

# WIDER WORKING PAPERS

*Well-Being: Foundations, and the Extent  
of Its Realization in Poor Countries*

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**WELL-BEING: FOUNDATIONS, AND THE EXTENT OF ITS  
REALIZATION IN POOR COUNTRIES**

by

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This article combines the text of the Frank Paish Lecture delivered at the Bristol Meeting of the Royal Economic Society and the Association of University Teachers of Economics in April 1989 (forthcoming, Economic Journal, Supplement, 1990), and Dasgupta and Weale (1989). It forms the basis of Chapters 1-3 of my forthcoming book: The Economics of Deprivation.

One of the pleasures and benefits of academic life is the presence of young colleagues who are at once reflective, generous and patient. Paul Seabright and Martin Weale have given a great deal of their time to discuss the subject matter of this article with me over the past several months. I have also had a number of fruitful conversations with Geoffrey Hawthorn of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Cambridge and he directed me to the kind of quantitative evidence on political and civil rights I was seeking and which is reported here. Charles Blitzer of the World Bank very kindly and very promptly provided me with data on economic indicators for the period I needed. I have also learnt much from the many discussions I have had over the past several years with Kenneth Arrow, Peter Bauer, Frank Hahn, Ross Harrison, Eric Maskin, Amartya Sen and Richard Tuck. Carol Dasgupta read an earlier version of this paper and removed a number of infelicities of style. To all these good people I am most grateful.

## 1. Well-Being: The Motivation

Two aspects of persons have alternately dominated the thinking of social philosophers over the centuries, each true in itself, but each quite incomplete without the other. One sees us capable of deliberation, having the potential capacity to do things. It details agency, choice, independence and self-determination, and thereby that aspect of our selves which fashion projects and pursue goals. The other views us as seats of utility or satisfaction; as loci of possible states of mind, attained by the extent to which desires are fulfilled, by the activities that are undertaken and the relationships enjoyed. If one vision sees us doing things, the other sees us residing in states of being. Where the former leads one to the language of freedom and rights, the latter directs one to a concern with welfare and happiness.

These are related aspects of course, in fact so closely related that they have often been conflated into one without having caused any obvious damage. Consider for example that people often appeal to a category of socio-economic rights (that is, rights to certain scarce resources) when advocating policies which have an impact on the extent of absolute poverty in a society. Now, it is possible to use instead some notion of aggregate welfare and reach similar conclusions. We may, for instance, be considering the desirability of a nutrition-guarantee scheme. We could advocate it by invoking persons' well-being interests, such as certain types of positive rights. (See Section 6.) We could also commend it on grounds of aggregate utility. We could do this by noting first that nutrition intake is a determinant of individual welfare, that at low levels of intake it is a critical determinant, and that in the absence of such a scheme a sizeable fraction of the population would be vulnerable to food deprivation. We could thus argue that the level of aggregate welfare which would be expected to be achieved could be increased by the establishment of a policy of food guarantees; for example, by the use of means-tested food stamps, an income maintenance programme, a food-for-public-work scheme, unemployment benefits, targeted food subsidies, or whatever. In other words, it isn't immediate if the language of positive rights has any greater cutting power over aggregate-welfare reasoning. Current social philosophers who restrict themselves to this language and are critical of Utilitarianism for its narrowness overlook, to take only one

example, that the philosophical foundations of the Welfare State in Britain rested originally on Utilitarian calculations. (See Gutmann, 1980.) It isn't enough to attack welfarist theories by merely pointing to the fact that they elide over the claims of individual rights and to produce hypothetical examples in which they move us in different ethical directions. Rights themselves need to be justified, and it would be remarkable if they could be justified in ways other than by an appeal to the human interests their recognition protects and promotes. This, as has been noted elsewhere (see Scanlon, 1978, p.93), was the incontrovertible insight of the Classical Utilitarians.

Nevertheless, there are substantive differences between these two broad outlooks. We have no guarantee that fusing them does not lead to ethical errors in the choice of policy, and much has been written in recent years on the dangers of conflating them. (See especially Rawls, 1972,1974,1982,1988.) Within the economics literature, however, the language of rights continues to be in part familiar and in part quite alien. In applied welfare economic theory it rarely makes an appearance.<sup>1</sup> In development economics it has featured prominently in recent years, but most writers have used it in a restricted manner. One group would seem to judge states of affairs almost exclusively in terms of the extent to which individuals and groups enjoy negative rights and thereby negative freedom (eg Bauer, 1981, 1984); the other almost exclusively in terms of positive rights and thus positive freedom (eg Drewnowsky and Scott, 1966; Hicks and Streeten, 1979; Morris, 1979; Streeten et al., 1979; Sen, 1981, 1983, 1988b; Silber, 1983; Ajit Dasgupta, 1988). And they are not the same, (see Section 6).<sup>2</sup>

In this article I want to develop the notion of rights in a manner which may prove helpful

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<sup>1</sup> I am thinking for example of the ethical stance adopted by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Barr (1987).

<sup>2</sup> I am not suggesting at all that these authors aren't sensitive to this distinction, merely that in their applied work they concentrate on one at the near-exclusion of the other. To take only one example, Sen (1988b), in asking what (sub-Saharan) Africa and India have to learn from each other, concentrates on gender-biases in survival chance and on the occurrence of famines. There is no mention of the fact that the African record on civil and political liberties is appalling, not only absolutely, but also in comparison with those in India. (See Table 1 below.)

The distinction between positive and negative freedom and rights may well be familiar to all economists. So I will use these expressions in what follows even before explaining them in Section 6.

to economists. I say this with feeling, because the philosophical literature on this matter isn't entirely transparent. It isn't always clear how certain distinguished kinds of rights are related to one another and how they are in turn related to the satisfaction of welfare and preference. I want to discuss these matters in a language economists are used to, and I want to argue in favour of an ethical conception of life more pluralist in reach than the ones on offer in much of the literature on welfare and development economics. It is such a pluralist conception of a person's good which I shall call his well-being.<sup>3</sup> This I shall do in Sections 2 through 7, and it is only the first purpose of this article. The second purpose is to use this framework on some crude data pertaining to what in 1970 were 51 of the world's poorest countries, to get a sense of the distribution of well-being among them.<sup>4</sup> This will be done in Sections 8 and 9. My two purposes are complementary. For if development and analytical welfare economics, and more generally political economy, aren't about the circumstances in which people are born and the manner in which they live and die, they are about nothing. Seen from this perspective, however, the data I shall analyse are unquestionably coarse. They are aggregates for each country, and they don't offer information about the distribution of well-being within any country. What I want to do is to undertake a cross-section study of six important ingredients of the 'aggregate well-being' of a society, provide a ranking of these countries on their basis (Section 8), and then proceed to see if these ingredients are systematically related to one another (Section 9). The indices we will study are: per capita national income, life expectancy at birth, infant survival rate, adult literacy rate, and indices of political and civil rights. Each reflects an aspect of well-being. To put it crudely, but not inaccurately, the first can be thought of simultaneously as a measure of average welfare and the extent of commodity choice.<sup>5</sup> The second,

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<sup>3</sup> I am usurping this term from the philosophical literature, where it has for long been in use in a variety of senses.

<sup>4</sup> The choice is, as is inevitable, somewhat arbitrary. But only somewhat. Each of these 51 countries in 1970 enjoyed a per capita gross national income less than \$1,500, evaluated in 1980 international prices. See Summers and Heston (1988).

<sup>5</sup> A rise in national income can under certain circumstances be interpreted as an increase in aggregate preference satisfaction. See Mirrlees (1969), who provides a general statement for second-best economies. See also the well-known works of Nordhaus and Tobin (1973) and Usher (1973) for empirical work extending the reach of national income estimates.

third and fourth are different aggregates of welfare and positive rights; and the last two reflect negative rights.

I want to think of negative freedom as providing an environment within which people pursue their own conception of the good. For this they require scarce resources. (See Section 5.) Now, the positive rights indices which we will consider here reflect achievements, not the availability of the inputs necessary for achievement. (See Section 7.) A more complete picture of states of affairs would require of us to study the availability of resources as well. Space forbids that I attempt it here.<sup>6</sup>

Indices of political and civil rights will, I think, be of particular interest. They don't make an appearance in applied welfare economics. But quality-of-life indices currently on offer in development economics, as for example the one underlying the partial order advanced by Sen (1981), are ill-conceived, or so I will argue, because they are overly limiting: they are based exclusively on positive liberties. They are insensitive to a category of liberties of profound value for our lives, some partly for instrumental reasons, and others because they have ultimate worth. Political and civil rights do not, of course, represent all that is in the notion of negative rights. More generally, our six ingredients of well-being capture only a limited aspect of the idea. But as an approximation, they together are a good deal better than those currently on offer in the empirical literature.

I was at first tempted merely to rank countries in the sample in terms of each of the six indices in turn, and to then provide an informal commentary on the maximal set of countries. As it happens, the maximal set is large. For this reason it seemed to me worth appealing to an aggregate measure which offers a complete ordering and which has some ethical appeal. The classical Borda Rule is one such measure, and in Section 8 I will provide a ranking of the countries in our sample in terms of this rule.<sup>7</sup> The ordering reveals much that is of interest.

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<sup>6</sup> I have attempted it elsewhere. See Dasgupta (1989b).

<sup>7</sup> The strengths and limitations of the Borda Rule have been exhaustively investigated by Goodman and Markowitz (1952), Smith (1973) and Fine and Fine (1974). It will be recalled that the Borda Rule provides a method of rank-order scoring, the procedure being to award each alternative (here, country) a point equal to its rank in each criterion of ranking (here, the criteria being per capita income, life expectancy at birth, infant survival rate, adult literacy rate, and indices

In Section 9 we will change direction and ask a different question. We will ask if, on a cross-country basis, we can detect a conflict between acknowledgements of positive and negative rights. For this we will wish to study the cross-section relations between political and civil rights indices and improvements in the indices of welfare and positive rights for the period of the data. To me the most significant and reassuring finding is that they are, with one exception, positively and significantly correlated.<sup>8</sup> The argument, which I have often heard expressed in conversation, that poor nations can't afford the luxury of political and civil liberties is thus belied by the data. I am of course familiar with the fact that correlation doesn't imply causation. I am also aware that indices of negative rights can change dramatically in a nation, following a coup d'etat, a rebellion, an election or whatever, and as we will be using a six-year average index (the period 1973-1979) for them, we must be careful in interpreting the statistical results. But I can't imagine that these difficulties provide reasons for ignoring negative liberties in the estimation of the quality of life, even at this crude level of investigation. Subject to these obvious cautions, what the evidence seems to be telling us is that, statistically speaking, of the 40 poor countries on observation, those whose citizens enjoyed greater political and civil liberties also performed better in terms of improvements in life expectancy at birth, per capita income and infant survival rates. This seems to me to be worth knowing.

## 2. The Government as an Agency of the Polity

We shall be thinking of the production and distributional arrangements of commodities and services, and the protection and promotion of the rights of persons in a society as the outcome of a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. The government is thus an agency of the polity, and

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of political and civil rights), adding each alternative's scores to obtain its aggregate score, and then ranking alternatives on the basis of their aggregate scores. To illustrate, suppose a country has the ranks i, j, and k, respectively, for three criteria. Then its Borda score is  $i+j+k$ . The rule invariably yields a complete ordering of alternatives. It can be viewed as a social welfare function, since the criteria can be thought of as 'voters'. Of Arrow's classic axioms, the Rule violates the one concerning the independence of irrelevant alternatives. See Arrow (1951,1963).

<sup>8</sup> The exception is the improvement in adult literacy rates. See Section 8.

it is empowered with just the right kind of authority so as to be able to perform as an effective agent. This framework is broad enough to accommodate a number of rights-based theories, such as those of Hayek (1960), Bauer (1971,1980,1984), Rawls (1972), Nozick (1974), Buchanan (1975), Dworkin (1978), Fried (1978), Scanlon (1978) and Sen (1985), and a variety of utilitarian theories; for example the preference-fulfilling welfarisms of Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), Arrow (1951,1963), Meade (1955,1976), Harsanyi (1955,1982), Graaff (1962), Posner (1974,1979), Hare (1981), Mirrlees (1982), and Parfit (1984).<sup>9</sup>

It is not a new conception. It dates back at least to Aristotle. In his Politics, Aristotle saw the State as the perfect community, in fact a partnership, "having the full limit of self-sufficiency, which came into existence for the sake of living, but which exists for the sake of living well." Thus, in particular, the State is a product of reason. Its political authority is concerned primarily with the resolution of conflicts that inevitably arise when individuals and groups pursue their own interests, or more generally their own conceptions of the good. In modern formulations this relates to the sharing of those benefits and burdens which arise from societal and communal living.

There is in fact a related task before the State, which is at the centre of discussion whenever economists study social organizations. It lies in coordinating the activities which individuals and groups in an interrelated world are engaged in while they pursue their particular interests. By 'coordination' one means something different from resolution of conflicts. It means that there needs to be some kind of balance among various activities, say, production and consumption activities, so that, for example, shortages do not occur in some commodities and surpluses in others; for either would signal some form of waste, and thus a loss in terms of the goodness of a state of affairs. Plainly, in order to achieve such coordination there is need for some form of regulation, and this regulative function in Aristotle's view also falls properly on the government.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> With a bit of work I believe it is possible to show that this conception is broad enough to accommodate even communitarian viewpoints. For a contrasting opinion, albeit confined to Rawls' contractualism, see Sandel (1982).

<sup>10</sup> For the modern organization theorist there is much of interest in Aristotle's views and those attributed to him by his medieval followers, such as Marsilius of Padua. (See Marsilius, 1956.) For example the State is seen as comprising various functional parts. They function in



These considerations, following from a contractualist view of the State, are today familiar matter, and rehearsing them here may appear to be a statement of the obvious. But much current debate in development economics is on the proper role of governments in poor countries, on the ethical constraints which ought to circumscribe their zones of control, and on their ability to be effective in many of the areas of action they frequently enter, and which in principle they ought to enter.<sup>11</sup> In any case, these issues transcend poor countries and development economics. They appear urgent whenever we reflect upon the idea of a civil society, and the rights, duties and responsibilities of various agents and agencies within it. Right and wrong carry with them no cultural or technological conditionality. The fact that a tradition might not even acknowledge, let alone condemn, the violation of certain individual, or group, or gender rights does not make the violation right, and it is a fundamental error to think that it may.<sup>12</sup> To be sure, the state of an

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different ways so as to provide collectively for human needs. Each part of the State is defined by its caring for a different human function; farmers for their nutrition function, the 'mechanic artisan' for the 'sensitive' function, and so on. At a broader level of classification Aristotle saw the State as comprising six parts, with their associated offices: agricultural, artisan, military, financial, priestly, and judicial or deliberative.

One should distinguish those elements of Classical and Medieval conceptions which are culturally specific from those that characterize their central thrust. As an instance one should note that the priestly, the warrior and the judicial are, in Marsilius' view, strictly part of the State and are called the 'honourable' class (honorabilitatem). The remaining four are offices only in the 'broad sense of the term, because they are offices necessary to the state'. Persons belonging to these are referred to collectively as the 'common mass' (vulgaris). (See Marsilius, 1956, Discourse I, Ch. 5, p.15.) It may be noted that the honourable class is seen as providing what we would today recognise as public goods (religious truths, warfare and the law). The common mass are assumed to provide private goods (food, clothing and implements). I do not know if the higher status bestowed upon the providers of public goods is on account of their being in charge of providing public goods, or whether it is because such commodities as defence, religious truths and the law are regarded in some sense higher-order goods. See Dasgupta (1989a) for further discussion.

<sup>11</sup> Among the many writings reflecting contrasting views see Myrdal (1968), Adelman and Morris (1967,1973), Bauer (1971,1980,1984), Adelman (1975,1979), Streeten (1981), Streeten et al. (1981), Little (1982), Lal (1983), Sen (1983) and Dreze and Sen (1989).

<sup>12</sup> The view that ethical truths are culturally specific, what one might call ethical relativism, was held by early anthropologists. It says roughly speaking that among other things what is 'right' is to be thought of as that which is right for a given society, that this latter is to be understood in functional terms, and that therefore external criticism and condemnation is misplaced and wrong. This view has had some revival in recent years along communitarian lines. See for example Banuri (1986). For a critique of ethical relativism, see Williams (1972).

In a highly sophisticated form this view finds expression in a quite different body of literature: the recently developed 'economic analysis of law'. (See Coase,1960; Demsetz,1966,1967,1972; Posner,1974,1979; Furubotn and Pejovich,1972,1974.) This theory sees legal rights as wholly

economy (for example, its level of economic development) and the motivation of its political authorities, will have an implication for the extent to which various public policies should be in effect and can be effective. But that is a different matter. To be sure also, there are countries for which the label of a civil society would be a travesty, where the fundamental conceptions of society and social interactions among their members are so much at variance that there is no meeting point. To use Professor Rawls' apt expression, such societies are not 'well-ordered'. However, even for them there are on occasion narrow windows of concerned public action, and for this one requires a language. Ethical theories of the State are designed to provide one.

The role of the agency of government is circumscribed as well by the fact that much information relevant for the choice of public policy is only imperfectly known by it. To put it more sharply, a great deal of information is only privately known. This is a deep fact, not an incidental one, and the gap between what is privately observable and known and what is publicly verifiable is at the heart of the problem of incentives. Public action is constrained by the fact that it cannot be founded upon unverifiable pieces of information.<sup>13</sup> All this is a way of saying that governments should not pursue courses of action which are incompatible with private incentives; a rather banal observation perhaps, but one which is rarely put to use in theoretical political philosophy and is often ignored by governments in practice.<sup>14</sup>

In fact, asymmetric information has further consequences. It invites us to consider the instrumental worth of a variety of rights; for example, legal rights to certain kinds of property and

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instrumental to the pursuit of welfarist goals, such as for example Pareto-efficient allocations of commodities and services. It interprets the assignment of property rights in terms of its ability to reduce the costs that are inevitably incurred by parties when they transact among one another. Legal rights are thus seen not to have any moral basis at all. They are instituted so as to minimise transaction costs, or more generally so as to increase aggregate welfare. For a decisive criticism of the theory, see Fried (1977, and 1978, Chapter 4).

<sup>13</sup> For example, governments would surely be unable to implement income tax schedules if they had no means of assessing individual and corporate incomes.

<sup>14</sup> A most notable exception among political philosophers is Professor Hayek. See for example Hayek (1960). I have gone into this range of questions elsewhere. See Dasgupta (1980, 1982, 1986.)

to protected spheres of individual or agency discretion.<sup>15</sup> The point is not to deny that there are patterns of rights which are basic, that is, which have intrinsic worth; what Dworkin (1978, p.93) calls background rights. Quite the contrary, and we will take this up in Section 4. Rather, it is that there are patterns of rights in any society which ought to be located for their instrumental value only. Their protection and promotion further basic rights or collectivist goals.

One of the most profound problems in applied welfare economic theory is to locate the right mix of government, market, community and household activities. There are in fact two separate issues here: what are the duties of government and what are good institutional arrangements for meeting these duties? The former can be discussed a good deal in the abstract, the latter cannot. The latter rests heavily on instrumental grounds, the former less so. In fact the latter requires of us to judge the appropriate range and depth of government involvement in production and distribution, and we cannot comment on how extensive a government's actual reach should be if we don't know something of the wealth of the country and its distribution, the reliability of its administrative capability, the performance of its markets and of existing patterns of communal security provided through the family, the village or whatever. For example, it has been observed by social anthropologists that a growing problem women face in developing countries today is a continued deterioration in kinship support systems which has accompanied economic and cultural changes. (See eg Mueller, 1983.) We shouldn't conclude from this that in earlier times such support systems worked wonders.<sup>16</sup> Rather, it tells us that unless some alternative mechanism is provided, women will be increasingly vulnerable to acute deprivation.

Among other things a State is characterised by its shared institutions and arrangements for the distribution of benefits and burdens. A normative theory of the State should be in a position to enable members of society to justify these arrangements to one another.<sup>17</sup> This cannot be done

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<sup>15</sup> See Dasgupta (1980, 1982). See also Scanlon (1978), who emphasises the instrumental role of rights from a different perspective.

<sup>16</sup> The oft-repeated claim that in nineteenth-century sub-Saharan Africa they did, has been shown to be false by Iliffe (1984,1987).

<sup>17</sup> See Scanlon (1982) for a forceful expression of this. For further discussion see Waldron (1984).

by merely looking solemn and uttering pious sentiments about the dignity of man, his autonomy, and the ability of persons to appear in public without shame. The most promising avenue available at the moment for finding such a justification lies in social contract theories. Among the aims is to find economic arrangements "...which no one can reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement," (Scanlon, 1982, p.110). I shall not go any farther into the underlying reasoning behind contractual notions. But the idea of a social contract will provide the background for the discussion which follows.<sup>18</sup>

### 3. Acts and their Consequences<sup>19</sup>

There is a tradition in moral and political philosophy which distinguishes two broad types of considerations for reaching ethical judgments: consequentialist and deontological. The key to deontological reasoning lies in a recognition of the priority of the right over the good. The hallmark of consequentialism is just the reverse: it acknowledges the priority of the good over the right.<sup>20</sup> Consequentialist theories judge actions, and more generally, policies which govern actions, solely in terms of their consequences. For example, in welfarist theories they are judged by their welfare consequences. For this reason they are often called goal-based theories. They identify desirable social goals, for example the maximization of aggregate welfare, and they insist that agents in any

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<sup>18</sup> See Hamlin (1986) for a review of modern contract theories of the State. See also Sugden (1989), who develops a contractual view and then argues vigorously in favour of a perception of the legitimate role of government quite at variance with the one I sketch here. Space forbids that I dwell on where I think he goes wrong; but it is possible that part of our differences will turn out on close examination to be semantic. There are, of course, several social contract theories currently on offer, differing by way of the circumstances under which the contract is thought to have been 'drawn up', the extent to which re-negotiation is allowed, the amount of information the interested parties are assumed to have possessed at the time the contract was conceived, and so forth. I am being deliberately vague about these matters in the text because the objects of government interest I shall be looking at are those that fall under the duties of government in a number of social contract theories, such as for example that of Professor Rawls. I should add that contract theories aren't the only route for admitting considerations of the kind we will be discussing below. Many of the issues we will be raising have been raised in much the same way along other conceptual routes.

<sup>19</sup> This Section is based on Dasgupta and Seabright (1989), which goes into the issues discussed here in greater detail.

<sup>20</sup> Ross (1930) is the acknowledged modern classic on the distinction between the right and the good. Rawls (1972) as always, has an illuminating discussion of the contrasts, as do Dworkin (1978), Fried (1978) and Lyons (1982).

society ought deliberately to seek and realize an aggregate of them.

There are many versions of consequentialism. More particularly, there are a variety of welfarist theories, and they differ by way of the goals they advocate. For example, Classical Utilitarianism, which evaluates actions in terms of their impact on the sum of human happiness, is one version --- still the most well-known version.<sup>21</sup> Then there are pluralist consequentialist theories. They pursue multiple goals all at once. For example, there are consequentialist theories which value both aggregate well-being and an equal distribution of well-being.<sup>22</sup> Such a theory may, but it need not, specify the weights reflecting the relative importance of the goals when they are in conflict. If weights are not specified by the theory, not all consequences can be ranked by it. The moral theory in such an instance is able to offer only an incomplete ordering of states of affairs. This isn't to say that ethical choice is not possible, it is only to say that the theory offers only maximal sets of actions from which the chooser can select.<sup>23</sup> It does not identify optimal actions, or more generally, optimal policies.<sup>24</sup> But no matter how much they differ from one another, consequentialist theories are viewed as being related in one crucial respect: they evaluate states of affairs by their aggregate desirability and they thereby judge actions and policies in terms of an aggregate of their consequences.

Not so with deontological theories, or so the philosophical tradition asserts. These theories judge actions, and more generally policies, by their rightness or wrongness; not by their consequences, or anyhow, not solely by their consequences.

And how is the rightness or wrongness judged? Well, they are judged in different ways by different deontological theories. Thus, for example, in absolutist rights-based theories, such as that of Nozick (1974), it is wrong even to contemplate, let alone to undertake, an action which infringes

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<sup>21</sup> Sidgwick (1907) is the treatise on Classical Utilitarianism.

<sup>22</sup> See Barry (1965) for an account.

<sup>23</sup> A maximal set in this context is a set of actions with the property that none of them can be bettered by any feasible action and where none of the actions in the set is better or worse than any of the others in the set.

<sup>24</sup> See Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) for an analysis of the implications of ethical pluralism on the choice of investment projects in the public sector.

a person's moral rights. Rights in absolutist theories identify protected spheres of individual discretion and treatment, which the claims of the overall general good cannot override. Thus, lying is wrong because in lying one is using a person as a means to one's own ends, and this is to violate his integrity. Thus also, it is wrong for a government to torture a prisoner, even if this were the only means of obtaining information which would protect the safety of its people. Seen from such deontological perspectives each one of us as a rational moral agent is protected by a cloak of rights, which even the general good is unable to override.

I have tried to fashion these all-too-brief remarks in such a way as to provide an explanation of why the philosophical literature over the years has seen it natural to begin by distinguishing consequentialist theories from deontological ones in terms of whether judgments on actions are made solely on the basis of their consequences, and then to glide into a seemingly different distinction: one based on their relative concerns for the claims of the individual vis-a-vis the aggregate mass of individuals; or in other contexts, between the individual and the society of individuals. "The distinction between rights-based and goal-based theories...", writes Waldron (1984, p.13) in an otherwise excellent essay on theories of rights, "... (lies in the idea) that a requirement is right-based if it is generated by a concern for some individual interest, goal-based if it is generated by concern for something taken to be an interest of society as a whole." Right-based theories according to this reckoning shudder at the thought of aggregation exercises, because it is held that in any such exercise the interests of the individual can all too readily get swamped by claims made on behalf of a multitude of others. "A goal," writes Dworkin (1978,p.91), "is a non-individuated political aim." Or to put it bluntly, goal-based theories are collectivist. Try as they might, consequentialists have not been able to shake their theories loose from this charge levelled against them recurrently by deontologists.

What are we to make of this? There is of course a problem with the distinction right at the outset. It may seem easy to keep actions distinct from their consequences, but it isn't in fact easy at all. One reason is that they are both parts of a more general, more fundamental notion, one

which is familiar to economists: that of a state of affairs, or a social state.<sup>25</sup> In identifying a social state, an evaluator is required to provide as complete a description of the world as is possible to offer given the evaluator's information and powers of discrimination. It includes past actions, present actions, intended actions, Mother Nature's choice of actions; and the past, present and future consequences of this stream of actions. It thus includes past, current and future experiential states, the production and distribution of goods and services, and economic and social interchanges. In short, each social state is a complete history of the world, extending from the known past to the indefinite future --- as complete that is, as current powers of discrimination will allow. It is the concern of ethical theories to evaluate and rank states of affairs. In this they are the same. Where they differ is in the identification of features of social states they judge to be ethically significant. The distinction between acts and consequences in this broader framework is formally so tenuous that it is difficult to see how so central a classification as is provided by the labels 'deontological' and 'consequentialist' can be sustained on its basis. If actions matter intrinsically, they can be made part of a description of consequences, and then the distinction collapses. What the concept of a social state does for us is to show that consequences matter very much in deontological theories as well. If an action is wrong because it violates someone's moral rights, it must be the case that one of the consequences of the action is a violation of these rights. In rights-based theories a great deal of weight will be placed on this harm. States of affairs bearing this feature will thereby appear low in the overall ranking of social states.<sup>26</sup>

In the following section I will argue that the distinction between deontological and consequentialist theories is not to be sought in the idea that the latter worships aggregation whereas the former shies away from it: for aggregation is an inevitable exercise in ethical reasoning concerning political action. Here I want to sketch the idea that there is indeed a deep underlying difference between these two classes of theories, one which has little to do with the 'extent' of

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<sup>25</sup> See Arrow (1963).

<sup>26</sup> This, as I understand it, is the direction of analysis advocated in Dworkin (1978), Fried (1978), Mackie (1978) and Sen (1982). Sen (1982) introduces the vocabulary of 'goal-rights' to highlight the commonality of the two frameworks of moral reasoning.

aggregation. The difference lies rather in the hold that the past has over our evaluation of current and future actions and their consequences. It is a significant feature of moral theories which are taken to be consequentialist that the past plays a role only through what is feasible today, it is allowed to play no role in our evaluation of those aspects of feasible states of affairs which lie in the future. If current preferences have been moulded by foregone experiences, the past certainly plays a role in welfarist evaluation of states of affairs, but only through the effect of the past on future experiential states. It is still the present and the future which ultimately count. Consequentialist theories in general, and welfarist theories in particular, regard by-gones as true by-gones. If breaking a promise is judged wrong in a consequentialist theory it is by virtue of its impact on what is to come. Under deontological reasoning it would be wrong even if it were to have no impact on the future. By-gones here are not by-gones. We can't of course affect the past. But the past affects our evaluation of what are today available options. We can't shake loose from it. This is at the heart of deontological reasoning, and it has found its deepest expression in recent years in Nozick (1974), where the idea of historical entitlements is made to play a decisive role in the delineation of individual rights.

In a most suggestive passage on the tensions that inevitably arise between individual aspirations and the claims of communal living, Arrow (1974, pp.28-29) recalls one of the early books of the Iliad, where Agamemnon is seen raising the question whether the Greeks ought not to abandon their seige of Troy. They had been there for nine years and had got nowhere. Perhaps it was after all rather pointless. It is as always Odysseus who makes them realise, however, that such consequentialist reasoning is irrelevant. There was a commitment made a decade earlier, and this is all-important. They must stay and fight and not break the agreement. The Greeks remain, and all that is to follow from this decision does follow. And Arrow remarks, "It is this thinking which I think gives rise to the greatest tragedies of history, this sense of commitment to a past purpose which reinforces the original agreement precisely at a time when experience has shown that it must be reversed." True enough, and from a consequentialist point of view, which is what Arrow adopts in this passage, the Greek sense of commitment would seem pointless and disastrous. But for better or worse, the claims of the past often have a deep hold on our sensibility. It is of



course Arrow's intention to draw this out, to display the tension which often exists between the claims of living and the desirability of avoiding tragic consequences.<sup>27</sup> However, deontological and consequentialist theories haven't for the most part been distinguished along these lines. They have been distinguished instead by the degree to which an ethical theory justifies trade-offs between one person's interests and those of another. This is a different issue, an issue in aggregation. It is discussed next.

#### 4. Public Judgements and Aggregative Evaluations of Well-Being

In talking of aggregate utility in welfarist moral theories we mean just that, nothing more. Summation of individual welfares, which different versions of utilitarianism urge upon us, is only one type of aggregation. Judging states of affairs solely on the basis of the lowest welfare level attained in a society is another.<sup>28</sup> There are in fact an infinite variety of welfare aggregates, each embodying an ethical viewpoint. (See Roberts, 1980a,b, for an illuminating discussion of this.) The argument that aggregative considerations cannot guarantee the protection of individual welfare interests --- because, say, the claims of a large number can always swamp the claims of a few -- is not correct. It depends upon the type of aggregation being advocated. To be sure, Classical Utilitarianism is vulnerable to such a charge, but not those theories which admit no trade-offs when the welfare level of one of them assumes low enough values. One way such welfare security levels can be guaranteed is to build in constraints in the evaluative exercise, for example, by insisting that the welfare level of no individual falls below a stipulated level.<sup>29</sup> Such an ethical theory is a far cry from Classical Utilitarianism. It is nonetheless welfarist: it judges actions and evaluates

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<sup>27</sup> In a famous essay Bernard Williams explored this connection with a related motivation, that of linking moral realization to the contingencies of luck. (See Williams, 1976.) It was central to Williams' thesis to introduce the idea that we may regret our past choices, something which finds no room in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of choice under uncertainty. The idea has been put to fine use in modern decision theory by Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> Rawls' theory of justice was initially so interpreted in the economics literature. See, for example, Alexander (1974). Rawls however does not subscribe to this interpretation. See Rawls (1974).

<sup>29</sup> In all this I am assuming that welfare is a fully measurable numerical index and that we can make full interpersonal comparisons of welfare. See Scanlon (1987) for a recent discussion of the moral basis of making such comparisons.

outcomes solely on the basis of their welfare consequences; that is, the welfare components of states of affairs. In some welfarist theories utility is seen as a mental state, reflecting satisfaction, pleasure or desire fulfillment; in others, as in social choice theory, it is seen as a numerical representation of a person's preference ordering over social states; and in yet others, as in much of welfare economics, it is seen as a numerical representation of the ordering over social states on the basis of which a person actually chooses.<sup>30</sup>

Rights, on the other hand, are usually seen as providing a basis for protecting and promoting a certain class of human interests, such as agency, independence, choice and self-determination. An individual has a right when there is a reason for awarding him some liberty, opportunity or commodity even though mere considerations of welfare or utility would not warrant the award. Rights do not go against interest. They reinforce some interests against the claims of other, less urgent or vital interests. Rights offer a way of distinguishing states of affairs with the same welfare consequences. Rights-based theories are therefore non-welfarist, but not all non-welfarist theories are rights-based. For example, distributive principles founded upon the idea of desert, or Karma (literally 'deed') can be quite different from those based on rights. Ethical theories which totally ignore human welfare are rationally repugnant and are therefore in error. It would be totally absurd, for example, if an ethical theory were to value only the formation of the capacity to form life plans, and were indifferent to its realization and the experiential states which go with its realization. So the issue is not whether human welfare is an appropriate ingredient in an ethical theory, but whether it ought to be the sole ingredient. Put another way, rights-based theories scrutinise not only the utility consequences of public actions, they also evaluate certain features of states of affairs which give rise to the utility consequences. They distinguish between different types of interest.<sup>31</sup> What are often called non-welfarist theories might then be more appropriately called extra-welfarist theories.

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<sup>30</sup> In the literature on social choice theory welfarism amounts to invoking the neutrality axiom on social welfare functions. An excellent diagrammatic exposition of social choice with or without interpersonal comparisons of utilities is Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984).

<sup>31</sup> See for example Rawls (1972), Buchanan (1975), Dworkin (1978,1984), Fried (1978), Scanlon (1978), Gewirth (1981) and Sen (1982).

Rights are often regarded as inviolable, or absolute: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)." (Nozick, 1974, p.ix.) This means that they impose rigid constraints on what people may or may not do. Thus, states of affairs in which Nozickian rights are violated to the slightest extent are rejected in Nozick's scheme of things. Only those which are left after this pruning exercise are subject to social choice. (Nozick, 1974,p.166.) But this is an aggregation exercise. The presence of deontological constraints tells us how the aggregation is to be conducted, it does not offer an alternative to aggregation. The exercise is influenced in other theories by the suggested hierarchy of rights, as in Rawls (1972), where they are lexicographically ordered. This poses a mathematical problem, in that a lexicographic ordering cannot be represented by a numerical function. (See Debreu, 1959.) But this is of no significance for social choice. A Rawlsian citizen can still arrive at public judgments.

The brilliance of Professor Nozick's and Professor Rawls' writings has given the impression to many that rights by definition are inviolable, that rights-based theories don't entertain trade-offs among individual interests, and that they differ from welfarist theories most vitally in that the latter are rapacious in their willingness to do so. But this would be a wrong impression.<sup>32</sup> Rights are not all or nothing. For example, there are always degrees to which interests are frustrated and thus the corresponding rights --- if there be corresponding rights --- are not met. Even for rights there may be trade-offs, and since inviolability means a zero rate of trade-off, we will not depart from the practical spirit of inviolability (when rights are inviolable) if we do allow trade-offs between rights, and between rights and other goods such as welfare; provided of course that the trade-off rate is very very small in appropriate regions of the space of states of affairs. From such a perspective, what distinguishes welfarism from rights-based theories is not that the latter avoid aggregation. Nor, as seen from this perspective, do they differ in that the latter are incapable of admitting trade-offs

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<sup>32</sup> "Collective goals may, but need not, be absolute. The community may pursue different goals at the same time, and it may compromise one goal for the sake of another ... Rights may also be absolute: a political theory which holds a right to freedom of speech as absolute will recognize no reason for not securing the liberty it requires for every individual; no reason, that is, short of impossibility. Rights may also be less than absolute; one principle might have to yield to another ... We may define the weight of a right, assuming it is not absolute, as its power to withstand such competition. It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot be outweighed by all social goals." (Dworkin, 1978,p.92.) See also Gewirth (1981), who asks if there are any absolute rights.

where the former are most eager to admit them. Where they differ is somewhere else. They differ in terms of the kinds of objects which are aggregated.

A common objection to non-welfarist theories is that they are paternalistic. (Indeed, in economics texts welfarism is often identified with the idea of consumers' sovereignty.<sup>33</sup>) The argument stems from the twin observations that each rational person is the best judge of what is good for him, and that individual autonomy ought to be respected. Now, this conclusion doesn't itself depend upon individual preferences. It rests instead as the objective moral basis for giving rational preferences a fundamental role as the ground of ethically relevant valuation. But this means that when we talk of individual autonomy, we are concerned, among other things, with the rights and liberties that are a pre-requisite for persons to develop their goals and interests in an autonomous fashion and to shape their lives in accordance with their reflective preferences. Ironically, among these are rights which protect people from paternalistic interference.<sup>34</sup> We are talking of political morality here. Even when he desires rationally, not everything that a person desires can legitimately form the basis of a claim on others.<sup>35</sup> Going beyond welfarism doesn't imply at all that others are presumed to know better what is good for us. It means simply that others aren't obliged to take into account all of our desires when agreeing on public action. This alone suggests why welfarism will not do, and why going beyond welfarism isn't to invoke paternalism. Recall that we are pursuing a contractual view of the State. The ingredients which form the basis of public action are a complexity of the welfare, rights and liberties of persons. In what follows, I shall call such an aggregate for each person his well-being. An individual's well-being is ethically significant. It reflects a morally legitimate interest. It does form the basis of a claim on

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<sup>33</sup> Strictly speaking, "consumers' sovereignty" is associated with what one might call choice-theoretic welfarism, a species of welfarism which founds social choice on an aggregate of the functions which represent the orderings over alternatives on the basis of which individuals actually choose. Such aggregate functions as these are often called Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions. See Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and Graaff (1962) for an account of such ethical theories.

<sup>34</sup> See Scanlon (1978) for further elaboration.

<sup>35</sup> "The range of things which may be objects of my rational desires is very wide indeed, and the range of claims which others could not reasonably refuse to recognise will certainly be narrower than this." (Scanlon, 1982, p.119.)

others in a contractually-based State because a person could reasonably reject a political argument which gave no weight to his well-being.

These considerations also lead us to abandon the dichotomy based on whether ethical theories are want-regarding or ideal-regarding.<sup>36</sup> If wants were to be equated to desires, and thus to a certain kind of utility, the class of ideal-regarding theories would be far too large to be of use, including as it then would, all non-welfarist theories. It would include rights-based theories, duty-based theories, perfectionist theories and theories which extol the virtues of nationalism. If, on the other hand, wants were to include interests, then want-regarding theories would in turn form too coarse a category: they would contain both welfarist and rights-based theories. And as we have seen, much the most telling distinctions lie precisely among them.

We are inquiring into the legitimate role of the State, and thus with the claims we can make on others as members of a social union. We are therefore particularly interested in a certain set of human interests, those which give rise to claims on goods. It pushes us back, quite naturally, through the concept of well-being, to that of commodity needs.

## 5. Commodity Needs

A great many commodities do not possess intrinsic value. Their value derives from the uses to which they are put and is measured in terms of their contribution to the human good.<sup>37</sup> Social institutions --- family, extended kinship, commune, the State --- are the medium in which this conversion occurs. These ideas have been the central dogma of economics and of recent political philosophy, and they realise their sharpest focus in those aspects of human functionings that are a pre-condition for the pursuit of different conceptions of the good. The idea of basic needs, as it appears in development economics (see Streeten et al.,1981, for an influential statement, and Pant,1962, for a pioneering early work), relates to positive-rights goods. (See Section 6.) Rawls'

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<sup>36</sup> Barry (1965) pursues this distinction.

<sup>37</sup> I am thinking here of inanimate commodities. The valuation of animal protein poses deeper problems, for they possess intrinsic worth. I should also add that I am thinking only of what one might call 'economic' commodities here. Goods like freedom possess intrinsic value, not just instrumental worth.

much discussed concept of primary goods is also related to this viewpoint,<sup>38</sup> as are Fried's (1978) and Dworkin's (1981) conception of general resources. One advantage of appealing to the concept of needs is that we are able to see commodity consumption as an input, negative liberties as a background environment, and welfare and individual functionings as an output vector of what is in effect a complex 'production process'.<sup>39</sup> At one extreme are nutrition, clean water, shelter and medicine, which are inputs (indeed complementary inputs) required for sheer survival. The production process here is physiological.<sup>40</sup> One class of what are often called social indicators --- for example the fraction of a population consuming less than their required nourishment, the extent of a population with access to drinking water, the number of hospital beds, doctors and nurses per hundred thousand individuals, the number of school teachers per thousand children, the percentage of births attended by health staff, primary school enrolment rates for girls and boys, and more generally, real income estimates --- are crude measures of commodity availability. Some of them, as we can see from the list, are particularly crude because they do not tell us how easily accessible these goods are to all members of society. They don't on their own tell us of the distribution of their availability. Nevertheless, they try and capture the input side of the production process. And if they are buttressed by the distribution of their availability, they reveal a good deal more. Then there are indices which attempt to capture the negative-rights enjoyed by members of a society; for

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<sup>38</sup> "Primary goods ... turn out to be those things which are generally necessary for carrying out ... plans successfully whatever the particular nature of the plan and its final ends." (Rawls, 1972, p.411. See also Rawls, 1982, 1988.) Rawls' primary goods include (negative) freedom and self-respect, and an index of income and wealth, the latter being a pre-requisite for the enjoyment of positive freedom. (See below in the text.) I shall be disaggregating this index and will identify some of the component commodities which go to make this index. Commodity needs were also much discussed by Marx (1970) in his account of the transformation of food and fuel into labour power. Such commodities as are required for satisfying basic needs have on occasion been called natural rights goods (Weitzman, 1977) and merit goods (Musgrave, 1959). The term basic needs appears to have been introduced into the modern literature in Benn and Peters (1959). These authors used this category of needs to identify a decent standard of living. In the text I am illustrating the idea in a starker way. See Barry (1965) and Wiggins (1987) for a more comprehensive discussion of various categories of needs.

<sup>39</sup> Thus Fried's (1978) and Sen's (1982,1985) focus on human functionings --- the achievements of an individual --- is to look at one aspect of the output side of the production process. (See also Williams, 1985, Chapter 3.) Utility constitutes another aspect of the output side.

<sup>40</sup> In pure production models in economics a commodity is called basic if it is a necessary input for the production of pretty much anything else. See, for example, Sraffa (1960).

example the extent to which people are able to play an active and critical role in the choice of political leaders, the ability of people to express their opinions without fear of reprisals, the extent to which they are protected from physical harm from others, and so on. They form the background environment within which people can engage in what we may regard as a production process, converting commodities and services in conjunction with effort and ability and ingenuity into living.

On the output side is another class of social indicators, what we would call achievements. They include adult literacy rates, infant and child survival rates, life expectancy at birth, and the inverse of morbidity rates. They also include indices measuring the lack of group discrimination and internal conflict. The idea is to see them not only as a reflection of aggregate utility realized in the economy, although they plainly affect welfare and so should be evaluated because of that. The idea is to see them also as they are, as measures of the extent to which certain real, vital interests of persons are being served and promoted, and to evaluate economies on such bases.<sup>41</sup>

Commodity needs are not all or nothing. The ability to perform tasks, whether mental or physical, can range widely for a person. Obviously, there are degrees of functioning. On some days we feel better and function better than on others. For those of us who are fortunate, this variation has little to do with nutritional fluctuations. For many who are not so fortunate, it can have a lot to do with it. Work by nutritionists in recent years has shown in a quantitative manner that there are various degrees of morbidity and malnourishment. In such work undernourishment is not identified with hunger. An undernourished person is usually also a hungry person, but undernourishment is not measured in terms of the experiential state of hunger. It is usually measured clinically or anthropometrically, and on occasion by the impaired ability of the person to perform tasks, like walking, moving things, concentrating, caring for matters; simple things like

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<sup>41</sup> Economic historians have in recent years advocated the use of data on height to estimate the nutrition status and its distribution in earlier times. See in particular Floud and Wachter (1982) and Floud (1987). See also the suggestive work by Waaler (1984). Fogel (1987,1988) provides a compelling account of the history of the elimination of chronic undernourishment in England and France. Anthropometric measurement in general has of course for long formed a biomedical basis for judging nutritional status. See Dasgupta (1989b) for further discussion.

that.<sup>42</sup>

Basic commodity needs in particular and needs in general are person-specific. For example, nutrition requirements vary from person to person: people differ in their genotypes and in their history. To an extent they can also alter their needs by behavioural adjustment. There is also the possibility of some adaptation at the physiological level, not merely at the behavioural level.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, even basic needs are not nearly constant over one's life. An obvious example is the changing needs of a person from birth to death: during the growth phase, pregnancy, lactation and so forth. Then there are special needs, such as those of handicapped persons. Moreover there are certain needs, those just mentioned for example, which are relatively easy to monitor publicly. But there are others, certain psychological ones for instance, such as the need to participate in political life, that are less easy. They are often feelings and sensations, often communicable to others, but not readily verifiable publicly.

The claims of needs suggest a sense of urgency. They hint, but only hint, at a preemptory argument. Basic needs display these features in a sharp form. We can postpone one's listening to a piece of music or attendance at a social occasion, but we can't postpone the consumption of water when thirsty, or food when hungry, or medical attention when ill. Such needs have lexicographic priority over other needs in our own evaluation of goods and services.<sup>44</sup> From this it does not, of course, follow that political morality demands that all activities cease until each and every person's basic needs have been met. There are other claims on resources. As always, there is a multiplicity of claims, and thus objectives. Nor is the idea behind appealing to the language of needs to displace well-being as a central concern of political morality. Needs are patently an instrumental notion ("a need for what?") and its reach, as well as its limitations, lie precisely there. The production of living by means of commodity inputs has to be undertaken by people themselves.

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<sup>42</sup> For an argument as to why these considerations are of profound importance to the analytical economics of poverty, see Dasgupta and Ray (1987b). I have also gone into these questions in my Walras-Bowley Lecture to the Econometric Society. See Dasgupta (1989c).

<sup>43</sup> The evidence for costless adaptation is, however, extremely tenuous. See WHO (1985), Dasgupta and Ray (1987b) and Dasgupta (1989b).

<sup>44</sup> See Scanlon (1975), Wiggins (1987).



The political and economic structure of a society influences the distribution of benefits and burdens within it. Needs provide a most valuable marker for guiding public policy. The observation that needs vary, that there are different types of needs, that there are wants which are not needs, is not much more than a banality. We could make the same observation about 'well-being', or for that matter about 'preference fulfilment' and 'functionings'. But it would be grotesque if these concepts were for that reason banished from the political lexicon. What would political morality then be about?

When a manufacturer contemplates starting a production line, he wants to know what quality he ought to aim at, and how much he ought to produce. In judging this it would be of help to him if he were to pause and ask what the known technological possibilities are for transforming commodities and services into a final product. The concept of needs occupies an analogous niche in discourses on public action. To dispense with it is to ignore an entire range of ethically relevant information.<sup>45</sup>

## 6. Freedom and Rights: Positive and Negative

In his classic essay on liberty, Professor Isaiah Berlin disentangled two concepts of liberty which, although they had become fused in some of the literature, had historically developed in divergent directions, until they came into direct conflict with each other. In contrast with the idea that a person can be said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with his activity (or in other words, negative freedom), Berlin identified positive freedom with the ability "... to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed ... conceiving goals and policies of (one's) own and realizing them," and the ability "... to be conscious of (oneself) as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for (one's) choices and able to explain them by reference to (one's) own ideas and purposes". (Berlin, 1969, p.131.)<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> The language of needs finds less favour today than it used to. See, for example, Fried (1978), Goodin (1988), Dreze and Sen (1989) and Stern (1989). The remarks in the text are designed as a counter to their objections.

<sup>46</sup> Positive and negative freedom are but two senses in which the word 'freedom' has been used. Berlin (1969, p.121) asserts that there are more than two hundred senses in which the word has been used by historians of ideas. The mind boggles at the mere thought.

At one level the two concepts amount to the same thing. Each addresses the extent to which a person has control over his life, to shape it in line with his conception of the good. At another level they are, as Berlin noted, quite different. One way of distinguishing them is to ask after the sources, or agencies, which constrain choice. (See Dasgupta, 1986.) Negative freedom is the absence of deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which we could otherwise act. Since it reflects the size of the protected sphere of individual discretion, its domain of discourse is the relationship among people. The domain of positive freedom, in contrast, would appear to be the relationship between persons and resources. For example, a person may be assetless and, more importantly, chronically malnourished and morbidity-prone, lacking thereby motivation and physical capabilities necessary to be employable in a freely functioning labour market (including self-employment), his sole means of escape from the bonds of deprivation. He is unable to be a thinking, willing, active being. Such a person does not have life plans and projects, or own ideas and purposes. But if he is not prevented by any one from seeking and obtaining employment, if no positive harm is inflicted upon him by anyone intentionally, he is negatively free.<sup>47</sup>

We conclude from this that it does not do to identify freedom with negative freedom, even though there is currently a good deal of temptation to do just that.<sup>48</sup> We are talking of the extent to which a person has power and control to shape his own life. At a basic level we are talking about the actual extent of sets of choices. Of course not all choices are of equal urgency or value to the person whose freedom is the object of inquiry. Different kinds of freedom of choice will have different intrinsic (and in some cases, instrumental) worths when evaluated by the person in question. But from this it does not do to say that it is only one type of freedom which is real freedom, the rest other things. A person dying of starvation may well be negatively free. But the foreclosure on his freedom to do anything is terminal. At the opposite end, quality-of-life indices based exclusively on positive liberties, as in Sen (1981), will not do either. It is a perverse index

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<sup>47</sup> For an extension of modern general equilibrium theory to accommodate these ideas, see Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987a), Guha (1988), Moene (1988), Hammond (1989) and Madden (1989).

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, Buchanan (1975) and Joseph and Sumption (1979). For an illuminating discussion of the various shades of freedom, see Kornai (1988), Lindbeck (1988) and Sen (1988a).

of well-being which totally neglects an entire class of primary liberties.<sup>49</sup>

The idea of freedom, both positive and negative, with its emphasis on the ability of persons to undertake motivated activities, to exercise their realized capacities --- their innate or trained abilities --- and the recognition that the exercise of our natural powers is a leading human good, has strong historical antecedents, most especially Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics. Much attention is paid by Aristotle to the connection between enjoyment (alternatively well-being) and the exercise of our capacities. Rawls (1972, p.414), in an extended discussion, calls this connection the Aristotelian Principle. (See also Williams, 1985, Chapter 3.) There is no suggestion though that enjoyment as conceived of in this principle is the same as happiness or utility as we use the terms today. (See Vlastos, 1962.) The point of interest is in a person engaging and bringing to fruition those activities which, upon rational deliberation, go towards making his total life well-lived. The concept of a well-lived life is fraught with difficulties, but the centrality of social organization and its implied role as a basis for resource allocation is clear enough: it lies in the fact that the social life is an expression of a person's sense of social unity, and commodities and an absence of coercion are a means by which persons can pursue their own conception of the good. We can curb our desires and needs and thus commodity requirements. We can as well escape into an inner world of self-sufficiency to accomodate an absence of both types of liberty. Several, what one might call mystical, systems in fact instruct us to do just that. But if the exercise of our natural powers is a

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<sup>49</sup> Professor Rawls' theory of justice embraces both negative and positive freedom. For this reason it inquires into the just distribution of those 'commodities' which are essential to the exercise of freedom. He calls them (social) primary goods. It is possible to think of his first principle of justice ("Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all") as directed at negative freedom and the first part of the second principle ("Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are...to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle...") at the positive version. (See Rawls, 1972, p.302.) It should be noted that among Rawlsian primary goods there are some, such as an index of income and wealth, that have only instrumental value. By way of contrast the others, such as self-respect and basic liberties would seem to have intrinsic worth. In a long and important essay Dworkin (1978, Chapter 6) argues otherwise. He argues that Rawls' theory of justice as fairness is based on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern and respect in the design of political institutions, a right they possess simply as human beings, with the capacity to make plans and give justice. He argues that Rawlsian principles are chosen behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance precisely so as to protect this inviolable and most fundamental of rights.

leading human good, there is no getting away from commodity requirements and the need for negative liberty.

There is a connection between the modern concept of basic needs and the Aristotelian Principle. The principle affirms that enjoyment is by no means the result of returning to a normal or healthy life, or of making up for our deficiencies; for many kinds of enjoyment arise only when we exercise our faculties. What the Aristotelian system does is to show how such basic commodity needs are in themselves a part of what creates a claim-right to them.

There are several contemporary versions of this line of reasoning. For example, in an influential essay, Vlastos (1962) explored the argument that rights have priority over welfare or desert because their fulfilment provides the necessary background environment for persons to be capable of deliberating and acting upon considerations such as welfare. Satisfaction of basic commodity needs is a part of what constitutes such an environment, as does the enjoyment of negative freedom. In the absence of such a set of background entitlements there would be nothing to guarantee the integrity of citizens as intelligent, free agents. A contractual theory of the State would perforce require such entitlements. It is this argument which provides a link between freedom, commodity needs and claim-rights.<sup>50</sup>

This link has more recently been explored in a powerful essay by Fried (1978), who distinguishes two types of rights, along the lines of Berlin's two concepts of freedom. We are to think of positive rights as a claim to something, a share of material goods (such as Rawlsian or Dworkinian resources), or some particular commodity, such as medical attention when in need. It is to the satisfaction of politically relevant needs that we have positive rights, and Fried derives this from the primary morality of respecting the integrity of persons as free, rational but incorporated beings. A negative right on the other hand is a right that something not be done to one, that some particular imposition be withheld. It is a right not to be wronged intentionally in some specified

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<sup>50</sup> I shall not pursue here the important links that tie rights to responsibilities, a matter which has been much neglected in the recent literature on political philosophy. (An exception are the Communitarians. See eg Selznick, 1987.) These lie at the heart of the notion of citizenship. See T.H. Marshall (1965). See also Rawls (1982) for a contractualist's perception of these matters and how the notion of social unity may be integrated with that of an individual's self-fulfillment.

way. It too is derived from the primary morality alluded to above.<sup>51</sup>

Now, it is a most interesting feature that positive rights are inevitably asserted to scarce goods, and so scarcity implies a limit on their claim. Negative rights (the rights not to be interfered with in forbidden ways), on the other hand, appear not to have such natural limitations.<sup>52</sup> This is not to say that protection against unauthorized violence does not involve material resources. But then the claim to protection from, say the government, against such violence is a positive right, not a negative one.<sup>53</sup> This striking asymmetry in resource costs may well explain the powerful hold negative rights, and by implication negative freedom, have on our moral sensibilities. It is always feasible to honour negative rights --- there are no direct resource costs ---, but it may not be feasible to honour positive ones: the economy may simply not have sufficient resources to enable all to enjoy adequate nutrition, for example. Thus, it is possible to entertain the idea that negative rights are inviolable, in a way it is not for positive rights. (For how can a right be inviolable if it is not feasible to protect it?) But as we have argued earlier, the fact that a right is not inviolable does not make it any the less a right. Moreover, while we may not possess an inviolable right to adequate diet and health care, we may nevertheless possess an absolute right to a fair share of whatever resources the economy possesses. And it may be argued that in a contractual view of the State the government has an obligation to pursue policies which bring about situations in which such 'basic needs' are obtainable by all.<sup>54</sup> Concern with a just distribution of resources arises from this.

## 7. Outcome versus Resource Evaluative Theories

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<sup>51</sup> There are of course other possible rights, such as personal rights to privacy, development of our talents, and so forth; and political rights, such as the right to vote, to participate in government, and so on. And they are related to both positive and negative rights.

<sup>52</sup> "If I am let alone, the commodity I obtain does not appear of its nature to be scarce or limited one. How can we run out of people not harming each other, not lying to each other, leaving each other alone?" (Fried, 1978, p.110.)

<sup>53</sup> The agency on whom we are making the claim to protection is by hypothesis not the one who is committing the offence.

<sup>54</sup> I am being tentative here for good reason. We do not as yet possess a fully developed contractual theory of the State; that is, one which convincingly shows what the contract carries in it.

These considerations have a bearing not only upon the general design of economic organizations, they also tell on the related issue of appropriate zones of duties and responsibilities -- for individuals, families, kinship groups, voluntary organizations and the State. Over which levers of control should the government exercise choice? What ought to be the protected spheres of individual and familial discretions? And so on. As noted earlier, constituent indices of well-being, such as welfare and functionings, reflect the output side of what is essentially a production process in which commodities are inputs and an absence of coercion a necessary background environment. (Among other determinants are, for example, the individual phenotype. But this would be regarded as a parameter for the person; ie his characteristic.) Indices, such as the availability of basic needs, or general resources, are on the input side of this same process. Each side reflects features of states of affairs. Where they differ is over something else. They differ in connection with the allocation of zones of responsibility in the good polity.

The claims of rights require among other things that the State should be the protector of negative freedom.<sup>55</sup> The State provides the inputs necessary for the exercise of this freedom. It does not force people to employ it. I am free to cease typing this article and to go out of the house if I choose to. But I am not compelled to exercise this choice. If I were, I would not be free. For this same reason it is, I believe, a feature of contractualism that the obligation of the State is limited to ensuring that citizens have access to adequate amounts of basic needs.<sup>56</sup> A social contract would not allow the State to go farther. If it were to, it would encroach upon negative freedom. From this it follows that the State cannot be entrusted with the duty of ensuring that people actually make use of the basic needs in an efficient manner. Citizens may be prohibited from trading these

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<sup>55</sup> The way this responsibility of the government is established varies from theory to theory. Rawls' account invites persons to attain a reflective equilibrium in which, among other things, government responsibilities in a just society are deduced. Nozick's account proceeds along a hypothetical, evolutionary process in which the State emerges almost from a primeval social jungle.

<sup>56</sup> As always, 'adequate' is an inadequate word and we have already noted in which ways it is inadequate to serve our purpose. I am using it here nevertheless for brevity. I should also add that whether the government facilitates the performance of markets, or publicly provides some of the basic needs, or enforces income and wealth transfers so as to enable all to have access to adequate amounts of them, is a different matter.

rights away.<sup>57</sup> But citizens cannot be made to use them if they choose not to. For example, we can imagine a community in which all have access to adequate medical facilities, but where a great many people, due to deeply held religious convictions, choose not to make use of them. It is then possible that in terms of individual capacities to function (eg life expectancy at birth and morbidity rates) the community will score badly. In terms of commodity availability, however, it would score well. A social contract would presumably also have it as a role of the government that it obtains and provides information on the use and worth of such goods, and that people have available to them the means by which they are able to make use of this information.<sup>58</sup> But the contract would not allow the government to force people to use them.<sup>59</sup>

These considerations direct us to assess the performance of governments in the field of positive rights on the basis of the access that citizens have to 'basic needs'; that is, goods which are necessary for the exercise of positive freedom. Primary (economic) goods, such as an index of income and wealth, and general resources as a focus of distributive justice, as in Rawls (1972), Fried (1978), Adelman (1979), Dworkin (1981) and Streeten, et al. (1981), are an articulation of this view. Welfare, functionings, well-being and achievements in general, as in Meade (1955,1976), Harsanyi (1955), Adelman (1975), Morris (1979), Hare (1981), Mirrlees (1982), Sen (1981,1985) and Williams (1985) are not.

As we noted earlier, there is in fact another reason why we may be required to focus on the distribution of resources, as opposed to the distribution of outcomes. Functionings and achievements are often publicly observable, but the innate ability of individuals and the efforts they make to realise them by the use of resources is often not. This gives rise to serious problems of

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<sup>57</sup> See Weitzman (1977). See also Dasgupta (1986).

<sup>58</sup> The reason why the government should have some responsibility over this is that information has the features of public goods; that is, once obtained, it can be consumed jointly. For a discussion of what kinds of information governments ought to provide, see Arrow (1962), Dasgupta and David (1987) and Dasgupta (1988).

<sup>59</sup> Among the exceptions are primary and secondary education and the insistence that children participate in free mid-day school meals to counter, for example, sex biases in food allocation within households. But these are based on a different argument: protecting the rights of the very young. See Streeten (1984) for reflections on these questions in the context of theories based on basic needs.

incentives. (Individuals, if it is in their interest to do so, may well claim that their own needs are greater than those of others, and thereby seek a larger share of resources than they actually have a right to, given their true needs.) There are, of course, a great many needs which are publicly verifiable, such as for example those of physically handicapped persons, and average needs associated with such publicly identifiable characteristics as pregnancy, young and old age, illness and so forth. Even here, there are always interpersonal variations. There are also a number of needs which only experts can ascertain, such as for example medical requirements. But there are many needs that are not easy to ascertain in public, and this creates problems if we were to try and tailor resource allocation to persons according to their specific needs, and thus ultimately according to person-specific well-being.<sup>60</sup> This is not to deny that well-being is what is ultimately of value. Nor indeed that there are needs which can only be inferred by studying aspects of a person's well-being. (For example, inferring a child's nutrition requirements by observing her growth performance). It is only to affirm that information constraints, among other things, may force us to evaluate the performance of governments by the distribution of resources and the extent of negative liberties enjoyed by people.<sup>61</sup> It is not without reason that the (implicit) contract a patient has with his doctor concerns, on the doctor's side, the care and attention that he is to devote to the patient's case: the contract doesn't usually specify the eventual state of health of the patient. If there were no uncertainty, if all actions were publicly observable and all matters of relevance jointly known, it would be possible to draw up an efficient contract which is built on performance, or outcome, rather than on the doctor's attention, or her input. But when information is asymmetrically distributed, it isn't a matter of indifference which way the contract is drawn up.

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<sup>60</sup> That one would wish to use statistical information, say of the distribution of needs in an identifiable population, goes without saying. The literature on incentives develops this idea.

<sup>61</sup> There is now a large, technical literature on the design of public policy in the face of incentive problems. See Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979), Laffont, ed. (1979), Laffont and Maskin (1983) and Mirrlees (1984) for summary statements of the literature. Elsewhere (see Dasgupta: 1980,1982), I have tried to use this formal literature on certain problems in political philosophy, specifically the role of decentralised decision-making in achieving welfarist goals. Seabright (1988) has made use of it to discuss the role of the State.



And there is yet another reason why an eye must be kept on the distribution of resources. It is that if we were to look only at achievements, we would not know the resource costs which went into the realization of these achievements. And without this information we would not know if greater achievements could have been realized with the same overall use of resources. In short, we need also to study the distribution of resources if we are to judge the efficiency of resource use.

In welfare economic theory the natural move, after such an extended discussion of the concept of well-being, would be to provide axiomatic bases for social well-being functions. The direction I shall take in this article will instead be towards empirical matters. And so I shall keep separate the various ingredients of individual well-being. A comprehensive evaluation of public policies and private behaviour involves a complex use of statistics and case-studies. My aim here will be far more limited than that. I shall look at the average level of a number of ingredients of well-being in each of the countries in the data-set for the period under review, the decade of the 1970s, and see how they were related to one another on a cross-country basis. We will not only be interested in an international comparison of well-being for a given year (Section 8), we will also be interested in the way these ingredients would appear, statistically, to hang together. Towards this, in Section 9, I shall study the correlations between negative rights and improvements in the indices of positive rights. This gives us some idea of the extent to which there may, as a contingent matter, be trade-offs between different categories of rights and freedoms.

## 8. Inter-Country Comparison of Well-Being<sup>62</sup>

Table 1 summarizes the data which we will use for an inter-country comparison of well-being. We are considering a set of countries which, in 1970, were the poorest of the poor. To be precise, we have selected those whose real national income per head in 1970 was no greater than \$1,500 at 1980 international prices.<sup>63</sup> In this Section I want to rank countries on the basis of their

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<sup>62</sup> This section is taken from Dasgupta and Weale (1989).

<sup>63</sup> Data on per capita national income have been taken from Summers and Heston (1988), those on life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates from World Bank (1989), and the ones on literacy rates, from World Bank (1983). Not all figures are available for all countries. So, our

TABLE 1

	Y	E	M	L	R1	R2
Bangladesh	540.0	48.0	140.0	26.0	4.0	4.0
Benin	534.0	47.0	124.0	28.0	7.0	7.0
Bolivia	1529.0	50.0	130.0	63.0	3.0	5.0
Botswana	1477.0	55.0	78.0	25.0	3.0	2.0
Burundi	333.0	46.0	126.0	25.0	6.0	7.0
C.A.R.	487.0	47.0	143.0	33.0	7.0	7.0
Chad	353.0	42.0	147.0	15.0	6.0	6.0
China	1619.0	67.0	56.0	69.0	6.0	6.0
Ecuador	2607.0	63.0	75.0	81.0	3.0	5.0
Egypt	995.0	58.0	108.0	44.0	5.0	5.0
Ethiopia	325.0	44.0	155.0	15.0	7.0	7.0
Gambia	556.0	40.0	159.0	15.0	2.0	2.0
Honduras	1075.0	60.0	87.0	60.0	3.0	6.0
India	614.0	54.0	107.0	36.0	3.0	2.0
Indonesia	1063.0	53.0	105.0	62.0	5.0	5.0
Jordan	1885.0	62.0	58.0	70.0	6.0	6.0
Kenya	662.0	55.0	83.0	47.0	5.0	5.0
Korea	2369.0	67.0	32.0	93.0	5.0	5.0
Liberia	680.0	52.0	100.0	25.0	4.0	6.0
Mali	356.0	44.0	184.0	10.0	7.0	7.0
Madagascar	589.0	51.0	146.0	50.0	5.0	5.0
Malawi	417.0	44.0	169.0	25.0	6.0	6.0
Mauritania	576.0	43.0	142.0	17.0	6.0	6.0
Mauritius	1484.0	65.4	45.2	85.0	2.0	4.0
Morocco	1199.0	57.0	102.0	28.0	4.0	3.0
Nepal	490.0	45.1	142.2	19.0	6.0	5.0
Niger	441.0	42.0	150.0	10.0	6.0	7.0
Nigeria	824.0	48.0	118.0	34.0	3.0	5.0
Pakistan	989.0	49.0	124.0	24.0	5.0	6.0
Paraguay	1979.0	66.0	47.0	84.0	5.0	5.0
Philippines	1551.0	61.0	52.0	75.0	5.0	5.0
Rwanda	379.0	45.0	127.0	50.0	5.0	6.0
Senegal	744.0	45.0	147.0	10.0	3.0	4.0
Sierra L.	512.0	38.0	172.0	15.0	5.0	6.0
Somalia	415.0	44.0	145.0	60.0	7.0	7.0
Sri Lanka	1199.0	68.0	34.0	85.0	3.0	2.0
Sudan	724.0	46.0	123.0	32.0	5.0	5.0
Swaziland	1079.0	51.7	133.4	65.0	6.0	5.0
Tanzania	353.0	50.0	119.0	79.0	6.0	6.0
Thailand	1694.0	62.0	51.0	86.0	4.0	6.0
Tunisia	1845.0	60.4	91.8	62.0	6.0	5.0
Uganda	257.0	46.0	113.0	52.0	7.0	7.0
Yemen	957.0	42.9	163.7	21.0	7.0	7.0
Zaire	224.0	49.0	111.0	55.0	6.0	7.0
Zambia	716.0	50.1	90.4	44.0	5.0	5.0
Zimbabwe	930.0	55.0	82.4	69.0	5.0	5.0

KEY

Y : per capita national income in 1980 at 1980 international price

E : life expectancy at birth in 1980.

M : infant mortality rate in 1980.

L : adult literacy rate in 1980.

R1 and R2 : political and civil rights indices for 1979.

SOURCE

World Bank (1983, 1989) and Taylor and Jodice (1983).

average levels of well-being. For this purpose I shall use the Borda Rule on six ingredients of well-being. And I look at matters for the period 1979-1980. Countries are listed alphabetically.

The first column of figures (Y) in Table 1 presents per capita national incomes for the year 1980. There are in all 46 countries for which data on each of the six constituents of well-being are available for the year in question.<sup>64</sup> For this reason, Table 1 contains information about 46 countries.

A statistic of considerable significance is life expectancy at birth. It captures a variety of things of ethical concern, representing as it does aspects of positive liberties and welfare.<sup>65</sup> The second column of figures (E) provides data on life expectancy at birth for the year 1980.

The third column of figures (M) concerns infant mortality rates in 1980.<sup>66</sup> It has been customary to consider infant mortality rates separately from child death rates; the latter being the number of deaths of children aged 1 to 4 per thousand children in this age group in a given year. The primary reason for doing so is that the source of sustenance changes when an infant is weaned. It is exposed to a different set of nutritional circumstances. However, UNICEF has recently advocated the use of a consolidated index of under-5 mortality rate, this being the annual number of deaths of children under 5 years of age per 1000 live births. (See UNICEF, 1987. For an earlier advocacy, see Dyson and Moore, 1983.) As a measure of the vulnerability of a person to a loss of all liberties in her early years, there is much to commend it. However, I have been unable to obtain data for this index for the years 1970 and 1980. (UNICEF, 1987, presents figures for this for the two years 1960 and 1985.) And so I merely use data for infant mortality rates, provided in World Bank (1989). I doubt though that we lose much because of this. Infant survival rates and their improvements are usually correlated greatly with the survival rates (and their improvements)

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<sup>64</sup> Summers and Heston (1980) does not provide a figure for real national income per head for 1980 in the Sudan, but they do provide an estimate for the year 1970. I have used the decade-long growth rate in per capita gross national product from World Bank (1983), as an approximation, to estimate Sudan's 1980 real national income per head at 1980 international prices.

<sup>65</sup> Elsewhere, I have gone into the question of why life expectancy, and by the same token mortality rates, are key statistics regarding well-being. See Dasgupta (1989b).

<sup>66</sup> Infant mortality rate is the number of live births out of every 1000 that is expected not to survive the first year. It is 1000 minus the infant survival rate.

of the group under 5 years of age.

There remains, then, data on adult literacy rates. These are presented in the fourth column of figures (L). They are estimates for the year 1980.<sup>67</sup>

The fifth and sixth columns of figures will probably be of the greatest interest to economists. They represent indices of political and civil rights (R1 and R2, respectively) in our sample of 46 countries, for the year 1979. (In Section 9 we will present the corresponding indices, when averaged over the period 1973-1979.) They are taken from the valuable compendium of Taylor and Jodice (1983).<sup>68</sup> Political rights are taken to be the right on the part of citizens to play a part in determining who governs their country and what the laws are and will be. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty).

Civil rights are different. They are rights the individual has vis-a-vis the State. Of particular importance are freedom of the Press and other media concerned with the dissemination of information, and the independence of the judiciary. The index measures the extent to which people, because they are protected by an independent judiciary, are openly able to express their opinions without fear of reprisals. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). As these indices may not be familiar to economists, I provide their key in the Appendix. But even a glance at these columns tells us that for the most part negative liberties are scarce in poor countries. Citizens of 32 of the countries in our sample suffer from systems which score 5 or more for political rights, and those of no less than a staggering 38 countries from systems which score 5 or more for civil rights. And as the Appendix makes clear,

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<sup>67</sup> Literacy-rate figures are more than usually unreliable, or so I am reliably informed by friends. I am using them, nevertheless, because they are appealed to quite frequently in the literature. (See, for example, Morris, 1979; Sen, 1981.)

<sup>68</sup> In fact it is because these two indices are provided for the period 1973-1979 that I have tried to restrict studying the other indicators for the decade of the 1970s. It should of course be noted that political and civil rights do not exhaust the set of negative rights. Taylor and Jodice (1983, pp.66-71) present indices for the extent and intensity of political and economic discrimination based upon ethnic, linguistic, religious or regional identity in a number of countries. The idea is to see to what extent members of a group or groups are systematically restricted in their access to some political rights or economic values relative to other groups in their society. Because a number of the 46 countries being studied here are missing from the sample for which these indices are available, I am ignoring them in this article. But see Dasgupta (1989b) for a discussion of these indices.

these scores reflect severe deprivation of negative liberties. There are only a handful of exceptions, namely Botswana, Gambia, India and Sri Lanka, where political and civil rights were more or less respected during the year under review.<sup>69</sup> However, for the overwhelming bulk of the countries, the columns make for dismal reading. And when they are combined with the columns reflecting positive rights and welfare, the picture which emerges is chilling. There is nothing to commend the state of affairs in a large number of countries in our sample.

Table 2 presents country ranks for each of the six constituents of well-being we are considering in this article. These are provided in the first six columns of figures. The first, second and fourth columns of figures (namely Y, E and L) rank countries in ascending order. Thus, for example, in terms of real national income per head (Y), the poorest country (Zaire), is given rank 1, and the richest country (Ecuador) is ranked 46. The reverse order is followed in the third, fifth and sixth columns of figures (namely, M, R1 and R2).<sup>70</sup> Finally, the seventh column of figures presents the countries' Borda ranks, in ascending order, with the worst-off country (Mali) ranked 1, and the best-off (Sri Lanka) ranked 46. What do these rankings tell us?

Let us first look at the ten worst countries in terms of our measure of well-being. In ascending order, they are: Mali, Ethiopia, Niger, Chad, Yemen, Malawi, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Central African Republic (C.A.R.). Nine of the ten are in sub-Saharan Africa. How does this list compare with the ranking of countries based exclusively on real national income per head? To see this, we note from the first column of figures in Table 2 that, in ascending order, the ten poorest countries in our sample in 1980 were: Zaire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Chad and Tanzania (tied at fifth place), Mali, Rwanda, Somalia and Malawi. The lists aren't the same, of course. But they are strikingly similar. They contain six countries in common, all of them in sub-

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<sup>69</sup> Civil-rights scores are worse than their political-rights counterparts. Thus, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nigeria and Senegal score a tolerable 3 for political rights (in fact the same as Botswana, India and Sri Lanka), but they fall down terribly over their civil-rights records. Mauritius is curious. It scores a 2 for political rights, but a disappointing 4 for civil rights.

<sup>70</sup> This is simply because high mortality rates are bad, and because, as mentioned earlier, political and civil rights indices are scored over the range 1 to 7, with high scores reflecting bad regimes.

TABLE 2

						BORDA RANK	
Bangladesh	16	19	32	16	11	6	21
Benin	15	17	26	17	40	37	12
Bolivia	38	23	30	34	3	9	33
Botswana	36	31	10	12	3	1	39
Burundi	4	14	28	12	28	37	9
C.A.R.	12	17	35	20	40	37	10
Chad	5	3	38	4	28	25	4
China	40	44	7	36	28	25	38
Ecuador	46	41	9	41	3	9	43
Egypt	30	35	20	23	15	9	29
Ethiopia	3	7	41	4	40	37	2
Gambia	17	2	42	4	1	1	17
Honduras	32	36	13	30	3	25	34
India	20	30	19	22	3	1	30
Indonesia	31	29	18	32	15	9	31
Jordan	43	39	8	38	28	25	35
Kenya	21	31	12	25	15	9	28
Korea	45	44	1	46	15	9	44
Liberia	22	28	16	12	11	25	23
Mali	7	7	46	1	40	37	1
Madagascar	19	26	37	26	15	9	24
Malawi	10	7	44	12	28	25	6
Mauritania	18	6	33	8	28	25	13
Mauritius	37	42	3	43	1	6	45
Morocco	34	34	17	17	11	5	32
Nepal	13	13	34	9	28	9	14
Niger	11	3	40	1	28	37	3
Nigeria	26	19	23	21	3	9	26
Pakistan	29	21	26	11	15	25	20
Paraguay	44	43	4	42	15	9	42
Philippines	39	38	6	39	15	9	41
Rwanda	8	11	29	26	15	25	16
Senegal	25	11	38	1	3	6	18
Sierra L.	14	1	45	4	15	25	8
Somalia	9	7	36	30	40	37	7
Sri Lanka	34	46	2	43	3	1	46
Sudan	24	14	25	19	15	9	22
Swaziland	33	27	31	35	28	9	25
Tanzania	5	23	24	40	28	25	19
Thailand	41	39	5	45	11	25	40
Tunisia	42	37	15	32	28	9	36
Uganda	2	14	22	28	40	37	11
Yemen	28	5	43	10	40	37	5
Zaire	1	21	21	29	28	37	15
Zambia	23	25	14	23	15	9	27
Zimbabwe	27	31	11	36	15	9	37

KEY

The first six columns of figures are the rank orders of the six columns, respectively, of Table 1. Seventh column presents the countries' Borda ranks based on these six. Note that the first, second and fourth columns rank countries from worst (score 1) to the best (score 46). The third, fifth and sixth columns rank countries in the reverse order, from the best (rank 1) to the worst (rank 46). The Borda ranking is from the worst (rank 1) to the best (rank 46).

Saharan Africa.<sup>71</sup>

Turning to the ten highest-ranked countries, we note that judging by average well-being they are, in descending order: Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Rep. of Korea, Ecuador, Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand, Botswana, China and Zimbabwe. For comparison, note that the ten richest countries in our sample, in descending order are: Ecuador, Rep. of Korea, Paraguay, Jordan, Tunisia, Thailand, China, the Philippines, Bolivia and Mauritius. I don't know if we should be surprised by these lists. I was: there are seven countries common to them, and I wasn't expecting to see China in both lists.<sup>72</sup>

These are, however, only partial comparisons, and it is useful to check how the Borda ranking compares in general with the other six orderings of countries. To see this we compute the (Spearman) correlation coefficient between the Borda ordering and each of the six other rankings in turn. They are: 0.91 (with the ranking based on life expectancy); 0.91 (with infant mortality rates); 0.75 (with adult literacy rates); 0.64 (with political rights); 0.62 (with civil rights); and finally, 0.83 (with real national income per head). The strong correlation with the rankings based on life expectancy at birth and infant survival rates is striking, as is the (relatively) weak correlation with the orderings based on negative rights. Somewhere in the middle is the correlation with the

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<sup>71</sup> Judging by our consolidated index of well-being, nine out of the ten worst-off countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, the isolated figure being that of Yemen. However, when judged by real national income per head, all ten are from this region. Yemen is interesting, in that she is 28th from the bottom when judged by national income per head, but only 5th from the bottom in terms of average well-being.

<sup>72</sup> That Sri Lanka topped the list in average well-being in 1980 isn't really a surprise. Sri Lanka's remarkable achievements in the field of health and welfare have been much commented upon. See, for example, Isenman (1980) and Sen (1981). What the Summers-Heston estimates tell us now is that the country is as well one of the most affluent in the group under study. (It is twelfth from the top in terms of per capita real national income.) It should be noted that the controversy over whether Sri Lanka's achievements in the fields of health and welfare have been realized only over the past thirty years or so (see Bhalla and Glewwe, 1987; Pyatt, 1987; and Isenman, 1987), or whether they predate 1960, has no bearing on our discussion in the text, which is about the state of affairs in 1980.

The inclusion of China in the top ten affluent nations of our list was a surprise to me, used as I am to perusing the annual World Development Report of the World Bank. Its inclusion in the top ten countries when judged by average well-being wasn't a surprise at all, given China's remarkable achievements in the allocation of nutrition and medical care. That it has an appalling record in negative rights doesn't count against it, relatively speaking, because most poor countries give it more than just a good run for its money in this sphere.

ranking based on per capita real national income. This suggests that, for poor countries at least, orderings based on infant mortality rates or life expectancy at birth are more informative than those based on real national income per head.<sup>73</sup> There is nothing inevitable about this. It simply happens to be a fact.

## 9. Are Trade-offs required between Positive and Negative Freedoms?

In the previous Section we made an international comparison of average well-being in the year 1980 among, what were around the beginning of the 1970s, 46 of the world's poorest countries. In this Section we ask a different question: does the statistical evidence suggest that a choice has to be made between negative liberties and achievements in the field of positive freedoms?

Towards this we look at data for the decade of the 1970s. Table 3 summarizes them. We have collated data on 51 countries, all of which had a per capita real national income of less than \$1,500 in 1970 at 1980 international prices. In the first column of figures I present the average of the 1970 and 1980 per capita real national incomes, to take account of the fact that countries in the sample differed in their growth. Since we are interested in their performance, we will also be interested in the percentage change in real national income per head in each of the countries over the ten-year period under review. These are given in the second column of figures. It will be noticed that an astonishing 15 out of the 51 countries under study experienced a decline in income per head; all except two (Bangladesh and Nepal) being from sub-Saharan Africa.

The third column of figures records life expectancy at birth in 1970. Now, improvements in this index is a delicate matter to handle. Equal increments are possibly of less and less ethical worth as life expectancy rises to 65 or 70 years and more. But we are measuring achievement here. So it would seem that it becomes more and more commendable if, with increasing life expectancy, the index were to rise at the margin. The idea here is that it becomes more and more difficult to

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<sup>73</sup> UNICEF (1987) adopts the under-5 mortality rate as the basis of its ranking of countries. This is in marked contrast with the practice of other organizations, which order countries on the basis of real national income per head. (See eg the annual World Development Reports of the World Bank.) Our computations in the text suggest that, if we are to choose a single index with which to compare countries, the infant (or under-5) mortality rate, or indeed life expectancy at birth, is probably the right one to use.



TABLE 3

	Y	$\Delta Y$	E	$\Delta E$	M	$-\Delta M$	L	$\Delta L$	R1	R2
Bangladesh	578.4	-12.5	45.0	8.6	140.0	**	22.0	4.0	4.9	4.2
Benin	552.5	-6.5	40.0	17.5	155.0	21.4	5.0	23.0	7.0	6.3
Bolivia	1383.0	23.6	46.0	11.8	153.0	16.1	39.0	24.0	5.6	4.1
Botswana	1179.0	67.7	50.0	16.7	101.0	25.3	41.0	-6.0	2.1	3.1
Burundi	324.0	5.7	45.0	2.9	137.0	8.7	16.0	9.0	7.0	6.4
Cameroon	789.0	24.5	49.0	12.9	126.0	17.2	19.0	**	6.1	4.4
C.A.R.	499.0	-4.7	42.0	13.2	153.0	7.0	7.0	26.0	7.0	7.0
Chad	409.5	-24.2	38.0	9.5	171.0	14.9	6.0	9.0	6.4	6.4
China	1315.5	60.0	59.0	38.1	69.0	22.0	43.0	26.0	6.7	6.7
Congo	986.5	-1.1	51.0	13.8	98.0	17.0	35.0	**	5.9	6.1
Ecuador	2005.0	85.8	58.0	22.7	100.0	27.8	61.0	20.0	6.4	3.7
Egypt	833.0	48.3	51.0	24.1	158.0	33.8	26.0	18.0	5.6	4.7
Ethiopia	333.0	-4.7	43.0	2.7	158.0	2.0	4.0	11.0	6.3	6.1
Gambia	561.0	-1.8	36.0	9.1	185.0	14.9	**	**	2.0	2.0
Ghana	494.5	-25.9	49.0	9.7	110.0	10.0	27.0	**	6.6	5.1
Haiti	623.0	26.5	48.0	12.5	162.0	19.7	15.0	**	6.4	6.0
Honduras	1001.0	16.0	53.0	25.9	115.0	26.7	45.0	15.0	6.1	3.0
India	595.0	6.6	48.0	18.8	139.0	24.8	28.0	8.0	2.1	3.3
Indonesia	811.0	90.2	47.0	18.2	121.0	14.4	39.0	23.0	5.0	5.0
Jordan	1653.0	32.7	55.0	28.0	90.0	40.0	32.0	38.0	6.0	6.0
Kenya	607.0	19.9	50.0	16.7	102.0	20.7	20.0	27.0	5.0	4.6
Korea	1779.0	99.2	60.0	35.0	51.0	46.3	71.0	22.0	4.9	5.6
Lesotho	**	**	49.0	9.7	134.0	14.5	**	**	5.3	3.9
Liberia	694.0	-4.0	47.0	15.2	124.0	21.1	9.0	16.0	6.0	4.3
Madagascar	631.0	-12.5	45.0	17.1	183.0	21.4	**	**	5.1	4.4
Malawi	359.0	38.5	40.0	10.0	193.0	13.1	**	**	6.9	6.0
Mali	336.5	12.3	40.0	10.0	204.0	10.3	2.0	8.0	7.0	6.6
Mauritania	573.0	1.1	39.0	9.8	166.0	15.4	5.0	12.0	5.9	6.0
Mauritius	1254.5	44.8	62.4	17.0	61.4	31.5	**	**	2.7	2.3
Morocco	1037.5	36.9	52.0	17.9	128.0	22.0	14.0	14.0	4.6	4.4
Nepal	498.0	-3.2	41.6	9.1	157.4	10.3	9.0	10.0	6.0	5.0
Niger	421.0	10.0	38.0	9.5	170.0	12.5	1.0	9.0	6.7	6.0
Nigeria	727.0	30.8	44.0	11.1	158.0	27.0	15.0	19.0	5.7	4.0
Pakistan	893.0	24.1	46.0	8.8	142.0	13.6	15.0	9.0	4.3	4.9
Paraguay	1584.0	66.4	65.0	6.7	59.0	24.5	75.0	9.0	4.9	5.4
Philippines	1322.5	41.8	57.0	17.4	66.0	25.0	72.0	3.0	4.9	5.1
Rwanda	323.5	41.4	48.0	-9.4	135.0	6.4	18.0	32.0	6.9	5.3
Senegal	752.0	-2.1	43.0	5.4	164.0	11.0	6.0	4.0	5.6	4.4
Sierra L.	485.5	11.5	34.0	8.7	197.0	13.4	7.0	8.0	5.6	5.0
Somalia	394.5	11.0	40.0	10.0	158.0	8.8	2.0	58.0	7.0	6.4
Sri Lanka	1108.5	17.8	64.0	25.0	52.0	42.9	75.0	10.0	2.0	3.0
Sudan	703.7	6.1	42.0	10.5	149.0	18.7	13.0	19.0	5.9	5.7
Swaziland	911.0	45.2	46.1	16.5	145.2	8.7	**	**	5.7	3.9
Tanzania	318.0	24.7	45.0	14.3	132.0	10.7	10.0	69.0	6.0	6.0
Thailand	1378.5	59.4	58.0	18.2	73.0	34.9	68.0	18.0	5.4	4.1
Tunisia	1460.5	71.5	53.9	24.9	127.2	30.2	16.0	46.0	6.0	5.0
Uganda	304.5	-27.0	47.0	-3.0	117.0	3.7	25.0	27.0	7.0	7.0
Yemen	742.0	81.6	38.6	10.4	187.8	13.6	3.0	18.0	7.0	7.0
Zaire	291.0	-37.4	45.0	11.4	131.0	16.5	35.0	20.0	7.0	6.1
Zambia	752.5	-9.3	46.5	10.7	106.0	16.3	29.0	15.0	5.0	4.9
Zimbabwe	870.0	14.8	50.5	15.3	96.2	16.0	39.0	30.0	5.9	5.0

TABLE 3 CONTD.

- KEY
- Y : per capita gross national income; average of 1970 and 1980 values in 1980 international prices.
- $\Delta$ Y : % change in Y over the decade 1970-1980.
- E : life expectancy at birth in 1970.
- $\Delta$ E : life expectancy improvement index =  

$$\frac{(\text{life expectancy at birth in 1980} - \text{life expectancy in 1970}) \times 100}{(80 - \text{life expectancy at birth in 1970})}$$
- M : infant mortality rate in 1970.
- $\Delta$ M : infant mortality rate improvement index =  

$$\frac{(\text{infant mortality rate in 1970} - \text{infant mortality rate in 1980}) \times 100}{(\text{infant mortality rate in 1970} - 10)}$$
- L : adult literacy rate in 1960.
- $\Delta$ L : adult literacy rate improvement index =  
 (adult literacy rate in 1980 - adult literacy rate in 1960)
- R1 : political rights index, averaged over 1973-1979 (decreasing with increasing liberties)
- R2 : civil rights index, averaged over 1973-1979 (decreasing with increasing liberties)

SOURCES World Bank (1983, 1989) and Taylor and Jodice (1983, Tables 2.1 and 2.2)

increase life expectancy as life expectancy itself rises. A simple index capturing this feature is the ratio of the increase in life expectancy to the short-fall of the base-year life expectancy from some target figure, say 80 years.<sup>74</sup> The fourth column of figures in Table 3 gives life expectancy at birth in 1970, and the fourth column of figures gives the improvement-index over the period 1970-1980 for the 51 countries under review. It will be noticed that all but 2 of them (viz. Rwanda and Uganda) recorded an improvement.

Infant mortality rates in 1970 are presented in the fifth column of figures.<sup>75</sup> Now, the construction of an improvement in this index poses a similar problem. To be sure, the ethical issues here are somewhat different from those concerning increases in life expectancy at birth. But we are trying to record performance here. A figure of 10 per 1000 for the infant mortality rate is about as low as it is possible to attain today.<sup>76</sup> So I take the index of improvement to be the ratio of the decline in infant mortality rate over the period in question (viz. 1970-1980) to the base-year infant mortality rate minus 10. As it happens, all countries for which data are available have shown an improvement in infant survival rates.<sup>77</sup> The sixth column of figures shows this.

The construction of an index of improvements in adult literacy rates doesn't pose problems of the kind we faced in connection with life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates. It isn't immediate why it should be a lot less or a lot more difficult to increase literacy when people are more literate. So we may as well then record increases in adult literacy rates over a given period to obtain their net improvements. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate estimates of adult literacy for the year 1970 for a number of countries. I have therefore collated the figures for 1960 from World Bank (1983) in column seven and then presented net increases in literacy rate over the

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<sup>74</sup> Thus, an increase in life expectancy at birth from 35 to 40 years is less difficult to achieve than an increase from 60 to 65 years. See Sen (1981).

<sup>75</sup> Note how the Rep. of Korea, Sri Lanka, Paraguay, Mauritius, China and Thailand stand out from the rest.

<sup>76</sup> Japan and several countries in Western Europe have pushed the infant mortality rate down below 10 per 1000. See World Bank (1988). Declines in figures below about 20 or so per 1000 are due not to nutritional improvements, but to better paediatric care.

<sup>77</sup> I was unable to obtain a figure for the infant mortality rate in Bangladesh for 1980.

period 1960-1980 in the eighth column of figures. Data on adult literacy are missing for at least one of the two years for 10 countries. It will be noticed that, but for Botswana, each of the 43 countries for which data are available recorded an improvement in this index.<sup>78</sup>

The ninth and tenth columns of figures in Table 3 present indices of political and civil rights in our sample of 51 countries, averaged over the period 1973-1979. (See Taylor and Jodice, 1983, Tables 2.1 and 2.2.) We commented upon the extent to which poor people living in poor countries are deprived of such human rights. Any further comment is superfluous.

There is a temptation to suggest that extremely poor countries simply can't afford the luxury of political and civil rights. A central purpose of Sections 2-7 was to argue that they aren't luxuries at all. They form the environment within which men and women shape their lives. Positive and negative liberties are both liberties, and a restriction in any one of them is a form of deprivation. Nevertheless, it is important to ask if, as a contingent matter, there is a trade-off between them when a country is poor, so that there is a question of choice, that if you want fast growth in income or rapid improvement in positive liberties you have to forego some negative liberties. For this a statistical analysis of Table 3 is of partial help.

I begin with an analysis of rank orders. Table 4 consists of the 21 (Spearman) rank correlation coefficients associated with the 7 columns of figures we are interested in: namely, per-capita national income and its percentage growth; improvements in life expectancy at birth, infant survival rates and adult literacy rates; and political and civil rights indices. The correlation matrix tells us that the kind of choice suggested above is a phoney kind of choice, that statistically speaking, societies aren't faced with this dilemma.<sup>79</sup> But the matrix tells us more, and the morals which emerge from Table 3 appear to be these:

- (i) Political and civil liberties are positively and significantly correlated with per capita

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<sup>78</sup> I have found the data on Botswana puzzling. It is possibly an artifact arising from the large migratory population of the country.

<sup>79</sup> Kendall rank correlation coefficients are, as it happens, quite similar to the Spearman values, and so I don't report them here. It should be noted that in computing the correlation matrix the orderings of political and civil liberties have been reversed, since greater liberties are, in the Taylor-Jodice tables, associated with lower values of their indices.

TABLE 4

GROWTH	.6392						
	N( 50)						
	SIG .000						
LQ	.6491	.4824					
	N( 50)	N( 50)					
	SIG .000	SIG .000					
IM	.7434	.4829	.7764				
	N( 50)	N( 50)	N( 51)				
	SIG .000	SIG .000	SIG .000				
AL	.0086	.1844	.3090	.0636			
	N( 41)	N( 41)	N( 41)	N( 41)			
	SIG .479	SIG .124	SIG .025	SIG .346			
F1	.5372	.2481	.2370	.4414	-.3974		
	N( 50)	N( 50)	N( 51)	N( 51)	N( 41)		
	SIG .000	SIG .041	SIG .047	SIG .001	SIG .005		
F2	.4728	.2163	.2777	.4184	-.2718	.7290	
	N( 50)	N( 50)	N( 51)	N( 51)	N( 41)	N( 51)	
	SIG .000	SIG .066	SIG .024	SIG .001	SIG .043	SIG .000	
	GDP	GROWTH	LQ	IM	AL	F1	

(Spearman) Correlation matrix based on Table 3

income and its growth, with improvement in infant survival rates and with increases in life expectancy at birth.<sup>80</sup>

(ii) Per capita income and its growth are positively and significantly correlated, and they in turn are significantly correlated with improvements in life expectancy at birth and infant survival rates.

(iii) Improvements in life expectancy at birth and infant survival rates are, not surprisingly, highly correlated.

(iv) Political and civil rights are not the same. But they are strongly correlated.

(v) An increase in the adult literacy rate isn't related systematically to per capita income, or to its growth, or to improvements in infant survival rates. However, it is significantly and positively correlated with improvements in life expectancy. More curiously, it is negatively and significantly correlated with political and civil liberties.

These suggest that literacy stands somewhat apart from other 'goods'. It doesn't appear to be driven with the other positive rights in our list of objects. Quite the contrary in fact. Regimes that have bad political and civil rights records are associated with good performances in this field. I have no explanation for this which is compelling to me.

## 10. Remarks

What should we make of these conclusions? We began by addressing some of the most fundamental of issues in political economy, where hard conclusions are so terribly difficult to reach, and we have ended by applying these ideas to some really raw and coarse data. The limitations of statistical analyses are often noted by social scientists, and there are many who find them mechanical, bloodless, and lacking in the kind of insight which only detailed micro-studies can offer. There is something in this, but it is also good to recognise their strength. Such analyses as this should only be seen as a complementary route to case studies of nations. Their strength lies in that we avoid getting enmeshed in historical details which can mesmerize us into thinking that

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<sup>80</sup> The correlation between civil rights and growth in real national income per head is at a 6.6% level of significance, but all the others are well under the 5% level of significance.

whatever happens to be the case has had a certain inevitability about it. The claim that 'historical forces' have led poor societies to their present plight is one which, however true, is not only a conversation-stopper, it is also a vehicle that has often been used by social scientists for condoning the most predatory of political regimes and reactionary of social practices. To take the claim too literally is to overlook the existence of choice and thus responsibility. And that is to deny persons the respect which is owed to them.

## APPENDIX

Taylor and Jodice (1983, pp.60-61) provide an account of their scoring system for political rights. Those countries which score 1 enjoy political systems in which the great majority of persons or families has both the right or the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Political parties in these countries may be formed freely for the purpose of making the right to compete for public office fairly general. Countries scoring 2 are those which have political systems with an open access which, however, do not always work, due to extreme poverty, a feudal social structure, violence, or other limitations on potential participants or results. However, as with countries coded 1, a leader or party can be voted out of office. A score of 3 is associated with political systems in which people may elect their leaders or representatives, but in which coup-d'etat, large-scale interference with election results, and frequent non-democratic procedures work. A score of 4 is associated with systems in which full democratic elections are blocked constitutionally or have little significance in determining power distributions; of 5 with systems in which elections are either closely controlled or limited, or in which the results have little significance. Countries scoring 6 have political systems without elections or with elections involving only a single list of candidates, in which voting is largely a matter of demonstrating support for the system; but where nevertheless there is some distribution of power. Finally, a score of 7 is associated with systems that are tyrannies, without legitimacy either in tradition or in international party doctrine.

Taylor and Jodice (1983, pp.64-65) provide an account of their scoring system for civil rights. Those countries which score 1 enjoy political systems in which the rule of law is unshaken. Freedom of expression is both possible and evident in a variety of news media. Countries scoring 2 are those with political systems that aspire to the above level of civil rights but are unable to achieve it because of violence, ignorance, or unavailability of the media, or because they have restrictive laws that seem to be greater than are needed for maintaining order. A score of 3 is associated with political systems that have trappings of civil liberty and whose governments may



be successfully opposed in the courts, although they may be threatened or have unresolved political deadlocks, and may have to rely often upon martial law, jailing or sedition, and suppression of publications. A score of 4 is awarded to political systems in which there are broad areas of freedom, but also broad areas of illegality. States recently emerging from a revolutionary situation or in transition from traditional society may easily fall into these categories. Countries scoring 5 are those with political systems in which civil rights are often denied, but in which there is no doctrine on which the denial is based. The media are often weak, controlled by the government, and censored. Countries scoring 6 are those in which no civil rights are thought to take priority over the rights of the State, although criticism is allowed to be stated in limited ways. Finally, countries scoring 7 are those which suffer from political systems of which the outside world never hears criticism, except when it is condemned by the State. Citizens have no rights in relation to the State.

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