Abstract

Contemporary Africa reveals a range of causes, consequences and responses to conflicts which are increasingly interrelated as well as regional in character, as around the Great Lakes/Horn. Their economic and non-state features are undeniable, leading to some promising possibilities in terms of ‘track-two’ diplomacy both on and off the continent, such as the ‘Kimberley Process’ around ‘blood’ diamonds. Development corridors and trans-frontier peace-parks may also constitute innovative ways to moderate and contain conflict. As often, changeable African cases challenge established assumptions, analyses and policies, such as those around civil society, governance, regional and security studies.

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‘The continent comprises many Africas’ (Anglin 1999: 96).

‘Close to a fifth of the continent’s people now live in countries disrupted by wars and civil unrest that inflict enormous costs on these economies’ (ADB 2000: 23).

‘In future research (on new regionalism) there is a need to … Analyze systematically the achievements as well as negative effects of regional conflict resolution, regional interventions and peace-keeping operations in concrete cases as well as within a comparative framework’ (Schulz *et al.* 2001: 266 and 268).

The turn of the century in Africa was distinguished by three interrelated yet rather divergent sets of issues which swirled around the conflict (theory and policy) nexus. First, although most contemporary conflicts start within one particular country, all spill-over at least one border, and in the cases of conflicts around, say, Congo, Liberia or the Sudan, over several. Second, relatedly, as indicated in the next section, most controversially, a novel genre of analysis was advanced which asserted that there were economic rather than merely ethnic or personality factors behind current wars; and these economic interests tend to get advanced through cross-border trade in diamonds and other minerals in exchange for weapons. But third, simultaneously and somewhat in contradiction, there was also a growing awareness that not all the continent’s conflicts were the same. Rather, there began to be, perhaps somewhat reluctantly, a creeping recognition that its several long-standing struggles – all of which have pronounced ‘regional’ dimensions – have considerable vintage and difference. As *The Economist* (2001: 15) noted, long-standing conflicts in West Africa ‘have merged, to become a single regional war’.

So, given the start of the century this article focuses on the emergence of a political economy of violence approach (Cilliers and Mason 1999, Le Billon 2001 and Uvin 1998) around the troubled cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, with their distinctive regional features, whilst also recognizing that the continuing struggles in the Horn – most recently between Ethiopia and Eritrea – may have little if anything to do with the (political) economy. Moreover, I also recognize that conflicts are rarely static, so any investigation of such ongoing struggles has to appreciate that there are distinctive periods in all the continent’s continuing battles, especially during and after superpower/alliance bipolarity and/or apartheid in/around South Africa ... and now, late twentieth versus early twenty-first centuries? All of which pose profound dilemmas for even well-intentioned ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Ayoob 2001): how to transcend such through ‘the responsibility to protect’ (ICISS 2001, Weiss 2002).

After an overview of Africa’s several interrelated conflicts – and the set of analytic and policy responses to them from non-state as well as state, intra- as well as extra-continental sources – at the start of the new millennium, I turn to a pair of *distinctive regional cases*, proceeding from the more to the least orthodox, formal and inter-state. The penultimate section focuses on the ‘discovery’ of and myriad responses to ‘conflict’ diamonds. And I conclude by abstracting a set of possible futures for this pair of regional conflict types which entail profound policy as well as analytic implications: not just the desiderata of advancing human development/security through peace-keeping/-building but also the possibilities of authoritarian or anarchic regimes. Such an analysis
in part consists of a juxtaposition of regional (integration/interaction/competition) with security (causes and responses to conflict) literatures and genres, with an emphasis on prospects for non-state activity, both NGO and think tanks, leading to regional peace-building/tracks two and three/policy networks/communities (from the Horn of Africa to ‘Kimberley Process’, ‘humanitarian intervention’ to ‘responsibility to protect’ (ICISS 2001, MacLean et al. 2002, Stremlau 2000 and Weiss 2002)).

Surprisingly, at least until recently, uncomfortable dimensions of inequalities or poverty, with their potential for conflict, were rarely treated in debates about or critiques of ‘globalizations’ (Luckham et al. 2001, Nafziger and Auvinen 2000, (www.oup.co.uk/best.textbooks/politics/globalization2e, www.polity.co.uk/global) – at least until 11 September 2001 – despite the proliferation of analyses and discourses around them (Milanovic) www.res.org.uk/media/milanovic.htm). As Robert Wade (2001: 93) laments, in a critique of established fields of study which I echo in the final section below:

The global distribution of income is becoming ever more unequal. Anybody interested in the wealth and poverty of nations must be interested in the global distribution of income ... Despite its importance, this issue has received rather little attention within the fields of development studies, international relations, and (until very recently) international economics.
1 Overview

In this opening section, I treat the salient interrelated sets of issues around Africa’s ongoing regional conflicts, to which I return at the end: analytic or theoretical approaches and policy or applied responses (Dunn and Shaw 2001, McGowan and Nel 2002, Vale et al. 2001).

1.1 Conceptual frameworks

Just as Africa is heterogeneous, so likewise are the causes and characteristics of its ubiquitous conflicts especially if the analysis stretches over time, particularly during and after the Cold War and/or apartheid. Notwithstanding the power of the ‘new’ political economy of violence perspective, then, the apparent diversities in causes and courses, scale and spill-over of both conflicts and peace-building partnerships, suggest the need to reconsider whether there can ever be one singular continental perspective or rather a group of regional forms. Africa has had a varied set of historical experiences, in terms of imperial connections and economic relations, let alone ecological contexts. Just as Samir Amin proposed distinguishing an analytic trio of Africas in the early 1970s so, at the turn of the century, learning from Douglas Anglin’s opening assertion, we might identify several – in fact three – distinct regions in terms of both types of conflict and peace-making responses, informed by insights drawn from the embryonic perspectives termed ‘new regionalisms’ (Shaw 2000). In turn, the latter two provide the table of contents of this paper as I proceed from the first to the last, even if the place or definition of cases like Somalia and the Sudan remain problematic/changeable:

(a) orthodox inter-state/-regime conflicts and responses (e.g. Ethiopia and Eritrea);

(b) semi-orthodox, semi-state (economic) conflicts and responses (Angola, Congo and Sudan); and

(c) non-orthodox, largely non-state, conflicts and responses (Somalia and West Africa).

As we will see below, the emerging political economy of violence perspective relates more to types (c) and (b) than (a). The apparent resilience of conflict in Africa has begun to generate a critical analysis which is novel in approach but disturbing in terms of implications, let alone curious in terms of origins/correlates (Berdal and Malone 2000). The political economy of violence perspective (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Duffield 2001, Forcese 2001, Reno 1998, Smillie et al. 2000) suggests that at least some of these resilient wars are more about economic resources/survival than, say, ethnicity, ideology, region, religion etc. In the next subsection as well as the final section, I seek to begin to identify some of the problematic implications of such a perspective for several interrelated analytic approaches, as well as for state and non-state policy choices/directions.

In particular, I raise a series of questions about a set of implications arising from this emerging political economy of conflict genre for all three established actor types in the ‘governance’ nexus or ‘triangle’ (Shaw 2001); i.e. not just for states but also for private sectors and civil societies, as indicated in a recent generic diagram (see below) from the Commonwealth Foundation (1999: 16), which suggests that the state ‘corner’ is shrinking while the other two are growing. Clearly, the African state is in ‘transition’
towards both down-sizing and redefinition given two decades of neo-liberal conditionalities; hence the relative rise of NGOs and multinational corporations (MNCs) (MacLean et al. 2001). But both of the latter are themselves beginning to confront troubling questions about their own attitudes to and practices in such ubiquitous and seemingly endless conflict situations (Bryans et al. 1999, Spearin 2000). And the triangle may be severed or dysfunctional in situations where one or all of the parties seek to destabilize rather than advance peace; as indicated below this may lead to it being superseded by a quadrangle.

As William Reno (1998) argues, as weak(ened) African states began to lose control throughout their countries, of agendas, armies, identities, media, resources, territories etc. so conflicts multiplied over the shrinking national cake (cf Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.). Effective authority for ‘governance’ came to reside elsewhere, leading to an inability to contain either the causes or consequences of conflict. Such a ‘regime vacuum’ presents profound dilemmas for the prospects of efficacious ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Shaw 2001 and 2002) or ‘responsibility to protect’ (ICISS 2001). In turn, the expectations of and pressures on not only private security companies (PSCs) but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including think tanks, are intensifying as surrogates of effective national regimes: onto track two or three by default rather than by design.

Inequalities and insecurities have helped to spawn a new set of ‘non-traditional’ security issues which reduce levels of ‘human security’ (Canada 2000, Thomas 2000, UNDP 1999, UNESCO 2000) such as economic, ecological, gender and social security, especially threats from gangs and guns, droughts and floods, migrations and refugees, infectious diseases and viruses etc. (Axworthy 2001, MacLean and Shaw 2001). In turn, these have served to intensify traditional as well as new varieties of insecurity or threat, exacerbated by the proliferation of non-state (i.e. private) as well as state security formations as indicated.

Furthermore, as examined further below, the diminished African state (Reno 1998) cannot any longer afford much of a regular military establishment if it ever could. However, at least until 1990, the logic of the Cold War helped to keep both regimes and armies in business. But the post-bipolar era has posed challenges to the sustainability of
the political economy of armies as well as mafias (Howe 2001). As military budgets decline so statutory forces have had to begin to learn to fend for themselves; hence the apparent willingness of some African governments to ‘sell’ statutory forces to UN and other PKOs, even if some/all of the ‘off-budget’ proceeds go into private pockets rather than national exchequers. Moreover, men in uniform have learned to take them off after hours to pursue private gain as bandits, pirates etc. And demobilized soldiers tend to have few other life skills other than using their weapons to secure at least their own Basic Human Needs (BHNs) (Kingma 2000).

As militaries become more autonomous, so their relationships with state and companies change. Hence the imperative of recognizing, as suggested above already, that the ‘triangle’ of state-civil society-economy may become quadrilateral in which the military acts in a manner increasingly independent of the state in both economic and security (and hence political) matters: soldiers in business and soldiers as mercenaries. In which case, established notions of civil-military relations are in for a profound shock, leading towards the imperative of ‘reform’ of the military sector (Howe 2001).

1.2 Policy responses

Regional conflicts in Africa – both more traditional and non-traditional – have increasingly become of global concern. This is particularly so for diasporas and for crisis or developmental NGOs, now stretching to include consumer groups sanctioning particular offending companies which induce ameliorative reactions from brand managers (see Klein 2000 on the trio of Nestle, Nike and Shell campaigns and corporate responses). So, unlike the Cold War period before the 1990s, Western involvement is no longer an echo of broader bipolar tensions. Yet, as suggested already, wars’ internal causes cannot be separated from international contexts, particularly neo-liberalism as ideology and globalizations as condition. In short, the characteristic mixture of economic stagnation and growing inequality is a flammable one, even if it has not always lead to overt antagonism and confrontation, in part because of some authoritarian reactions as well as anarchic conditions (Dunn and Shaw 2001).

The emergence of regional arms races as well as conflicts – rather than any anticipated ‘peace dividend’ (which was restricted to a few cases like Mozambique) – has profound developmental implications as human and financial resources get diverted into the military. Prospects for regional development recede as conflicts both escalate and proliferate and ‘off-budget’ incomes and expenditures become priorities for regimes and leaders alike. And such negative consequences increase with the proliferation of short-term peace-keeping operations for both militaries and NGOs. Such negative developmental implications of civil wars are further magnified if parallel private sectors and interests are also recognized. And the longer-term implications of protracted conflict for both civil-military relations as well as the corruption of civic culture/civil society are equally worrisome, tending to undermine any apparent progress towards formal democratic processes (Brommelhorster and Paes 2003, Howe 2001).

A kaleidoscopic array of inter-regime and (often!) -regional ‘alliances’ has come to characterize African inter-state relations since independence. In addition to continental coalitions around the founding of the OAU, a series of sub-continental networks emerged in Eastern and then Southern Africa in the post-colonial era over regional integration and national liberation (Clapham 1996). Definitions of regions remain fluid
and problematic (Grant and Soderbaum 2003). As a recent *Strategic Survey* from the IISS (2000) suggests at present both the Horn and the Great Lakes Region are characterized by ‘interlocking wars’ based on tactical rather than continuing patterns of alliance. The succession of Kabila I by Kabila II indicates how fluid are these tactical arrangements as the kaleidoscope of interrelated intra-African armies, parties, regimes and extra-African associates shifted again in 2001/2.

According to Howe (2001), Mills and Stremlau (1999) etc. both mining companies and international financial institutions (IFIs) as well as national regimes have come to sanction the hiring of private security forces in tough times/places, such as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone. Given restrictive limits on the terms of any commitment of statutory forces from the North – at least prior to 11 September 2001 – and reflective of the new revisionist/realist mood, informed analysts like Herbert Howe (2001: 187-241) have begun to countenance *mercenary interventions when necessary* if other actions/sanctions have been insufficient. But perhaps even more surprisingly, NGOs engaged in peace-building have likewise come to consider the possibility/necessity of such contracts. In ‘Mean Times’, a report for CARE Canada and related Canadian and global NGOs on ‘Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies: stark choices, cruel dilemmas’, Bryans *et al.* (1999) come to recommend that: ‘NGOs should consider the privatization of security for humanitarian purposes’. Such hitherto unthinkable possibilities pose profound challenges for both analysis and practice, whether established academics so recognize or not, as indicated in the final section.

Moreover, nowadays both conflicts and responses to them increasingly involve a *heterogeneous range of state/non-state actors at all levels, from local to global: onto peace partnerships or networks*. So, in addition to official actors, private companies and non-governmental organizations are associated with peace-keeping policies and practices in Africa as elsewhere (Beman and Sams 2000, Mbabazi *et al.* 2002, Mekenkamp *et al.* 1999). As Lloyd Axworthy (2001: 23) reflected after his years as foreign minister in Canada:

> Actualising the concept of human security requires all actors – states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and business – to act responsibly.

Given the complexities as well as protractedness of contemporary peace-building, let alone constraints on governments’ budgets and roles, we can expect such non-state actors to come to play increasingly central roles in peace operations in the new century. Almost all state and inter-state institutions are under pressure from and coordinate with a variety of non-state agencies in both specific and general policies and practices over peace support measures: aspects of an emerging ‘Global Compact’ (www.unglobalcompact.org). Kofi Annan in his millennium review characterizes these as ‘complex peace operations’ (UN 2000a: 48) rather than ‘complex political emergencies’ (Cliffe 1999); responsibility to protect rather than humanitarian intervention. Such continuous forms of communication and coordination among the trio of actor types at all levels, as illustrated below, can be regarded as a novel variety of governance. I propose the notion of ‘tracks two/three governance’ to embrace such processes and policies, with implications for the pattern of long-term human development/security in different regions of the continent.
During the 1990s, a set of non-state think tanks emerged within and around Africa as partial responses to its conflicts. These often play regional rather than just national roles and tend to be concentrated in Southern Africa rather than elsewhere. Moreover, the regional salience of such embryonic analytic and/or advocacy communities (Mbabazi et al. 2002) varies considerably; i.e. progress towards any regional ‘security community’ (Adler and Barnett 1998) is uneven and certainly not unilinear. These may also be involved in direct ‘track two’ type confidence- and peace-building activities in addition to engaging in informed analysis and creative policy inputs (Mbabazi et al. 2002, MacLean and Shaw 2001). Such not-for-profit institutions have become especially well-developed in post-apartheid South Africa – e.g. ACCORD, CCR, ISS and SAIUA (all in the list of web-sites in the references) – but may also be found elsewhere, such as the Centre for Foreign Relations in Dar es Salaam and the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs in Lagos. They have come to reflect growing continental and global concerns such as peace-keeping, small arms/landmines etc. And, typically, they connect with national NGO networks and have begun to engage in training for indigenous capacity in peace-building, both military and NGO.

The maturation of such institutions and their roles is apparent in two massive compendiums at the turn of the century on conflict prevention and peace-keeping on the continent (Beman and Sams 2000, Mekenkamp 1999, www.euconflict.org). Yet the demand for ‘third party’ interventions by (preferably indigenous) tracks two and three, given state and economic declines, far outstrips their ability to respond, given their meagre resources which are out of proportion to the pressures. Clearly an effective continent-wide network of such indigenous as well as international human security think tanks/NGOs would be an essential first step towards a sustainable track two and three capability (Mbabazi and Shaw 2000, Mbabazi et al. 2002). But their roles are likely to be more circumscribed in inter-state rather than less formal conflicts as indicated in the pair of case studies below. I do not deal with the Horn here, in part as one of its central confrontations – that between Eritrea and Ethiopia – is *sui generis*: inter- rather than semi- or non-state even as it impacts macro-regional wars, such as that in and around the Sudan.

2 Angola, Congo and the Great Lakes

‘The debilitating war in Congo is the widest international war in Africa’s history and poses an unprecedented foreign policy challenge’ (Boya 2001: 71).

The quagmire of Congo – ‘one of the world’s most complicated wars … one of the world’s most troubling …’ (Seybolt 2000: 59) – soon dragged down the embryonic grouping of ‘new Africans’. The Congo has always confounded its rulers, from Leopold II to Mobutu, who both ran it as a personal colony or fiefdom. Kabila II likewise soon succumbed to illusions of grandeur even while his idiosyncratic rule consisted of selling off whatever remained of the family jewels to fellow African presidential ‘protectors’.

However, ‘middle’ Africa – from the Horn to Southern Africa – currently offers two contrasting, albeit complicated – sets of conflicts: Congo and the Great Lakes on the one hand, and Angola on the other. The latter is the most divisive and intense, the
former the most complex and regional. Together, they challenge naïve, ill-informed perspectives.

Whilst there has been a series of largely African state-led efforts in regional, continental and global fora to negotiate and implement cease-fires, such as the mid-1999 Lusaka Accord and April 2002 Sun City talks, in reality Congo has been partitioned by a group of neighbouring leaders who have paid their statutory forces by allowing (some!) access to the loot, with profound long-term implications in terms of casualties (3-4 million deaths thus far), civil-military relations, corruption etc. Just as the Congo was initially the possession of the King of Belgium rather than the Belgian state, by century’s end, Congo was again divided among African regime and party leaders.

Across the border between Congo and Angola, Canada’s then-Ambassador to the UN in New York, Robert Fowler, given Canada’s two-year seat on the Security Council, served as Chair of the UN’s Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA. He prepared the first, critical report for the UN on causes of the conflict in Angola (Fowler Report 2000) which named names of UNITA’s high-level accomplices in Africa and Europe, as examined further in the next section. This raised a number of sensitive interrelated issues for policy discourses within the UN and its member-states. If diamonds (and oil) kept the civil strife alive for both sides, at least until the assassination of Savimbi in early 2002, then what does that tell us about the intolerable conditions – nightmare – of the majority for whom (human) security/development is but a dream. Subsequent UN reports focused on Congo and West Africa with equally telling data.

Moreover, the ‘loot’ in Congo as elsewhere is not static: as global markets in diamonds and gold etc. change so does the interest of mafias, mercenaries, miners, smugglers, soldiers etc. For example, as the price of hard metals like platinum escalated early in the new century, so informal sector suppliers in the Congo began to concentrate on titanium rather than diamonds or gold! The complexities and dynamics of such interrelated, regionalized struggles on the continent are well-captured by Margareta Sollenberg et al. (1999: 23) with important implications for policy as well as analysis:

Three types of external (intra-African) military involvement can be seen:

(a) external military assistance, including either arms sales of direct military support to a government (e.g. Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC);

(b) direct military intervention of foreign troops directed against a government (e.g. Rwanda’s and Uganda’s intervention in the DRC); and

(c) indirect external intervention, that is, support of various kinds to rebel groups operating against a government (e.g. Sudan’s support of the LRA and the ADF in Uganda in the form of arms and logistic assistance).

A fourth type of external involvement, that by countries outside Africa, has become less explicit since the end of the Cold War, although it still exists.
And the latter increasingly involves private extra-continental economic and strategic interests rather than those of states. The trio of authoritative UN reports in 2000/1 as well as criminal investigations in Paris reveal private links between African oil and precious metals and Eastern (Russian, Ukrainian and Bulgarian, in particular) arms suppliers. Two Israeli-based East European entrepreneurs are especially engaged in the triangular trade involving diamonds to Tel Aviv: Lev Leviev’s Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp) and Arkady Gaydamak’s Africa-Israel Investments. As Africa Confidential (9 February 2001: 1) cautioned: ‘The political cost of the arms-for-oil scandal is growing fast in Luanda and Paris. It reaches right across the power elite in the two countries’. But if Congo/Great Lakes/Angola are complicated conflicts, their complexities pale by contrast to those in West Africa, the least formal or traditional set of wars.

Both these regional conflagrations, however, reveal the ubiquitous, corrosive character of diamonds and related high value products like oil and gas: states who control their production can import material (and operatives) who keep them in power (Campbell 2002, Cilliers and Dietrich 2000, Howe 2001). Thus, UNITA transformed itself after the end of the Cold War into a ‘regime’ which controlled the alluvial diamond fields rather than monopolized Western, especially US, assistance. But as its territorial reach shrank by the end of the 1990s, especially with the loss of access to the Cuango Valley, its diamond income declined: by the end of the century, while MPLA secured an annual income of US$1 billion from diamonds, that for UNITA was down to US$100 million.

3 West Africa and ‘blood diamonds’

‘Instead of attracting and mobilising a popular following in Sierra Leone to overthrow the country’s corrupt and inept government, RUF commanders have fought the government with guns bought with diamonds, brought from Liberia, or captured from their enemies. They do not have to rely on the goodwill of local inhabitants or the contributions of their energies and wealth, and they do not have to engage in the arduous political and organisational task of building a mass movement to fight their way to power. The RUF bases its political power on control over diamonds, much as had the corrupt Sierra Leone politicians that the RUF criticised’ (Reno 2001: 222).

Other than the long-standing and destructive conflict around Angola, the most controversial and resilient contemporary struggle has been in West Africa (Cockburn 2002): the interrelated conflicts in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, concentrated around the confluence of their three borders. At the turn of the century, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) commissioned Ian Smillie et al. to research and write a report on the real economic causes of the continuing conflict in the unhappy country and region of Sierra Leone. Their report (Smillie et al. 2000) on ‘The Heart of the Matter; Sierra Leone, diamonds and human security’ was a primary catalyst in snowballing effects around the production chain of ‘dirty’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds and the possibilities of sanctioning the informal/illegal sector and its official/formal associates/allies at certain choke-points.

In short, given the rather dramatic change in state-economy-society relations in Sierra Leone post-independence, accelerated by structural adjustment conditionalities as well
as corrupt regimes, the established diamond sector became informalized and criminalized under the Siaka Stevens regimes. Thus the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) was superseded by the so-called National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) with its Lebanese connections, and the national income, infrastructure and integrity rapidly declined.

However, by contrast to the Harker if not the Fowler report, that from the PAC helped inform and generate parallel debates in a variety of organizations, including the US Congress, Canadian Parliament and the UN, centred on the remarkable ‘Kimberley Process’, inaugurated in May 2000 in the South African city where the industry began. The latter brought together the crucial elements in an attempt to contain the negative impacts of informal sector extraction and distribution particularly in Southern Africa: from capital to labour, environmental and women’s groups to non-violent and local communities: the bases of a new form of governance appropriate to local to global interests (‘Other Facets’ 2001-2). Symbolically, coinciding with the Kimberley deliberations and as the war in Sierra Leone heated up again, De Beers and Debswana opened the extension of the Orapa mine in Botswana. The contrast between growth levels and standards of living and human development/security in two small diamond-producing African states – Botswana and Sierra Leone – could not be starker, with profound implications for analysis and praxis, as suggested below (Parpart and Shaw 2002, ‘Other Facets’ 2001-2). As Ralph Hazelton (2002: 1) suggests:

South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have been at the forefront of the campaign to halt conflict diamonds and to create a certification system which would assist in this. They, along with the diamond industry, have also been the most vocal champions of ‘prosperity diamonds’ and ‘diamonds for development’. NGOs focusing on conflict diamonds have been accused of neglecting this side of the coin and of endangering the entire diamond industry.

4 Kimberley Process: divergent corporate and regional interests

Corporate, inter-regional and other responses to the ‘blood’ diamonds campaign have been illustrative of a wider process of private sector reactions to such increasingly frequent and articulate allegations of inappropriate and/or illegitimate or illegal operations: threats of consumer and other boycotts or sanctions (Klein 2000). Following the turn of the century revelations from intra- as well as extra-continental sources (Campbell 2002, Cilliers and Dietrich 2000) of diamonds as a primary cause of conflict (Global Witness 2000a and b, Smillie et al. 2000), De Beers undertook a series of interrelated defensive or preemptive corporate strategies not only to engage in negotiations at multiple levels with and initiatives by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, especially their new World Diamond Council (www.worlddiamondcouncil.com) – intense discussions about corporate and (inter)national regulations to contain the threat to the industry from blood diamonds – but also to advance itself as a (very profitable!) consumer brand (Klein 2000, Stein 2001) rather than a diamond explorer or miner. In late 2000, De Beers created a ‘strategic alliance’ with the leading luxury goods brand in the world, LVMH. With Moet Hennesssey Louis Vuitton, over the next few years the De Beers brand intends (if the EU and US authorities permit) to establish a network of upmarket retail
outlets to sell its own brand of diamond jewellery, which it is to source from anywhere, not just its own mines (www.debeers.com).

Clearly the threat to the De Beers’ oligopoly posed by the trans-national controversy over informal or illegal diamonds as a cause of conflict has led to a series of preemptive measures, especially given the delicate gender dimensions of both the character of extraction/conflict and commodity chain in this instance: from male miners, both formal and informal, through male distributors and polishers to female fingers, the latter being largely affluent northern consumers. Once the monopoly and myth of diamonds ‘being forever’ are broken (www.forevermark.com), the market and price could collapse with profound implications for the relatively successful local economies of southern Africa (Hazelton 2002). Hence the possibility of new entrants/technologies and logistics, especially given novel sectors, exists.

Already, the contrast in the developmental impacts of the production and distribution of gems from divergent small states like Botswana and Sierra Leone is palpable (see Cockburn 2002), in part a function of the production techniques and capital/technological requirements for kimberlite versus alluvial versus deposits, respectively. The former has been Africa’s – indeed at 9.2 per cent the world’s – fastest growing economy for three decades and now is solidly in the rank of ‘medium’ HDI states. By contrast, the latter typically comes last in the list of countries in the UNDP’s annual human development index; i.e. the bottom of the class of even ‘low’ HDI (Hazelton 2002, UNDP 1999). As Hazelton notes (2002: 3), the centrality of the diamond sector in Botswana, now the world’s largest, is palpable: almost US$2 billion p.a., generating a profit of almost US$1.7 billion; 33 per cent of GDP, 60 per cent of government revenue and 79 per cent exports.

The potential and cumulative impacts of ‘dirty diamonds’ on De Beers and other formal sector producers (particularly Southern African states and companies as well as labour and communities) cannot be minimized, hence De Beers’ corporate plan. Furthermore, the global diamond industry created the World Diamond Council moved to improve corporate and (inter)national regulation to outlaw the 4 per cent of ‘rough diamonds’ which it claims is the only source of the controversial conflict diamonds, indicating willingness to negotiate with all-comers including (I)NGOs (www.diamond.net, www.worlddiamondcouncil.com).

The May 2000 to mid-2002 multi-stakeholder ‘Kimberley Process’ is symptomatic of the complexities of state and non-state ‘foreign policy’ in the new century, for a diversity of actors in Canada, South Africa etc. (Grant et al. 2003). The participants from states and interstate institutions, companies and (I)NGOs worked through a variety of channels to advance effective sanctions: G8 (including Russia), OAU, World Diamond Council, World Federation of Diamond Bourses as well as the UN (‘Other Facets’ 2001-2), even if some INGOs continue to express scepticism or reservations (see ‘Kimberley Process Report Card on Conflict Diamonds, Valentine’s Day 2002’ in ‘Other Facets’, 5, March 2002: 4). Sanctions on any remaining uncertified blood diamonds are intended not only to deter conflict but also to support legitimate enterprises and governments: a delicate balancing act if sanctions are to be really ‘smart’ (Hart 2002).

There are, then, emerging inter-regional tensions between the formal, industrial diamond sector in Southern Africa and the informal, non-industrial elsewhere on the
continent, notably around Angola/Congo and Sierra Leone (see Cockburn 2002). The former have tried to dissociate themselves from any notion that all diamonds are tainted, as any negative impact of such a global campaign on their capital- and technology-intensive production would have profound developmental implications, especially for Botswana and somewhat for Namibia. Such differences exacerbate, for example, tensions around Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC which has accelerated the enrichment of the Mugabe elite. Just as in the other two types of regional conflict and response – i.e. more ‘traditional’ contexts – distinctive patterns of alliance have become quite apparent around the issue of conflict diamonds in West Africa (and Angola): African states like Botswana and Namibia as well as South Africa along with mining capital and organized labour concentrated in Southern Africa (Hazelton 2002) versus warlords and informal traders, certain transnational mineral entrepreneurs centred on Congo and Sierra Leone, even Antwerp versus Tel Aviv or other emerging centre for polishing in the Gulf and Ukraine – with profound implications for policy and practice. Such distinctive patterns of production, distribution and accumulation, let alone conflict, should come as no surprise as they were precisely the focus of Samir Amin’s tentative typology of the continent’s several political economies over 30 years ago. ‘African capitalism’ may differ from that on other continents, but in turn there are pronounced inter-regional differences within the continent, especially Southern African capital, labour, technology and infrastructure and those elsewhere (Dunn and Shaw 2001).

In short, the real causes of and responses to conflict on the continent remain problematic at the start of the new century, in part because of outmoded analytic and policy assumptions and approaches and, in part, because of a growing diversity of real interests (e.g. diamond (re!)exports from countries entrenched in the DRC like Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe!). Intra- and extra-continental, state and non-state responses to Africa’s continuing crises will necessitate a mixture of diplomacy and pressure, economics and politics, positive and negative sanctions, tracks two and three etc. if there is to be any prospect of a genuine and sustainable African Renaissance/Initiative/Partnership in the first decade of the new century as the intra-continental alliance of heavyweights – Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa – continues to advocate at the World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org) and elsewhere. The PE of violence perspective tends to retard any such prospect just as tracks two and three can advance it.

5 Conclusions and projections

The actualities of African state and non-state foreign policy/international relations/political economy are in great flux as both global and local contexts continue to evolve (Dunn and Shaw 2001). Neither analyses nor policies towards them have really kept pace with the actual shifts in the relationships among states, companies and civil societies (Shaw 2001). And, as indicated below, such trilateral relations can lead backwards towards authoritarian or anarchic regimes as well as forwards towards peacekeeping/-building, let alone human security or development, as indicated in the following section on sub-regional peace initiatives (Grant and Soderbaum 2003).
5.1 Regionalisms: onto zones of peace?

Therefore, distinctions need to be made to indicate the importance of pragmatic and flexible varieties of peace-making interventions from both intra- and extra-regional sources as well as the imperative of informed and nuanced analyses if (state and non-state) policy responses are to be as appropriate as possible. They also imply the unlikelihood of a series of distinct ‘security communities’ on the continent (Adler and Barnett 1998); i.e. one singular African renaissance.

Hence the interesting evolution and implementation, concentrated to date in Southern Africa, of a set of corridors, notably that from Maputo, which constitute potential sub-regional zones of peace. As they involve a range of heterogeneous partners in their governance or development, notably local-to-national governments and companies, they can be compared to a diverse range of ‘triangles’, often export-processing zones (EPZs), in Southeast and East Asia.

Similarly, the diplomacy around and the development of trans-frontier or cross-border peace-parks offer alternatives to regional conflict, even if they all include South Africa as a partner. The first, between Northern Cape and Botswana – Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park – was inaugurated in mid-May 2000 (Tevera 2002).

Both of these two types of sub-regional governance architectures for human development/security – corridors and peace-parks – may have significant longer-term implications for human security/development, in part as they have broader and deeper roots among a diversity of actors – communities, economic, ecological, infrastructural, functional, political etc. – than merely presidential agreements, i.e. the real basis of any sustainable renaissance on the continent.

5.2 Implications for established analyses/policies

The profound challenges posed to established analyses and policies by the variety of causes of conflict on the continent make creative, revisionist perspectives imperative to minimize the possibilities of inappropriate idealistic or cynical reactions. This is increasingly recognized inside as well as around the continent, even if more by inter- or non-state agencies like the UN and World Bank or Global Witness and PAC, respectively, than the academy. Happily, extra-continental concerns are now being reflected and balanced by continental groupings like CODESRIA and the ECA as reflected in NAI/NEPAD.

First, for both ‘new’ and ‘old’ regionalism(s) alike, the proliferation of both conflicts and conflict actors/agents needs to be taken on board, in Europe as well as in Africa and elsewhere. Classic regional studies still largely concentrate on economic and functional structures and relationships rather than more uncomfortable patterns of conflict, now involving myriad non-state as well as state actors. Yet, just as seeking to outlaw another world war was a catalyst for European integration, so contemporary conflicts have generated regional movements and momentum for human security/development around civil societies, corridors, peace parks, think tanks, track two/three etc. as indicated above (Hettne et al. 2001, Grant and Soderbaum 2003).
Second, for *security or strategic studies*, the growing focus on the ‘real’ political economy of violence (Klare 2002) has profound implications, leading not only away from ‘national’ towards ‘human’ security (Axworthy 2001) but also to analysis of novel issues and coalitions. Some of these are related to Africa’s current concerns like AIDS, land-mines and other small arms, migrations, ‘track-two’ diplomacy, demilitarization (Lamb 2000), demobilization (Kingma 2000) etc. while others are somewhat longer-term, such as ecological sustainability, viruses, even post-conflict redevelopment etc. (UNDP 1999).

Third, *development studies/policies* can no longer overlook awkward factors like the political economy of conflict, peace-building and reconstruction. Rather, in the emerging post-neoliberal era, rather than concentrate on self-congratulatory comparisons about ‘external’ ‘competitiveness’, they need to incorporate such inconvenient critiques of established policies which have failed to address underlying ‘internal’ social inequalities: onto emulation of UNDP’s (1999) not uncontroversial advocacy of a ‘human security’ perspective: onto the real PE of child soldiers, private armies etc. (Berdal and Malone 2000, Braathen *et al.* 2000, Cilliers and Dietrich 2000).

Fourth, in such unenviable contexts, any discovery and advocacy of *civil society* groupings is to be encouraged, given their exclusion even repression in the continent’s initial post-independence state socialist dispensation. They are important not only in terms of programme delivery but also in relation to advocacy; i.e. from human development to human security – and onto ‘partnerships’ with the other pair of actor types (i.e. corporations and states) (Mbabazi and Shaw 2000, Mbabazi *et al.* 2002, Grant *et al.* 2003).

And, finally, fifth in terms of these somewhat ‘interdisciplinary’ perspectives, issues of *governance* among myriad non-state as well as state actors cannot be separated from questions of the causes and containment and resolution of conflicts: onto sustainable forms of ‘peace-building governance’? And such post-conflict governance must involve a variety of interested stake-holders, including a variety of think tanks, leading towards policy/security communities. But how sustainable and representative are such networks/partnerships, given the palpable jealousies of some African presidents (Mbabazi *et al.* 2002, Thomas 2000)?

In short, as I have already suggested elsewhere (Shaw 2001), even before the PE of conflict genre became so popular, the dynamics/ambiguities of the continent’s wars have served to challenge a variety of analytic and policy prescriptions, with implications for a range of assumptions/assertions, state and non-state actors etc. alike. Hence the imperative of informed but modest new analytic suggestions or directions for the first decade of the new century at least, not just for African Studies but also for Development even Global Studies. And if security policies are thereby challenged so likewise should be development policies: *ex Africa semper aliquld novi!*
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