennett 2005). Second, the Bush administration specifically drew on the Japanese example in building its public case for the Iraq war in the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003. US officials cited the occupation of Japan as evidence of the possibility of exporting democracy by military force. As Bush stated in February 2003:

> America has made and kept this kind of commitment before—in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments … In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home. There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken.[7]

3.1   State-building in Japan, 1945 –52

The US occupation of Japan was highly attuned to the scope and strength of Japanese public institutions. This high level of attention was evident in a number of key decisions made throughout the occupation and political reconstruction of Japan. First, in comparison to US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, planning for the occupation and political reconstruction of Japan began earlier and was more comprehensive. US planning for the 'postconflict' phase with Japan and the possibility of an occupation began in early 1943 in the State Department, and intensified as military victory became more likely. The US goal of full democratization was set at the Potsdam conference in July 1945, where the war-time allies declared that, as a condition of surrender, 'The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people', and that 'The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as … there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government'.[8] Planning for the post-war occupation was led by a newly-created interagency group called the 'State-War-Navy

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[6] For a contrary view of the role of election in the process of democratization, see Diamond (2008); Carothers (2007); and Lindberg (2006).

[7] For similar comments by then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, see Rice (2003). For a critique of the comparison between Iraq in 2003 and Germany and Japan in 1945, see Dower (2003); Cooper (2005); and Fukuyama (2004: 39-41).

[8] See 'Potsdam Declaration' in *Political Reorientation of Japan* (1949: 413).

Coordinating Committee' (or SWNCC, a precursor to the current National Security Council system), and drew on the expertise of a variety of departments. This process culminated in the 'Basic Directive', issued by the Department of Defence to US Army General Douglas MacArthur in November 1945, which laid out in detail US policy on governance issues ranging from political reorganization to economic and social affairs. The US also vested political authority in a highly developed occupation structure: SCAP was organized around a powerful executive in MacArthur, and sections corresponding to each Japanese ministry. These sections drafted SCAP directives issued to the Japanese government implementing the US democratization agenda, and oversaw the adoption and implementation of these directives by the Japanese legislature and bureaucracy.

Second, the United States kept in place many of the pre-war state structures that underpinned a high degree of Japanese institutional capacity, which had remained intact despite military defeat. From the Meiji period in the nineteenth century onward, Japan systematically acquired the attributes of the modern, European state. In particular, Japan built a highly effective national bureaucracy, led by an efficient, non-partisan, professional class of civil servants. Although modelled on European bureaucracies, Japanese civil servants held even more power and authority than their European counterparts as a result of their status as the personal servants of the emperor, the head of the Japanese government, and considered a sacred figure. The United States allowed this state apparatus to continue relatively unchanged, exemplified by the decision to allow the emperor to remain as the nominal head of state. SCAP took advantage of this pre-existing state structure when implementing its democratization agenda. Almost all SCAP-initiated reforms, from constitutional revisions to civil rights and labour reform, were issued in the form of directives (or 'SCAPINS') to the Japanese government, which in turn were declared as laws by the Diet and implemented by the relevant ministries.[9] The early decision not to fundamentally alter or dismantle the highly developed Japanese bureaucracy thus provided a basic continuity of effective governmental power and allowed the US occupying authority to more effectively implement its own democratization agenda.

Third, the US occupation sought to purge the government of individuals associated with the previous ruling regime, but not in a way that would risk weakening the underlying administrative capacity of the Japanese state. Article 6 of the Potsdam Declaration stated that 'There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest'.[10] SCAPIN 550 directed the removal of 'undesirable personnel' from government office and positions of public influence. Under the process set up by SCAP, individuals responded to questionnaires about their public history, which were then reviewed by screening committees. Eligibility rulings were based on a careful review of an individual's case history, and not on the categorical exclusion of individuals who met specific criteria.[11] The result was a narrow purge targeted at elites associated with wartime fascism and ultranationalism. In the foreign ministry, for example, only 32 of 632 individuals were purged, and only about half of those at the highest

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[9] This system created space for Japanese government elites to alter or obstruct the intent of US directives at both the legislative and implementation stage, although this tactic was mitigated in part by the size and expertise of the SCAP staff overseeing them. See Dower (1999).

[10] 'Potsdam Declaration' in *Political Reorientation of Japan* (1949: 413).

[11] However, this gradually shifted as pressure to complete the purge by the spring of 1948 increased. See Baerwald (2003).

two levels (23 of 45). In the finance ministry, only 9 of over 7,000 employees were removed; in the justice ministry, only 47 of 2,309.[12]

The scope of the purge was also narrowed by other factors. The purge was structured in such a way as to avoid reducing the functioning of the professional bureaucracy at a key moment. Due to the need for capable administrators, heightened by the reliance of SCAP sections on the corresponding Japanese bureaucracy in implementing US-initiated reforms, many purgees were later allowed to return (Baerwald 2003). For example, most of the senior officials in the Home Ministry—notorious for its role in the 'Thought' Police Bureau during the war—were allowed to return to influential positions in government service and business. In the 1952 elections, the first after the end of the US occupation, over half of former purgees who had previously served in the Diet were re-elected (Montgomery (1957: 87, 48). The extent of the purge was also limited by poor implementation and enforcement. The United States did not have enough personnel or resources to carry out the detailed screening process for each individual, and was forced to rely on the Japanese Home Ministry to enforce that those designated actually be eliminated from positions of influence. The result of all these factors was that the capacity of Japanese national political institutions was not fundamentally affected by the purge process. In the assessment of one historian, 'The effect of the purge itself on the bureaucratic system as a whole was negligible' (Montgomery 1957: 8).[13]

Moreover, not only did the purge not reduce the power of the state bureaucracy in Japan, but in many ways the process initiated by the US occupation actually strengthened it. The removal of top political leaders weakened the main party organizations, which were more heavily dependent than the bureaucracy on the personal leadership of specific individuals, and did not fully recover until a new party leadership could emerge. The new postwar legislature was also relatively inexperienced and disorganized, which resulted in more governance functions being taken on by the permanent bureaucracy, and particularly in implementing SCAP directives. As a number of historians have documented, US occupation policies had the somewhat unintended effect of shifting power from one set of elites to another, and specifically away from the imperial court and the wartime military leadership to the civilian bureaucracy, and away from the large industrial family owners to economic managers within the government. The permanent state bureaucracy was thus one of the main winners from the US occupation.[14]

Finally, the United States initiated an array of social and economic reforms designed to create the conditions for sustainable liberal democracy, and in the process successfully built institutional capacity where it was needed and did not previously exist. A prominent idea among US occupation planners attributed Japanese illiberalism and aggression to the excessive concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small economic and social elite. The November 1945 Basic Directive issued to MacArthur therefore instructed the

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[12] These figures are collected in Montgomery (1957: 86).

[13] A similar story occurred in the concurrent US occupation of Germany. In the major German ministries, on average about 49 per cent of individual civil servants were screened, and of those only about 16 per cent were actually removed. The result was that only about 1,000 permanent civil servants were purged, many of whom eventually returned to government service. See Herz (1948: 577-8) and Montgomery (1957: 78-9).

[14] See, for example, Johnson (1975). See also two accounts by participants in the occupation: Bisson (1949) and Baerwald (2003). According to Baerwald, 'One unintended consequence was that the civilian bureaucrats were able to strengthen their control over the National Assembly's two chambers at the expense of long-serving parliamentarians'.

military government to 'encourage the development of democratic organizations in labour, industry, and agriculture', and to 'favour a wider distribution of ownership, management, and control of the Japanese economic system'.[15] The means chosen by SCAP to implement these changes emphasized top-down reform, using the power of the state to promote a wider distribution of wealth and building governmental capability where necessary.

Two examples illustrate this occupation reform strategy. First, a core feature of the US democratization programme was breaking up the large industrial conglomerates, or *zaibatsu*, which many in the US government had identified as a driving force behind Japanese illiberalism and military expansion. The *zaibatsu* were large industrial or financial groups dominated by a single or extended family. These groups were not full monopolies, but held oligopolistic positions in a number of separate industries, creating a system of horizontal, interlocking interests across economic sectors such as insurance, banking, and industrial manufacturing (Hadley 2003: 74-59). According to one estimate, ten families controlled approximately three-fourths of Japan's industrial and financial resources (Schaller 1985: 39). As Eleanor Hadley, a member of the US occupation staff, wrote in 1948, a 'comparable business organization to one *zaibatsu* family, Mitsubishi, in the United States 'might be achieved if, for example, United States Steel, General Motors, Standard Oil of New York, Alcoa, Douglas Aircraft, E. I. duPont de Nemours, Sun Shipbuilding, Allis-Chalmers, Westinghouse Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph, RCA, IBM, US Rubber, Sea Island Sugar, Dole Pineapple, United States Line, Grace Lines, National City Bank, Metropolitan Life, the Woolworth Stores, and the Statler hotels were to be combined into a single enterprise' (Hadley 1948: 429).

After several rounds of negotiation both within SCAP and with the Japanese government, SCAP ultimately proposed and implemented a law forcing the sale of *zaibatsu* stock to small holders and creating rules controlling the size and ownership of new businesses to check the rise of new monopolistic organizations. The goal of the policy was to create a system of small, competitive businesses, which would 'lay the foundation for a Japanese middle class and competitive capitalism' (Edwards 1948). The law also created a number of new national regulatory structures, such as the Holding Company Liquidation Committee and the Fair Trade Commission, to implement and enforce these anti-monopoly measures. These recommendations were ultimately adopted as SCAP policy in the form of FEC 230, and implemented, after some delay, by the Japanese government in the form of the 'Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power' in December 1947.

A second example concerned the issue of land reform. Civilian administrators within SCAP identified the predominant pattern of Japanese land ownership—in which over half the Japanese population lived in rural areas, and two-thirds in some form of tenancy arrangement—as an additional cause of Japanese illiberalism. Landed elites in Japan frequently held powerful positions in the military and the state bureaucracy, while the rural peasantry formed the bulk of the military's manpower. This system, MacArthur believed, had been 'one of the chief bases of the romantic conservatism of modern ultranationalism'.[16] Land reform was therefore driven by a belief that wider land ownership and economic independence was an important condition for a successful political democracy.

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[15] 'Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive, 1380/15, 3 November 1945', in *Political Reorientation of Japan* (1949: 428-39).

[16] Quoted in Smith (1994: 162).

Similar to the anti-monopoly programme, SCAP sought to harness the power of the state to encourage a wider distribution of land ownership.[17] An October 1946 land reform law placed limits on the amount of land a single family could own, expropriated land from large holders, and issued former tenants credit to purchase newly available properties. SCAP also created a new government mechanism to oversee and enforce these changes. The programme was largely successful: the tenancy rate fell from 70 to 10 per cent of the rural population, and rates for lending land generally decreased. By December 1949, 89 per cent of agricultural land was farmed by its direct owners, an increase from 54 per cent in 1945 (Dore 1959: 175). New landowners were also mobilized into democratic politics, and generally gravitated towards non-communist parties. According to MacArthur (1964: 313), 'the redistribution [of land] formed a strong barrier against any introduction of communism in rural Japan. Every farmer in the country was now a capitalist in his own right'. A study of the US democratization programme similarly concluded that the land reform programme 'altered the pattern of ownership in the countryside and removed the major social pillar of traditional authoritarianism and militarism' (Smith 1994: 162).

3.2   State-building in Iraq, 2003–11

The US approach to state-building in Iraq differed dramatically from Japan. In the case of Iraq, the United States failed to preserve the existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, and faced substantial barriers to rebuilding those state institutions that had eroded or collapsed as a result of the war and ensuing insurgency conflict. In terms of occupation planning, the US war plan envisioned a relatively small US force that would enter and exit Iraq quickly. Civilian officials in the administration, and particularly in the Defence Department, aggressively pushed to reduce the force levels required in CENTCOM's off-the-shelf plan for an Iraqi invasion (OPLAN 1003-98), which was created by Anthony Zinni in the late 1990s and called for three military corps and about 380,000 troops overall. After the capture of Baghdad in mid-April 2003, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks' first instructions to US ground commanders were that the majority US forces would be withdrawn within three to four months, and that the 140,000 troops currently in the country would be reduced to about 30,000 by September. On April 21, Rumsfeld cancelled the original plan to deploy two additional Army divisions—the 1st Armoured Division and the 1st Cavalry Division—to help secure the country, instead sending only one (Gordon and Trainor 2006: 26).

In contrast with the Japanese occupation, Bush administration decision-makers also, at least initially, rejected the idea of creating a formal occupation authority that would wield sovereignty in Iraq, and instead formed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance under a retired general, Jay Garner. It was expected that this group would be in Iraq for a minimal period of time, would make a minimum number of changes to Iraqi national institutions, and then transfer political authority to a functioning Iraqi state within 90 days.[18] Planning for the civilian side of the occupation—providing public order, administering state institutions and services, and initiating a democratic political process— therefore lagged behind military planning for winning the war itself. The ORHA, for example, was understaffed, operated without clear guidance from the Defence Department,

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17 For an overview of the land reform law by a SCAP participant, see Ladejinsky (1951).

18 On expectations about how long the ORHA would remain in Iraq, see Bensahel (2006: 458-9) and Packer (2005: 132-3l).

and was given only eight weeks in early 2003 to prepare for the post-war mission, in contrast with the military planning that had been ongoing since late 2001. Bush himself was briefed on the post-war occupation plan only one week before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Gordon and Trainor 2006: 503).

This plan for a temporary organization designed to assist the Iraqi state in transition was eventually overwhelmed by events in Iraq following the fall of the Iraqi regime, and the Bush administration was compelled to form a more structured occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by a former ambassador, Paul Bremer. Even after the establishment of the CPA, however, the US continued to make decisions that dismantled or undermined the capacity of Iraqi state institutions. As in Japan, a key aspect of the programme to democratize the Iraqi state was the elimination of former party elites from public and quasi-public offices. Bremer's first executive order as the top CPA official concerned the 'de-Baathification' of Iraqi politics, and banned Baath party members from 'holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions'.[19] However, these party officials represented the vast bulk of administrative experience and competence in the Iraqi state. As Steve Browning, an army engineer and CPA official, stated to Bremer, the purged Baathists were 'the brains of the government…the ones with a lot of information and knowledge', without whom the CPA would have 'a major problem' running the state ministries (Chandrasekaran 2006: 71). In contrast with the Japanese occupations, where the purges were narrower in scope and attempts were made to ensure a basic continuity in the state, the debaathification order was wider and deeper—it applied to a broader range of government officials and at greater levels in the bureaucracy. The result severely weakened Iraqi national political institutions.

A similar effect resulted from CPA Order Number 2, which disbanded the regular Iraqi military. The decision dissolved several Iraqi national institutions, including the Iraqi armed forces, the Ministry of Defence, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service, leaving the Iraqi government without the ability to re-establish or maintain public order (Ricks 2006; Dobbins et al. 2009).[20] The Bush administration and then CPA, however, failed to fill the institutional gap left by these decisions. The initial plan for policing, for example, was based on the recommendation of a leading government expert on post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Haiti, and called for sending 5,000 police advisors to Iraq to fill the law enforcement vacuum after the fall of the Hussein regime and to train Iraqi police forces. The White House reduced this number to 1,500, and later decided instead to hire a private contractor to send 150 police advisors with no direct law enforcement responsibilities (Gordon and Trainor (2006: 155). The result was an almost total collapse of public order in the aftermath of the invasion and the fall of the old regime (Flibbert 2013; Ricks 2006).

Other aspects of the CPA reform agenda focused on reducing the scope of the Iraqi state, which US officials viewed as bloated and inefficient. The result was the introduction of a series of free market-oriented reforms, including privatizing state-owned companies, rolling back the state sector, and eliminating a vast network of state subsidies for food, oil and other goods. In one assessment, these initiatives 'crippled the bulk of Iraq's non-oil economy,

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[19] http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders.

[20] The text of the order is available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/#Orders.

threw hundreds of thousands of workers into the streets and further alienated the Sunnis, who were the managerial class of the country' (Zakaria (2007).[21]

3.3 State-building in Afghanistan, 2001–13

Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the US approach to state-building in Afghanistan differed from both the occupations of Japan and Iraq. The initial US military strategy for regime change involved a more limited direct military commitment, relying on a combination of air power, special forces, and an indigenous militia, the Northern Alliance, to overthrow the Taliban (Edwards 2010; Biddle 2005). The military stabilization operation in Afghanistan was also more multilateral than in Iraq or Japan. In August 2003, responsibility for combatting the Taliban-led insurgency and maintaining security under the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force transferred to NATO, although the US retained the largest combat role. Following the political process set up by the UN-sponsored Bonn Framework in December 2001, a transitional administration led by an interim president, Hamid Karzai, was put in place until 2004, when Karzai won a national presidential election.

The US approach to state-building in Afghanistan differed from its approach in Iraq and Japan in several respects. The Afghan state was historically small in both scope and strength, often providing a minimal degree of security and a basic economic system while many governance functions were accomplished at the local or regional level (Barfield 2010). According to the World Bank, in 2000 Afghanistan ranked at or near the bottom percentile in a number of measures of governance, including political stability, government effectiveness, and corruption (World Bank, WGI).[22] This weakness was also a more direct cause of the intervention than in either Japan or Iraq, as US leaders feared the potential for terrorist organizations to operate in regions of Afghanistan outside the reach of the central state. The US intervention therefore focused both on expanding the scope of the Afghan state and on building the strength of Afghan institutions, but failed to make significant progress in accomplishing either goal. In terms of establishing security, the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government struggled in decisively defeating the Taliban-led insurgency, and despite a large US investment in training national military and police forces, these forces have struggled to effectively operate independent of US support. The United States also attempted to expand the state into new areas, such as education, that had previously been under local or regional control, and to expand the reach of government institutions and services into regions where they previously been absent. Yet, according to most assessments, the Afghan state is unable to deliver many basic services outside the capital region of Kabul. In one account, the international intervention created a state that was both 'overcentralized' and 'underresourced', resulting in a situation where 'the national government, and specifically the president's office, would intrude deeply into local affairs, but would still lack the ability to perform the basic functions that Afghans expected of the state (Paris 2013: 544). This weakness was in some cases reinforced by the perception of widespread corruption of the Karzai regime, further reducing its popular legitimacy.

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[21] On CPA-initiated privatizing reforms, see Foote et al. (2004).

[22] See also Miller (2013)

4   Why state-building during interventions succeeds or fails: contending theories

What explains the differences in outcomes across these cases? Why was the United States more successful in state-building in Japan than in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and what lessons can the policy and research communities draw from this experience? A number of theories have emerged in the scholarly and policy literature seeking to explain the success and failure of armed state-building. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular have given rise to a diverse range of explanations seeking to account for why the United States and its international partners failed to gain traction in promoting durable and effective state institutions, and what this might suggest for the broader debate over external state-building. These arguments can be grouped into four categories of explanations that highlight: (i) the level of commitment made by the intervening state; (ii) prior economic, political, and social conditions in the target state; (iii) the domestic incentives created by large international aid programmes; and (iv) ideational factors. This section describes and assesses each of these arguments.

4.1   The level of commitment

One of the most prominent arguments to emerge in the literature on US state-building is the claim that successful state-building depends on the level of commitment by the intervener, measured in terms of the duration of the operation and the investment of material resources such as manpower and aid. Dobbins et al. (2003: xxv) contend that 'among the controllable factors, the most important determinant seems to be the level of effort, measured in time, manpower, and money'. Pei et al. (2006: 82) concur that 'greater commitment translates into greater leverage and increased capacity to implement reconstruction policies'.

Dobbins et al. cite a number of cases in favour of this argument in which the United States was unwilling to bear the costs of a protracted state-building commitment, including Somalia in 1991 and Haiti in 1994. Supporters of this view also cite the Bush administration's failure to provide sufficient military force levels to maintain security in Iraq following the collapse of the Hussein regime (Flibbert 2013; Byman 2008; Bensahel 2006), or the failure to provide sufficient resources for the Afghanistan mission until the Obama Administration's 'surge' of military and civilian resources in 2009 (Paris 2013). But overall the evidence for this view is weak. In terms of the duration of the United States' commitment to the rebuilding process, the US remained in Iraq for nine years and has remained in Afghanistan for over ten with limited and, in the case of Afghanistan, diminishing results. In Japan, in contrast, the overall duration of the US occupation was shorter (seven years) and the majority of institutional reforms took place in the initial three-year period from 1945 to 1948 (Dower 1999; Schaller 1985). The amount of US foreign assistance is similarly uncorrelated with state-building outcomes in these cases. The United States provided US$15.2 billion in total assistance to Japan and US$29.3 billion in assistance to Germany from 1945 to 1952, an amount equivalent to the first three years of the Iraqi occupation, yet these cases are widely considered successful examples of democratic state-building (Serafino et al. 2006).[23] In Afghanistan, the US has provided over US$54 billion alone to training and equipping Afghan military and police under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), yet these organizations are still dependent on US support for a number of key logistical and combat tasks (SIGAR 2013).

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[23] Japanese and German aid figures calculated in 2005 dollars.

4.2 Prior conditions in the target state

Several scholars and analysts have coalesced around a second explanation: that the success of external state-building is shaped by the pre-existing conditions in the target state. One hypothesized set of factors is whether the state targeted for intervention has any prior experience with democratic governance or has previously built up bureaucratic capacity in state institutions. Leaders brought to power following external intervention may have been socialized into democratic norms or carry over institutional knowledge from the previous regime. According to Brownlee (2007: 339), for example, 'Over the past century nation-building outcomes have greatly depended on prior conditions in the subject society', and specifically that 'pre-existing bureaucratic and parliamentary institutions in the target society translate into increase capacity to implement reconstruction policies'. Similarly, Fukuyama (2004: 38) argues that US successes in Japan and Germany were due to the fact that their pre-war state capacity was carried over into the post-war period. In short, according to this view, the best predictor of future state strength is past state strength.

Other scholars point to the wider economic and social conditions in the target state. Drawing on the comparative politics literature on democratic transitions, this perspective argues that absence of favourable domestic preconditions such as ethnic homogeneity and economic development can pose substantial barriers to the creation of robust democratic institutions following foreign intervention. According to Diamond (2008: 95-6), 'the notion that there is a strong association between a country's level of economic development and its likelihood of being a democracy has been one of the most prominent theories of the social sciences, and one of the best sustained by the evidence'.[24] Others hypothesize that democracy may be more difficult to sustain in states with greater social heterogeneity, including greater ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity.[25] Minority groups may fear the insecurity that could follow from a loss of political power in electoral competition, particularly in the absence of impartial state institutions or constitutional limits on the exercise of power by the majority, and therefore oppose democratization or measures strengthening the central state. Armed state-building by international actors in heterogeneous societies may exacerbate this dynamic by displacing a previously dominant group from power, who may choose to fight to regain their previous position out of fear of their place in a new order (Downes 2011).

The US experience provides evidence supporting the view that international actors face barriers to building the scope and strength of the state in countries that lack these preconditions. Looking specifically at democratization outcomes, for example, Downes and Monten (2013) find that states with high levels of per capita income and low levels of ethnic diversity were the most likely to undergo a democratic transition following foreign intervention.[26] The three states that experienced the largest net democratic change—Japan in 1945, Germany in 1945, and Panama in 1989—were characterized by relatively high levels of GDP per capita and low levels of ethnic diversity, while Germany and Japan possessed highly industrialized economies (Downes and Monten 2013). In contrast, Afghanistan in 2001 was one of the poorest states in the world, while by 2003 the Iraqi economy had been

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[24] On the link between economic development and democratization, see also Terrell (2010); Boix and Stokes (2003); and Przeworksi et al. (2000).

[25] See, for example, Horowitz (1993) and Lijphart (1977). For challenges to this argument, see Fish and Brooks (2004).

[26] See Moon (2009); Enterline and Grieg (2008); Bellin (2004); and Byman (2003).

weakened by a decade of sanctions following the first Gulf War. Consistent with the diversity argument, US intervention in Iraq triggered a struggle for power among contending sectarian groups that slowed the economic and political reconstruction process. Support for insurgent violence in the Sunni community was driven in part by the belief that in the absence of strong, impartial national institutions, the rights of the minority group would not be protected in a Shia-dominated state (Kaufmann 2006).

4.3   Aid and incentives

A third line of argument locates the causes of failure in the incentives large aid programmes create for the leaders of states that experience intervention and reconstruction by outside actors. One perspective highlights the dynamic that arises when interveners seek both to directly provide public goods in weak states while simultaneously attempting to improve local capacity to provide that good, via aid or training programmes. In these cases, aid may crowd out domestic capacity-building: national leaders may have little incentive to invest scarce resources in improving state capacity in these areas while they are being accomplished by international actors. A similar problem may arise if the international intervener has a stronger interest in accomplishing a particular policy goal than national leaders themselves, for example the United States' interest in eliminating terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan. In these cases, national leaders may calculate that international actors will continue to provide a particular public good independent of their own choices. In other cases, foreign aid may simply prop up or legitimize the leaders of otherwise nonfunctioning or weak states (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

A related perspective focuses on the difficulties international aid donors face in attaching conditionalities to assistance. In many cases, international donors may attempt to use the threat to cut off aid as an incentive to state leaders to meet benchmarks in building new institutional functions, root out corruption, or eliminate inefficiencies and waste in the provision of public services. Yet donors may find it difficult to credibly commit to 'pull the trigger' to withhold aid to vital public services if specified conditions are not met, because the harms will be inflicted on the intended beneficiaries of aid rather than state leaders themselves (Fukuyama 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004). In the context of international intervention, according to this view, this dynamic may also result in the problem of 'moral hazard', where state leaders are encouraged to behave more recklessly by the knowledge that they are insured against failure by their international supporters (e.g., Byman 2006).

Many analysts have identified this dynamic as a key source of the US failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. US strategy attempted to both defeat the insurgency and build Iraqi security forces capable of standing on their own. But because the US was unable to credibly commit to allowing Iraqi security institutions to fail in defeating the insurgency, this policy undermined any incentive for the Shia-majority leaders in the Iraqi government to invest in institutional capacity in the security sphere and encouraged them to take greater risks in the belief that the United States would ultimately protect the security of the regime. As Larry Diamond described in 2006, 'we have what social scientists call a terrific moral hazard problem in Iraq today. The different Iraqi parties do not need to assume moral and political responsibility for their country's future, because they know there are 140,000 American troops holding up the floor of security in the country' (National Public Radio 2006). Posen (2006) similarly argues that 'Iraqi politicians will not apply sustained pressure to their

security forces to improve themselves so long as they know that the Americans will remain to protect the state from the insurgents'.[27]

4.4 Ideational factors

A final hypothesized set of factors focuses on the ideas and beliefs held by the leaders of interveners regarding the appropriate size and strength of the state. According to this argument, leaders hold views about the role of the state in the context of their own domestic politics, which influence their views about the role of state-building in foreign societies (Flibbert 2013; Dodge 2005; Monten 2005). Drawing on liberal theory, Green (2012) identifies two types of leaders: those with a 'positive' view of liberty, who see a role for an activist state in building the conditions necessary for democracy to advance, and those with a 'negative' view of liberty, who see placing constraints on the size and power of the state as a key condition for democracy. The differences in the Truman and Bush administrations' occupation strategies were in part the result of differences in domestic philosophy, which shaped how US policy-makers in both cases approached the question of state strength in the countries they occupied. US officials in Japan, influenced in part the domestic philosophy associated with the New Deal, retained the capacity of Japanese national institutions, and employed it to promote a wider distribution of economic wealth, an expanded middle class, and greater social pluralism. These policies all created the conditions for sustainable liberal democracy in Japan once sovereignty was transferred to an elected government. In contrast, Bush administration officials in Iraq implemented a more conservative agenda of limiting the Iraqi state and dismantling what they regarded as either bloated or expendable public institutions, resulting in a political system with weaker national institutions than prior to the invasion.

This explanation can account for several differences in the three cases, including both the type of occupation authority set up by the United States and the types of political reforms the occupations implemented. The Truman administration was strongly identified with the liberal ideology of the New Deal, which initiated a massive expansion of the scope and strength of the US federal state in response to the economic and social conditions created by the Great Depression (Kennedy 1999; Hamby 1985; and Higgs 1987). New Deal ideas about state-building also heavily influenced the US democratization agenda in Japan. At both the planning and implementation stages, US officials sought to use the power of the state to advance democratic reform. Many of the key positions within SCAP bureaucracy were filled by individuals with direct experience in New Deal regulatory agencies in the 1930s and 1940s, and who applied the lessons of New Deal reforms and its institutional solutions to Japan.[28] According to Charles Kades, an officer in the Government Section of SCAP who had served in a number New Deal agencies, many in SCAP brought to Japan the sensibility of a 'thorough New Dealer … the government should intervene in times of crisis, introducing radical measures where necessary, but always within the framework of free, competitive,

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[27] At the same time, there is some evidence of international donors successfully exercising aid conditionality, for example, in improving women's political participation and election laws in Afghanistan. See Bush (2011) and Rosenberg (2013).

[28] In some cases, SCAP reforms were specifically modelled on New Deal policies, for example in the area of anti-trust laws (Schaller (1985: 39; Hadley 1948).

capitalist society'.[29] Instead of dismantling the Japanese state, the occupation preserved and channelled it toward a series of social and economic reforms designed to create the conditions for sustainable liberal democracy.

In contrast, modern conservatism has been dominated by a belief in reducing the scope and the strength of the US government while reversing the expansion of the New Deal welfare state.[30] In domestic politics, US conservatives stress reducing the size of the state sector, free market solutions to public policy problems, and the unintended consequences and negative externalities generated by large government programmes. Scepticism of an activist state was at the heart of the original neoconservative intellectual movement in the mid- to late 1970s.[31] Early neoconservative writers such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1979) and Irving Kristol (1995) emphasized the limits to state-directed intervention or reform to solve social, economic, and political problems, in fields as diverse as crime rates and political party reform. As Fukuyama wrote in 2004,

> The idea that state-building, as opposed to limiting or cutting back the state, should be at the top of our agenda may strike some people as perverse. The dominant trend in world politics for the past generation has been, after all, the critique of 'big government' and the attempt to move activities from the state sector to the private markets or to civil society (2004: ix).

Prior to the 2003 Iraq War, neoconservative attitudes towards the questions of international state-building were in part an extension of this domestic worldview, and were reinforced by two foreign policy events. The first was the neoconservative interpretation of the United States' role in ending the Cold War.[32] The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe appeared to vindicate many of the hard-line policies advocated by neoconservatives since the 1970s and implemented by the Reagan administration. For many of the individuals who would later hold key positions within the Bush administration, the lessons of these events produced a certain template for democratic state-building: that authoritarian regimes were weak and vulnerable to external pressure; that democracy and market economies were natural and spontaneous conditions to which societies would revert when obstacles were removed; and that the assertion of military power was an effective means of promoting democratic change. In the neoconservative view, these events confirmed the failure of statist planning, and demonstrated the importance of bottom-up processes over the importance of the state in democratic transitions.

A second formative experience shaping the neoconservative view of international state-building was the Clinton administration's approach to intervention in the 1990s, and particularly US stability and reconstruction operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The conservative critique of these military missions followed in part from ideological beliefs about the adverse or unintended consequences of activist state intervention. Long-term state-building commitments, senior Bush officials came to believe, bred dependence in the target

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[29] Quoted in Dower (1999: 31). For first-person accounts of the Japanese occupation by other 'New Dealers', see Cohen (1987) and Hadley (2003).

[30] See, for example, Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2004).

[31] For an intellectual history of these ideas within neoconservatism, see Fukuyama (2006) and Monten (2005).

[32] On the lessons neoconservatism generally took from the end of the Cold War, see Kopstein (2006); Fukuyama (2006); and Mann (2004).

state and created a kind of international social welfare (Mandelbaum (1996).[33] Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated this view in a February 2003 speech on US policy in Afghanistan:

> The objective is not to engage in what some call nation-building … In some nation-building exercises well-intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems and say let's fix it. This is well motivated to be sure, but it can really be a disservice in some instances because when foreigners come in with international solutions to local problems, if not very careful they can create a dependency. A long-term foreign presence in a country can be unnatural.

This view preceded the lead-up to the Iraq. As Condoleezza Rice (2000) wrote in an article outlining the Bush campaign's prospective foreign policy agenda, the military was 'not designed to build a civilian society'. In a 1999 speech, Bush similarly criticized 'open-ended deployments and unclear military missions'. From the conservative perspective, these 'nation-building' missions were not only an ineffective misuse of the military, undertaken on behalf of diffuse and undefined goals disconnected from the national interest, but also shared the same problems as domestic state-sector policy solutions.

These assumptions about democracy promotion and the state were all brought to bear in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002 and 2003, as well as in the post-conflict military operations and political strategy that followed. The result was a military and post-war plan that de-emphasized the importance of state institutions and minimized the role of US as the central state authority in Iraq. US planning was driven by the assumption that democratic transitions were easy and could be achieved with a minimum of central direction. In both private debates and public statements, Bush administration officials advanced the belief that US forces would be, in Vice President Cheney's words, 'greeted as liberators' and that democratic institutions and practices would quickly and easily take hold in Iraq following the deposing of the Saddam Hussein regime, as they had in Eastern Europe following the retrenchment of Soviet power.[34] Administration officials consistently used the most optimistic scenarios while downplaying the costs, time, and manpower necessary to democratize the country.[35] According to Kopstein (2006: 87-8), 'the script from which the United States was working in Iraq during the spring of 2003 was based on its reading of the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe: topple the leader, pull down his statue, and let civil society take over'. Flibbert (2013) similarly concludes that the Bush administration was 'ideologically predisposed to ridding Iraq of state authority'.

5   Future research

This review suggests several lessons for the use of military intervention as a tool for assisting fragile states build more durable and effective state institutions, either alone or when coupled with large international aid programmes. First, it is easier for international actors to preserve

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[33] A US special envoy to Iraq and Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, similarly critiqued the 'security welfare states' created by these military operations; see Constable (2002). For a more general statement of this view, see Coyne and Davies (2007).

[34] Quoted in Bensahel (2006).

[35] See, for example, Bensahel (2006); Gordon and Trainor (2006); and Ricks (2006).

existing state strength than to build it. A key factor in the success of the Japanese case was the US choice to preserve the bureaucratic capacity of the Japanese state, limit the purge of individuals who were associated with pre-war nationalism but nonetheless held critical institutional knowledge, and channel state power towards promoting social and economic reform. In contrast, many argue that the less selective purge of the Iraqi military and Baathist party figures substantially weakened the Iraq state. An important future research question is how external interveners can balance the need to hold regime figures accountable for past crimes or abuses of power, while still preserving the institutional knowledge and experience critical to state capacity.

A second lesson is that while foreign assistance can succeed in delivering public goods in areas where national institutions are failing (such as security), aid may also create a disincentive for national leaders to invest in institutions that can provide these goods absent foreign support. This logic may explain why, despite massive US programmes intended to build the security sectors in Iraq and Afghanistan, these programmes have had limited success in creating organizations that can operate independent of foreign support. An important area of future research might therefore explore how to structure conditionality in aid programmes so as to minimize these crowding-out and moral hazard effects.

Finally, a key question arising from this analysis is the extent to which state-building success is driven by the choices of the intervener, or by 'structural' conditions over which interveners have no control, such as the pre-existing economic conditions or political experience of the targeted state. If these structural factors are the key drivers of success, improvements in the amount, design, or administration of aid programmes will not substantially improve state-building outcomes.

Appendix

Appendix Table: Cases of US foreign-imposed regime change, 1900–2003

Target	Intervener	Year	Leader removed
Nicaragua	US	1909	José Santos Zelaya
Nicaragua	US	1910	José Madriz
Honduras	US	1911	Miguel Davila
Dominican Republic	US	1912	Eladio Victoria
Mexico	US	1914	Victoriano Huerta
Dominican Republic	US	1914	José Bordas Valdez
Haiti	US	1915	Revolutionary Committee of Safety
Dominican Republic	US	1916	Francisco Henriquez
Belgium	UK/France/US	1918	Von Faulkenhausen
Costa Rica	US	1919	Federico Tinoco Granados, Juan Bautista Quiros
Nicaragua	US	1926	Emiliano Chamorro
France	UK/US	1944	Pierre Laval
Belgium	Canada/UK/US	1944	Alexander von Falkenhausen
Luxembourg	UK/US	1944	Gustav Simon
Denmark	UK/US	1945	Werner Best
The Netherlands	Canada/UK/US	1945	Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Norway	UK/US	1945	Vidkun Quisling
Germany	UK/US/USSR/France	1945	Admiral Karl Doenitz
Japan	US	1945	Suzuki Kantaro
Iran	US	1953	Mohammed Mossadeq
Guatemala	US	1954	Jacobo Arbenz, Carlos Enrique Diaz, Elfegio Monzon
Republic of Vietnam	US	1963	Ngo Dinh Diem
Chile	US	1973	Salvador Allende
Grenada	US	1983	Hudson Austin
Panama	US	1990	Manuel Noriega
Haiti	US	1994	Raul Cedras
Afghanistan	US	2001	Mullah Omar
Iraq	US	2003	Saddam Hussein

Note: Shading indicates cases of regime change in which the US promoted democratic reform.

Source: Downes and Monten (2013). Table reproduced by permission of MIT Press.

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