

# **WIDER WORKING PAPERS**

**Development and Patriarchy:  
The Middle East and North Africa  
in Economic and Demographic Transition**

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THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IN  
ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION**

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## Development and Patriarchy: The Middle East and North Africa in Economic and Demographic Transition

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### I. Introduction and Summary

What are the links between development, social change, and women's status in the modernizing countries of the Middle East and North Africa? What is the relationship between socio-economic development, patriarchal structures, and the advancement of women?

I propose that the relationship between development and women's emancipation is neither direct, automatic, nor unilinear. Intervening factors such as economic crisis, cultural revivalism, and political instability could worsen women's status. But I will argue that development erodes classic patriarchy, even though new forms of gender inequality emerge and class differences are intensified, and I propose that the long-term trend is toward less rather than more gender inequality, because development has provided women (although not all women) with education, paid employment, access to the public sphere, and a wider range of life-options.

I then turn to the Middle East and North Africa, to examine the ways in which socio-economic development has benefited women, and the ways in which it has undermined their position and well-being. In so doing I raise questions about the "development" process itself, in particular the limits of oil-centered industrialization, and about the nature of states and state policies in specific Middle Eastern countries. Unintended outcomes of development and state policies are considered as well.

Since the early 1960s, state expansion, economic development, oil wealth, and increased integration within the world system have combined to create educational and employment opportunities favourable to women in the Middle East. For about ten years after the oil price increases of the early 1970s, a massive investment programme by the oil-producing countries affected the

structure of the labour force not only within the relevant countries, but throughout the region, as a result of labour migration. Since then, the urban areas have seen an expansion of the female labour force, as women have occupied paid positions in factories and offices, as workers, administrators, and professionals. Feminist concerns and women's movements also emerged, and by 1980 most Middle Eastern countries had women's organizations dealing with issues of literacy, education, employment, the law, and so on. These social changes have had a positive effect in reducing traditional sex segregation and female seclusion, in introducing changes in the structure of the Middle Eastern family, and in producing a generation of middle class women not dependent on family or marriage for survival and status. Increased educational attainment and labour force attachment has created a stratum of highly visible and increasingly vocal women in the public sphere.

The secular trend toward altering and improving women's work and women's lives seems to have encountered an impasse in the 1980s. The crisis resulted in part from the drop in real prices of primary commodities, including oil, throughout the 1980s (until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 raised the price of oil again). According to the UN, debt as a percentage of GNP for the Middle East and North Africa in 1989 rose to 70 percent; during the 1980s, the region's debt increased from 4.4 billion dollars to 118.8 billion dollars. In Israel, the serious economic plight has been alleviated by massive American aid. But elsewhere, tough economic reforms, along with poverty, unemployment, and debt servicing have led to a spate of popular protests and "IMF riots" in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The austerities required by debt servicing and structural adjustment, social disparities, and political repression have tended to de-legitimize "Western-style" systems and revive questions of cultural identity, including renewed calls for greater control over female mobility. It is in this context of economic failures and political delegitimation that Islamist movements are

presenting themselves as alternatives, with specific implications for the legal status and social positions of women.

Thus on balance it appears that the economic strategies pursued (excessive reliance on oil revenues, high military expenditures) and the political mechanisms deployed (authoritarian rule), have resulted in (a) a limited set of achievements for women, and (b) social tensions and a conservative backlash with particular implications for women.

This paper will highlight the positive and negative entailments of development for Middle Eastern women, its contribution to the erosion of the patriarchal family, and the impasse faced by women in the context of economic failures and political crisis.

## **II. Women, Development, Islam: Issues, Debates, Propositions**

The status of women and the process of socio-economic development are correlates, but the nature of the association has been the subject of considerable debate.

A major conundrum in the field of women-in-development remains whether economic development helps or harms the lot of women in developing countries. The goal of "integrating women in development" has come under attack by some feminist researchers of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. One group argues that women have indeed been integrated into development -- much to their disadvantage, as they have become the latest group of exploited workers, a source of cheap and expendable labour (Elson and Pearson 1981; Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Jain 1990). Another group argues that development, especially modernization of a capitalistic kind, has everywhere reduced the economic status of women, resulting in marginalization and impoverishment (Ward 1984; Sen and Grown 1987). A further indictment of integration into development and into the world-system is that recession and the debt crisis

during the 1980s have placed disproportionate burdens on women, especially poor women but including working women (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989). Similarly, there has been disagreement regarding female proletarianization and the gender effects of employment. On one side there is the premise that "the female labour force participation rate as the measure of women's economic status is ... arguably the key one of the various indicators of the quality of life for women" (Joekes 1987: 21). On the other side is the assertion that "waged employment rarely represents a liberation for Third World women" (Mitter 1986: 63).

A parallel issue of controversy concerns the status of women in Middle Eastern Muslim countries. There is a widespread notion that the region and its people are overwhelmingly conservative, that change is slow and is resisted, and that tradition, custom, and Islam are entrenched. In journalistic accounts and popular Western perceptions, the status of women is assumed to be everywhere low, presumably due to the centrality of Islam in the lives of the people and the laws of the land. In more serious scholarship, many writings have focused on Middle Eastern women as victims of reactionary laws, oppressive regimes, and fundamentalist movements. Other writings have tended to move too far in the opposite direction, and in an over-compensation for the negative portrayal of Middle Eastern women, they try to argue that Islam elevates women, or that Middle Eastern women actually wield "enormous power", or "subtle power", at least in their households. These perspectives have been labeled "misery research" and "dignity research" respectively. In my view, each is overly simplistic and neither is especially illuminating. It is methodologically deficient to proffer "Islam" as the explanatory variable in stability and change. The status of women in the Middle East cannot be understood by recourse to Koranic exegesis; nor can it be possible that Middle Eastern women are all victimized, or that they are mere passive observers of events around them. A more robust explanation

considers the nature of socio-economic development in the Middle East, its differential impact upon classes and strata of women, the role of political elites and of state policies in effecting both continuity and change, and women's varied roles and activities today. In a word, pre-existing and longstanding constraints on women's mobility and freedom of action have been eroded by the process of development and state expansion, albeit unevenly.

### **A Definition of Development**

My definition of development is a broad process of economic and social change, usually promoted by technological advancement but crucially effected by changes in social structure, property relations, and cultural understandings. Conceptually, in addition to capital and class, states and revolutions play a role in development and change. This is a sociological approach to development, which differs from the typical development economics approach. Whether of a capitalistic or socialistic type, development is constituted by industrialization, urbanization and proletarianization; an ultimate achievement should be mass education and mass employment. This was the process that unfolded in the countries of what used to be called the First World and the Second World. Concepts of women's emancipation and the decline of patriarchy have come about through gradual development processes and through conscious action, whether by states or by social movements.

Most revolutions and many nationalist movements have combined a developmentalist orientation and concepts of women's rights. As such they have been crucial agents of the advancement of women through the encouragement of education and employment and through changes in the legal system. In many Third World countries, including Middle Eastern societies, feminism and nationalism were linked (Jayawardena, 1986).



Concepts of the emancipation of women came about in the context of nationalism and anti-colonialism, state-building, and self-conscious attempts toward modernity in the early part of the century; male feminists were especially instrumental in problematizing The Woman Question. In the Middle East, revolutionaries or nationalists who explicitly equated national progress with the advancement of women included the Kemalists in Turkey, the Marxists in South Yemen and the Marxists in Afghanistan. Post-independence Tunisia under Bourguiba (as Turkey earlier in the century) replaced the Islamic personal status laws (based on *Sharia*, Islamic canon law derived from the Koran) with a civil law code regulating personal and family relations and equalizing the duties and responsibilities of the sexes.

In addition to being a structural process of change, development can be seen in normative and policy terms, especially in the "human development" perspective formulated by Amartya Sen and adopted by the UNDP. In this definition, development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect (*Human Development Report 1990*, p. 1). This definition focuses on people and their well-being -- what people can actually do and be -- also known as the "capabilities approach." Consequently, underdevelopment is defined as the lack of certain capabilities (not the lack of income, as in the World Bank definition of development).

### A Definition of Patriarchy

Patriarchal society is a precapitalist social formation which has historically existed in varying forms in Europe and Asia, and where property, residence, and descent proceed through the male line. In classic patriarchy, the senior man has authority over everyone else in the family, including

younger men, and women are subject to distinct forms of control and subordination. The key to the reproduction of classic patriarchy lies in the operations of the patrilocally extended household, which is also commonly associated with the reproduction of the peasantry in agrarian societies (Kandiyoti 1988). The subordination of women in kinship-ordered or agrarian societies is linked to the reproduction of the kin group or of the peasantry as well as to the sexual division of labour. There is a predisposition to male dominance inherent in the relation between the precapitalist peasant household and the world of landlords and the state, and in the reproduction of kinship-ordered groups, wherein women are exchanged and men are the transactors in what Gayle Rubin has called "the traffic in women" (Rubin 1975). In a patriarchal context, women are assimilated into concepts of property. The "honour-shame complex" is a patriarchal feature built around the importance of virginity in these transactions (see Pitt-Rivers 1977).

Michael Mann's elaboration of the trajectory of patriarchy historically and cross-culturally provides a useful perspective and framework (Mann 1986). Mann has identified and traced the interrelations of five principal stratification nuclei -- five collective actors that have affected gender-stratification relations over recent history. They are: the atomized "person" (more pertinent to liberal, bourgeois society); the connected networks of household/family/lineage; genders (the male and female sexes given social power-significance), social classes; and nations and nation-states. According to Mann, the patriarchal society is one in which power is held by male heads of households. There is also clear separation between the "public" and the "private" spheres of life. In the private sphere of the household, the patriarch enjoys arbitrary power over all junior males, all females and all children. In the public sphere, power is shared between male patriarchs according to whatever other principles of stratification operate. No female holds any formal public position of economic, ideological, military, or political power.

Indeed, females are not allowed into this public realm of power. (It goes without saying that men have the monopoly on the means of violence.) Whereas many, perhaps most, men expect to be patriarchs at some point in their life cycles, no women hold formal power. Within the household they may influence their male patriarch informally, but this is their only access to power. Contained within patriarchy are two fundamental nuclei of stratification: the household/family/lineage and the dominance of the male gender.

Although Mann regards this as an ideal-type, his narrative is consistent with Gerda Lerner's theory of "the creation of patriarchy" based on her reading of the first written records emerging from Mesopotamia around 2,500 B.C., to Western Europe up to the 18th century A.D. (Lerner 1986). It also accords well with what we know about the legacy of *patria potestas* -- the Roman paternal authority (see Bullough, *et. al.* 1988, esp. Chapters 2-6).

Patriarchal societies have distinguished the public from the private; in the public sphere power relations have been overwhelmingly between male household-heads (patriarchs); and the private sphere has usually been ruled formally by a patriarch. In this context, there is no basis for collective action by women. If women sought to influence public power, they had to go through patriarchs. Social stratification was thus two-dimensional. One dimension comprised the two nuclei of household/family/lineage and the dominance of the male order. The second dimension comprised whatever combination of "public" stratification nuclei (classes, military elites, etc.) existed in a particular society. The latter dimension was connected to the former in that public power-groupings were predominantly aggregates of household/family/lineage heads. But apart from this, the two dimensions were segregated from each other.

In modern times, as the particularism of agrarian societies gave way before the universal and diffused stratification of modern society,

stratification became gendered internally. This occurred with the entry of women in the public sphere. Mann notes that in Western Europe, from about the 16th to the 18th centuries, the stratification system changed under the pressure of emerging capitalism, first in agriculture and then in industry, as more of economic life became part of the public realm. What this entailed for women in terms of work and family relations has been explored in depth by Tilly and Scott (1978). Mann goes on to note that the particularist distinction between the public and the private was eroded, first by employment trends and the emergence of more universal classes, secondly by universal citizenship by all persons in the nation, and thirdly by the nation-state's welfare interventions in the "private household/family". Other authors have noted that women's rights movements have emerged in the course of this trajectory, and have contributed to the elimination of some of the more egregious aspects of the patriarchal legacy (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986; Bullough *et. al.* 1988, esp. Chapters 13 and 14).

As Judith Stacey found for contemporary China, patriarchy is fostered in a family and social system in which male power over women and children derives from the social role of fatherhood, and is supported by a political economy in which the family unit retains a significant productive role. Young brides marry into large families, gain respect mainly via their sons, and late in life acquire power as mothers-in-law. Their dependence shifts, initially from father to husband, and finally to son throughout their life-cycle (Stacey 1983).

In a patriarchal context, the process of female proletarianization differs from male proletarianization. Unlike men, female proletarians do not undergo a process of separation or dispossession from the means of production, as they typically do not hold possession or control of it as precapitalist peasant producers. A proletarianized woman can sell her labour power to any capitalist whereas a female peasant producer labours under a particular configuration of male power relationships within the family (Bryceon 1985).

Although the proletarianization of women entails labour control (as it does for men), wage work also provides prospects for women's autonomy -- a factor that does not obtain for men.

### Islam and Patriarchy

Like Judaism and Christianity before it, Islam came into being in patriarchal society. Patriarchy continues to govern gender relations in Muslim societies because of the persistence of tribal structures and kin-ordered networks. The tribal structure is the pristine type of patriarchal organization, and can still be found in the Arab world, in Iran, and in Afghanistan (see Eickelman 1989). The social organization of the tribe (*qabila*) or the communal group (*qawm*, especially in Afghanistan) is affiliation based on blood ties, and is patriarchal in the classic sense. Keddie feels that continuing controls on women are connected to the pervasiveness of tribal structures in the Middle East, or what Tillion calls "the republic of cousins", and notes that even though most nomadic women are not veiled and secluded, they are controlled (Keddie 1990; Tillion 1983). Patriarchy is thus strongest in rural areas, within peasant as well as tribal communities. Turkey provides an apposite example of the split between a highly patriarchal countryside and an urban context where gender and family relations are more egalitarian.

North Africa, the Muslim Middle East (including Turkey and Iran), and South and East Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India and rural China) form what Caldwell (1982) calls the "patriarchal belt" and Kandiyoti (1988) the "belt of classic patriarchy". The area is characterized by extremely restrictive codes of behavior for women, such as the practice of rigid gender segregation and a powerful ideology linking family honour to female virtue. Men are entrusted with safeguarding family honour through their control over female members; they are backed by complex social arrangements which ensure the protection -- and dependence -- of women (Kabeer 1988). In

contemporary Muslim patriarchal societies, such control over women is considered necessary in part because women are regarded as the potential source of *fitna*, that is, moral or social disorder (Mernissi 1987). Men traditionally had the unilateral right of divorce; male authority over women has been interpreted as denial or permission to work outside the home or to travel; family honour and good reputation, or the negative consequence of shame, rest most heavily with the conduct of women. The *Sharia* itself does not enjoin women to veil, but certain *hadith*, or sayings of the Prophet compiled by his followers, do. Sexual segregation, also legitimated on the basis of *hadith*, is part of the Islamic gender system. In South Asian Muslim societies in particular, *purdah* (literally, curtain, also meaning covering and seclusion) remains common, and is also strongly linked to men's honour. As Mandelbaum put it, "Honour is the key good for these men, and their honour is balanced on the heads of the women" (Mandelbaum 1988:19). Women's life-options are severely circumscribed in the patriarchal belt; in some countries, particularly in South Asia, women's life-chances are adversely affected by patriarchal arrangements which favour men. One typically finds an adverse sex ratio, low female literacy and educational attainment, high fertility rates, high maternal mortality rates, and low female labour force participation in the formal sector.

Patriarchy, therefore, should not be conflated with Islam, but rather should be understood in social-structural and developmental terms. The emergence of a modern middle class tied to the capitalist economy or the state bureaucracy would seem to represent a weakening of the patriarchal order. But as we shall see, states and their legal systems may serve to undermine or perpetuate patriarchal controls on women.

## **The Role of the State**

The nature and objectives of the state, political system, and ruling elites is a crucial factor in the equation that makes up the legal status and social positions of women. Legislation is a key element in the strategies available to the state in its efforts to produce social changes or to maintain the status quo. Through the law, and especially through family law, the state can maintain existing gender arrangements; it can alter social policies and laws in the direction of greater restrictions on women; or it can introduce new legislation to foster more equality within the family and raise women's status in the society and in the economy. Family law regulates marriage, divorce, individual rights and responsibilities, and the transmission of property through inheritance; it is thus a prime example of state policy affecting women (Charrad 1990). Change in family law is also significant as it is an index of social change in the Middle East and an illustration of the internal debate within Islam and the capacity for Islamic reform.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century Muslim family law became subject to challenges from reformers and modernizers, who sought changes in marriage, divorce, polygamy, child custody and inheritance in order to improve women's position. The first reform movement was in Egypt in the early 20th century; reforms were also made in the Nasser period. The Atatürk reforms of the 1920s were the most comprehensive; these were followed by the Bourguiba reforms in Tunisia in the 1950s, which abolished polygamy and unilateral (male) divorce, and reforms in Syria and Iraq. In Iran, the Pahlavi state instituted the Family Protection Act in 1967, meant to offer women more rights in family matters and to raise the legal age of marriage. Other reforms to bolster women's position in the family were undertaken in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, or South Yemen) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A particularly poignant case of such an attempt was Afghanistan. Motivations for such reforms are varied. A regime's search for political

legitimacy, a larger labour force, or an expanded social base could lead a state to construct health, educational and welfare services conducive to greater work participation by women, and to encourage female activity in the public sphere.

In many cases state legal policies foster and perpetuate family structure and the authority of male members in a more modernized form of patriarchy, or what Sharabi (1988) calls "neopatriarchy". According to Sharabi, neopatriarchy is the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the context of dependent capitalism; it is modernized patriarchy. Whatever the outward (modern) forms of the contemporary neopatriarchal family, society or state, their internal structures remain rooted in the patriarchal values and social relations of kinship, clan, religious and ethnic groups. A central feature of this system is dominance of the father within the household and at the level of the state.

I have adopted the term "neopatriarchal state" from Sharabi to describe the states of the Middle East and North Africa, in much the same as "bureaucratic-authoritarian state" was applied to many Latin American cases. It is useful as an umbrella term for the various types of political regime in the Middle East: "authoritarian-socialist" (Algeria, Iraq, Syria, former South Yemen); "radical Islamist" (Iran, Libya); "patriarchal-conservative" (Saudi Arabia, Morocco); "authoritarian-privatizing" (Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt). Some of these states have strong capitalistic features, while others have strong feudalistic characteristics. Whether the regimes be monarchies or republics, radical or conservative, socialist or populist, they share the essential features of neopatriarchy.

Neopatriarchal state practices build upon and reinforce particular normative views of women and the family, often but not exclusively through the law. In particular, laws which render women legal minors and dependents of men reflect and perpetuate a modernized form of patriarchy.



In some cases, the focus on women is an attempt to deflect attention from economic failures. States may also find it useful to foster patriarchal structures because the extended family performs vital welfare functions. The joint household system and intergenerational wealth flows that are characteristics of patriarchal structures provide welfare and security for its members. This is, of course, incumbent upon an adequate supply of household members, especially sons, through high fertility. Where this does not occur, the material consequences of reproductive failure is disastrous, as Mead Cain (1986) demonstrates for Bangladesh. It is especially dire for women, who attain status and old-age security through having sons. In all cases, the persistence of patriarchy relieves the state of the responsibility for the provision of welfare to citizens.

Jean Pyle (1990) has found that in the Republic of Ireland, state policy can have contradictory goals: development of the economy and expansion of services, and the maintenance of the "traditional" family. Similarly, in the Middle East, two apparently contradictory developments may be discerned: (1) the expansion of state-sponsored education, as well as industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization, processes which undermine patriarchal family authority, and (2) the retention or observance of Muslim family law, which legitimates the prerogatives of male family members over female family members. Today the application of Muslim family law varies throughout the Middle East (see Esposito 1982; Nasir 1990) depending principally on type of political regime and the strength of modern social classes.

Most neopatriarchal states in the Middle East have an instrumentalist approach toward women, gender, and the family: Policies and laws which strengthen the position of the state itself are the ones which will be enacted.

### Some Propositions

1. The status of women has been tied to and shaped by forms of production and property relations. Changes in production and distribution, including macro-level changes in demography, technology, and the economy, and changes in consciousness and political forces have also affected the sexual division of labour, gender systems and the status of women. Historically, the transition from simple hunting-and-gathering communities to agrarian technology entailed a major shift in gender relations, what Engels (1975/1884) called "the world-historical defeat of the female sex" and what Gerda Lerner (1986) has called "the creation of patriarchy." With the rise and development of capitalism, patriarchy in Western Europe declined and was replaced by systems of gender inequality. Subsequently, gender relations and the position of women have been affected by urbanization, industrialization, the expansion of wage labour, warfare and political conflict. In the late 20th century, the trend seems to be less rather than more gender inequality.

2. Many demographic studies of developing countries, including summaries and reports of the World Fertility Survey of 1977-1982, have found that fertility and non-agricultural labour force participation are negatively related (Anker et al 1982; Bodrova and Anker 1985; McDonald 1985; Sathar et al. 1988). Economic development usually leads to structural increases in services and industrial jobs; as women's share of the labour force increases, fertility rates decline.

3. Notions of female equality and autonomy -- the essence of Feminism -- and of course the women's movement, evolved with modernity and development (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986). This has sometimes been met by a backlash. A similar, though not identical, trajectory may be observed in parts of the Third World. Indeed, in the Middle East, the erosion of classic patriarchy through the process of socio-economic development and the public visibility of women may be one cause of the rise of reactive Islamist

movements (Mernissi 1987; Moghadam 1991a). This has also been suggested for South Asia (Chhachhi 1991; Vaid and Sumgari 1991).

4. We now have some studies indicating that for working class women, paid employment leads to changes in household decision-making. In Latin America, development processes and women's participation in paid employment in the formal sector seem to have positive effects on family relations and the sexual division of labour within the household (Finlay 1989; Safa, *in press*; Fiala and Tiano 1991).

5. Although one would not want to romanticize factory work -- there is certainly much that can be done to improve conditions -- there is growing evidence from around the world that employed women, including working class women with factory jobs, value their work for the economic independence and family support it provides, and for the opportunity to delay marriage and childbearing. In many countries, young women in particular are able to escape restrictive family circumstances, and to enjoy "horizon-broadening" experiences and the companionship of other women (Joeke and Moayedi 1987). Paid employment also provides opportunities for women's self-organization as women workers. Mitter quotes the young woman vice-president of the Bangladesh Garment Workers Federation, referring to the expansion of export oriented garment production in Bangladesh: "These jobs have been catalysts for a bigger struggle for women's independence" (Mitter 1986: 75).

6. Although state-sponsored education has provided some upward social mobility (as well as geographic mobility) for women of the popular classes, the benefits of development have accrued mainly to middle class and upper middle class women.

Hanna Papanek has described the contradictory and class-specific consequences of development and women's employment. She notes that in many developing countries, such as the West Asian and South Asian

countries she considers, educated women from the middle class have been entering modern-sector employment in increasing numbers. Many of these women come from families where paid jobs for women were unacceptable in earlier generations. Papanek explains that

Their entry into the paid labour force has occurred in response to two factors. First, demand for educated female labour has increased as a result of the expansion of the modern sector [and the state]. Second, ... aspirations have risen and now increasingly require cash incomes beyond those earned by adult male family members. ... On the other hand, uneducated women -- mostly poor -- have lost their traditional earning opportunities, partly as a result of accelerated technological innovations and other changes brought about by development. Poor, uneducated women obviously do not compete for the same jobs that have become available for educated middle-class females. Much of the work poor women have depended on in the past is now being done by men or machines. (Papanek 1985: 134).

With regard to wage employment and women's status in Turkey, Abadan-Unat (1981: 127) refers to the existence of "archaic and patriarchal family structures" as obstacles to the transformation of women's status. Kandiyoti has argued that we cannot speak of a simple decline in women's status with the transition to an urban wage labour economy because capital penetration introduces considerable heterogeneity into the gender division of labour, as illustrated in her empirical study of women in shanty-towns, lower middle class and traditional middle class women, and educated middle and upper class women (Kandiyoti 1977, 1980) and her discussion of village patriarchy (Kandiyoti 1984).

One may therefore propose that in the short-term, the relationship between development and women's status is an empirical question which seems to depend on a number of factors. First, the structure of pre-industrial relations, and women's pre-existing positions in their communities, provide important clues as to the impact of development on women's status. The mobility and autonomy women enjoyed in the Andes, south India, or in parts of sub-Saharan Africa prior to colonialism and modernization stand in

contrast to the situation of women in the belt of "classic patriarchy". Women in the Andes (Bourque and Warren 1981) or in the Pacific (Gailey 1987) lost status with colonialism and economic development, but in the Middle East, most of South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia, where the control of women was strongest, development would be more likely to improve their situation by disrupting patriarchal controls.

Second, there is the **class factor**. Middle class women generally benefit more from development than do proletarian and peasant women, in terms of income, status, working conditions, and quality of life. In many developing countries, middle class women work in the public sector, such as in government agencies, where conditions are better and jobs more secure than they are for proletarian women in the private sector.

Third, **type of development strategy** is key. Studies indicate that export-oriented industrialization is more conducive to increased female employment (Joeke and Moayed 1987). In contrast, oil-centered industrialization, such as has proceeded in most of the Middle East, has tended to marginalize women, and import-substitution industrialization through capital-intensive technologies has favoured male labour over female labour. In many Middle Eastern countries, women's share of the measured labour force is considerably below the Third World average, and women's participation in industrial production is insignificant.

Fourth, how development affects women depends to a great extent on **the nature of the state and of its economic and social policies**. Women's access to education, training, and employment opportunities; the existence of labour protection codes; policies that allow women to combine jobs and household responsibilities -- these are largely determined by the nature of the regime in power, its social base, political will, and resources.

Having outlined the conceptual framework and advanced a number of propositions, let us now turn to the countries of the Middle East itself.

### III. The Political Economy of the Middle East

Outside of Middle East Studies, the social structural diversity within the region is not well understood. Neither is it properly appreciated that this has implications for gender relations generally and for women's roles and status more specifically. Some countries have more developed class structures than others; the size and significance of the industrial working class, for example, varies across the region. State types vary, too, and range from Saudi Arabia's theocratic monarchism to Turkey's secular republicanism. Following Mabro (1988), the countries of the region can be divided into the following economic groups:

[a] oil economies poor in other resources, including very small populations (United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya);

[b] mixed oil economies (Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt);

[c] non-oil economies (Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen).

The countries are further divided into the city-states (such as Qatar and the UAE), the "desert states" (for example, Libya and Saudi Arabia), and the "normal states". The latter have a more diversified structure and their resources include oil, agricultural land, and large populations (for example, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Syria). Some of these countries are rich in capital and import labour (for example, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait), while others are poor in capital or are middle-income countries that export labour (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen). Consequently, human and material resources -- including the development of skills, or "human capital formation" -- differ among these various types. There is variance in levels of overall development, including industrialization and infrastructure, and in standards

of living and welfare. The structure of the labour market and the characteristics of the labour force, including the female labour force, are also varied.

Overall, and unlike Latin America and Southeast Asia, industrialization has been fairly limited in the region, and this has served, among other things, to limit female labour force participation. It should be noted that industrialization began in Latin America and Southeast Asia earlier than it did in the Middle East. In the case of South Korea, first the Japanese and then the Americans played a role in the expansion of agricultural and industrial production as well as education. In Brazil and Mexico, foreign investment played an important role in propelling industrialization (Harris 1986; Jenkins 1991). The success of the Southeast Asian countries in making a transition to export-led industrialization in the early 1960s contributed to their rapid economic growth, facilitated by the rapid expansion of world trade in the 1960s. By contrast, in the Middle East the rate of industrial expansion remained slow until the mid-1950s. The industrialization drive gained momentum when revolutionary regimes took over in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, and when the Shah of Iran decided to divert oil revenues to finance industrialization. Between 1955 and 1975 the industrialization of the Middle East (with the notable exception of Israel) followed a classic pattern of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), where machinery was imported to run local industries producing consumer goods. This was associated with an economic system characterized by central planning and a large public sector (Mabro 1988; Richards and Waterbury 1990), which opened up some employment opportunities for women, mainly in the civil service (as a result of the expansion of the state apparatus), but also in state-run factories or industrial plants in the private sector receiving state support and foreign investment. There was also some foreign investment, through the transnational corporations (TNCs).

Those countries rich in oil and poor in other resources (category [a] above) have chosen an industrial strategy based on the transformation of hydrocarbon resources into petroleum products and petrochemicals. A strategy relying on oil, gas and finance, which is heavily capital-intensive and minimizes the use of labour, is not conducive to female employment. Notwithstanding the industrial strategy of ISI in other countries (categories [b] and [c] above), Algeria, Iran, and Iraq remained dependent on oil revenues for foreign exchange. Mabro notes that unlike Latin America, ISI in the Middle East did not evolve into manufacturing for export. Because of oil revenues, governments chose to extend the import-substitution process, moving into capital-intensive sectors involving sophisticated technology. What should be added is that investment in iron and steel plants, petrochemicals, car assembly plants, and similar industries, turned out to be not only costly and inefficient, but was not especially conducive to increased female employment.

For the OPEC countries, foreign exchange from oil revenues constituted the accumulation of capital, although an industrial labour force in the manufacturing sector was also created. Increased oil revenues and foreign exchange facilitated changes in the structure of the economy. The augmentation in the activities of capital was followed by increased male employment and an increase in the labour force involved in industry and services. These changes affected women, too, who were increasingly brought into the labour force. Among those developing countries where female employment increased significantly during the 1970s, especially high increases were reported in Syria and Tunisia, where female labour increase topped that of men. Massive interregional migration of men from the labour surplus countries of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and North Yemen to better paying jobs in the oil-rich states of the region (such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE) also affected female employment patterns. In many



countries, the working age population remaining in the rural areas came to be dominated by women. The migratory trend created labour shortages in agriculture and in the labour markets of the sending countries. The agricultural sector thus became dependent on its female resources. Some of the labour-receiving countries experienced a dramatic rise in female labour force participation; this was true for Bahrain and Kuwait, although not so for Libya and Saudi Arabia. The female activity rate in Bahrain reached 11.1 percent in 1981, while in Kuwait the female economically active population doubled between 1970 and 1980. By 1980, women's employment in Kuwait represented 18.8 percent of total salaried employment. In a 1982 special economic report on South Yemen (the PDRY), the World Bank estimated women's employment at more than 20 percent. Here, too, between 1976 and 1984 the number of women working in the public and mixed sectors together doubled.

Concomitantly, new job vacancies were created in the service and industrial sectors that were filled by women. For the relatively well-educated women, services (teaching, health and welfare) were, and remain, the main areas of possibility, while in the more developed Middle Eastern countries (such as Turkey and Egypt), women's participation increased in commercial and industrial undertakings and in public administration. During the period of rapid growth, some governments tended to provide generous benefits to working women. In this way, the large public sectors created throughout the region constituted an advantage for educated women, whose entry into the public sphere was thereby facilitated.

The degree of occupational choice that women had within the structure of employment was linked to the type of industrialization the country was undergoing, the extent of state intervention and the size of the public sector, and the class background of women entering the labour force. In some places, development and state expansion afforded women a range of work

opportunities in the professional labour market that was wider than that in the most industrialized societies of the West. This was particularly striking in Turkey, where in the 1970s the female share of teaching, banking, and the medical profession reached one-third, and where one in every five practicing lawyers was female (Kazgan 1981). A similar pattern has been found for other Third World countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, and India. Cross-national studies indicate that in societies undergoing capitalist development, there is a curvilinear relationship between the level of industrial and economic development and the range of options open to women in professional careers. At intermediate levels, there are higher proportions of women in professional schools and also in the professional labour market than at either extreme. In such countries, law, medicine, dentistry and even engineering constitute a "cluster" of occupations that appear as women's options. But class is another explanatory variable. A kind of affirmative action or quota system may be operating for the upper class, limiting the social mobility of the lower classes. With regard to women's access to high-status professions in Turkey, Oncü (1981) suggests that under conditions of rapid expansion, the elite recruitment patterns into the most prestigious and highly remunerated professions are maintained by the admission of women from the upper reaches of the social hierarchy.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the formal economy could not absorb all the entrants to the labour force, and the urban population in all developing countries has been growing rapidly due to natural population growth and to high in-migration rates. Thus the period also saw unemployment, the expansion of the urban informal sector, and the rising phenomenon of female heads of households resulting from male migration, separation, divorce, and widowhood. In 1980, the female share of unemployment was generally higher than the share of employment. For example, the female share of

unemployment in Syria was 16 percent; in Tunisia, it was 18 percent. Low wages tended to enlarge the informal sector and to push women into it.

By 1980, the heady days of the 1970s, when OPEC was a major international economic actor, were over. In the 1980s, all Middle Eastern countries were beset by economic and political difficulties. The global oil market became very unstable, leading to fluctuating and declining prices. The near-collapse of prices in 1986 (from \$28 per barrel to \$7 per barrel) had repercussions throughout the Middle East: austerity measures were introduced, availability of development aid decreased, and major development projects were suspended. Many countries, especially in North Africa, experienced low or negative economic growth rates, declining state revenues, and high levels of indebtedness to foreign creditors. In some cases (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria), debts became truly enormous in relation to the country's economic capacities; Turkey was on the World Bank's list of "severely indebted middle-income countries". The most active Arab borrowers from the World Bank -- Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia -- have had to impose austerities on their populations as a result of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policy packages, and several have experienced "IMF riots" (see Niblock 1991; Seddon 1992). High population growth rates, coupled with continued rural-urban migration, have concentrated larger numbers of the unemployed in major urban areas. Various social strata have been adversely affected by the debt and the inflationary-recessionary cycles which have been plaguing the region, especially in Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Egypt.

As a result of these vagaries, the region still lags behind other regions in terms of female labour force participation rates. But women's integration into the work force has been rising steadily since the 1960s in all Middle Eastern countries. Although participation rates are relatively low (see Table 1), the female share of the labour force is nearing 20 percent (see Table 2).

## Tables 1 and 2 here

### **Industrialization and Female Proletarianization**

TNC relocation has affected women mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Southeast Asia. The most important areas of activity for foreign investors in the export manufacturing sector in developing countries has been the textiles and clothing and electronics industries. Five countries dominate in terms of the size of their EPZ operations: Hong Kong, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Singapore and Taiwan. Rather less important but still substantial are EPZs in Brazil, Haiti, Malaysia and Mexico. Over the years, a majority of jobs created in the export manufacturing sector has gone to women. Indeed, "the disproportionate access that women have to export manufacturing employment and their overwhelming importance as suppliers for the export manufacturing sector" is emphasized by Joeques and Moayed (1987: 21).

In the Middle East, free production zones were established in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Democratic Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia. In Iran, a world market factory, commencing operations in 1974 with U.S. and West German capital investment, produced shoes, leather goods, textiles and garments. However, most of the workers were male. The kinds of concentrations of female labour in TNCs that are characteristic of Southeast Asia and some Latin America and Caribbean countries are rarely found in the Middle East, in part because this kind of industrialization has not been pursued by all the countries of the region. Mabro has suggested that Iran probably would have embarked upon an export-oriented strategy, but that the Revolution and the war with Iraq arrested the process of industrial development. This would also explain the decline in female industrial

employment in the years immediately following the Revolution and subsequent fall of overall female employment in Islamic Republic.

In part because of import-substitution policies, and partly because of excess reliance on oil revenues, industry in the Middle East has failed to make progress comparable to that achieved in India, Brazil, Korea, or Singapore. Among Arab countries, Morocco is the country in which industry makes the largest relative contribution to GDP: 18.6 percent. Morocco also enjoys a relatively high share of manufacturing in its merchandise exports: 32 percent. It also has the highest percentage of women in production, and nearly half of the economically active women in the urban areas are engaged in textile work, although much of this is homework. Those countries with the largest shares of manufacturing in their merchandise exports are Israel with 80 percent and Turkey with 57 percent. Other Middle Eastern countries do not usually come near the top 50 in ranking of world manufacturing production. This has implications for patterns of female employment. Lower levels of industrialization and manufacturing for export result in less female proletarianization and activity in the productive sectors.

In both the oil and mixed oil economies the contribution of petroleum to the national income, both direct and indirect, is such as to make the apparent share of other sectors appear insignificant. Exceptions to this pattern are Turkey, Tunisia, Israel and Morocco. Of these four countries, only Tunisia exports oil, though its oil share of exports is lower than that of OPEC countries (42 percent in 1985 compared to Saudi Arabia's 97 percent or Iran's 85 percent). The other countries have had to rely on exports of manufacturers and agricultural goods. Notable among them is Turkey; in 1984 manufacturing constituted 54 percent of GDP. (Egypt under Sadat tried to follow the Turkish model and liberalize its economic system in order to promote industrial exports. But it was less successful than Turkey). What should be noted is that in the non-oil economies, female labour force

participation is higher than elsewhere and is indeed encouraged by policy-makers.

Thus for the Middle East as a whole, one finds a correlation between industrial strategy and female labour force participation. The data suggest that export-led industrialization and female employment are positively related, while oil-centered industrialization inhibits female employment. Those countries with export-led industrial (and agricultural) strategies and higher levels of female labour force participation are Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. During the 1980s, in Tunisia, 40 percent of all employed women worked in the industrial sector, and in Morocco it was nearly 30 percent. A study of the Moroccan clothing industry showed that the proportion of women workers was higher, both within and between firms, when the product was for foreign markets. By contrast, Algeria and Iran have relied heavily on oil revenues, and report a very small female labour force.

In the case of Turkey, more women are engaged in agricultural work than in the modern industrial sector. Although Turkey's proximity to Europe and its greater participation in the international division of labour have drawn more women into world market activities, most of these activities are in the informal sector -- unwaged, family-based production of agricultural goods or carpets. Agriculture, light manufacturing industry (tobacco, textiles-apparel, food-beverages, packaging of chemicals) and certain subdivisions of service industries are typically "feminine" occupations. But this constitutes a relatively small percentage of Turkish female labour force. In 1985 fully 69 percent of the economically active female population of 5.5 million was in agriculture, and only 7.6 percent were production workers. Indeed, work in the manufacturing sector remains a predominantly male phenomenon in Turkey. In Israel, too, the most industrialized economy in the region, the role of women in industrial work is also negligible; the female share of production workers is about 13 percent. (See Tables 3 and 4).

Tables 3 and 4 here

The limited participation of women in industrial production and manufacturing are illustrated in the tables. The female share of production work ranges from a low of 1 percent in Libya and Jordan (and next to nothing in the Gulf city-states) to highs of 23 percent in Morocco and 17 percent in Tunisia. The range is not vastly different from that in Latin American countries, but in East and Southeast Asian countries women workers constitute 20-30 percent of production workers. Another difference is that fewer women production workers are salaried in the Middle East. The female share of manufacturing employees is lower in the Middle East than in Latin American and East and Southeast Asia, although again, Tunisia and Morocco depart from the pattern.

Care must be taken in interpreting the high percentages recorded for Iran and Afghanistan. For there, much of what purports to be industrial activity for women is in fact of a rural and traditional type, such as carpet weaving. In the 1970s Iran was sometimes included in the varying lists of NICs, and the development literature stressed a significant increase not only in male but in female participation in industry. One study cited the increase in female labour force participation in Iran in the same category as Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. By 1976, industry's share of the total labour force was about one-third. According to ILO data, some 33 percent of the female economically active population in 1976 was engaged in industrial work. However, what this statistic masked was the dualistic nature of Iranian industry, and the polarization of the industrial labour force (both male and female) between workers in small and traditional workshops, and workers in large and modern factories. Close examination of census data reveal that most female industrial workers were actually rural women involved in

traditional manufacturing (carpets, handicrafts, clothing for the domestic market, etc.). A far smaller proportion were in the larger urban factories. Two-thirds of the women in the category "female employers/own-account workers" were in manufacturing. A large percentage of women in "industrial/manufacturing" activities were found in the category "unpaid family workers".

Thus one cannot escape the conclusion that if, as Joekees (1987) has argued, industrialization in parts of the Third World "has been as much female-led as export led", this is not pertinent to the Middle East. To be sure, in nearly all the large countries women are engaged in light manufacturing -- clothing, woven goods, shoes, food processing, confectioneries. But in the cities of the Middle East, most women are marginalized from production, and especially from the formal sector productive process, and are concentrated in community, social and personal services. There does seem to be a widespread Middle Eastern attitude that factory work is not suitable for women -- although this may itself be a function of the limited demand for women's labour, given the current stage of industrialization and the high rates of male unemployment in the Middle East. The exceptions are Morocco and Tunisia. For the region as a whole, industrialization has led to the creation of a female labour force, but that labour force is small in part because industrialization itself is limited.

### **Characteristics of the Female Labour Force**

During the 1980s, economic activity rates of women ranged from a low of 4.8 percent in Jordan, 6.8 in Syria and 7 percent in Algeria to highs of 18 percent in Kuwait, 22 percent in Turkey and 27 percent in Israel. In relation to Latin America, Southeast Asia, as well as the advanced industrialized countries, female activity rates in all age groups are quite low. Moreover, in general female labour force participation tends to be concentrated in the age



groups 15-29; it is even lower in the older age groups. The exceptions are Turkey and Israel, where female activity rates are both the highest in the region (over 45 percent), and fairly consistent across the age groups. They are followed by Tunisia, which has a 30 percent activity rate for women in the age group 15-34. Kuwait and Qatar also report fairly high activity rates (37 percent) for women ages 25-49; these are professional women who, in fact, comprise the female labour force in those countries.

For the region as a whole, the female share of the economically active population is reaching 20 percent, although there are higher shares in Israel, Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco. Other countries with large populations (for example, Iran) do not count women in agriculture, and thereby report a very small female economically active population. In terms of employment status, and as seen in Table 5, the female share of the total salaried population is generally under 20 percent, from a low of 5.2 percent in the UAE and 9 percent in Iran to 17 percent in Morocco in 1982. Kuwait reports a 20.8 percent female share, while Israel's female share is highest at 41.5 percent.

As seen in Table 6, the percentage of the economically active female population (EAP) that receives a wage or salary is high in Kuwait (97 percent) and Israel (79 percent), average in Syria (46 percent) and Egypt (30 percent), and low in Turkey (14 percent). The female share of the paid labour force in Morocco in 1982 was 17.6 percent. In Iran, the proportion of the female EAP that receives a wage appears high (51.6 percent), because the Iranian enumerators do not count rural women as part of the EAP. If they did, the statistic would probably be closer to Turkey's. In Turkey, the female share of the salaried labour force is a mere 15 percent. Fully 80 percent of the female labour force was classified "unpaid family labour" in 1980. These women are mostly in agriculture. In some cases, women in agriculture are not enumerated, but large percentages of female agricultural workers are found in Turkey, Egypt, and Syria.

Tables 5 and 6 here

Table 7 illustrates the distribution of the female EAP in branches of industry. The distribution in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait and Syria is skewed in favour of Group 9 of the major industry branches, that is, community, social and personal services. Turkey's female EAP is skewed in favour of Group 1, or agriculture. Tunisia's female labour force is more evenly distributed, and in a departure from the Middle Eastern pattern, more women are in industry than in agriculture or services. These patterns may be compared with those elsewhere in the world, as shown in Table 8.

Tables 7 and 8 here

Middle Eastern women are concentrated in professional occupations, although large percentages of the female labour force are also found in agriculture (Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Turkey), and in production (Morocco). The high incidence of women workers within the "professional, technical, and related workers" group in most countries may be the outcome of occupational stereotyping prevalent in the region, where women cluster around specific jobs such as teaching and nursing. It may also be a function of the class distribution of income and work participation, whereby women from elite families are most likely to be those who are employed.

In terms of occupational distribution, all countries have minimal female presence in administrative and managerial occupations. There also appears to be a marked disinclination for women to enter sales work or even clerical work, except in Israel. This may be an extension of a long-standing pattern in which the merchant class has been typically male, and the traditional urban markets -- bazaars and souks -- have been the province of

men. Throughout the Middle East, the largest percentages of employed women are in the teaching professions.

In tandem with industrialization, the Middle East is experiencing the demographic transition. We now turn to the gender dynamics of this process.

#### **IV. The Demographic Transition in the Middle East: The Significance of Female Education**

In the Middle East, as in other developing regions in the twentieth century, the demographic transition is occurring more rapidly than it occurred in Europe. Declines in mortality as a result of better health care has led to accelerated population growth.

The World Fertility Survey of 1977-1982 found that fertility is highest in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. But it also found that "substantial fertility declines have been observed over recent years in all regions except sub-Saharan Africa." If fertility rates are still high, this might suggest a "cultural lag" or a "knowledge lag": people in the midst of a changing mortality matrix have imperfect knowledge of their increasing survival chances. But it may also be explained by the persistence of the patriarchal household, incomplete proletarianization and industrialization, and pro-natalist state policies. The process of proletarianization is not yet complete, as large segments of the urban population are informal workers rather than formal sector wage workers. When households are engaged in "cottage industries", it is rational for them to increase the number of "workers". For capital, large supplies of cheap labour is functional and profitable. And for many newly independent Third World states, at least until recently, a large population was associated with national strength. This idea was quite explicitly stated by leaders of Algeria, Kenya, India, China, to name a few. A pro-natalist policy was adopted by the authorities in the Islamic Republic in 1979, which also banned abortion and prohibited the importation of

contraceptives. Among the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia explicitly supports population growth. It is highly likely that, in the wake of the Gulf War in early 1991, and following from a decision to reduce its long-standing dependence on foreign workers, Kuwait will adopt an explicit pro-population growth policy.

Moreover, female illiteracy is high in those areas, and female employment in the formal sector of the economy remains low. Overall unemployment (male and female) is high, and informal sector economic activities are often small family enterprises which are not incompatible with high fertility. In many countries, although illiteracy among women has been declining, it remains high (see Table 9). These characteristics go far to explain how the economy of the family works and why its fertility remains high.

Table 9 here

Basheer Nijim explains that the Arab countries exhibit a variety of population policies and concerns. "Population policy" is understood to be an intention to improve the overall well-being of the national population. Definitions of well-being vary and are certainly debatable, as are prescriptions of how to reach objectives. At the level of state policy-making, the approach to population growth ranges from pro-natalist to laissez-faire to pro-family planning. Consequently, countries are in significantly different stages along the continuum of transition and development. Table 10 illustrates the demographic transition in the Arab World. Iran would be in Stage 3, and Afghanistan in Stage 1 or 2.

Table 10 here

As can be seen from Allman's table, high fertility is found in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and Syria. Within each of these countries, fertility rates are variable by region, class, education, and employment. Nevertheless, all Middle Eastern countries have seen fertility declines since the 1960s (see Table 11). Lower fertility rates and improved health care may also explain the fact that infant mortality and under-five mortality has declined, in some countries quite dramatically. Life expectancy varies; it is highest in Israel (76) and the oil-rich Gulf states (for example, 73 in Kuwait), and lowest in the Yemens (52) and Afghanistan (42). But it has definitely increased since 1960. For example, life expectancy in Iran has increased from 50 in 1960 to 66 in 1987. And maternal mortality for the region (280 per 100,000 live births) is lower than the average for developing countries (290).

Table 11 here

What is especially interesting is that the age at first marriage is rising in the Middle East and North Africa.

Egypt and Iran, two large Middle Eastern countries, are representative of the profound changes underway in the region. Whereas a few decades ago the majority of women married before the age of twenty, today only 22 percent of that age group in Egypt and 18 percent in Iran are married. The legal age was lowered following the assumption of power by Islamists, but it is interesting that this has not been translated into a higher rate of marriage for girls under twenty. Mernissi argues that the idea of a young unmarried woman is completely novel in the Muslim world, for the whole concept of patriarchal honour is built around the idea of virginity, which reduces a woman's role to its sexual dimension: to reproduction within early marriage. The concept of a menstruating and unmarried woman is so alien to the entire

Muslim family system, Mernissi adds, that it is either unimaginable or necessarily linked with *fitna*. The unimaginable is now a reality.

Mernissi notes that young men, faced with job insecurity or failure of the diploma to guarantee access to the desired job, postpone marriage. Women, faced with the pragmatic necessity to count on themselves instead of relying on the dream of a rich husband, see themselves forced to concentrate on getting an education. The average age at marriage for women and men in most Arab countries has registered a noticeable increase. In Egypt and Tunisia the average age at marriage for women is twenty-two and twenty-four, respectively, and for men in both countries twenty-seven. In Algeria the average age at marriage has increased to twenty-one for women and twenty-four for men; in Iran the figures are 20 for women and 24 for men. In Morocco, Sudan, and Jordan the average age of marriage for women is twenty-one; men marry at around age twenty-five. The oil countries, known for their conservatism, have also witnessed an increase of unmarried youth: age at marriage for women is twenty and for men it is twenty-seven. The lowest age of marriage for girls is found in Yemen, at 17, where the fertility rate is also the highest. Of course the patterns of nuptiality are influenced by urbanization: the more urbanized youth marry later in all countries. And it should be noted that in all cases the average age of marriage is higher than the legal minimum. (See Table 12 for demographic characteristics.)

Table 12 here

What explains these changes? Caldwell argues that mass schooling has probably had a greater impact on the family in developing countries than it had even in the West. First, mass schooling has come in many countries at an earlier stage in terms of the economic and occupational structure than it did in the West. Secondly, schooling frequently means Westernization, including

Western concepts of family and gender. According to Caldwell (1982:322), "Schools destroy the corporate identity of the family, especially for those members previously most submissive and most wholly contained by the family: children and women." Fatima Mernissi (1987: Introduction) has also emphasized the role of state-sponsored education in creating a generation of unveiled and independent women; her thesis is worth quoting *in extenso*:

As corrupt and inefficient as it proved to be, the national state did nevertheless carry out a mass educational programme (limited to males only in the rural area) after independence, and fostered the emergence of a new class: *educated youth of both sexes*. This class is the result of the interplay of three factors: (1) the demographic factor, the "youthification" of the population; (2) a political factor, the emergence of the welfare state; (3) a cultural factor, the change in women's self-perception as actors in society...

Centuries of women's exclusion from knowledge have resulted in femininity being confused with illiteracy until a few decades ago. But things have progressed so rapidly in our Muslim countries that we women take literacy and access to schools and universities for granted.

Educational attainment of parents seems to have some effect on children's aspirations for themselves. A study of female education in Egypt in the early 1980s found that all the students whose fathers had a university education saw nothing less for themselves than a comparable education (Khattab and el-Daeiff 1984). The great majority (98 percent) of the daughters of working mothers expressed a desire to pursue a university education; only two percent were satisfied with a secondary education as their goal. The overwhelming majority (93 percent) believed that once a young woman completes her education, she must work. They further asserted that the ultimate goal of education for women was their future employment.

To reiterate: The single most important determinant in the age of marriage has been education. The World Fertility Survey (WFS) report on Egypt, like many others, shows that there is a definite positive relationship

between level of education and age at first marriage: Increasing education opportunities for young Egyptian women are largely responsible for the recent decline in early marriage and the upward trend in age at marriage, particularly in urban areas. Table 13 shows the increases in primary and secondary school enrollments, as well as the tertiary education ratio.

Table 13 about here

Like Caldwell, Mernissi (1987) notes that education for women is having a rapid and revolutionary impact: "Access to education seems to have an immediate, tremendous impact on women's perception of themselves, their reproductive and sex roles, and their social mobility expectations". Higher levels of education tend to result in more knowledge and use of contraceptives. In Middle Eastern countries there are moderate proportions of between twenty-four and thirty-eight percent. Whereas on average the desired number of children in Egypt is four, and the mean number of children ever born to illiterate mothers is 4.4, it drops to 2.1 for women with secondary school education. The mean number of children ever born to university educated women is 1.8. Contraceptive use among the more educated is clearly a factor here. But although fertility and education are negatively correlated, small increases in education -- such as a few years of primary education -- are insufficient for fertility decline. There is also some evidence that the work status of the wife, especially if she works in the modern sector of the economy (non-agricultural, cash economy), is an important determinant of marital fertility, although education of both wife and husband seems to be the stronger socio-economic determinant in the Middle East. The connections between literacy, employment, tertiary enrollment, and fertility are illustrated in Table 14.



Table 14 here

The Syrian Fertility Survey of 1978 found that "while those with no schooling have a rate of 8.6 children, those with incomplete primary and those with complete primary schooling or above have rates of 4.3 and 3.2, respectively". And this despite the fact that "Syria has no organized family planning programme". The report concluded that "The very large differences in recent fertility between women of varying educational background and between rural and urban sectors suggest the likelihood of further decline in the national level of fertility as the Syrian population becomes more educated and urbanized. Similarly, the Turkish Fertility Survey of 1978 found that "women with high socio-economic status tend to have higher age at marriage and may have lower fertility." The survey found pronounced "socio-cultural" and "demographic" differences between urban and rural, eastern and western, educated and uneducated population in Turkey. All fertility surveys showed a positive relationship between age at marriage, education, and child health.

There is some consensus that the dramatic increase in the educational attainments of women in the postwar era in the U.S. was a major cause of the women's movement. The baby boom generation, even more than those born a few years earlier, went to college in massive and unprecedented numbers. College education in turn increased women's labour force participation; at the same time there was an expansion of married women's labour force participation (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986; Bullough, *et al.* 1988). A similar pattern may be discerned in Middle Eastern countries -- activist women, married and unmarried, emerge from the ranks of the educated and employed. It is in this context of rapid social change -- the impact of industrialization, urbanization, and education on marriage, the family, and sex roles -- that there has been a conservative backlash in the form of the Islamist movement. According to Mernissi, "fundamentalism" is a "defense

mechanism against profound changes in both sex roles and the touchy subject of sexual identity". Fundamentalists are concerned that education for women has destroyed the traditional boundaries and definitions of space and sex roles. Schooling has dissolved traditional arrangements of space segregation and of family ethics.

## V. Country Profiles

In this section we survey several countries in the region. As will be seen, a country's development strategy, state and legal system, and economic conditions are the most critical factors in determining women's work status and social positions, as well as in explaining variations across the region.

### Turkey

Turkey provides a nearly unique example (the other being Tunisia) of a country which replaced the Islamic personal status laws with a civil law code regulating personal and family relations and equalizing the duties and responsibilities of the sexes. In Turkey in the 1920s secular legal codes based on Western models were introduced. Such legal codes are an important basis for women to act as autonomous persons. In the late 1960s there were signs that women in one region of western Turkey were exercising their full legal rights to sue for divorce, to protect their personal reputations and their claims to property (Starr 1984). Another result is that Turkey is unique among Middle Eastern or Muslim countries in the large numbers of women in the legal profession.

But during the 1980s there was a shift in state orientation. The social-democratic years of the 1970s were halted by a military coup in 1980. Between 1983 and 1990, some 700 Koranic schools were established throughout the country, and their graduates have raised calls for Islamization. During this period, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, the architect of a tough stabilization and

structural adjustment programme, was also the most openly Islamic Turkish leader in modern times.

In the formal sector, a woman on maternity leave is given the right to return to the job she held before childbirth. But for the majority of Turkish women, wage work is elusive. This is because of the structure of Turkey's agrarian sector, in which so many Turkish women are involved. As Turkey's countryside is characterized by a system of "peasant proprietorships" (Keyder 1979), most Turkish women are unwaged family workers. One area where the Turkish state has been deficient is in the provision of literacy and education, especially for girls. Between 1975 and 1985 the illiterate female population declined from 49 percent to 32 percent, but the reduction of male illiteracy was much steeper, from 24 percent to 13 percent. In 1985, women constituted fully 70 percent of the illiterate population. These illiteracy figures may help to explain the large number of Turkish women in agriculture. Is there a link between the persistence of rural female illiteracy and the development strategy of export-led agriculture?

Kandiyoti's research comparing the status of Turkish women in nomadic tribes, peasant villages, rural towns, and cities reveals that the influence of the patrilineal extended household -- where the father dominates younger men and all women, and there is a hierarchy by age among the women -- is pervasive in all sectors, but is less so in the towns and cities because of neolocal residence and the diminished importance of elders. It is true that compared to peasant and nomadic women, urban women play a sharply reduced role in the productive process, even though they are more likely to head their own households. But peasant and nomadic women do not receive recognition for their own labour, not even for their offspring, as these belong to the patrilineal extended family (Kandiyoti 1984). In many parts of rural Turkey, women have been traditionally called the "enemy of the spoon", referring to the fact that they will share the food on the table without

contributing economically to the household (Berik, 1985). Berik's study of carpet weavers in rural Central Anatolia reveals that the labour power of the female weavers, and the wages that accrue to them, are controlled by male kin.

By contrast, wage work in the formal sector seems to improve women's standing in the household. A study of Turkish women factory workers showed that "married women factory workers in Bursa have gained a considerable degree of power over decision-making in their families as a result of their employment. Over half the married women who were interviewed reported that they and their husbands took decisions together and often consulted each other" (Ecevit 1991: 77).

## Egypt

In the late 1950s and during the administration of the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's public sector expanded significantly through a series of Egyptianization decrees (1956-59) which gave the Government control of foreign-owned assets, such as the Suez Canal. This was followed in the early 1960s by the adoption of a highly centralized development policy approach and a massive wave of nationalizations of Egyptian-owned enterprises in industry, banking, trade and transport. At the same time, the Government embarked on an employment drive whereby state-owned enterprises were forced to include among their annual targets the creation of significant numbers of new jobs; the administrative apparatus of the state was also expanded rapidly both at the central and local government level. Equally important was the objective of spreading health and education services in urban and rural areas with a corresponding growth of government employment in these services.

The state's guarantee of a job to all high school and university graduates encouraged women, including women from working class and

lower middle class families, to take advantage of the government's free education policy (Hoodfar 1991). A distinctive feature of the Nasserist state was its political support to the education of women and to their integration into national development. Labour Law 91 of 1954, over and above its guarantee of equal rights and equal wages, made special provisions for married women and mothers. Later, under Sadat, these provisions were expanded to facilitate women's labour market participation. This law was applied primarily in the public and government sectors, which made jobs in these areas particularly attractive to women. As a result, the state became the single most important employer of women. Since Nasser's time, many women have entered into previously male strongholds -- universities, the administration, professions, industry, the business world, politics.

By the mid-1980s, the Egyptian government was faced with the difficult issue of how to reduce its commitment to job creation in the face of severe recessionary conditions in the economy. This was in the context of a record level of 15.5 percent overall (open) unemployment, according to the 1986 population census (up from 7 percent in the 1976 census), and with poor prospects for either the domestic productive sectors or the Arab oil-rich markets to create significant job opportunities for Egyptian workers. Moreover, high inflation has effectively eroded the financial advantage of the white-collar work force. This has fueled social tensions -- including the growth of Islamism, with its attendant ideological and social pressures on women. Employed women now feel compelled to don *hijab* at work, even though they will claim that the turn to Islamic dress is their own choice.

The economic crisis in Egypt, as well as rapid demographic growth, limit formal employment opportunities for women. Thus the vast majority of Egyptian women are engaged in the informal sector, as street vendors and hawkers, selling food and other wares, working at home as seamstresses, generally engaged in a myriad of small-scale income-generating activities.

## Tunisia

Government policy since independence prioritized women's emancipation and integration in development, and the Constitution and civil code reflected and reinforced that position. Staunchly secular, President Habib Bourguiba made the participation of women in public life a major policy goal. In the Constitution all citizens are ensured the same rights and obligations as well as equality before the law. Polygamy and male repudiation were outlawed, allowing women the right to petition for divorce and custody of their children. The Tunisian Code gives greater rights to women and decreases the legal control of male kin over them. It establishes a minimum age for marriage as twenty for a man and seventeen for a girl (unlike Morocco's eighteen and fifteen, respectively), and stipulates that the bride must attend her own marriage ceremony and express her consent to marriage.

A law in 1960 made it possible for the minority of women who are members of the social insurance service (mainly those employed in industry, handicrafts, and services, with the exception of housework) the right to pregnancy-leave six weeks before delivery and six weeks afterwards. During this period 50 percent of monthly wages were to be paid (SIDA 1974). In the 1980s, the distribution of the female labour force was more balanced in Tunisia than in many other countries: 26 percent in agriculture, 48 percent in manufacturing, 21 percent in services. Women's participation in formal politics matched the trends in employment. In 1981 there were seven female deputies in parliament; in 1983 there were 50,000 female members of the ruling social-democratic Neo-Destour Party and 57,000 members of the National Union of Tunisian Women; and in 1985 some 492 women were voted municipal councillors around the country.

Economic problems have encouraged Islamist forces and threatened women's gains. In May 1989 Islamists competed openly in Tunisia's

parliamentary elections, winning 14 percent of the total vote and 30 percent in Tunis and other cities, beating the main secular opposition party, the Movement of Democratic Socialists, into third place. Although the Tunisian state remains opposed to Islamist political aspirations, more mosques have been built and Koranic universities restored since the removal of Habib Bourguiba.

### **Iraq**

In Iraq, the Ba'ath Party had an interest both in recruiting women into the labour force in the context of a continuing labour shortage, and in wresting women's allegiance away from loyalties to kin, family or ethnic group and shifting that allegiance to the party-state. The 1978 Personal Status Law, although limited in its objectives, aimed at reducing the control of extended families over women. In November 1977 the government conducted a census to determine the characteristics of the illiterate: 2.2 million illiterates, aged 15 to 45, of whom 70 percent were women. The government then passed laws requiring attendance at adult-literacy classes, made extensive use of trade unions and other "popular organizations", daily use of TV, and so forth. Different textbooks were prepared for peasants, workers, housewives, and so on (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 121). Women were recruited into state-controlled agencies and put through public education as well as vocational training and political indoctrination.

The ruling Baath party encouraged a wide range of employment for women, who by the late 1970s comprised 29 percent of the country's medical doctors, 46 percent of all dentists, 70 percent of pharmacists, 46 percent of its teachers and university lecturers, 33 percent of the staff of government departments, 26 percent of workers in industry, and 45 percent of those on farms. Maternity leave was comparatively generous, and jobs of pregnant women were protected.

On the other hand, a recent study stresses the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society, "reinforced by bedouin tribal values" and "Islamic ideology as tools to control women" (al-Khayyat 1990:11). This seems to create ambiguity and role conflict among women with education and jobs (p. 198).

## Iran

In the 1930s, the first Pahlavi monarch forcibly removed the veil from women in public. The second Pahlavi state granted women the right to vote in 1962 and in 1967 introduced the Family Protection Act which limited polygamy, allowed women to initiate divorce, and increased their child custody rights after divorce or widowhood. However, the Shah himself was opposed to "women's lib" and frequently derided the demands of Western feminists. Moreover, his reforms were in place for only ten years and did not have widespread impact. When the Khomeinists assumed power in 1979, one of their first steps was to abrogate the Family Protection Act. Interestingly, the very first display of opposition to the Islamists -- and this at the height of the new regime's popularity and support -- came from educated middle class women, in early March 1979. These were the women who had been the principal beneficiaries of several decades of modernization. Development -- however limited and skewed in its Iranian variant -- combined with state reforms had allowed a segment of the female population upward social mobility through education and employment, and created a stratum and generation of women who opposed veiling and rejected Islamist exhortations that working women in the civil service return to the joys of domesticity. These women were subsequently silenced -- or imprisoned, killed or exiled. But in an interesting twist (and a further illustration of the interplay of structure, consciousness, and agency), it is educated and employed Islamist women in Iran -- university professors, members of parliament, the widow of a former prime minister -- who are now demanding a modification of the



rigid gender rules which were implemented in the early 1980s (Tohidi 1990; Gerami 1990; Moghadam 1988, 1991b).

Government sector employment -- limited though it is -- is important for Iranian women. Nearly all women who are waged and salaried are in the public sector, where they enjoy insurance, pensions, and other benefits. Labour legislation provides women with 12 weeks of maternity leave. But in the private sector they are likely to be "self-employed" or unpaid family workers in agriculture or rug-weaving workshops and of course without any benefits at all.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which had a very pro-natalist policy in the early 1980s, has now adopted a family planning policy. This came in the wake of the results of the November 1986 national census of population and housing, which revealed a population growth rate of 3.2 per annum, one of the highest in the world.

## Algeria

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian state promoted industrialization in tandem with the preservation of the close-knit family union. Algeria's attitude towards family law and personal status oscillated for over 20 years. Legislation consisted of a "perplexing mismatch" of Maleki law and secular codes (Charrad 1990; Saadi 1991). Both the industrial strategy and the pro-natalist Boumedienne social policy worked against female employment. By the 1980s, as a result of a galloping birth rate, nearly three-quarters of Algeria's population was under the age of thirty. According to the 1987 Census, the employed population numbered 3.7 million men and a mere 365,000 women -- out of a total population of 13 million over the age of fifteen. The female share of the employed population was 8.8 percent. Still, this represents a steady increase in female employment since 1966.

Reasons for the low levels of female employment are Algeria's chronically high unemployment, a conservative cultural stance on the part of the leadership, and the specific development strategy pursued by the state. Algeria's development strategy was one of heavy industrialization (partly on the assumption that it would eventually encourage mechanized agriculture). In the new, large-scale factories, such as steelworks and petrochemicals, skilled workers were needed, and it was men who were trained for those jobs. The result was a very low female labour force participation in industry. As in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, women are an under-utilized source of labour -- with implications for fertility, population growth rates, and overall social development.

In the early 1980s the Algerian government began to make concessions to the growing Islamists in the National Assembly. A Family Code was drafted which alarmed many women and provoked protest demonstrations. In the midst of a privatization effort, faced with high rates of unemployment (in the order of 22 percent), a heavy debt servicing burden, and other assorted economic ills, Algerian policy-makers were unwilling to risk legislation that could potentially aggravate the situation, and thus conceded to the Islamists in the National Assembly. The final bill, passed in 1984, gives women the legal right to work, but renders them economic dependents of men. It strengthened the legal prerogatives of husbands, retained unequal inheritance between women and men, legalized polygamy, and reconfirmed the principle of matrimonial guardian. An innovation is that if the father dies, the mother (and not agnatic kin) now becomes automatically the child's guardian. Algeria's post-Boumedienne turn toward conservatism in family law was met with fierce opposition by women who quickly organized themselves into feminist and democratic groupings. But this has not stemmed the tide toward neopatriarchy. In the parliamentary elections of June 1990, the Islamist party

won the most seats, a situation which North African feminists and democrats felt was bound to adversely affect women's existing fragile and limited rights.

The result of the Algerian state's cultural conservatism is that women's participation in state and other social agencies is quite low when compared to male participation. For example, women comprise only 11 percent of the employees of ministries, 34 percent of schoolteachers, 24 percent of higher education instructors, and 36 percent of public health workers. There are no women in the sectors "affaires religieuses" and "protection civile" (Saadi 1991). Still, Algerian women are more likely to work in the government sector than in the private sector. Indeed, 86 percent of employed Algerian women are engaged in the public sector, as against 14 percent in the private sector. For Algerian men, the respective rates are 55 percent and 45 percent. Thus any contraction of the public sector would have devastating effects on women's fragile and limited employment situation.

### **Jordan**

In Jordan, one finds an overall low crude participation rate (19.6 percent in 1984 for both men and women), due partly to a very high rate of population growth (about 3.8 percent annually) and large under-15 population, high out-migration, and low female economic activity. During the 1970s the state encouraged education and indeed made educational compulsory for nine years. There has consequently been an impressive increase in female education: by 1984-85 girls accounted for some 48 percent of the total school enrollment (Hijab 1988). The area of women's employment, however, has been less impressive. In 1979, the percentage of economically active women in the total labour force was only about four percent, while the female share of employees was only nine percent. As in Yemen, out-migration of Jordanian male labour did not result in an increasing number of women being brought into the wage labour market; rather their activities in informal sector and as unpaid family workers increased. Labour shortages due to

migration led to labour importation, mainly Egyptians, at all levels of skills, rather than the training of women in marketable skills to meet the shortages.

Jordan's five year plan (1980-85) sought to further integrate women into the development process, and predicted an increase of the total number of women in the working age bracket, excluding agricultural workers, to nearly 14 percent. But by 1984 the crude female participation rate was only 4.8 percent. Nearly half of all women in the modern sector are in education, while textile workers represent about 30 percent of Jordan's female labour force. In an untoward economic situation characterized by a large external debt and high male unemployment, there has in fact been an implicit government policy to discourage female employment (Hijab, 1988). In the first parliamentary elections since 1967, held in November 1989, 34 out of 80 seats were won by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamists. This political development, too, is likely to stymie efforts to integrate women into public life.

### **North Yemen**

In North Yemen, the 1975 census and manpower survey listed only nine percent of all Yemeni women as participants in the urban modern sector labour force. These women are generally young, unmarried women in their late teens or early twenties, or widowed or divorced women. Interestingly enough, in Yemen's case female factory workers actually exceeded female government employees (even though both categories represent a fraction of the total labour force in these areas); female production workers tend to be older, illiterate, of low socio-economic status and often migrants to the cities. In government offices women employees are veiled. Barriers to female employment include the importation of foreign labour to compensate for male out-migration (rather than training domestic female labour), inadequate access to education, and "culturally defined attitudes and practices ... lack of

childcare facilities, and the legal code, the Sharia" (Myntti 1985). In 1983, only 2 percent of North Yemen women were literate, and the total fertility rate was 6.8. Fertility rates are high throughout the Gulf states and Libya, where female employment is also very limited.

Patriarchal ideology is so strong in the rural areas that even female-headed households caused by male out-migration to the oil-rich countries has not significantly changed women's position in the family and vis-à-vis men. According to Myntti, "male relatives remaining behind make the decisions as surrogates for the absent emigrant" (quoted in Morsy, 1990:141).

### **Saudi Arabia**

State personnel have designed policy not only to promote economic growth and development but also to reproduce traditional familial relations. In Saudi Arabia women's place is in the home and their life is more circumscribed than in any other Middle Eastern country. The percentage of Saudi women who work outside the home, mainly in the teaching and health sectors, is about five percent. Saudi culture -- devotion to Islam, extended-family values, the segregated status of females, and the al-Saud monarchic hegemony -- has been formulated in an increasingly deliberate fashion, constituting a new political culture which acts as a screen to insure that technological and human progress remains within acceptable bounds (Gallagher and Searle 1985). For example, to minimize sensitivities concerning male physicians and female patients, a substantial number of Saudi female physicians are being trained, whose efforts will be directed toward female patients. In the wake of the Gulf crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Saudi authorities called for wider participation of women in the labour force "in the area of human services and medical services within the context of fully preserving Islamic and social values." And yet the authorities cracked down on a group of 70 women, most of them university lecturers,

who demonstrated their desire for change by driving their own cars through the streets of Riyadh.

## **VI. Development, the State, and Women's Status**

"Socialist" ideology has sometimes motivated state support for female emancipation, including education and employment. An example is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, or South Yemen). Legal reform in the 1970s, modeled after that of other socialist states, expressly targeted the "traditional" or "feudal" family as "incompatible with the principles and programme of the National Democratic Revolution", ... "because its old relationships prevent it from playing a positive role in the building up of society" (Molyneux 1985). Left-wing radicals were responsible for the 1970 Constitution which explicitly included "women" as part of the "working people" and "productive forces", who had both the right and obligation to work. The PDRY state consequently went further than any other Middle Eastern regime in legislating gender equality and mandating women's active involvement in the construction of the new order. Another example is Afghanistan. When socialists came to power in Kabul in 1978, they too attempted to implement a wide-ranging and radical programme for women's emancipation, combining land reform with marriage reform and compulsory education.

Notwithstanding the centrality of state action in the determination of women's legal status and social positions, state capacity is itself subject to such internal and external constraints as economic resources, political legitimacy, the weight of cultural values and institutions, regional trade, capital and labour flows, world market prices and global power politics. In the case of South Yemen, poor resource endowments stymied government policy. In the case of Afghanistan, the political elite was unable to implement its radical programme for land reform and women's rights in the face of

massive internal opposition from rural and tribal groups, as well as a hostile international environment.

A more complex illustration of the vicissitudes of state policy is provided by Iran. In 1979 the new Islamic government abrogated many of the liberal codes instituted by the previous state, urged domesticity and family attachment for women, and discouraged contraception. By the mid-1980s a number of factors converged to modify and liberalize the Islamist state's position on gender. These factors included the expansion of the state apparatus, the dearth of male labour in a war situation, and women's own resistance to their second-class citizenship (Moghadam 1988). As mentioned above, rapid population growth in a situation of decreasing government revenue has led the government to adopt a family planning policy.

The active role of the state in national development has meant that for many women it is no longer a male guardian -- father or husband -- who is the provider, but the State. As Mernissi (1984) remarks,

... The North African woman of today usually dreams of having a steady, wage-paying job with social security and health and retirement benefits, at a State institution; these women don't look to a man any longer for their survival, but to the State. While perhaps not ideal, this is nevertheless a breakthrough, an erosion of tradition. It also partly explains the Moroccan women's active participation in the urbanization process: they are leaving rural areas in numbers equalling men's migrations, for a 'better life' in the cities -- and in European cities, as well.

The study of the Middle East has not figured prominently in the WID literature, but it should, for it is a good testing ground of certain propositions and assumptions of the literature. The proposition that development reduces the status of women assumes that women's status in peasant or herder society is higher. In fact, there are no peasant societies in which women are treated equally with men; everywhere the norm has been women's "social marginalization and economic centrality" (Meillassoux, 1981, cited in Richards and Waterbury 1990: 88). Women have always worked and engaged in

productive activity in the Middle East, especially in the large agrarian countries. Their participation in rural production, while considerable, has been historically devalued by the pervasive patriarchal ideology which sees women as "lacking in mind and religion" (Morsy 1990:138). It would appear that socio-economic development has at least benefited some strata of women in patriarchal societies by providing them with the means to enlarge their choices (through education and income-earning opportunities) and to improve their life-options.

Assumptions about the global quest of capital ignore the fact that there has been relatively little foreign investment in the Middle East, with implications for female proletarianization. Because the region is regarded first and foremost as a source of oil and petrodollars, international capital and Middle East states alike have not aggressively pursued foreign investment in the kind of industries likely to enhance female employment. The proposition that women everywhere have been "integrated into development" -- and to their distinct disadvantage -- should be modified in light of the fact that in the Middle East there continues to exist an exceedingly large population of under-utilized labour, that is, women. In countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Algeria, where women constitute under 10 percent of the measured labour force, and where their participation in the industrial sector is especially limited, "integrating women in development" is fairly revolutionary in its implications. In turn, policy-makers must be persuaded of the positive developmental pay-off of investing in further education and employment of women: a more skilled and competitive work force, stabilized population growth, healthier children, more prosperous households, an expanding tax base. Attention to the ways and means of integrating women in development and in employment therefore remains a pressing item on the national agenda of each country of the region. Although it is beyond the scope of the present paper to develop my argument, it can be



readily shown that in all historical cases of rapid economic growth and industrialization -- Soviet Russia, wartime USA, South Korea -- women were drawn into production and administration on a massive scale.

At the same time, the Middle East provides a positive example of the benefits of large public sectors for women. Women's entry into public life has been facilitated by state-sponsored education and by job opportunities in the expanding government sector and public services. Formal/modern sector employment and especially opportunities within the civil service have been an important source of status and livelihood. An important implication is that any contraction of the public sector wage bill due to privatization and structural adjustment could damage an already relatively fragile female resource base.

"Development" must be seen, therefore, to have had a differential impact on women's lives. Its effects have been positive as well as negative, depending on region, culture, and class. Positive effects of development, and especially of wage employment, on working class women includes their greater participation in decision-making in the household. Even women in EZPs or in world market factories have been known to express satisfaction with their factory jobs. In one study of Mexican *maquila* workers, almost two-thirds of respondents declared that they would keep working at their job even if they did not need the money (Tiano 1990). Fatima Mernissi's interviews with working women in a world market electronics plant show the value these women place on their jobs and the satisfaction employment brings to them. During a visit to a multinational pharmaceutical plant (not an EPZ) outside Casablanca in early December 1990, a sample of 20 women workers revealed that they enjoyed their jobs, were cognizant of the better conditions of work and higher wages at that plant, and would continue to work even if the household did not require their additional income. The workforce was unionized (the result of a bitter labour dispute some ten years

earlier), and several of the women with whom I spoke had been or were workers' representatives. On the other hand, transnational firms are not known for long-term stable employment, and women's continued employment in the large-scale private sector depends to a great extent upon the vagaries of international trade and the world market.

It is likely that as countries turn toward economic liberalization, encouraging manufacturing for export, increased trade, and foreign investment, women's employment will increase. However, the growth of small-scale manufacturing -- as distinct from employment in large and modern firms or in the public sector -- may not be in their best interests. At the end of the twentieth century, Middle Eastern working women have come a long way, but socio-economic development should be able to serve them better than it has.

## VII. Summary and Conclusion

State expansion, economic development, oil wealth, and increased integration within the world system have combined to create educational and employment opportunities favourable to women in the Middle East. Demographic characteristics have been changing dramatically. Although benefits have spread unevenly, they have undermined patriarchal attitudes and practices. But it appears that just as women have been making inroads into public life, including the work force, a cultural and political backlash in the form of conservative Islamist movements has taken shape and targeted them.

Female labour force participation is still low in relation to that of other regions of the world, and, of course, low in relation to male labour force participation. Several explanatory factors have been discussed in this paper. One is the general low level of industrialization and transnational activity in the region, and the small percentage of women in industrial jobs as compared

with the Southeast Asian and Latin American NICs. Although ISI opened up some employment opportunities for women -- for example, in state-run factories or in industrial plants in the private sector receiving state support -- import-substitution industrialization tended to be capital-intensive and to favour male employment. In particular, the oil-exporting countries chose a development strategy which relied on oil, gas and finance; this minimizes the use of labour and offers insignificant employment opportunities for women. Another factor is the ambivalence of state managers to equality and empowerment for women. The economic crisis facing the region is yet a third factor.

It is in this context of social and economic crisis -- and in the context of growing numbers of educated and employed women -- that Islamist movements have gained ascendancy in the region, placing enormous political and ideological pressures on women. At the same time, Islamist movements have many women supporters, and they have been recruiting within the universities. According to the Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Islamists are typically lower middle class of recent rural and small-town background, "experiencing for the first time life in huge metropolitan areas where foreign influence is most apparent and where impersonal forces are at maximum strength".

This paper has also shown that along with economic development there has been a concomitant change in the social structure, with the rise of modern classes of urban proletariat and salaried middle class. Developmentalist, welfarist states also have instituted legal reforms to bolster women's position within the family and in the society. The combined and cumulative effect of these social changes has been a differentiation of the female population, and an expansion of the range of options available to them, although life-options and life-chances are specific to social class. Social trends include later marriages, more education, formal sector employment,

smaller families, and greater decision-making among women. These trends are relevant to a small percentage of the urban female population, but they have been visible enough to result in opposition by conservative forces. The relative rise in the position of females is seen by conservative forces as having the greatest potential of any factor for destroying the patriarchal family and its political, economic, and demographic structure.

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TABLE 1

Evolution of Labour Force Participation in Selected Countries  
(in percent)

Country	Year	Male	Female	Total	% Female in EAP*
Algeria	1966	42.2	1.8	21.7	4.3
	1975	43.4	1.9	22.3	4.3
	1982	38.9	2.9	21.1	6.7
Egypt	1966	51.2	4.2	27.9	7.5
	1975	50.4	4.1	27.9	7.5
	1982	48.2	5.8	27.3	10.4
Iran	1966	50.7	8.3	30.2	12.8
	1976	48.1	8.9	29.1	15.3
	1982 **	46.3	7.0	27.6	12.6
	1986	45.5	5.4	25.9	10.0
Jordan	1961	42.4	2.6	22.9	5.7
	1971	43.1	2.6	23.1	5.6
	1975	44.4	3.0	24.2	6.0
	1979	38.0	3.3	21.3	7.4
Kuwait	1961	47.4	0.4	29.7	0.5
	1970	53.0	5.2	32.4	6.9
	1975	47.9	5.1	28.5	8.1
	1980	55.1	10.9	36.2	12.8
Libya	1964	46.6	2.7	25.6	5.1
	1975	47.4	2.7	25.9	5.0
Morocco	1960	50.1	5.9	28.0	10.6
	1971	44.5	8.0	26.3	15.2
	1975	44.4	7.9	26.1	15.1
	1982	47.9	11.6	29.6	19.6
Syria	1960	46.0	5.4	26.3	10.1
	1970	42.7	5.5	24.8	10.8
	1975	45.2	6.0	26.6	11.2
	1983	38.5	5.6	22.4	12.1

\* Economically active population.

\*\* The 1982 figures for Iran are for urban areas only.

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1981, 1985, Table 1; ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective, 1945-89*, Table 1, p. 60; H. Azzam, J. Abu Nasr, and I. Lorfing, "An Overview of Arab Women in Employment," in J. Abu Nasr, N. Khoury, and H. Azzam, eds., *Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World* (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1985), p. 21.

TABLE 2

## Employment Profile, Selected Regions

		Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East and North Africa	Asia and Ocenia	South Asia	East and South- east Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean
Labour force		40.6	30.9	46.4	35.6	54.2	35.1
Women in labour force		37.8	18.7	33.2	22.0	41.2	26.3
Labour force in agriculture	1965	77.8	62.5	75.1	72.0	77.2	45.1
	1985-87	70.3	38.9	64.1	59.6	67.3	25.3
Labour force in industry	1965	8.6	14.0	10.2	12.3	8.9	21.8
	1985-87	9.8	15.3	12.7	11.9	13.3	17.4
Labour force in services	1965	13.7	23.5	14.7	15.8	14.1	33.3
	1985-87	20.0	45.7	23.2	28.5	19.4	57.3

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (New York: OUP, 1990), Table 23, pp. 173-175.

TABLE 3

Percentage of Females among Production Workers  
(1970s and latest) (percent)

Country	Year	Production All Statuses*	Salaried
Afghanistan	1979	24.1	-
Algeria	1966	4.0	2.4
	1987	2.5	2.4
Egypt	1975	2.4	2.8 (1976)
	1984	5.8	-
Iran	1966	25.0	18.2
	1976	19.8	7.9
	1986	15.0	7.1
Iraq	1977	5.5	3.7
	1987	4.0	-
Israel	1972	12.1	-
	1987	13.4	14.3
Jordan	1979	1.0	-
Kuwait	1975	0.3	0.2
	1985	0.2	0.2
Lebanon	1970	10.0	8.1
Libya	1973	1.0	0.4
Morocco	1971	15.5	-
	1982	23.0	-
Sudan	1973	5.4	-
Syria	1970	5.3	4.0
	1981	4.0	3.0
	1984	3.8	-
Tunisia	1975	23.9	10.5
	1980	22.1	-
	1984	17.6	-
Turkey	1975	7.8	-
	1985	7.6	6.9
UAE	1975	0.1	0.1
	1980	0.1	0.1
Mexico	1960	10.4	-
	1970	12.8	10.9
	1980	16.8	15.3
South Korea	1955	13.2	48.6
	1966	25.2	19.3
	1975	28.0	27.7
	1980	25.8	28.5
	1988	31.1	29.3
	1989	31.0	31.6

\* includes own-account, employer, unpaid family worker and wage worker.

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1989-90*, Table 2B, and *Retrospective 1945-89*, Table 2B (Geneva: ILO, 1990); *National Census of Population and Housing*, November 1986 (Total Country), Table 14, p. 39 (Tehran: Central Statistical Office, 1987).

TABLE 4

Percentage of Females among Manufacturing Employees  
(1970s - 1980s)

Country	Year	Female Share
Afghanistan	1979	59.6
Algeria	1977	6.9
	1987	7.8
Bahrain	1971	1.0
	1981	2.4
Egypt	1976	6.5
	1984	12.3
Iran	1976	38.4
	1986	14.4
Iraq	1977	17.2
	1987	14.6
Israel	1972	24.0
	1982	25.2
Jordan	1979	5.9
Kuwait	1975	13.8
	1985	2.5
Libya	1973	7.4
Morocco	1971	-
	1982	36.1
PDRY	1973	13.5
Qatar	1986	0.8
Sudan	1973	16.5
Syria	1970	10.5
	1981	10.5
Tunisia	1975	51.6
	1984	55.5
Turkey	1975	17.6
	1985	15.2
UAE	1975	0.6
	1980	1.2

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective 1945-89* (Geneva: ILO, 1990), Table 2A; ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1989-90* (Geneva: ILO, 1990), Table 2A.

TABLE 5

Characteristics of the Economically Active Population  
Various Countries, 1980s

Country (year)	Total population	Total EAP	% female	Total salaried	% female
Algeria (1983)	20,192,000	3,632,594	6.8	n.a.	n.a. *
(1987)	23,037,916	5,341,102	9.2	04,137,736	8.8
Bahrain (1987)	278,481	73,972	19.3	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt (1984)	45,231,000	14,311,300	21.4	6,376,800	14
Iran (1986)	49,400,000	12,820,291	10	5,327,885	9.4
Iraq (1977)	12,000,477	3,133,939	17.3	1,864,701	7.9
(1983)	14,700,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Israel (1987)	4,365,200	1,494,100	39.0	1,110,800	41.5
Kuwait (1985)	1,697,301	670,385	19.7	619,722	20.8
Morocco (1982)	20,449,551	5,999,260	19.6	2,429,919	17.6
(1986)	24,000,000	14,000,000	35.0	n.a.	n.a.
Qatar (1986)	369,079	201,182	9.4	196,488	9.6
Sudan (1973)	14,113,590	3,473,278	19.9	905,942	7.4
Syria (1984)	9,870,800	2,356,000	13.8	1,216,781 **	12.4 **
Tunisia (1984)	6,975,450	2,137,210	21.2	1,173,630	14.3
Turkey (1985)	50,958,614	21,579,996	35.4	6,978,181	15.3
UAE (1980)	1,042,099	559,960	5.0	518,969	5.2

\* n.a. = not available

\*\* data for 1983.

Sources: CERED (Rabat 1989); *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 1987* (Alger 1989); ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* 1986, 1987 and 1988, Tables 1 and 2A; ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective 1945-89*, Table 2A; World Bank, *World Development Report 1985* (1990).

TABLE 6

Percent Distribution of Economically Active Women by Status of  
Employment in Selected Countries, Various Years

Country (year)	Employers and own-account workers	Salaried employees	Unpaid family workers	Not classified by status	Total
Algeria (1977) (1987) *	1.7	42.1	0.5	55.7	100%
Tunisia (1984)	27.2	38.7 (14.3) **	20.5	13.4	100%
Egypt (1983)	17.0	42.3 (14.5)	30.0	10.5	100%
Morocco (1982)	14.5	36.3 (18.0)	27.5	21.6	100%
Bahrain (1981)	0.9	88.6 (11.7)	-	10.3	100%
Iran (1976) (1986)	10.2 19.6	39.3 (12.0) 51.6 (9.4)	32.4 21.5	17.9 7.0	100% 100%
Iraq (1977)	10.6	27.3 (7.9)	58.0	3.6	100%
Israel (1982) (1986)	11.1 11.0	79.7 (40.0) 78.5 (41.1)	3.2 2.3	6.0 7.9	100% 100%
Kuwait (1985)	0.2	97.7 (20.8)	-	2.0	100%
Syria (1979) (1981) (1983)	9.9 11.4 9.8	41.7 (12.0) 60.9 (8.7) 48.0 (12.4)	44.5 22.2 36.9	3.9 4.0 4.7	100% 100% 100%
Turkey (1985)	4.7	14.0 (15.3)	79.2	2.0	100%
UAE (1980)	0.8	97.5 (5.2)	-	1.5	100%

\* Algeria's 1987 Census lists a female EAP of 492,442. Of that figure, 74% are employed ("occupées"), 13% are unemployed, and 13% are partly-employed housewives ("Femmes au foyer partiellement occupées").

\*\* This column refers to the female share of total employees, in percent.

Note about Iran: The 1986 Census (indeed, all previous censuses) seriously undercounts the female economically active population. Out of a total female population of 24 million, of whom perhaps 12 million may be presumed to be of working age, only 1 million are counted. Of that number, 50% are classified as "employees".

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1987, Table 2A; ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective 1945-89*, Table 2A; *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 1987* (Algiers 1989).



TABLE 7

Percent Distribution of Female Economically Active Population in Branches of Industry, Selected Countries, 1980s

Country Year	Industry Branches									NAD	Total Number
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8	Group 9		
Algeria 1985	3.6	11.9			2.7	2.7	3.0	75.7		-	326,000
Egypt 1984	41.2	0.003	8.6	0.3	0.6	6.8	1.1	13.7	23.8	4.7	2,354,600
Israel 1983	2.7	14.0		0.3	0.9	10.6	2.9	11.3	48.2	8.6	556,495
Kuwait 1983	0.08	0.25	0.96	0.05	0.89	2.2	1.5	2.2	89.3	1.5	132,128
Syria 1984	44.6	0.3	10.7	0.03	1.2	2.9	1.5	1.2	30.0	6.7	327,200
Tunisia 1984	22.1	0.4	40.6	1.1*	0.7	2.3	-	4.6	13.0	14.5	433,630
Turkey 1985	69.5	0.07	7.0	0.01	0.08	1.5	0.4	1.4	7.8	11.4	5,543,862

NAD = not adequately defined, unemployed persons not previously employed, and/or unemployed persons previously employed.

\* This includes groups 4 &amp; 7.

- Group 1 = agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
- Group 2 = mining and quarrying
- Group 3 = manufacturing
- Group 4 = electricity, gas and water
- Group 5 = construction
- Group 6 = wholesale/retail trade, restaurants and hotels
- Group 7 = transport, storage and communication
- Group 8 = financing, insurance, real estate and business services
- Group 9 = community, social and personal services

Source: ILO, *Yearbook Labour Statistics 1988*, Table 2A.

TABLE 8

Women's Employment by Sector, Percent Distribution:  
Cross-Regional Comparisons, mid-1980s

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels	Transport, storage, and communications	Financing, insurance, real estate, and business services	Community, social and personal services
Middle Eastern Countries						
Egypt	46.6	9.7	7.7	1.3	1.5	26.9
Tunisia	22.1	42.8	2.3 *	-	4.6	13.0
Turkey	69.5	7.2	1.5	0.4	1.4	7.8
Latin American Countries						
Brazil	15.4	12.1	11.1	0.9	2.5	54.2
Uruguay	0.5	21.8	15.0	2.1	5.8	53.6
Venezuela	1.7	15.8	22.0	1.6	7.8	49.0
Non-Muslim Asian Countries						
Philippines	31.0	13.6	25.1	0.6	1.9	27.0
Sri Lanka	60.7	26.6	5.1	1.4	3.6	1.7
Thailand	64.5	9.2	12.9	0.4	-	11.7
Muslim Asian Countries						
Indonesia	55.6	5.4	19.6	-	4.6	10.7
Malaysia	30.8	20.2	19.7	1.2	4.1	22.9
Pakistan	72.2	13.3	2.2	0.3	0.3	10.5
Selected European Countries						
Greece	34.0	16.2	17.8	2.0	4.9	24.3
Ireland	3.3	17.4	22.4	3.5	10.4	41.2
Italy	9.5	21.3	22.7	2.2	4.6	38.2
Spain	11.2	16.0	26.4	2.1	4.9	38.4

\* includes Group 4

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1988, Table 2A.  
ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1989, and *Retrospective 1945-1989*.

TABLE 9

Trends in Literacy, Men and Women, 1970 and 1985

	Literacy Rates (age 15 and over who can read and write)			
	1970		1985	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Afghanistan	13	2	39	8
Algeria	39	11	63	37
Bahrain	-	-	79	64
Egypt	50	20	59	30
Iran	40	17	62	39
Iraq	50	18	90	87
Israel	93	83	97	93
Jordan	64	29	87	63
Kuwait	65	42	76	63
Lebanon	79	58	86	69
Libya	60	13	81	50
Morocco	34	10	45	22
Oman	-	-	47	(1982) 12
Qatar	-	-	51	(1981) 51
Saudi Arabia	15	2	71	(1982) 31
Sudan	28	6	33	15
Syria	60	20	76	43
Tunisia	44	17	68	41
Turkey	69	35	86	(1984) 62
UAE	24	7	58	(1975) 38
Yemen	9	1	27	3
Yemen PDR	31	9	59	25

Sources: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Table 4, Table 8; UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1989* (Paris: UNESCO, 1989), Table 1.3; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (New York: OUP, 1990), Table 5.

TABLE 10

The Demographic Transition in the Arab World (after Allman, 1980)

Stage	Mortality	Fertility	Growth Rate	Fertility Differentials*	Modern Contraception	Countries in This Stage
1	High	High	Low	None	None	None
2	Declining	High and possibly increasing	High	None or slight	None or little	Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, YAR
3	Declining	High, probably at a maximum	High	Some	Beginning, but generally very little	Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait PDRY, Syria
4	Declining	Declining	Decreasing	Marked	Increasing use	Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon
5	Low	Low	Low	Slight	Widespread use	None

\* "Fertility Differentials" refers to differences within the country, such as between rural and urban areas, among socio-economic groups, and according to educational status.

UAE: United Arab Emirates

YAR: Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

PDRY: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)

Source: Basheer Nijim, "Spatial Aspects of Demographic Change in the Arab World," in Sami G. Hajjar, ed., *The Middle East: From Transition to Development* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), p. 37.

TABLE 11

## Trends in Fertility Rates and Contraceptive Use

	Total Fertility Rate		Contraceptive
	1965	1988	Prevalence Rate 1981-85
Afghanistan	7.1	-	2
Algeria	7.4	5.4	7
Bahrain	-	-	-
Egypt	6.8	4.5	30
Iran	7.1	5.6	23
Iraq	7.2	6.3	14
Israel	3.8	3.0	-
Jordan	8.0	6.4	26
Kuwait	7.4	3.7	-
Lebanon	6.2	-	53
Libya	7.4	6.8	-
Morocco	7.1	4.7	27
Oman	7.2	7.1	-
Qatar	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	7.3	7.1	-
Sudan	6.7	6.4	5
Syria	7.7	6.7	20
Tunisia	7.0	4.1	42
Turkey	5.8	3.7	51
UAE	6.8	4.7	-
Yemen	7.0	8.0	1
Yemen PDR	7.0	6.6	-

Sources: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Table 5; World Bank: *World Development Report 1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Table 27; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Table 20.

TABLE 12

Summary Measures of Demographic Characteristics from WFS Surveys:  
Middle East and North African Participants, early 1980s

	Egypt	Morocco	Sudan (North)	Tunisia	Jordan	Syria	Turkey	Yemen A.R.
Nuptiality								
1 Mean age at first marriage	21.3	21.3	21.3	23.9	21.6	22.1	20.4	16.9
2 % ever married age 15-19	22.5	22.1	21.8	5.2	19.0	22.7	22.4	61.7
3 Time spent in marriage	94.3	92.5	94.3	97.1	97.4	97.7	98.2	93.8
Fertility								
4 Crude birth rate	43 *	44 *	39	35 *	45	45	31 *	48
5 Total fertility rate	5.3	5.9	6.0	5.9	7.5	7.5	4.5	8.5
6 Children ever born to women 45-49	6.8	7.1	6.2	7.0	8.6	7.7	6.3	7.2
Child mortality								
7 Under age one	132	91	79	80	66	65	133	162
8 Under age five	191	142	151	107	80	86	166	237
Breastfeeding								
9 Full breastfeeding (months)	7.4	5.5	5.6	6.2	-	5.5	-	4.5
10 Breastfeeding (months)	17.4	14.5	15.9	14.1	11.1	11.6	14.3	11.0
Fertility preferences								
11 % want no more children	53.7	41.8	16.9	48.9	41.8	36.5	59.3	19.3
12 Mean desired family size	4.1	5.0	6.4	4.2	6.3	6.1	3.0	5.4
13 Wanted total fertility rate	3.1	3.7	4.8	3.6	5.1	5.6	2.4	7.4
Family Planning								
14 % aware of any contracept. m	90	84	51	95	97	78	88	25
15 % ever used any method	40	29	12	45	46	33	55	3
Currently using a method								
16 Efficient methods only	23	16	4	25	17	15	13	1
17 Any method	24	19	5	32	25	20	38	1
18 % willing to use contraception	43.1	23.7	8.7	27.0	36.6	20.4	39.0	4.9
19 Unmet need for contraception	17.9	10.8	7.6	12.5	10.6	10.5	12.8	10.7

Source: *World Fertility Survey: Major Findings and Implications* (Oxford and London: Alden Press, 1984), Appendix Table; pp. 52-54.

TABLE 13

## Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Enrollments

	% Primary School Enrollment (gross)		% Secondary School Enrollment (gross)		Tertiary Enrollment (Females as a % of Males)				
	1965		1986-1988		1965		1986-1988		1987-1988
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Afghanistan	26	5	27	14	4	1	10	5	18
Algeria	81	53	105	87	10	5	61	46	45
Bahrain	-	-	111 *	110 *	-	-	89 **	83 **	142
Egypt	90	60	100	79	37	15	79	58	52
Iran	85	40	122	105	24	11	57	39	43
Iraq	102	45	105	91	42	14	60	38	64
Isreal	95	95	94	97	46	51	79	87	94
Jordan	105	83	98	99	52	23	80	78	-
Kuwait	129	103	95	92	59	43	86	79	171
Lebanon	118	93	105	95	33	20	57	56	-
Libya	111	44	-	-	24	4	-	-	-
Morocco	78	35	85	56	16	5	43	30	49
Oman	-	-	103	92	-	-	46	29	71
Qatar	-	-	124 **	123 **	-	-	64 **	69 **	-
Saudi Arabia	36	11	78	65	7	1	52	35	76
Sudan	37	21	59	41	6	2	23	17	62
Syria	103	52	115	104	43	13	69	48	59
Tunisia	116	65	126	107	23	9	46	34	64
Turkey	118	83	121	113	22	9	57	34	55
UAE	-	-	98	100	-	-	55	66	-
Yemen	16	1	141	40	-	-	46	6	-
Yemen PDR	35	10	96	35	17	5	26	11	-

\* 1984-86

\*\* 1980-86

Sources: World Bank, *Social Indicators of Development 1988* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988); UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990*, Table 13; *Human Development Report 1991*, Tables 10, 31 (New York: Oxford University Press); UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Table 4.

TABLE 14

## Literacy, Education, Labor Force and Fertility Rates, 1980s

Country	Female Literacy 1985	Tertiary Enrollment (Females as % of Males) 1987-1988	Female Share of Salaried L.F.	Fertility Rate 1988
Afghanistan	8	18		-
Algeria	37	45		5.4
Bahrain	64	142		-
Egypt	30	52	14.0 (1984)	4.5
Iran	39	43	9.4 (1986)	5.6
Iraq	87	64		6.3
Israel	93	94	41.5 (1987)	3.0
Jordan	63	-		6.4
Kuwait	63	171	20.8 (1985)	3.7
Lebanon	69	-		-
Libya	50	-		6.8
Morocco	22	49	17.6 (1982)	4.7
Oman	12 (1982)	71		7.1
Qatar	51 (1981)	-	9.6 (1986)	-
Saudi Arabia	31 (1982)	76		7.1
Sudan	15	62		6.4
Syria	43	59	12.4 (1983)	6.7
Tunisia	41	64	14.3 (1985)	4.1
Turkey	62 (1984)	55	15.3 (1985)	3.7
UAE	38 (1975)	-	5.2 (1980)	4.7
Yemen	3	-		8.0
Yemen PDR	25			6.6

Sources: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1989*, Tables 4 and 5; UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1989*, Table 13; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990*, Table 20; UNDP, *Human Development Report 1991*, Tables 10, 31.



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