

Research Paper No. 2006/109

## **International Organizations as a Profession**

Professional Mobility  
and Power Distribution

Jean-Marc Coicaud\*

September 2006

### **Abstract**

The role of international organizations grows with the acceleration of globalization and the increasing importance of global governance. However, thus far, only limited and rather narrow research has been generated on the subject. It is a state of affairs that reflects on international studies, as well as on the power realities of the world. By assessing international organizations through the career prospects that they offer to skilled professionals, this paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. As such it unveils some of the internal dynamics of international organizations and explores their external consequences in terms of the relations between international organizations, the people employed by these, and the power play (economic, social, political and even cultural) at the national and international level.

**Keywords:** professional attraction, human resources, power, international elites

**JEL classification:** Z1, Z13, A13

Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2006

\* Head of the United Nations University (UNU) Office at the United Nations in New York.

This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on the International Mobility of Talent.

UNU-WIDER especially thanks ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile) for its vital cooperation on the coordination of the project.

UNU-WIDER also acknowledges with thanks the financial contributions to its research programme by the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development).

ISSN 1810-2611      ISBN 92-9190-893-2 (internet version)

## Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Leila Laouadi and Jean-Marie Chenou for their research assistance. Jibecke Jönsson and Louise Bergström helped improve the style of the text. The author also wishes to thank the Human Resources Department of the United Nations system, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group for their help. The comments of a number of colleagues helped improve the text; these include Tony Addison, Yves Dezalay, Martha Finnemore, Henri Fourcault, Arnaud Guillois, Makiko Koriyama, Giovanni Mastrogiacomo, Claude Sauveplane, Andrés Solimano, Rahul Sur, Juha Uitto, Vasu Vaitla, Roland Vaubel, and Thomas G. Weiss. Needless to say, the author takes responsibility for the errors that may exist in the text.

*For Patrick Weil.*

*The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.*

*[www.wider.unu.edu](http://www.wider.unu.edu)*

*[publications@wider.unu.edu](mailto:publications@wider.unu.edu)*

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)  
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland

Camera-ready typescript prepared by Adam Swallow at UNU-WIDER

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. Publication does not imply endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of any of the views expressed.

The role of international organizations grows with the acceleration of globalization and the increasing importance of global governance. However, thus far, only limited and rather narrow research has been generated on the subject. It is a state of affairs that reflects on international studies, as well as on the power realities of the world. While international relations have traditionally focused on more political issues (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and international law as an external description of international organizations, the internal analysis of international organizations, especially in terms of human resources, remains rather limited.<sup>1</sup> The failure to address more prosaic institutional and organizational aspects that are of equal significance has left the study of international organizations as a profession, and as a workplace, suffering from a striking lack of research.<sup>2</sup>

This paper is an attempt to bring some clarity to the understanding of the internal dynamics of international organizations by examining why they are an attractive workplace to professionals with skills marketable both internationally and nationally. This is also to provide a better understanding of the links between international organizations, the people employed by these, and the distribution of power (economic, social, political and even cultural) at the national and international level. Against this background this paper proceeds in four steps. First, it takes note of the limited amount of research conducted on the professional culture in international organizations and explains why this is the case. Second, it examines what leads people to join international organizations (including how they envision their work). Third, it shows that the marketability of international organizations and of the professionals working for them is an indicator of the power relations at the national and international level, and the place that international organizations occupy in these. Moreover, this section reflects on the socio-economic and educational profiles of international civil servants. Fourth, and finally, this paper draws some lessons from the analysis of the mobility of professionals in the context of international organizations and reflects on the questions that the findings leave pending for further research.

## **I – From the state of the field to the state of the world**

Why is the research conducted on the professional culture of international organizations so limited when they themselves are no recent phenomena? What does this indicate for the studies of international relations and for the power realities of the world?

### **The study of international organizations and their professionals**

The fact that historically the study of international organizations has been only a sub-field of international studies has limited the understanding that we have of them. A

---

<sup>1</sup> A sample of good academic studies on the international civil service include: Krosney (1967); Jordan (1972); Weiss (1975); McLaren (1980); Beigbeder (1988, 1996); Mouritzen (1990); Cooker (1990); Dijkzeul (1997); Barnett and Finnemore (2004); Udom (2003); Vaubel et al. (2003).

<sup>2</sup> It is not only in academia that prosaic aspects of international organizations are overlooked. At the UN itself, traditionally, the strategic importance of human resources as well as of public information and statistics has not been acknowledged sufficiently.

neglect of the more practical issues has limited both the internal and external analyses of international organizations, especially in terms of human resources.

Traditionally in international relations, the amount of research conducted on international organizations, its resources, prestige and prospects, have been lower than for issues such as security and foreign policy. And those few scholars who have taken a strong interest in international organizations have tended to be captives of mainstream perspectives. With a focus on political questions, international organizations have been largely approached with state-centered lenses. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004) point out, while many scholars have shown that there is more to international life than great power realpolitik, and that enduring cooperation is possible with a little help from international institutions, 'they couched their argument within a statist framework borrowed from neo-realists that gave short shrift to international organizations as independent actors'. These scholars were interested in the 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures' that governed state action'.

Mainstream international law has hardly been more successful in giving a satisfactory account of international organizations. The way in which international organizations are taught and researched by law faculties, merely tends to describe their functioning and activities from an external point of view according to the United Nations charter, international norms and institutional mandates. With recent developments of international law, scholars indicate attempts to go beyond this state of affairs. This is especially the case in the United States where, for instance, the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach bringing together international law and international relations, attempts to redefine the study of international organizations (Slaughter et al. 1998; see also Goldstein et al. 2000). This is equally true in the European context, as illustrated by the *European Journal of International Law's* efforts to promote critical and theoretical, and at times sociological, perspectives on international organizations (Chimni 2004). Nevertheless, these attempts of renewal tend to leave the inner workings of international organizations by and large unattended.

Moreover, the lack of a first-hand knowledge that characterizes the scholarship on international organizations does not help. Despite the growing interaction between academia and international organizations, few academics have a substantial inside knowledge of international organizations and, a significant gap remains between the two. This makes studies on international organizations somewhat external, 'desincarnated'.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, if certain progress has been made in this domain, the data available on the practical aspects of international organizations, and the access to it, is far from perfect. This is particularly true for human resources.

Over the past years, the improved collections of quantitative data of departments of human resources of international organizations have allowed a better overview of the workforce and of the various aspects of working conditions. This is a welcome complement to the studies on human resources that have until now been conducted on a

---

<sup>3</sup> A first step towards addressing this shortcoming would be to allow and even encourage more academics to spend a sabbatical as scholar-in-residence in strategic departments of international organizations, and more scholarly-minded international civil servants taking time-off in universities or think tanks to reflect and write on their practical experience in an academic context.

regular,<sup>4</sup> or *ad hoc* basis. Also, data has become more accessible through information made available on the international organizations websites,<sup>5</sup> or on the websites of the national ministries of foreign affairs.<sup>6</sup> Yet, significant shortcomings are still at work. Although some organizations do better than others, data collection is not as systematic as it should be. For instance, socio-economic and educational backgrounds of the professionals of international organizations are difficult to trace. Moreover, there is a lack of homogeneity in the collection of data from one organization to another.<sup>7</sup> This makes it difficult to come up with reliable and coherent figures. As for access, progress has not amounted to total transparency. If the information made public on websites is helpful, it is still very limited. In addition, researchers face substantial problems in conducting interviews with human resources, even compared to accessing people who deal with politically sensitive matters.<sup>8</sup>

### **Distribution of power and international organizations as a profession**

In mainstream international studies, the methodological challenges of analyzing the working conditions of international organizations are further impeded by the power distribution at play. This leads international organizations to be considered secondary institutions, and the examination of human resources, of marginal importance.

In developing countries, international organizations are often among the more powerful actors. The impact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its adjustment policies, the World Bank and its loan policies, the United Nations and its humanitarian-peacekeeping and reconstruction interventions can have on countries in crises, illustrates this. However in the developed world, international organizations rank only as secondary powers. This is especially the case in Western democracies. While the commanding position of Western democracies in the international distribution of power enables them to underwrite international organizations financially, normatively and

---

<sup>4</sup> See the work of the International Civil Service Commission on the United Nations system (excluding Bretton Woods institutions) on human resources issues, <http://icsc.un.org>. On the International Monetary Fund (IMF), refer for instance to Lahti (2004).

<sup>5</sup> Also, as part of their efforts for further openness and transparency, the World Bank and the IMF have made efforts in recent years to liberalize their policy on access to archives; see World Bank (2002) and IMF (2003). On the other hand, the United Nations' archives policy has not changed since 1984. See UN (1984, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> National governments seem particularly eager to facilitate access of information to nationals who wish to work for international organizations. See for example to the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ministere\\_817/emplois-stages-concours\\_825/emplois-dans-les-organisations-internationales\\_4338/mission-fonctionnaires-internationaux\\_4339/notre-mission\\_11109.html](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ministere_817/emplois-stages-concours_825/emplois-dans-les-organisations-internationales_4338/mission-fonctionnaires-internationaux_4339/notre-mission_11109.html), section 'guide pratique'.

<sup>7</sup> From one organization to another, the criteria of classification and collection of data often vary. That is also the case from one country to another. In addition, especially in developing countries, data tends to be either missing or unreliable. All this makes it challenging to paint a credible and realistic overall picture. On the importance of good statistical tools for the conduct on public policy in general see the historical study of Rothschild (2002).

<sup>8</sup> One is left wondering whether such difficulty of access is caused by issues of confidentiality, by a lack of transparency, professionalism, resources or all of the above.

politically, it also renders international organizations relatively negligible and instrumental to them.

This situation encourages a gradual growth of international organizations under Western influence, which also takes a toll on the scholarship on international organizations. In the Western context, the way in which academic research has overlooked the need to study international organizations, and more specifically the influence of the professional culture on the functioning and work of these organizations, can be explained by two ways in which power impacts scholarship. First, it is more attractive to analyze objects that are at the center of power than objects in the margins of power;<sup>9</sup> second, the study of power is shaped by the very power that it examines.<sup>10</sup>

Yet, the professionals of international organizations are not foreign to power and an analysis of these professionals can improve the understanding of international organizations and how they participate in power. As a matter of fact, as will be seen in the following sections, assessing international organizations through the career prospects they offer to highly skilled professionals is quite instructive. Especially as it unveils how power is at work in the professional dimension of international organizations and as such, offers valuable insights on three related and complementary levels, the:

- i) distribution and dynamics of power (economic, political and cultural) within international organizations;
- ii) interplay between national and international power (economic, political, and cultural); and
- iii) incidence that this interplay has on the power (economic, political and cultural) of institutions and actors, both at the national and international level.

## **II – Professional attractiveness of international organizations**

To grasp the attractiveness of international organizations to skilled professionals three questions will be considered: First, what is the magnitude of international staff in international organizations, coming both from developed and developing countries? Second, what are the differentials of financial benefits among international organizations, as well as among national governments, universities and the private sector, in developed and developing countries respectively? And what role do these differentials play in the migration of professionals? Third, beyond financial motivations, what factors (such as exposure to an international environment, interaction with qualified peers and career development) have an impact on, and to what extent do they influence, the decision of professionals to join international organizations?

---

<sup>9</sup> One could add that an object which is closely linked with power is easier to study because of its greater visibility. Its influence on reality is identifiable, including through records.

<sup>10</sup> A significant part of the epistemology and methodology of the sciences of social reality (including history, economics, and sociology) is about ensuring their credibility by trying to be as little as possible the captive of the trappings of power.

## **Magnitude of international staff in international organizations**

To account for the magnitude of international staff in international organizations, it is necessary in a first instance to focus on who is employed by international organizations, and on what their origins are in terms of developed and developing regions and countries.

*Multiplication of international organizations* – With the widening and deepening of global governance and globalization, the number of international organizations is growing to cover more and more sectors; some organizations being more important than others. At the most basic level, an international organization is an institution established through an agreement made by three or more states, with a permanent secretariat that performs ongoing tasks. The United States' Federal Government's Human Resources Agency (n.d.) identifies five main categories of international organizations: i) United Nations with its subsidiary bodies, organs, and programs;<sup>11</sup> ii) UN specialized agencies;<sup>12</sup> iii) international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank Group;<sup>13</sup> iv) regional organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU); and finally, v) other international organizations including the Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Fund), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In 2005, the staff employed by the United Nations Secretariat, its most significant subsidiary programs, funds, and organs worldwide amounted to 40,074 distributed between the entities as shown in Table 1. Furthermore, a recent study conducted by Vaubel et al. (2003) presented numbers on the staff of 27 international organizations (see Table 2).

With the 73,660 staff in international organizations and those 40,074 of the United Nations, considering how many other international organizations there are, one could estimate that the total of people working for international organizations worldwide could amount to approximately 140,000.

---

<sup>11</sup> The United Nations Secretariat, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Environmental Program (UNEP), UN High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), UN Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UN University (UNU), International Court of Justice (ICJ), World Food Program (WFP).

<sup>12</sup> Examples are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Labor Organization (ILO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

<sup>13</sup> Additional examples include the UN Regional Development Banks (with the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Table 1: Staff of the United Nations Secretariat and other entities, as at 30 June 2005

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Regular budget</i>	<i>Extrabudgetary resources</i>	<i>Total</i>
UN Secretariat	7 753	8 236	15 989
UNDP		5 542	5 542
UNFPA		1 342	1 342
UNHCR	219	6 420	6 639
UNICEF		8 981	8 981
UNITAR		35	35
UNOPS		978	978
UNRWA	102	36	138
ITC		213	213
ICSC		36	36
UNJSPF		155	155
ICJ	84	14	98
UNU		121	121
Total	8 158	31 916	40 074

Notes: These figures refer to staff in appointments of one year or more. The entities specified include the UN Secretariat, UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), UN Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF), International Court of Justice (ICJ), UN University (UNU). For a more detailed table see Annex 1.

Source: UN (2005a: 9).

*Geographical breakdown of international staff in international organizations* – Given the difficulties in obtaining information and data on the human resources of international organizations, this paper mainly focuses on three international organizations, the World Bank Group, the IMF, and more specifically, the United Nations.

Of the UN Secretariat, as of 30 June 2005, out of the total of 15,989 staff with appointments for one year or more, only 2,581<sup>14</sup> were recruited under the system of geographical distribution.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Several categories of staff are excluded including staff appointed to the secretariats of subsidiary programs, funds and organs, with special status; staff appointed to peacekeeping posts, specifically funded for other field mission service or financed under the support account for peacekeeping operations; staff in the Field Service and the General Service and related categories of staff locally recruited; staff appointed to technical cooperation project posts (UN 2005a: 10).

<sup>15</sup> The number of staff that each member state is entitled to have in virtue of the system of geographical distribution is based on a scale of assessments, i.e. on the financial contribution of each member state to the regular UN budget.

Table 2: Staff size and the number of member states, 27 international organizations

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Staff</i>
ADB	2000	2 058
BIS	2000	500
CARICOM	2000	221
CoE	2000	1 216
EC/EU	2000	30 777
ESA	2000	1 718
FAO	1999	4 072
GATT/WTO	2001	368
IAEA	2000	2 136
IBRD	1998	6 800
ICAO	2000	759
IFAD	2000	265
IFC	2001	1 063
ILO	1999	2 393
IMCO/IMO	2000	274
IMF	2001	2 976
ITU	1999	770
OECD	2001	2 291
UNESCO	1999	2 348
UNHCR	2000	5 423
UPU	2000	151
WHO	1999	4 000
WIPO	2001	817
WMO	1999	264
Total	1998-2001	73 660

Notes: UNHCR is already listed in Table 1. The staff figures cover the following international organizations: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Caribbean Common Market Secretariat (CARICOM), Council of Europe (CoE), European Community/European Union (EC/EU), European Space Agency (ESA), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO), International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Labor Organization (ILO), International Maritime (Co-operation) Organization (IMCO/IMO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Transport Organization (ITU), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Health Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO). For a more detailed table see Annex 2.

Source: Vaubel et al. (2003: 8).

Table 3: Distribution of staff subject to geographical distribution among developing and developed countries and countries with economies in transition (2001-2005)

Group	Year	Combined desirable ranges	Group midpoint	%	Total staff		D-1 and above		D-2 and above		ASG and above	
					No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Developing countries	2001	896-1 213	1 054.6	40.6	1 038 (400)	42.7 (40.9)	161 (50)	49.5	59 (14)	52.7	22 (4)	55.0
	2002	930-1 259	1 094.5	40.5	1 053 (409)	42.5 (40.2)	151 (46)	46.6	55 (14)	50.5	23 (4)	56.1
	2003	903-1 258	1 093.7	40.5	1 032 (417)	41.5 (40.2)	150 (52)	45.0	54 (14)	46.2	23 (4)	56.1
	2004	933-1 263	1 098.1	40.7	1 023 (416)	40.7 (39.1)	148 (55)	44.7	56 (17)	48.7	20 (3)	51.3
	2005	968-1 310	1 139.3	40.7	1 024 (424)	39.7 (38.2)	141 (53)	42.9	49 (17)	45.4	17 (5)	41.5
Developed countries	2001	1 156-1 564	1 360.3	52.3	1 130 (526)	46.5 (53.8)	147 (53)	45.2	46 (10)	41.1	15 (3)	37.5
	2002	1 202-1 626	1 414.3	52.4	1 160 (555)	46.8 (54.6)	152 (59)	46.9	47 (13)	43.1	15 (3)	36.6
	2003	1 204-1 629	1 416.4	52.5	1 195 (568)	48.0 (54.5)	156 (56)	46.8	56 (18)	47.9	15 (4)	36.6
	2004	1 200-1 624	1 411.9	52.3	1 232 (591)	49.0 (55.6)	154 (64)	46.5	52 (18)	45.2	16 (6)	41.0
	2005	1 244-1 684	1 463.9	52.3	1 293 (625)	50.1 (56.3)	154 (61)	46.8	50 (17)	46.3	21 (6)	51.2
Countries with economies in transition	2001	157-213	185.1	7.1	264 (52)	10.9 (5.3)	17 (3)	5.2	7 (1)	6.3	3 (1)	7.5
	2002	162-220	191.0	7.1	267 (53)	10.8 (5.2)	21 (3)	6.5	7 (1)	6.4	3 (1)	7.3
	2003	161-218	189.9	7.0	262 (55)	10.5 (5.3)	27 (3)	8.1	7 (1)	6.0	3 (1)	7.3
	2004	162-219	190.0	7.0	258 (56)	10.3 (5.3)	29 (2)	8.8	7 (1)	6.1	3 (1)	7.7
	2005	167-226	196.8	7.0	262 (61)	10.2 (5.5)	34 (3)	10.3	9 (1)	8.3	3 (1)	7.3
Total	2001	2 210-2 990	2 600.0	100.0	2 432 (978)	100.0 (100.0)	325 (106)	100.0	112 (25)	100.0	40 (8)	100.0
	2002	2 295-3 105	2 699.8	100.0	2 480 (1 017)	100.0 (100.0)	324 (108)	100.0	109 (28)	100.0	41 (8)	100.0
	2003	2 295-3 105	2 700.0	100.0	2 489 (1 040)	100.0 (100.0)	333 (111)	100.0	117 (33)	100.0	41 (9)	100.0
	2004	2 295-3 105	2 700.0	100.0	2 513 (1 063)	100.0 (100.0)	331 (121)	100.0	115 (36)	100.0	39 (10)	100.0
	2005	2 380-3 220	2 800.0	100.0	2 579 (1 110)	100.0 (100.0)	329 (117)	100.0	108 (35)	100.0	41 (12)	100.0

Notes: See Annex 3 for the distribution of posts in the UN Secretariat subject to geographical distribution according to nationality, grade, and gender.

Source: UN (2005a: 17)

Table 3 provides the numbers for the UN Secretariat staff from developing and developed countries as well as for countries with economies in transition. It also includes the representation of member states at the senior and policy making levels.

Beyond the posts subject to geographical distribution, as a whole (including all categories – directors, professionals, and general service staff), 24 of the 191 Member States in 2005 occupied more than 72.2 percent of all Secretariat staff, each state with more than 100 staff members. For example Ethiopia, France, Kenya, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States, all had more than 400 nationals in the Secretariat. Moreover, including General Service staff from those states that host UN

facilities, headquarters, offices, or regional commissions (Austria, Chile, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lebanon, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States of America) will further increase their representation. Including all staff categories, 177 of the 191 member states were represented compared to 174 in the posts subject to geographical distribution. 14 Member States remained unrepresented.<sup>16</sup>

Turning to the staff of the World Bank Group, according to its *Annual Report 2005* approximately 8,700 staff from 164 countries were posted in more than 100 locations worldwide (World Bank 2006). Internal geographical distribution of the Bank is categorized according to primarily economic standing as Part I and Part II member countries. Part I countries are by and large developed countries, almost all donors to the International Development Association (IDA), who pay contributions in freely convertible currencies.<sup>17</sup> Part II countries, essentially developing countries, may be donors and are entitled to pay most of their contributions in local currencies.<sup>18</sup> In 2004, nationals of Part I countries accounted for 39 percent of all staff, and 63 percent of management and senior technical positions. Nationals of Part II countries accounted for 61 percent of all staff and 37 percent of management and senior technical positions. The 28 officers in the senior management of the World Bank included nine Part II country nationals.

---

<sup>16</sup> Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Comoros, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and United Arabs Emirates. (UN 2005a: 28).

<sup>17</sup> For more information, and for statement of voting power, and subscriptions and contributions of IDA Members, see 'Financial Statements' (World Bank 2006).

<sup>18</sup> List of Part I and Part II IDA member countries: Part I members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. Part II members: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. <http://web.worldbank.org>

Table 4: Geographic distribution of staff at the IMF by developing and industrial countries, 2004

Staff	Number	Percent
<b>All staff</b>	2 714	100.0
Developing countries	1 187	43.7
Industrial countries	1 527	56.3
<b>Total Support Staff (Grades A1-A8)</b>	718	100.0
Developing countries	394	54.9
Industrial countries	324	45.1
<b>Total Professional Staff (Grades A9-A15)</b>	1 633	100.0
Developing countries	682	41.8
Industrial countries	951	58.2
<b>Total Managerial Staff (B1-B5)</b>	363	100.0
Developing countries	111	30.6
Industrial countries	252	69.4

Notes: A9-A15 levels correspond to professional staff, B1-B5 levels correspond to more senior and managerial positions. As for A1-A8 levels, they are support staff, normally recruited locally except under particular circumstances (e.g., language skills requirements). However, within the local job market, efforts are made to recruit as diverse support staff as possible. For a more detailed table including 1990s data see Annex 4.

Source: IMF (2005: 89).

For the IMF, the *Diversity Annual Report 2003* (Lahti 2004: 15-18) presents the distribution of its staff from its 141 member-states between developing and industrialized countries (see Table 4). In difference from the World Bank this categorization is based on financial criteria considering aggregated purchasing power parity (PPP), valued gross domestic product (GDP), exports, and population, but also on analytical criteria taking into matters of sustainability such as source of export and institutional structures.<sup>19</sup>

Beginning with Africa, in 2004, the 190 staff from this region, despite its 0.6 percent increase in the past five years, represented only 7 percent of the total number of IMF staff. This representation was increasingly concentrated in the lowest grade group, support staff (A1-A8) with 10.3 percent. Since 2000, the African representation in the next grade group, professional staff (A9–A15), experienced an increase from 6.1 to 6.3 percent, while the managerial staff (B1-B5) had deteriorated from 3.8 to 3.6 percent. As a result, the share of African economists in the higher grades was among the lowest of all regions.

<sup>19</sup> However, the IMF is increasingly referring to a division of countries into two major groups, advanced economies, and other emerging market and developing countries, each divided into a number of subgroups. For more information see IMF (2006: 165- ), and especially the statistical appendix.

The Middle Eastern countries, especially the Arab countries, also suffered from a chronic under representation with only 111 Middle Eastern staff compared to 115 in 2003, representing 4.1 percent of the total IMF staff. Only 67 of these were Arab staff, which is as low as 2.4 percent IMF wide. Overall, the Middle Eastern countries were unevenly represented, with Pakistan having the largest representation, especially in the B grades, comprising 23 percent of all Middle Eastern staff IMF-wide, followed by Lebanon and Egypt. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Libya were highly underrepresented. In contrast to the African region, the Middle Eastern representation was stronger in the higher grades.

The representation of transition countries (former communist countries) on the other hand had been steadily increasing to a total of 129 staff members in 2004, representing 4.8 percent of the total IMF staff; 5.9 percent of the professional staff, and 0.8 percent of the managerial staff (three staff). Representation was higher in what the IMF calls the 'economist career stream' than in the 'specialized career streams'<sup>20</sup>. During the past five years, 52 candidates were hired from the region (compared to 11 in 2004), accounting for 6.7 percent of all recruitment. However, none of whom were hired in the managerial grades. The European transition countries comprised 16 percent of Europe's representation IMF wide (2 percent in the managerial grades) compared to the UK staff that alone comprised 19 percent of Europe's representation (32 percent in the managerial grades) IMF wide.

The 16.6 percent representation of the Asian region, was close to the regional quota of 18 percent, but unevenly distributed between India, Australia, New Zealand on the one hand, and the East Asian countries (ASEAN+3)<sup>21</sup> on the other. The most overrepresented country, especially in the B grades, was India with 28 percent of the Asian region's representation and 4.7 percent IMF wide. IMF wide, the representation of the ASEAN+3 countries was 8.4 percent, and in the managerial grades, only 3.9 percent. The East Asian staff represented 51 percent of the Asian region's representation, and IMF wide, East Asia accounted for 28 percent of the managerial staff.

For the Western Hemisphere, United States and Canadian staff comprised 67 percent of all Western nationals IMF wide, and 74 percent in the managerial grades. As for states other than the US and Canada, Peruvian staff comprised 18 percent of all other staff from this region, the Brazilian staff accounted for 13 percent and finally, Argentinean staff represented 12 percent of this group's representation IMF wide (but 28 percent in the managerial grades) (Lahti 2004: 18).

---

<sup>20</sup> The 'economist career stream' refers to staff members employed as economists, by far the largest professional group within the staff. The 'specialized career streams' refer to non-economist positions such as the department of human resources' staff, library staff, secretaries, etc.

<sup>21</sup> ASEAN+3 includes Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Lao (PDR), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (Lahti 2004: table 22, p. 57).

## Differentials in financial benefits

In light of the fact that differentials in financial benefits are generally considered critical to the decision of professionals to migrate internationally, what are these differentials in the context of international organizations? Where do they stand in comparison to financial benefits offered by national civil services, the private sector and universities in developed and developing countries?

*Financial benefits of international organizations* – The financial benefits of international organizations are not limited to salaries. They can include dependency benefits, education grants, rental subsidies, pensions, family-visit travels, annual leave and other.<sup>22</sup> However, for the sake of simplicity, and because they constitute a strong sample of analysis, the focus will mainly be on salaries.

When it comes to the UN, specific remuneration systems are applied to the general service (support staff) and related locally recruited staff, as well as to the field service (in particular peace-keeping mission staff). But since the professional and higher categories are generally considered to set the common system of salary, the focus should be on these. The salary of the professional staff of the higher categories is made of two main elements: a base or floor (minimum) salary<sup>23</sup> and a post adjustment, both expressed in US dollars. Post adjustment, as an integral part of the salary, is a cost-of-living adjustment designed to preserve equivalent purchasing power for all duty stations.<sup>24</sup> It represents a significant addition to the base salary. For instance, as of January 2006, a D1 post, the post of a principal officer, in step 1 (out of 15 possible steps) without dependants in New York had a base salary of USD 83,587. To this base salary in New York a post-adjustment of USD 53,244 is added, whereas in Tokyo, one of the most expensive cities in the world, the post-adjustment amounted to USD 74,141.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> The United Nations General Assembly decided that UN staff should be tax exempt from national income taxation. A few member states tax the emoluments of their nationals but in these cases the organization reimburses the income tax to these staff member. Therefore all international civil servants are subject to the payment of a staff assessment comparable to a national income tax. Staff assessment is paid to ensure that the net salary of each staff is the same. For more on these benefits, see *United Nations Common System of Salaries, Allowances and Benefits*, <http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sal/sabeng03.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Salary scales of UN professional staff and its specialized agencies are determined by comparing the salaries of professional staff working in New York with the salaries of US civil servants in Washington DC, plus a small differential or margin taking expatriation (about 90 percent of professional staff in the UN system work outside the home country) into account. The practice of basing the salaries of international civil servants on those of a *comparator* civil service arose in 1921 when the League of Nations decided that to recruit highly qualified staff, representative of its member states, the salary scale for internationally-recruited professional staff should compare favorably to the highest paid national civil service. Since that time, the *Noblemaire Principle* has served as the rationale underlying the salary system. In 1921, the comparator was the British civil service. Since the founding of the UN in 1946, one of the best paid national civil services has been that of the USA.

<sup>24</sup> Differences in living costs are measured through periodic place-to-place surveys conducted at all duty stations. The surveys measure the cost-of-living of the duty station in relation to the cost-of-living at the base of the system (New York) to create a post-adjustment index for each duty station.

<sup>25</sup> Post-adjustment calculated according to the 'Consolidated Post Adjustment Circular', ICSC/CIRC/PAC/377, *International Civil Service Commission*, New York, United Nations, 1 May

The financial benefits of international organizations show some differentials. Traditionally, the salaries of professionals at the World Bank and the IMF are in general significantly higher than those of the United Nations. Salaries in these organizations are adjusted not only to the US public sector, but also to the salaries offered by the private financial and industrial firms. Different classification of posts complicates the comparison of salaries across these organizations, as does the difference of benefits and post-adjustment as well as times of reference for data. Yet, taking the minimum salary of each position under the highest directing role in each of these three organizations from three reports published within the same twelve months, one can compare the following minimal salaries: the United Nations, assistant-secretary general (ASG/I) (1 January 2005) – USD 172 860; the IMF, department director (B5) (1 May 2005) – USD 234 350; and the World Bank, managing directors and senior vice presidents (K) (1 July 2004) – USD 242 500.<sup>26</sup> For a more detailed salary structure of each of these three organizations, see Annex 5.

*Comparing the financial benefits of international organizations with national civil services* – Although great disparities exist in between national civil services, the financial differences between international organizations and national civil services generally exceed those of between international organizations significantly. Traditionally the salaries of international organizations are calculated according to the best paid national civil service (UN 2005b: 39-57). Needless to say, this means that compared to the national civil service of developing countries, the financial benefits associated with a career in an international organization are considerable. The figures in Table 8 presenting the yearly average government employee wage of sample countries are a useful indication, although to be interpreted with caution.

The differences of financial benefits between international organizations and the national civil services of developed countries are less clear. Surely, the post adjustment makes the overall UN salary (base salary and post-adjustment) more attractive financially than most salaries in the national administrations of developed countries. But when one compares international organizations' salaries with the total cash remuneration of national civil service expatriates (base salaries and allowance of expatriation), especially in the foreign service, the differentials turn to the advantage of developed countries, where expatriation benefits are substantially better.<sup>27</sup>

---

2006, in relation to the United Nations 'Salary scale for staff in the Professional and higher categories, showing annual gross salaries and net equivalents after application of staff assessment', Effective 1 January 2006.

<sup>26</sup> See the International Civil Service Commission, <http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sad/ss/sal0501.pdf>, IMF (2005: 87), and World Bank (2006).

<sup>27</sup> Although not an organization included in this paper, the findings of a comparative study of the remuneration of the European institutions are quite clear: 'The net remuneration levels of the British, Italian and Danish Permanent Representations are generally above that of the EU institutions. At the French Permanent Representation the remuneration level is higher, or at about the same level, as that at the EU for most of the grades. The calculated average remuneration is in the range of 85-119 percent of the net remuneration of the EU for single staff and 98-135 percent for married staff' (PLS Ramboll Management 2000: 12).

Table 8: Average government employee wage in sample countries

Country	Average government wage, 1997 price (USD)	Year
Argentina	15 000	1996-2000
China	965	1996-2000
Colombia	6 095	1991-95
Egypt	4 125	1991-95
India	2 090	1996-2000
Indonesia	1 375	1996-2000
Jordan	4 230	1996-2000
Kenya	1 690	1991-95
Lebanon	5 670	1991-95
Mexico	4 700	1996-2000
Morocco	4 895	1991-95
Pakistan	1 220	1996-2000
Russian Federation	1 520	1991-95

Notes: This table presents the average annual government wage during the 1990s in US dollars. Although incomplete, these figures give an idea of salaries of civil services in developing countries and allow a comparison with the salaries of international organizations. The data comes from the World Bank's Public Sector Employment and Wages Database, and was prepared by Giulio de Tommaso and Amit Mukherjee during 2000-01. It is available at <http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/>. The wage figures, originally in Local Currency Unit (LCU), have been converted into US dollars for the sake of comparison. The wage figures of 1997 have been converted according to the rate of 1 January 1997. See also *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective* (1997), papers presented at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 5-8 April 1997, unpublished. The papers presented at this conference are available at <http://www.indiana.edu/~csrc/csrc.html>.

*Financial differentials between international organizations and universities* – When it comes to the financial differentials between international organizations and universities, again, academic salaries are much lower in developing countries than in developed countries, leaving the former unable to compete with the latter.<sup>28</sup> The figures in Table 9 give an estimate of academic salaries in developed countries.

---

<sup>28</sup> For academics' working conditions and salaries in developing countries, see World Bank (2000: 23-4).

Table 9: Faculty salaries in various countries and universities\*

Country	University	Assistant professor (average salary)	Associate professor (average salary)	Professor (average salary)	Professor (minimum salary)	Professor (maximum salary)	Date
France <sup>a</sup>	Public universities	43 860	-	51 359	41 974	84 257	2004-05
Japan <sup>b</sup>	Private Universities	43 464	57 517	73 477	68 497	77 981	2004
USA <sup>c</sup>	Public universities	50 805	59 491	78 359	-	-	2003-04
USA <sup>c</sup>	Private Universities	52 851	63 150	89 317	-	-	2003-04
Singapore <sup>d</sup>	Public University	66 459	95 996	135 379	103 380	169 839	2006
USA	Harvard <sup>e</sup>	82 900	92 300	163 200	-	-	2004-05
USA	Yale <sup>e</sup>	69 400	82 100	145 600	-	-	2004-05
USA	Princeton <sup>e</sup>	73 400	95 500	151 100	-	-	2004-05
USA	Stanford <sup>e</sup>	82 000	103 000	148 600	-	-	2004-05
USA	Berkeley <sup>e</sup>	71 300	77 700	121 800	-	-	2004-05

Notes: \* Converted from local currencies to USD at the rate of 1 February 2006.

Sources:

a French Ministry of Education, <http://www.education.gouv.fr/personnel/metiers/default.htm>

b Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University, Japan, 'Table 21: Salaries for Faculty (Academic staff) in Private Universities', *Statistics of Japanese Higher Education*, [http://en.rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/data\\_list.php](http://en.rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/data_list.php).

c *Update* (December 2004). Washington, DC: National Education Association, (10)5, p. 2, <http://www2.nea.org/he/heupdate/vol10no5.pdf>.

d National University of Singapore at [http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/is/nus\\_life.htm](http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/is/nus_life.htm)

e *Faculty Salary Survey 2005*, compiled by American Association of University Professors, available on the website of the Chronicle of Higher Education, <http://chronicle.com/stats/aaup/>.

As illustrated, the comparison between salaries in international organizations and salaries in academia in developed countries tends to favor international organizations. There are of course exceptions, especially in the United States. The competitive character of the academic job market and the willingness and ability of top American universities to provide high salaries for world-class experts lead them to offer unparalleled financial benefits. This is particularly the case for academic fields that compete with the private sector, such as science, technology, economics or business. In addition, for especially more senior academic staff in the United States, there are a number of additional substantive income revenues including speaking fees, consulting work, royalties, research grants, etc., on which little data is available. But, as a whole,

the average academic salary in developed countries is not as high as the one in international organizations.

*International organizations and the private sector* – When comparing the differentials of financial benefits in international organizations to the private sector, it makes sense to focus on companies with an international reach. Somewhat similar to international organizations vis-à-vis national administrations, these call upon a task force with advanced skills (including language skills) that perform well internationally. At times, also somewhat reminiscent of international organizations vis-à-vis the national civil service, their international character gives them a reputation edge over companies confined to the national realm. In addition, the structure of the financial benefits that they offer, including expatriation packages, echoes that of international organizations. In this regard, the private sector offers better financial benefits than international organizations. This is why the salaries of the private sector serve as a benchmark for the salaries of financial international organizations to ensure the attraction of the best professionals available on the job market. Needless to say, also in the private sector there are large disparities at play.

Incidentally, higher salaries of the private sector are accompanied by a strong marketability of accomplished professionals from the private sector vis-à-vis international organizations. This is especially the case for financial international organizations, where solid academic credentials and a first-hand experience on economic issues are valued. To a certain extent, this is also the case for the United Nations. The good reputation that the private sector can have in terms of dynamism, efficiency and good management of resources is viewed as an asset, not only by organizations that deal with economic development (UNDP for example; see UNDP 2004), but also by the areas of the United Nations in need of institutional and operational improvement, such as human resources and management. The difficulty for professionals to re-enter the private sector after an experience in international organizations gives an indicator of the marketability of international organizations vis-à-vis the private sector. In this regard, one has to admit that the marketability of the UN system is not very high. A former private sector professional who at mid-level career stays at the United Nations for a long period of time, risks facing considerable difficulties when re-entering the private sector. The damaged reputation of the UN in terms of management and ability to deliver taints the marketability of its workforce outside the UN.<sup>29</sup> As for the international financial institutions, while their competitiveness vis-à-vis the private sector is far better than the United Nations', arguably, the marketability of the World Bank and the IMF in the private sector is also lower than the one of the private sector vis-à-vis the World Bank and the IMF.

### **Examining other factors of professional attractiveness of international organizations**

Beyond financial incentives, what role does working in an environment that is in principle dedicated to the public good, and its career opportunities, have on the desire of skilled professionals to join and stay with international organizations?

---

<sup>29</sup> All the more true for someone who has led an entire career at the United Nations.

*International public service as a stimulating professional environment* – The prospect of working for international organizations in an environment that combines concerns for the global public good with an interaction with peers from around the world can certainly appear attractive. In fact, the results of the *Picture of UN Staff* survey conducted in 2005 (on what motivates or de-motivates UN staff, and what they think of the organization) indicate that idealistic reasons are primary for joining the UN and for staying with it (*UNSpecial 2005*). Idealistic reasons and interesting work represented 62 percent of the answers to why they joined the UN in 2005, against 54 percent in 1995 whereas reasons such as ‘to have a career’ or ‘by chance’ fall far behind. Table 10 contains sample indicators from this survey that paints a telling picture.

Table 10: UN staff's motivations (1)

1. Why did you join the United Nations? (tick max. 2 boxes)			
	2005	1995	2005–1995
For idealistic reasons/belief in the United Nations	32.92	25.5	7.42
To do interesting work	29.27	28.82	0.45
To have a career	14.77	14.38	0.39
By chance	10.14	12.75	-2.61
For the salary	6.55	7.49	-0.94
Lack of employment prospects elsewhere	2.27	3.14	-0.87
To remain in the country of my duty station	2.08	3.20	-1.12
Other (specify)	2	4.71	-2.71
2. Why do you still work for the United Nations? (tick max. 2 boxes)			
	2005	1995	2005–1995
Because the work is interesting	34.76	30.32	4.44
For idealistic reasons	21.86	15.25	6.61
To have a career	13.07	12.20	0.87
For the salary	11.30	13.67	-2.37
Retirement benefits	6.12	7.20	-1.08
Because it is difficult to find work elsewhere	5.7	9.46	-3.76
Other	2.58	3.36	-0.78
To remain in the country of my duty station	2.56	4.76	-2.20
Out of habit	2.05	3.78	-1.73

Note: This survey was the third to be launched with the help of *UNSpecial*, a magazine for Geneva-based UN staff. The first survey was conducted for the 40th anniversary of the United Nations in 1985 and limited to Geneva. The second, for the 50th anniversary in 1995, generated more than 4,000 responses worldwide. The 2005 survey produced 5,320 responses, half from Geneva and New York, and half from other locations (*UNSpecial 2005*).

Table 11: UN staff's motivations (2)

What could or has motivate(d) you to go on mission in the field? (tick max. 2 boxes)			
	2005	1995	2005–1995
Contributing to the UN ideals	32.60	30.99	1.61
Career development	25.64	23.50	2.14
Adventure	16.03	14.92	1.11
Financial reward	8.78	8.17	0.61
Other	5.21	7.49	-2.28
Frustration at work	3.51	7.15	-3.64
Personal reasons	4.49	4.90	-0.41
Nothing	3.73	2.86	0.87
If you have been on mission in the field, what was the impact on			
	2005	1995	2005–1995
(a) Your career?			
Positive	64.20	51.60	12.60
Negative	5.70	6.80	-1.10
No impact	30.10	41.60	-11.50
(b) Your personal development?			
Positive	86.50	90.40	-3.90
Negative	2.43	2.00	0.43
No impact	11.07	7.60	3.47
(c) Your professional competence?			
Positive	83.28	83.20	0.08
Negative	1.64	1.30	0.34
No impact	15.08	15.50	-0.42
Total			
Positive	78.01	75.00	3.01
Negative	3.25	3.40	-0.15
No impact	18.73	21.60	-2.87

Source: See Table 10.

Table 12: UN staff's work environment

Do you find that working in a multicultural environment is			
	2005	1995	2005–1995
Enriching	72.81	61.90	10.91
Stimulating	19.93	25.10	-5.17
Difficult	4.01	7.40	-3.39
Other	1.71	2.30	-0.59
Frustrating	1.55	3.30	-1.75

Results show that the motivations grounded in a commitment to ideals, and the interesting aspects of the work of the UN, are rather intertwined. In this context, the global scope of activities, which is one of the main characteristics of the United Nations, certainly plays an important role. Indeed, not only are UN professionals focusing on issues of global importance associated with international security and ethics, but they also have the possibility of being posted in a variety of places worldwide. While staff tend to primarily value a stable career at headquarters (in New York and Geneva in particular), the possibilities that the UN offers in terms of work in the field worldwide is another appreciated professional advantage.<sup>30</sup>

Working in a multicultural environment is also a benefit to which the staff of international organizations are very sensitive (see Table 12). Parents in particular, tend to value the international cultural and educational environment to which it exposes their children.

*Career prospects and international organizations: a mixed picture* – The question of career opportunities is a mixed blessing for the professional attractiveness of international organizations. On the one hand, in addition to high salaries, the ideals, the meaningful nature of the work and the multicultural environment, there are other factors which make a career in international organizations attractive. For those international organizations that are successful in maximizing human resources, these factors imply better career prospects for women and a vibrant career management and overall, more dynamic organizations and staff. On the other hand, there are less positive aspects of the professional culture of international organizations, which undermine their attractiveness. These aspects are by and large related to the minimization of (often already minimal) human resources, and the implications that this has on the working conditions of, and in, international organizations.

---

<sup>30</sup> There is more to the story of peacekeeping operations. Although peacekeeping field posting are appreciated by some, especially by junior staff, for many who are posted in the field on a more permanent basis, it can be draining and unstable. In recent years, the UN DPKO has tried to improve the bridge between the professional tracks at headquarters with that in the field; field experience being more or less of a requirement for obtaining a post at headquarters.

Table 13: distribution of staff by gender at the IMF (for a more detailed table see Annex 6)

	1980		1990		2004	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>All staff</b>	1 444	100.0	1 774	100.0	2 714	100.0
Women	676	46.8	827	46.6	1 246	45.9
Men	768	53.2	947	53.4	1 468	54.1
<b>Total Support Staff (A1-A8)</b>	613	100.0	642	100.0	718	100.0
Women	492	80.3	540	84.1	613	85.4
Men	121	19.7	102	15.9	105	14.6
<b>Total Professional Staff (A9-A15)</b>	646	100.0	897	100.0	1 633	100.0
Women	173	26.8	274	30.5	579	35.5
Men	473	73.2	623	69.5	1 054	64.5
<b>Total Managerial Staff (B1-B5)</b>	185	100.0	235	100.0	363	100.0
Women	11	5.9	13	5.5	54	14.9
Men	174	94.1	222	94.5	309	85.1

Source: IMF (2005: 88).

Maximization of human resources, or the advantages of international organizations: Compared to national, regional or local administrations, the number of people working in international organizations is relatively small, especially in light of their global mandates.<sup>31</sup> Hence the need to maximize the minimal resources.

An important element of maximizing resources is the integration of the female workforce. The efforts that international organizations have made in recent years to achieve a more gender balanced workplace has increased their attractiveness. Generally, women are better represented in those international organizations (or departments) with a generalist mandate (the UN Secretariat for example) than in those with technical ones that do not deal directly with gender related issues.<sup>32</sup> Although there is still much progress to be made, especially in senior positions, gender balance is improving among

<sup>31</sup> For instance, the United States Federal Government employs more than 89,000 civilians overseas alone, and the city of Vienna has 70,000 public employees (UN n.d.)

<sup>32</sup> Women account for 99 percent of UNIFEM's workforce. Although less balanced in the higher grades, the situation is also rather balanced in UNICEF. As of February 2006, women represented 50 percent of international professional staff at the P-1 level, 67.59 percent at the P-2 level, 46.32 percent at the P-3 level, 41.19 percent at the P-4 level, 38.40 percent at the P-5 level, 34.34 percent at the D-1 level, 20.59 percent at the D-2 level, 33.33 percent at the Assistant Secretary-General level. The Executive Director of UNICEF is a woman (figures provided by the Department of Human Resources of UNICEF).

professionals at the entry and mid-career levels.<sup>33</sup> While currently, at the UN, female representation in the higher grades of director (D-2) and principal officer (D-1) is 33.3 percent and 33.2 percent respectively, in the professional category, female staff account for 41.3 percent. At entry levels, numbers are close to gender parity.<sup>34</sup> At the World Bank, women account for 52 percent of all staff and 26 percent of management and senior technical positions (World Bank 2006). As for the IMF, Table 13 shows that, although a great deal remains to be done, gender balance among professional and managerial staff has evolved positively between 1980 and 2004.

At a time when more and more women hold university degrees and skilled labor force is increasingly populated by women, gender efforts of international organizations are essential. In this regard, it is likely that international organizations offer better possibilities than the private sector.<sup>35</sup> In some countries, this phenomenon becomes particularly significant. In Japan, for example, the percentage of women with higher education is almost equal to that of men and it is one of the highest of developed countries.<sup>36</sup> Yet, women do not have equal career opportunities.<sup>37</sup> As such, female students are encouraged to acquire skills that are marketable internationally (Ono 2004), to learn foreign language skills and earn foreign degrees (Ono and Piper 2001). This explains the fact that there are almost as many Japanese women as there are Japanese men in professional positions in international organizations,<sup>38</sup> a *ratio* which certainly does not correspond to the domestic Japanese workforce.

---

<sup>33</sup> Historically, and as in other work sectors, support staff in international organizations has largely been female, and this continues to be the case today.

<sup>34</sup> 53.4 percent in the P-2 grade, and 44.9 percent in P-3 (P-1 being the lowest possible grade). See UN (2005a: 28).

<sup>35</sup> The difficulty of finding figures on the topic explains the tentativeness of our statement. Refer also to Kofman (2000).

<sup>36</sup> For example, women are awarded 66 percent of type-B first tertiary degrees in Japan. These degrees are defined as ‘focusing on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labor market [...]. They have a minimum duration of two years full-time equivalent at the tertiary level.’ This ratio is among the highest in the world, outperformed only by some Eastern European countries. In addition, Japanese women are awarded 39 percent of Tertiary-Type A degrees, which are largely theory-based and are designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research programs and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry and architecture (OECD 2004: table A4.2).

<sup>37</sup> In 2003, the gender gap in the hiring of university graduates made a conspicuous drop to only 2 percent, with 61.1 percent of male university graduates finding jobs and 59.1 percent of female graduates. However the positive picture is complicated by the fact that more female graduates take part-time job, and that many enterprises do not provide suitable or equal employment opportunities (‘Women’s Issues’, *Japan Fact Sheet*, <http://web-japan.org/factsheet/woman/work.html>). More generally, the fact that women are still not enjoying fair access to career opportunities is also a factor which pushes them to more aggressively than men pursue university studies. As a way to overcome practices of discrimination, this illustrates how when one is told that one is less worth than others, one tries to exceed others in exchange for recognition of one’s value.

<sup>38</sup> The substantial financial contribution of Japan to international organizations creates significant professional opportunities for Japanese nationals in these organizations. As of 1 January 2005 there were 318 Japanese women and 324 Japanese men working for international organizations (data provided by the Japanese mission to the UN, New York). And at the UN, there were 66 women occupying posts subject to geographical distribution compared to 55 Japanese men (UN 2005a: 48).

Dynamic career management is another factor, which can make international organizations attractive to skilled professionals. This requires a successful handling of human resources and reasonably good career prospects. In this perspective international organizations do not display equal human resources management in terms of hiring (with clear guidelines), career development (with institutionalized progress of career), and long-term stability. According to these benchmarks, the World Bank and the IMF seem to perform better than the United Nations. Without excluding room for further improvement, the IMF appears to be one of the more advantageous employers in this respect. Most initial appointments are offered for a term of two years and if performance shows potential, and if there is a continued need for the position, the staff may be offered a regular indefinite appointment. The average time that professionals spend in each grade respectively is one of the shortest among international organizations.<sup>39</sup> In addition, the staff salary structure is regularly adjusted, i.e. increased.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the substantial financial resources available, makes the working conditions of the IMF attractive.

Compared to the UN system, the IMF and the World Bank has a relatively small size workforce that deals with more targeted and technical issues calling for rather specialized and skilled professionals,<sup>41</sup> also in demand in the private sector. In addition, the World Bank and the IMF are proportionally better funded and have a central and one-site location in Washington, DC.<sup>42</sup> All this helps to explain why their human resource management performs better than that of the UN. This is not however to say that their output and track record, their ability to make a positive difference on the ground, exceeds that of the UN system.<sup>43</sup> But it does make them attractive to skilled professionals.

---

This is in contrast to other countries or regions where low financial contribution limits the possibilities of their well-educated workforce, especially women, to secure career opportunities in international organizations. This is often the case for countries in transition (Eastern European countries in particular) vis-à-vis the United Nations system.

<sup>39</sup> For instance in 2004, for A14 economists, this period of time was 3.2 years (3.3 years for men, and 2.7 years for women), and for A15 economists, 2.9 years (3.1 years for men, and 2.0 years for women) (Lahti 2005: 70).

<sup>40</sup> For instance, after analyses of updated comparator salaries, the IMF salary structure was increased by 5.6 percent for the fiscal year 2005, and the Board approved an increase of 3.6 percent for the fiscal year 2006 (IMF 2005: 86).

<sup>41</sup> At the IMF a Ph.D. is more often required than at the World Bank and the UN (where a Masters is usually the academic requirement) for a professional position.

<sup>42</sup> 'The most important implication of UNEP's location is the inability to attract and retain top-notch staff with the policy expertise and experience necessary to make the organization an anchor institution. Nairobi is not necessarily a desirable location for staff with the expertise management qualities, which UNEP needs. The increasingly treacherous security situation exacerbates the problem. In addition, the remoteness of UNEP has required frequent travel by the Executive Director and many senior staff imposing a heavy financial burden, but most importantly creating a leadership vacuum due to prolonged absences from Nairobi. The effective management of the organization requires that the leadership is present and responsive to staff needs and organizational priorities' (Ivanova 2005).

<sup>43</sup> For the IMF, refer for instance to Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 71-2). For the Bretton Woods institutions in general, see Stiglitz (2003).

*Minimization of human resources; or the downsides of international organizations* – Poor human resources management tends to be one of the disadvantages of international organizations. According to various studies and surveys, the UN is in many respects a rather unhappy place with dysfunctional characteristics, if not pathologies, which significantly impede its attractiveness to skilled professionals. Among the shortcomings related to the minimal use of already weak human resources, four important factors stand out: i) ambiguous security and career development tracks; ii) process rather than result-oriented work; iii) *ad hoc* and unsystematic implementation of mandates; and iv) self-centered exercise of leadership.

Both in the public and private sectors, there is a general trend to hire staff on short-term contracts.<sup>44</sup> In the UN in particular, this has become the rule rather than the exception. In 2005, the number of regular budget posts in the United Nations system was far lower than the extra-budgetary funds and short-term contracts for support and professional staff (see table in Annex 1). But before turning to the negative consequences of this trend, there are a few advantages that are worth mentioning. Short-term contracts provide flexibility and access to additional human resources that are all the more important in light of the reluctance of member states to increase the UN regular budget. In addition, short-term contracts are not necessarily followed by unemployment and they can go on for several years. Yet, the human and institutional costs of this trend make these positions less attractive, especially from the point of view of developed countries, in which the national civil service offers a long and well-delineated career.

At a human level, short-term contracts bring a sense of insecurity and the constant possibility of the termination of the contract renders staff vulnerable vis-à-vis management. Also, short-term contracts encourage what one could call ‘institutional cowardness’, where staff is reluctant to challenge and report wrongdoings that they may witness in fear of jeopardizing their job. This has negative effects on the functioning of the UN. In the worst case scenario, the external as much as the internal status of short-term staff without reasonable prospects of amelioration in the years ahead, results in them being treated as second-class citizens, which in turn leads them to be motivated primarily by ‘a-social self-interest’. Surviving in the current position or securing the next job is where most of the energy is spent. The quasi lack of institutionalized and predictable career development at the United Nations, the ambiguous long-term policy of the short-term contracts, encourages staff to have ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of the job. Moreover, the grade structure falls short of a formalized career track with clear guidelines of the requirements and selection process for the advancement in the profession, which well-functioning national administrations, or other international organizations, have. Rather, with the open-ended time spent in each grade,<sup>45</sup> and with staff left under the impression that promotion depends more on connection than on competence (*UNSpecial* 2005), the lack of proper career development constitutes a major disincentive.

---

<sup>44</sup> In a 2004 survey on human resources management practices commissioned by 30 international organizations (including the UN, World Bank and IMF), AHRMIO, reported a significant increase, from 6 percent in 1999, to 32 percent in 2003, in the number of international organizations which employ over 10 percent of their staff on a temporary basis (AHRMIO 2004).

<sup>45</sup> Short of progression mechanisms based on performance, time spent in each grade is likely to be lengthy. See Brewster and the ICC (2003).

Another unattractive aspect of the professional culture of the United Nations (although not specific to the UN) is its tendency to be more process, than result, oriented. Although certain UN bodies have more practical mandates that make them more action-oriented, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), overall, the environment is prone to make process more than result a defining character of its professional culture. The same goes for other organizations with similar mandates that have reached a routine level, be it national administrations or even well established private companies. Four main factors shape the work ethics in this direction. First, there is the hierarchical structure of most UN institutions, in which decision-making is highly concentrated and, as actors are squeezed in between layers of authority, no real sense of initiative is encouraged. This is especially the case in the UN Secretariat. Second, there is a tendency of the United Nations to adopt conservative courses of action trying to avoid the responsibility and the risks associated with trying to make a difference. This trait is linked to the political and financial dependency of the UN vis-à-vis member states, and its remoteness from direct constituencies. Third, there is the servicing function that a number of UN departments and institutions have vis-à-vis member states in the establishment and follow-up of multilateral commissions, conferences and negotiations. Combined with the cumbersome and slow rhythms of the politics of UN diplomacy, this can turn activities into a ritualistic production of documents with little short-term result. This only worsens when the entity has weak political clout, such as the at times frustrating predicament of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Fourth, the use of resources with unfocused and non-strategic spending of already limited resources renders progress, and progress assessment, difficult. As a result, an environment risks being created where activities are undertaken just for the sake of it.

A third downside of the UN professional culture is its *ad hoc* and unsystematic character. This is rather ironic considering the importance that rules and regulations have in the United Nations context. Yet, it is as if there is a significant disconnect between them and their ability to put tracking systems in place in the various domains of action, internally as well as externally. Indeed, one of the areas in which the United Nations is significantly weak is in recording its activities and drawing as well as applying the lessons learnt. It is rare that systematic and well reasoned mechanisms record action.<sup>46</sup> This makes the sharing of data and coordination of action among UN entities very problematic. In the United Nations Secretariat, the creation in the 1990s, along with a Policy and Strategic Planning unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, of a Lesson Learnt Unit (now the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section: PBPS), in the DPKO was designed to improve this shortcoming. Although some progress has been made, UN wide, much remains to be done. Most of the time there is only piecemeal information and coordination available. A tracking system would allow the UN not only to better grasp where it comes from and where it currently stands, but also provide instruments to identify and implement better policies. Instead, the lack of a systematic approach invites the United Nations to act in a state of semi-blindness, to extinguish fires with inadequate tools and only hope for the best; a position in which an

---

<sup>46</sup> In addition to registering activities, systematic and well reasoned records also calls for putting the findings in perspective, historically and comparatively, within the UN context and vis-à-vis other relevant actors.

organization dedicated to solving global questions and crisis, and anticipating on future ones, does not wish to find itself.

The unsystematic character of the UN way of doing business is one illustration among many of the under-institutionalization of the United Nations. As it weakens its capacity to be, and project itself as, professional, it also undermines its attractiveness for internationally skilled people. This is only reinforced by certain weaknesses at play in the selection process of senior management position where a lack of transparency and vague terms of references leave room for at times questionable reasons for appointment. This brings us to the fourth shortcoming, namely a self-centered exercised leadership.

According to the *United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey* conducted in 2004 (Deloitte Consulting LLP 2005), three sets of concerns stand out in terms of UN leadership. First, the discrepancies of United Nations leaders' lofty rhetoric, not matching words with acts. Second, the tendency of the UN leadership to be uninterested in management. It is already problematic that frequently those in positions of leadership are not trained to exercise managerial responsibilities. Adding insult to injuries, there is a tendency to concentrate on the more 'noble' aspects of the job (such as political and diplomatic issues) on the expense of investing the required amount of time and work into management. Third, while the custodians of the welfare of the organization, UN leaders should place their own interest if not after, then at least not at odds with that of the organization, it is not uncommon that the contrary happens. The institutional pathologies of the United Nations can become a reason for its leaders not to try to improve it. Assessing that turning the place around would not only be a difficult exercise, but also very unlikely to be successful, management is inclined to opt for individualistic strategies, using the visibility and contacts associated with their position as a springboard. Weak institutional accountability within the UN allows them to get away with it.<sup>47</sup> In the worst case, it amounts to the posturing of leadership. A posturing of leadership that is far from a healthy democratic leadership, that is more aware of its duties than of its rights and entitlements; a posturing of leadership that is far from using personal qualities not to personalize the institutions under its watch, but on the contrary to depersonalize them;<sup>48</sup> a posturing of leadership that, far from thinking strategically for the organization and its mission, fails to realize that unless an institution is strong internally, it cannot be strong externally and everybody, including the people that it is supposed to serve, loses. While this leadership behavior is not specific to the United Nations, the public service and public good ideals and goals of the UN, are prone to make it all the more demoralizing for professionals taking the ethical dimension of the United Nations message seriously.

---

<sup>47</sup> It also contributes to deprive the United Nations of the possibility to improve over time as an organization. To institutional growth is substituted a succession of 'fits and starts', a charade of permanent reform.

<sup>48</sup> Using personal leadership qualities to depersonalize institutions is meant to make the functioning of the institutions depend as little as possible upon individuals, allowing procedures and mechanisms to institutionalize in a dynamic way, motivating and committing its employees to the organization. Incidentally, using leadership to institutionalize the delegation of energy and power is one of the elements distinguishing democracy from authoritarian rule.

### **III – International civil service and distribution of power**

Despite the shortcomings, working for an international organization continues to be a popular professional choice. For instance, the average number of eligible people who apply for every vacant UN positions, support or professional, is 114 (UN 2004: 6) and for professional positions alone, the number of applicants per vacancy tends to be even higher, at times even twice as high.<sup>49</sup> This being said, the extent to which international organizations appeal to professionals with skills marketable nationally and internationally is not only explainable by the intrinsic characteristics of their professional culture. It also has to be understood in connection with relations of power at the national and international level. More specifically, in connection with the place that international organizations and their potential staff occupy in the international and national distribution of power. In order to clarify this state of affairs, two aspects of the question will be touched upon. First, how the appeal of international organizations tends to be relative to the power position of the countries of origin of potential staff and, second, how the attractiveness of international organizations can be relative to the power position that staff occupy in their home countries.<sup>50</sup>

#### **The power status of international organizations vis-à-vis countries of origin**

For professionals from countries at the top of the hierarchy of international power, joining international organizations is not often a primary choice, whereas for professionals who belong to countries in the middle or low ranks of the international distribution of power, a career in international organizations is an attractive proposition. This suggests that the appeal of international organizations is relative to the power position of the countries of origin of the potential staff.

*From international power to international organizations as a second choice* – The social prestige of an organization is largely based on its power, and on the extent to which it is, or derives from, a source of power. International organizations are not foreign to this status ‘law’. Their attractiveness as a working places is partly measured by their position in the distribution of power vis-à-vis member states. The examples of the United States and France illustrate this state of affair particularly well.

Regarding the United States, its centrality in the international distribution of power shapes the professional trajectories, social attachments and status which seem highly desirable to skilled ambitious American professionals. With the United States being a global power, the role of an American skilled professional often also implies a significant influence on international affairs. Therefore, for these professionals, there is little that is more rewarding than an American career. This situation is especially striking in the context of the public sector. For instance, if the choice is between being a senior official in one of the United State’s Executive Branch entities dealing with international issues, or being a senior official in an international organization, the

---

<sup>49</sup> In 2005, the average number of applicants for a P-5 position was 125, for a P-4 position it was 199, and for a P-3 position 335. Figures provided by the Department of Human resources of the UN.

<sup>50</sup> The tendencies examined correspond only to statistical trends. They simply provide an outline of the reality without pretending to give a comprehensive explanation of the personal trajectory of each international staff.

former is likely to be more attractive than the latter.<sup>51</sup> The power of the United States reverberates on the Executive Branch, on its posts and its staff, granting them with social prestige as well as with strong personal satisfaction.<sup>52</sup> Ultimately, the disparity of power between international and American organizations, accounts for patterns of professional mobility. For example, it is easier for a US national with a senior career in the American governmental machinery to be offered a senior position in an international organization, than for a US national with a senior career in international organizations to be proposed a senior position in the US government.

The case of France is less straightforward, echoing its increasingly ambiguous status as an international power. The national professional realm tends to be preferred over the international, particularly for senior careers in the public sector. Traditionally there is more social prestige attached to a senior career in the national administration than to a senior career in an international organization, and being a high civil servant often serves as a stepping stone for a political career. In this regard, the *Ecole nationale d'administration* (ENA), that educates most high civil servants, cabinet members and key politicians, holds a prime of place in the national landscape.<sup>53</sup> This situation is in line with the fact that France continues to see itself as a major power, and its public sector elite, nationally centered. Under these conditions, the declared commitment of France to international organizations, is not powerful enough to change the career of choice of its administrative and political elite. Joining international organizations on a seconded position does not help the career advancement of French high civil servants. In addition, the fact that career prospects in international organizations are less predictable than the ones in the national civil service also has a discouraging effect.<sup>54</sup> Hence, among French elite students and professionals, few see the attraction of joining international organizations. But at the same time France is growing defensive and insecure of its international standing, and the way in which its national administration and high civil servants function is increasingly seen more as part of the problem than of the solution. And the table of professional attractiveness turns. This is not to say that international organizations now constitute a more valued career path than the national high civil service but, compared to fifteen or twenty years ago, more well trained students and young professionals see beyond the national civil service. A career in international organizations is becoming an option that is not necessarily worse than the ones offered by the national administration. The current difficulty for university graduates and young professionals to find employment in France only adds to this evolution.

---

51 On the relationship between the state and civil society in the US and its impact on the respective social value assigned to private and public sector professions, such as lawyers and civil servants, see Cohen-Tanugi (1985).

52 'As we left, I reflected that it was hardly my skill that was moving the allies behind us. This was an exercise of American influence; the U.S. officials traveling with me called it the big dog barking as we flew from stop to stop – and it was a great feeling to be speaking for America. The exercise of American power would move others...' (Lake 2000: 275).

53 For a sociological analysis of the importance of ENA in France, see Bourdieu (1996).

54 Although mobility traditionally has not been a factor of career advancement for French civil servants, this is changing. In 2004, decree number 2004-708 made mobility and secondment compulsory for civil servants recruited through ENA (article 1 and article 2 paragraph C). The decree is available at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=LEX&nod=1DM004708#>.

*The pursuit of status through international organizations* – The situation is quite different for skilled professionals from countries standing in the middle or at the low end of the international distribution of power. To them, working for international organizations is an attractive option. In addition to granting financial benefits that are substantially higher than their national salaries, the workforce of an international organization gives a professional and social status that the national job market of these countries has a difficulty matching. This has to do with the greater range of action and opportunities that can come with international organizations. Consider for instance diplomacy. Generally speaking, it is much more difficult for a diplomat of a developing country to have an impact internationally, than it is for a diplomat of a leading developed country. Short of the backing of a powerful state, a diplomat stands more or less on his or her own, at times being no more than a background actor. In a high-level position within an international organization, a developing country diplomat has more of a chance to overcome this predicament, especially if he or she joins an international organization with a political clout. Moreover, it is certainly more comfortable to be a staff member of an international organization that seeks to get countries out of trouble, than to be on the other side of the fence. Thus it is not uncommon that developing countries diplomats are attracted to senior UN positions while this is relatively rare for countries dominating the international hierarchy of power, except for the very top positions.<sup>55</sup>

### **International organizations and the power position of its potential staff within their respective home countries**

The correlation between the attractiveness of international organizations to skilled professionals, and the distribution of power, extends to the position of the individual professionals in the distribution of power in their respective home countries. This correlation is rather straightforward. Skilled professionals with an ‘elite’ social and educational background from leading developed countries tend not to see international organizations as one of their first career choices, whereas skilled professionals from developing countries are prone to.

*Power distribution within leading countries and international organizations* – It is not surprising that the disparity of power between international organizations and powerful countries, which brings about the dependency of the former vis-à-vis the latter, translates into certain patterns of behavior of skilled professionals in leading countries. These patterns amount to professionals from countries at the top of the international distribution of power being more attracted to careers inside than outside the national framework. This state of affairs is first and foremost the case in the United States. Data shows that in general, those highly skilled US nationals who are not entrepreneur minded and who are trained in areas relative to international organizations, do not consider these organizations the most appealing professional option. Their educational background, often also a benefit of their privileged social background,<sup>56</sup> puts them in a

---

<sup>55</sup> The World Bank has always been headed by an American, and the IMF by a European.

<sup>56</sup> ‘Three-quarters of the students at the country’s top 146 colleges come from the richest socio-economic fourth, compared with just 3 percent who come from the poorest fourth (the median family income at Harvard, for example, is USD 150,000). This means that, at an elite university, you are 25 times as likely to run into a rich student as a poor one’, *The Economist* (2004).

position where they are able to get the best possible professional, financial and social rewards and recognition. The fact that the prestige of powerful professional US settings exceeds that of international organizations encourages American graduates on topics related to international organizations, to set their eyes on US government, universities, think tanks, Wall Street and other prestigious professional venues.<sup>57</sup> However, later in their career, some chose to join international organizations for a period, preferably in a high position, as a finishing touch.<sup>58</sup> Against this background, when it comes to the United Nations, those US nationals who consider international organizations as a long-term career tend to come from the second tiers of US universities.<sup>59</sup>

To a certain extent, this also applies to other developed countries. For instance few of the French professionals working for the United Nations come from elite schools, or have elite social backgrounds. Few graduated from elite schools, and the majority only holds Masters degrees. Moreover, those who are sons and daughters (actually more daughters than sons) of French diplomats tend to have a ‘moyenne bourgeoisie’ or ‘petite bourgeoisie’ socio-economic background. And for those who come from a higher social background, chances are that working for the United Nations was not their first choice but, a career on which they settled ‘faute de mieux’. An analysis of nationals of the United Kingdom is likely to show similar results. Another interesting example is Japan. Again, few graduates from elite schools such as the University of Tokyo, and the Faculty of Law in particular, consider international organizations for a full time career. They prefer to be where power is, namely at home. Moreover, with the time-limited contracts becoming the norm, a career at the UN becomes all the less attractive for Japanese males, who are still the main bread-winners. This being said, for Japanese women with an elite socio-economic and educational background, international organizations remain a quite prestigious career.

*Power distribution within developing countries and international organizations* – The picture tends to be reversed for developing countries.<sup>60</sup> This can largely be explained by the access to education. In most developing countries access to education face even more severe inequalities. Although, in the past fifty years enrollment in primary education and the demand for access to secondary education has risen,<sup>61</sup> this has not

---

<sup>57</sup> For an American graduate, not all these options are of equal value. Elite graduates, especially those who have a background in law, prefer to make their first mark in the private sector (law firms and others), to then join the public sector in positions of responsibility, via political appointments.

<sup>58</sup> In certain American elite circles, especially on the East Coast, it may look good and quite ‘progressive’, to have an international organization, including a UN, connection of some sort. For example, in a phone interview, Yves Dezalay stated that spending a few years with an international NGO can allow graduates from prestigious universities to acquire a ‘savoir-faire’ and contacts useful for a corporate career. For more, see for example Dezalay and Garth (2005).

<sup>59</sup> Incidentally, among American nationals working for the UN, the percentage of women tends to be higher than men (2005a: 50).

<sup>60</sup> A more detailed analysis would have to introduce some nuance to this statement, taking into account the various layers of elites in developing countries and their access to power (economic, social and political).

<sup>61</sup> The overall result has been that, by 1995, 70 percent of adults living in developing countries were literate, compared to less than half of the adult population in 1965. The number of adults in developing countries with at least some higher education has also increased from 28 million students in higher education in 1980, to 47 million in 1995 (World Bank 2000: 26-7).

removed the socio-economic inequalities in the access to education, particularly not for the absolute underdogs of society.<sup>62</sup> This is especially the case since the growth of education in developing countries has been accompanied by an increase of private profit oriented education, with tuitions fees that are much higher than in public establishments, especially for higher education. In effect, this system excludes the under-privileged students from the competition and major imbalances remain in terms of access to education between urban and rural areas, and between rich and poor households.<sup>63</sup> Only those who come from a privileged socio-economic background can afford international education and the limited scholarships offered by governments and foundations from developed countries, tend to benefit the students of higher socio-economic strata. The impact that this has on the marketability of professionals from developing countries at the international level is quite straightforward. Those socio-economic elites, who received the best education at home or abroad, are most likely to land a job internationally. In this regard, education in the United States, although more costly than in Europe, proves to be a good investment. The reputation of American universities over European universities serves as a useful 'passport', as a valuable asset that offers an edge of greater marketability, as well as social mobility at home and abroad.

Against this background, to professional elites of developing countries with skills that overlap those in demand in international organizations, international organizations are quite attractive. Once someone from a developing country has been educated abroad, the pull for staying abroad is powerful. Even more so when language is not an obstacle and when a *diaspora* from the home country already exists in the host country.<sup>64</sup> International organizations benefit from this pull power. A student from a developing country, compared to a US graduate, who studied at Harvard University, is likely to see international organizations as an attractive career option. From a general point of view, there are most likely not only more, but also more stable, opportunities in the United States.<sup>65</sup> More specifically, although the American job market is one of the most open ones, beyond those technical fields (engineering and science) in which foreign skilled professionals are in demand, it is still rather difficult for non-US nationals to enter. In contrast, and without even mentioning the challenge of obtaining a work permit, international organizations require good quality graduates from developing countries. Moreover, international organizations do not necessarily demand the level of English that American companies do.<sup>66</sup> This helps explain why in international organizations,

---

<sup>62</sup> See the example of India (Sen 2005: 211, 216-8).

<sup>63</sup> 'We know of no country in which high-income groups are not heavily represented in tertiary enrollments. For example, in Latin America, even though the technical and professional strata account for no more than 15 percent of the general population, their children account for nearly half the total enrollment in higher education, and still more in some of the best public universities such as the University of São Paulo and the University of Campinas in Brazil, the Simón Bolívar University in Venezuela, and the National University of Bogotá in Colombia' (World Bank 2000: 27-8).

<sup>64</sup> This is the case for the Indian subcontinent vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and North America, or for West and North Africa vis-à-vis France.

<sup>65</sup> Of course this all depends on the level and potential of development of the developing country, the extent to which it values graduates from good foreign universities, and how family connections can be used for success.

<sup>66</sup> The fact that French is widely spoken in Western and Northern Africa is an advantage for Western and Northern Africans who want to join the UN system. Yet, with the decrease of the global importance of France, English increasingly becomes a must. Moreover, when a former colonial link

professionals from leading developed countries tend not to have a ‘first-class’ educational and socio-economic background whereas most professionals from developing countries tend to be from very good social and educational backgrounds. This is more or less the case across the board of professionals, and all the more for senior officials in international organizations (see, e.g. Weiss et al. 2005). A rather ironic picture unfolds as international organizations come to in a way endorse the social and economic (and ultimately political) disparities of developing countries that they are supposed to address.

On the whole, the way in which attractiveness of international organizations reflects the inequalities of the social profile of skilled professionals in developed and developing countries, underlines an aspect of the geographical distribution principle. To a certain extent, one could argue that this principle, intended to be a democratic device bringing national diversity to international organizations, also, by unveiling the inequalities of home countries, constitutes an expression of their democratic limits as well as that of international organizations. This is not surprising. But it is quite troubling considering international organizations’ commitment in principle, to social, economic and political justice.

\*

Ultimately, the impact on home countries of how attractive international organizations are to professionals from developed and developing countries is ambiguous. On the one hand, professionals in international organizations accumulate a knowledge that can be useful for their countries of origin. On the other hand, it is in reality rare that these professionals return to apply their expertise at home, at least not until after a life-time career abroad. It is even worth considering how, as the mobility of talent increases, to what extent it is causing a brain drain, exhausting developing countries of their relatively small highly skilled workforce. Sure, in the field of finance, there are those professionals from developing countries who use a few years stay at the IMF as a way to gain professional credentials, to then leverage this experience for the purpose of a high level position back home.<sup>67</sup> This may also be the case for professionals in senior positions or with specific expertise. However, for the average professional, who has spent his or her career in an international organization, there is no direct ‘return on investment’ for the country of origin. Furthermore, if professionals do return home, it is often for retirement. But this also happens less than one would think. While nostalgia for the home country persists, few professionals return after a life-time career abroad. This is particularly the case when they have acquired a private life with a family in a new country. By then, working for an international organization has become part of an exit strategy.<sup>68</sup>

---

translates into English proficiency, it becomes an asset for working in international organizations. The large number of staff from India and to some degree Pakistan and of Philippines working in international organizations has to be seen in this context.

<sup>67</sup> For example, heads of central banks of developing countries often have an IMF experience, especially in Latin America.

<sup>68</sup> It is also interesting to note that the opening up of former communist countries to the West has changed the patterns of migration of professionals from these countries. While professionals from Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Central Asia who join international organizations used to

#### **IV – Lessons learned and pending questions, as a way of concluding**

In conclusion, let us briefly review some of the main lessons learnt and pending questions.

##### **Lessons learnt from the current state of professional attractiveness of international organizations**

Among the lessons that can be learnt from the paper, three stand out. They concern i) the interaction between international organizations and home countries; ii) the evolving patterns of attractiveness based on the evolution of home countries; and iii) the place of women in the mobility patterns of skilled professionals.

*Interaction between international organizations and home countries* – This paper has shown that the professional attractiveness of international organizations is related to the working conditions, the international standing of one's country, and one's place in the internal distribution of national power. As such, the analysis of the professional workforce of international organizations is a significant entry point to understanding national and transnational elites, to understanding their rationale and choice.

*Patterns of attractiveness of international organizations and evolution of home countries* – In this regard, the more a country is economically advanced and powerful internationally, the less attractive a full fledged career in an international organization is likely to appear to its professional elite. Compared to developed countries and their professional benefits, the fact that international organizations do not stand at the traditional center of power, and offer increasingly unstable career prospects, is a considerable disadvantage, especially for the UN. Although exceptions exist, this cannot persist as it only furthers the difficulty of attracting and keeping the 'best and the brightest'. It also risks becoming true for developing countries. As the powerful countries of the developing world are increasingly successful, chances are that their national professionals, could become less likely to overlook these shortcomings of international organizations. Since the UN system is particularly weak in this regard, the organization's ability to rely on a high quality workforce in the future is questioned.

*International organizations and women in patterns of skilled professional mobility* – Another lesson that emerges from this paper is the important role of women in the patterns of professional mobility towards international organizations. This is not only because international organizations are increasingly committed to gender parity. It is also in line with four other trends of our time. First, there is an increasing number of women with higher education, both in the developed and the developing world. Second, there is a female disentanglement from traditional sexual and family structures that gives women a certain autonomy that allows them to project themselves as individuals (Héritier 2002: 142-7). Third, there is a continued lack of equal access to professional careers in many countries, both developed and developing. Fourth, there is a female embrace of the international realm to overcome the barriers at home. In addition and

---

do it with the support of their government, this is less and less the case. The fact that young people from former communist countries can travel, study abroad, and market themselves has drastically modified their professional mobility and the hiring process of international organizations (Hirschman 2006).

more generally, there is perhaps a greater willingness of women to take risks and explore beyond the familiar (national).<sup>69</sup> More specifically, there is also the fact that the current unraveling of the international civil service renders it less attractive to men (who to a large extent still are the bread-winners, in both developing and developed countries). For women, a career even in an international civil service that is under attack can be a supplemental income to the husband's salary.<sup>70</sup> Against this background, it is indeed striking to see that among candidates for jobs in international organizations, there are more and more women – women who act as free agents, more existentially and psychologically detached from their home governments than men.<sup>71</sup>

### **Pending questions, and what to do about them**

The pending questions fall into three main categories: i) methodological, ii) institutional, and iii) normative/political.

*Methodological issues and sociology of national/transnational elites* – There is an urgent need for more research on the topics touched upon in the paper, especially now that the importance of globalization and of the institutions of global governance is becoming more and more cogent. At minimum, more research on the professionals of international organizations needs to be done. Having more comprehensive data on their socio-economic and educational background, as well as qualitative data on how they perceive their professional and life options, would improve the picture of the attractiveness of international organizations, and of the evolution of international bureaucracies.<sup>72</sup> Beyond this, it would be useful to have more systematic information on national elites and its patterns of transnational mobility (transversal and social upward mobility). This would open the possibility for 'a sociology of elites' at the international level, which is by and large missing (see Dezalay 2004: 151-2). Such a sociology would have to systematically examine the correlation between the place of the professional elite in the internal distribution of countries, and the place of these countries within the international distribution of power. It would also have to analyze the informal international/national elite networks in which international organizations often gravitate, and which are so important in their functioning. This would have to be done professional field by professional field, taking gender issues into account.<sup>73</sup> In time, this would give a better understanding of the dual process of socialization of the

---

<sup>69</sup> Social anthropology tells us that it is a traditional pattern for women to leave their family and the world in which they grew up, e.g. Héritier (1996; 2002: 133-5).

<sup>70</sup> This could be somewhat reminiscent of the fact that in France, the gradual feminization of educational professions (primary, secondary, and then university) cannot only be explained by democratization. It is also related to the decline of the teaching profession, in terms of comparative status and salary making it less and less viable to economically sustain a middle-class family.

<sup>71</sup> Women working abroad as skilled professionals are less likely than men to be part of home country networks.

<sup>72</sup> A book doing for international bureaucracies what Silberman (1993) has done on administrative history and organization theory in a national context would be extremely illuminating.

<sup>73</sup> On the need to go beyond traditional models of migration and to integrate the women factor, see for example Kofman (1999).

international realm on one hand, and of internationalization of national societies on the other.<sup>74</sup>

*Institutional questions for international organizations* – As we have seen, weak management of human resources has a strong impact on the professional attractiveness of international organizations. On this account, the United Nations system has to achieve much progress. How can it happen and will it happen? These are open questions and if the past is an indication of the future, there are reasons for pessimism. After all, that UN reform constitutes a recurrent issue is an indication of past efforts of reform with little progress. Yet, improving the United Nations is not out of reach. It is necessary to find a middle course between too much security as understood in traditional bureaucracies, and too much insecurity as a result of the lack of funding combined with an ideological understanding of liberal management of human resources.<sup>75</sup> This entails relating to professionals as an asset and not a liability.

*On a quest for a progressive agenda* – International organizations cannot be expected to be more democratic than their member states, neither at the policy, nor at the functioning level. There is a domino effect at play between the shortcomings of member states and those of international organizations. But this is to not say that international organizations are not to be held accountable for their limitations because, to a large extent, international organizations are allowing these shortcomings to persist. Their well-functioning is essential to the expression and service of their progressive message of political, economic and social inclusion. Being dysfunctional as well as subservient towards the powerful and contemptuous vis-à-vis the powerless, is not an option for international organizations, at least not if their message is going to be taken seriously. Making sure that international organizations are centers of professional and ethical excellence is the best way to nourish their legitimacy and bring the intended global corrective socio-economic and security effects. Under this condition international organizations are more likely to become instruments of progress rather than ‘caisses de résonance’ of inequalities and tools of regression. Under this condition, their professionals are more likely to find a place away from home and be part of ‘an aristocracy of responsibility, moved by a moral responsibility to think a world better, still receptive to the idea of idealism’ (Allott 2003: 338).

---

<sup>74</sup> ‘Properly construed, *The State Nobility* offers a systematic research program on any national field of power, provided that the American (British, Japanese, Brazilian, etc.) reader carries out the *work of transposition* necessary to generate, by way of homological reasoning, an organized set of hypotheses for comparative inquiry in her own country’ (Wacquant 1996: xiii). In addition, in light of the double phenomena of socialization of the international realm and of the internationalization of national societies, it is also a sociology of the international placement of national elite which is required. On this issue, though somewhat different from the one held in this paper, see Huntington (2004).

<sup>75</sup> ‘Ideological understanding’ of the liberal model of management of human resources, because in the private sector, even in industries which are cutting edge and throat cutting, seniority for highly skilled professionals, partly based on competition and competence, is more rewarded than one would think at first sight.

## Annex 1

### Staff of the United Nations Secretariat and other entities, as at 30 June 2005

Entity	Regular budget				Extrabudgetary resources				
	Professional and higher categories	Project personnel	General Service and related categories	Subtotal	Professional and higher categories	Project personnel	General Service and related categories	Subtotal	Total
UN Secretariat	3 133	4	4 616	7 753	2 621 <sup>a</sup>	1 005	4 610	8 236 <sup>b</sup>	15 989
UNDP <sup>c</sup>					1 581 <sup>d</sup>	789	3 172	5 542 <sup>e</sup>	5 542
UNFPA					193	218 <sup>f</sup>	931 <sup>g</sup>	1 342	1 342
UNHCR	89		130	219	1 877 <sup>h</sup>		4 543	6 420	6 639
UNICEF					2 657 <sup>i</sup>	1 410 <sup>j</sup>	4 914	8 981	8 981
UNITAR					6	23	6	35	35
UNOPS					665		313	978	978
UNRWA <sup>k</sup>	91	0	11	102	36	0	0	36	138
ITC <sup>l</sup>					75	43	95	213	213
ICSC					18		18	36	36
UNJSPF					49		106	155	155
ICJ	33		51	84	12		2	14	98
UNU					23	38	60	121	121
Total	3 346	4	4 808	8 158	9 620	3 526	18 770	31 916	40 074

Notes: These figures refer to staff in appointments of one year or more. The abbreviations stand for the following: UNDP – United Nations Development Program, UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund, UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF – United Nations International Children's Funds, UNITAR – UN Institute for Training and Research, UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services, UNRWA – United Nations Relief Agency and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, ITC – International Trade Center, ICSC – International Civil Service Commission, UNJSPF – United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, ICJ – International Court of Justice, UNU – United Nations University.

a Including 606 Professional, 720 Field Service and 131 General Service staff in peacekeeping operations with limited appointments of one year or more.

b Including 10 Professional and 79 General Service staff against revenue-producing accounts.

c Including staff charged to the UNDP core budget, funds managed by UNDP and UNDP supplementary funds.

d Including National Officers.

e Excluding 1,169 under UNDP 300-series contracts for appointments of limited duration.

f Including Headquarters General Service, country office General Service and National Officers.

g Including Junior Professional Officers.

h Including 294 National Professional Officers and 86 Junior Professional Officers.

i Including Professional staff and National Officers occupying posts funded by regular budget resources.

j Including Professional staff and National Officers occupying posts funded from project funds.

k Excluding area staff.

l A number of posts in ITC are financed jointly by the UN from the regular budget and by the World Trade Organization.

Source: UN (2005a: 9).

## Annex 2

### Staff size and the number of member states, 27 international organizations

Organization	Period	Staff				Number of member states			
		first year (1)	1985 (2)	last year (3)	$\Delta$ % p.a. Overall (4)	first year (5)	last year (6)	$\Delta$ % p.a. (7)	$\varepsilon_1 =$ (4)/(7) (8)
ADB	1981-2000	1,257	1,553	2,058	2.6	44	59	1.6	1.6
BIS	1950-2000	142	314	500	2.5	28	49	1.1	2.3
CARICOM	1973-2000	74	182	221	4.1	4	15	0.5	0.8
CoE	1980-2000	764	830	1,216	2.4	21	44	3.8	0.6
EC/EU	1968-2000	9,026	19,781	30,777	3.9	6	15	2.9	1.3
ESA	1974-2000	1,462	1,376	1,718	0.6	11	14	0.9	0.7
FAO	1963-1999	4,096	6,951	4,072	0	106	175	1.4	0
GATT/WTO	1953-2001	35	300	368	5	32	142	3.2	1.6
IAEA	1964-2000	661	1,964	2,136	3.3	82	130	1.3	2.5
IBRD	1953-1998	433	5,700	6,800	6.3	53	182	2.8	2.3
ICAO	1963-2000	503	875	759	1.1	101	187	1.7	0.6
IFAD	1978-2000	80	174	265	5.6	55	126	3.8	1.5
IFC	1964-2001	118	433	1,063	6.1	78	175	6.2	1.0
ILO	1963-1999	1,445	2,838	2,393	1.4	108	174	1.3	1.1
IMCO/IMO	1963-2000	43	251	274	5.1	54	157	2.9	1.8
IMF	1950-2001	444	1,646	2,976	3.8	47	184	2.7	1.5
ITU	1964-1999	372	742	770	2.1	116	188	1.4	1.5
OECD	1961-2001	1,008	(1,827 <sup>a</sup> )	2,291	2.1	20	30	1.0	2.1
UNESCO	1963-1999	2,379	3,171	2,348	0	109	188	1.5	0
UNHCR	1986-2000	2,138	n.a.	5,423	6.9	41	60	2.8	2.5
UPU	1963-2000	57	141	151	2.7	121	189	1.2	2.3
WHO	1963-1999	2,655	4,477	4,000	1.1	117	193	1.4	0.8
WIPO	1974-2001	157	288	817	6.3	36	177	6.1	3.3
WMO	1963-1999	114	295	264	2.4	125	185	1.1	2.2
unweighted arithmetic average:					3.2			2.5	1.28
				(3)/(1)				(6)/(5)	
Sum:		29,463	n.a.	73,660	2.5	1,515	3,038	2.01	1.24
out of sample: <sup>b</sup>									
Commonwealth	1992-2000	431	n.a.	305	-4.2	54	54	0	-
EFTA	1964-2000	144	71	71	-1.9	7	4	-1.5	1.3
NATO	1959-2001	603	1,134	1,083	1.4	15	19	2.4	0.6

Notes: <sup>a</sup> 1988. <sup>b</sup> not used in regression analysis.

Source: Vaubel et al. (2003: 8). Reproduced with the kind permission of the authors.

### Annex 3

#### UN Secretariat Staff in posts subject to geographical distribution by nationality, grade and gender

Country of nationality	Number of staff 30/06/2004		USG		ASG		D-2		D-1		P-5		P4		P-3		P-2		P-1		Number of staff 30/06/2005		Midpoint	Desirable range	
	Total	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	F Total				
																					F	Total			
Afghanistan	2											1		1								2	2	6.54	2-14
Albania	4	3												1					3			3	4	6.01	1-14
Algeria	6	2							1		1		1			1	1					2	5	7.75	3-14
Andorra	1	1																1					1	5.94	1-14
Angola	1																							6.23	1-14
Antigua and Barbuda	1	1												1								1	1	5.91	1-14
Argentina	29	17	1				1			3	3		2	5	1	3	5	7				18	31	21.43	17-26
Armenia	5						1								3		1						5	5.96	1-14
Australia	40	18						1	1	1	9	5	4		2	4	8	12				23	47	30.82	26-36
Austria	24	12									1	1	2	3	4	5	6	4				13	26	19.27	14-24
Azerbaijan	4	3												1	2			2				3	5	6.12	1-14
Bahamas	9	7												1	1	5	1	1				7	9	6.07	1-14
Bahrain																								6.34	2-14
Bangladesh	10		1						1		5		3										10	9.10	4-14
Barbados	2	2										2										2	2	6.02	1-14
Belarus	11									3			4		3								10	6.35	2-14
Belgium	30	13					2		3	3	4	2	3	5	6	5	1					15	34	22.55	18-27
Belize	3	1											1			1	1					1	3	5.89	1-14
Benin	4											2		1		1	1						5	6.08	1-14
Bhutan	4								1		1		2		1								5	5.93	1-14
Bolivia	7	3										1			4	1		1				3	7	6.20	1-14
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6	2										1			2		1	2				2	6	5.99	1-14
Botswana	1																	1				1	1	6.09	1-14
Brazil	36	10					1		2	1	7	2	7	4	4	4	1	3				14	36	33.37	28-38
Brunei Darussalam																								6.40	2-14
Bulgaria	15	5							1		2	2	5	2		2						6	14	6.29	1-14
Burkina Faso	4	3							1	1				1		1						3	4	6.18	1-14
Burundi	6	1									1		1	1	4							1	7	6.04	1-14
Cambodia	3	1											1	1								1	2	6.20	1-14
Cameroon	15	6							1		3	1	4	1	1	3						5	14	6.34	2-14
Canada	51	22		2					2	2	11	4	13	13	3	3		1				25	54	49.88	42-57
Cape Verde	4										1		2		1								4	5.89	1-14
Central African Republic	4										1		1				1						3	5.97	1-14
Chad	2										1		1										2	6.09	1-14
Chile	25	10			1				2	2			2		4	3	7	2				7	23	9.65	5-14
China	57	33	1				1	1	2	2	8	2	5	5	3	12	5	12				34	59	66.06	56-76
Colombia	11	3	1							1	2		2	2	1	1						4	10	9.24	4-14
Comoros																								5.90	1-14
Congo	3												2		1								3	5.97	1-14
Costa Rica	4	2							1	1				1	1							2	4	6.42	2-14
Cote d'Ivoire	10								1		2		3		4								10	6.41	2-14
Croatia	7	4										1		2	2	1	1					4	7	6.53	2-14
Cuba	6	2										1	1		2	1	1					2	6	6.77	2-14
Cyprus	3										1				1		1						3	6.48	2-14
Czech Republic	6	2					1				1	2	2					1				3	7	8.90	4-14
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1															1							1	6.51	2-14
Democratic Republic of the Congo	6	3											1	1		1	3					2	6	7.16	2-14
Denmark	16	7					1				1	2	3	1	2	4						7	14	17.04	12-22
Djibouti	6	1										2				2	1	1				1	6	5.90	1-14

Annex 3 continued Country of nationality	Number of staff																Number of staff		Midpoint	Desirable range				
	30/06/2004		USG		ASG		D-2		D-1		P-5		P4		P-3		P-2				P-1		30/06/2005	
	Total	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F			M	F	F	Total
Dominica	3															3						3	5.88	1-14
Dominican Republic	6	1									1		3					1				5	6.60	2-14
Ecuador	6	2									1		1		3	1						6	6.44	2-14
Egypt	14	5		1			1		1		1	6	2	1	1	1		1				16	9.32	5-14
El Salvador	8	4									1			1	3	2						7	6.35	2-14
Equatorial Guinea	2												2									2	5.91	1-14
Eritrea	6	2									1		1			2	2					6	5.97	1-14
Estonia	4	2													1	2	1					4	6.08	1-14
Ethiopia	19	6					1		1		1		4	3	1	2	6					19	7.61	3-14
Fiji	9	7													2	1	1	5				9	5.94	1-14
Finland	17	6					1		1		2	1	3	1	1	2	2	1				15	14.19	9-19
France	105	50	1				2		6		9	15	7	16	13	9	12	12	14			116	100.04	85-115
Gabon	2															2						2	6.03	1-14
Gambia	4	1					1					1		1								3	5.91	1-14
Georgia	3										1		1									2	6.01	1-14
Germany	137	51	1			1	2		2	13		20	11	19	16	15	17	16	10			143	141.05	120-162
Ghana	13	5	1						2		2	3	3	2								13	6.41	2-14
Greece	9	4								1	4	1		1	1	1	2					11	14.27	9-19
Grenada	2															2						2	5.88	1-14
Guatemala	3	2										1			1	1						3	6.60	2-14
Guinea	2													1		1		1				3	6.11	1-14
Guinea-Bissau																							5.91	1-14
Guyana	13	11						1	2				1	3			4		2			13	5.90	1-14
Haiti	3	2											1	2								3	6.10	1-14
Honduras	2														1							2	6.10	1-14
Hungary	9	2								1	2		4	1	1							9	8.02	3-14
Iceland	5	1									1		2		1		1	1				6	6.39	2-14
India	47	18	1					2	4	2	6		6	8	8	3	3	4	3			47	36.31	31-42
Indonesia	13	6										1	1	1	3	3	4	3				16	12.89	8-18
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	9	6							1	2	2	2				1						8	9.79	5-15
Iraq	6	3							2	1	1		1	1		1						7	6.74	2-14
Ireland	15	5				1			1		4	1	2	3		1	3					16	11.34	7-16
Israel	8	4								1	1	2			2		3	1				10	13.20	8-18
Italy	102	52	1		1		2		1	1		6	4	15	10	18	27	11	8			105	82.35	70-95
Jamaica	13	8				1					1	1	1	5	2	2	2					15	6.04	1-14
Japan	110	64	1				1	1	2		1	6	8	17	24	16	21	2	11			111	308.45	262-355
Jordan	8	2									1	1	4		2	1						9	6.16	1-14
Kazakhstan	7	3													2	1	2	2				7	6.57	2-14
Kenya	24	14						1	1	4	4	2	2	2	2	8						24	6.75	2-14
Kiribati																							5.88	1-14
Kuwait	1	1						1														1	8.42	4-14
Kyrgyzstan	5	2											1			1		2	1			5	5.99	1-14
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1													1								1	6.01	1-14
Latvia	3	1													2	1	1					4	6.14	1-14
Lebanon	15	5					1				2		1	2	4	2	1					13	6.31	2-14
Lesotho	3	3												2		1						3	5.92	1-14
Liberia	6	5								1	1	2		1		1						6	5.95	1-14
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2							1						1								2	8.02	3-14
Liechtenstein																							5.94	1-14
Lithuania	4	2												1	2	1						4	6.31	2-14
Luxembourg	5	1											2		1	1						4	7.06	2-14

Madagascar	3	1						1		1						1	4	6.31	2-14		
Malawi	4							1		1							3	6.16	1-14		
Malaysia	8	4		1			1		3			2			1	4	9	9.54	5-14		
Maldives	1											1					1	5.89	1-14		
Mali	8	2			1		2		1				1			1	7	6.19	1-14		
Malta	1				1										1	1	2	6.09	1-14		
Marshall Islands																		5.88	1-14		
Mauritania	3									2		1					3	5.95	1-14		
Mauritius	2																	6.06	1-14		
Mexico	16	9			1		3	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	37.19	32-43		
Micronesia (Federated States of)	1													1				5.88	1-14		
Monaco																		5.91	1-14		
Mongolia	5	2								1	2	2					2	5.94	1-14		
Morocco	7	4					1		2	1		1			1		4	7.27	2-14		
Mozambique	3						1		1							1		6.31	2-14		
Myanmar	4										2				2	1	1	7.12	2-14		
Namibia	3	1			1							1	1				1	6.00	1-14		
Nauru																		5.88	1-14		
Nepal	9									1		7		1			9	6.51	2-14		
Netherlands	30	6			1			3		7	2	11	4	1	2		8	32.24	27-37		
New Zealand	10	5			1			2	1	1	2	1	2	3	2		8	9.35	5-14		
Nicaragua	6	4										1	2	1	2		4	6.00	1-14		
Niger	3	2					1						1			1	2	6.18	1-14		
Nigeria	17	3						3		3		3	1	2	1	1	2	9.37	5-14		
Norway	8	3			1					2	1		1	1	1	2	5	16.42	12-21		
Oman	3	1						1								1	1	7.00	2-14		
Pakistan	17	5				1	2		2	1	1	3	3	2	1	1	7	10.14	5-15		
Palau																		5.88	1-14		
Panama	2	1					1					1					1	6.23	1-14		
Papua New Guinea	3											1		1		1	3	6.04	1-14		
Paraguay	3	2											1	1			2	6.18	1-14		
Peru	12	3				1		2	1	1		3	2	2			3	7.89	3-14		
Philippines	51	35						1		1	9	6	10	9	11		33	49	9.13	4-14	
Poland	11	2						2		1	2	3		2		1	2	11	13.80	9-19	
Portugal	8	4								1		1		2	2		3	5	13.33	9-18	
Qatar	1													1				1	6.87	2-14	
Republic of Korea	27	9						1		2	1	7	5	7	4	2	1	11	31	34.56	29-40
Republic of Moldova	1							1										1	5.97	1-14	
Romania	11	3						1				2		5	3		1	4	12	7.26	2-14
Russian Federation	106	14				1		3		13	1	18	3	36	5	18	5	14	104	25.91	21-31
Rwanda	5											1		2		2		5	6.08	1-14	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	5	3									1	1	1			1	4	6	5.88	1-14	
Saint Lucia	2	1										1				1	1	2	5.90	1-14	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	3	1											1	2			1	3	5.88	1-14	
Samoa																			5.88	1-14	
San Marino	2	2															2	2	5.91	1-14	
Sao Tome and Principe																			5.88	1-14	
Saudi Arabia	7	6								1			3	1			1	5	6	17.38	13-22
Senegal	15	3						2		2	1	1		2	3		4	13	6.19	1-14	
Serbia and Montenegro	7	1								2		3		2	1		1	8	6.38	2-14	
Seychelles	3	1								1					1		1	3	5.90	1-14	
Sierra Leone	4	3						1				2			1		3	4	6.00	1-14	
Singapore	10	5				1		1		2	1		2	1	1		5	10	11.93	7-17	
Slovakia	5	1				1						4		1			1	6	6.77	2-14	
Slovenia	5	3						1							3		3	5	7.17	2-14	
Solomon Islands	1														1			1	5.89	1-14	
Somalia	4	1								1	1	1					1	3	6.06	1-14	
South Africa	12	3								4	1	3	1	4	1		3	14	11.39	7-16	
Spain	49	24						1		3	2	10	6	14	12	2	5	25	55	45.61	39-52
Sri Lanka	8	4										4	1		1		2	6	6.58	2-14	

Annex 3 continued Country of nationality	Number of staff																		Number of staff		Midpoint	Desirable range			
	30/06/2004		USG		ASG		D-2		D-1		P-5		P4		P-3		P-2		P-1				30/06/2005		
	Total	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F			F	Total	
Sudan	6	1							1		1		4	1							2	8	6.77	2-14	
Suriname	3	1											1	1				1			1	3	5.89	1-14	
Swaziland	4	2											1				2				2	3	5.92	1-14	
Sweden	30	19			1	1		1	1		6	3	2	1	1	5		9			20	31	21.43	17-26	
Switzerland	11	5	1						2	1	1		3	1		3	3	3			8	18	24.46	20-29	
Syrian Arab Republic	9	5							2		1		2	2		4					6	11	6.86	2-14	
Tajikistan	1																	1				1	6.02	1-14	
Thailand	17	9						1	1	1	1	3	4	1	2	1					8	15	10.48	6-15	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	4	1														3	1				1	4	6.00	1-14	
Timor-Leste																							5.90	1-14	
Togo	7										1		1					3				5	6.01	1-14	
Tonga	1	1																	1		1	1	5.88	1-14	
Trinidad and Tobago	12	9					1		1				1	1	6	2					9	12	6.23	1-14	
Tunisia	10	2			1			1	1	1		2	1	1	1						2	8	6.58	2-14	
Turkey	11	5							2	2	1			1	2	2	2				5	12	13.18	8-18	
Turkmenistan																							6.05	1-14	
Tuvalu	1												1									1	5.88	1-14	
Uganda	22	8				1	1		2		4	1	2	3	3	3	1				8	21	6.58	2-14	
Ukraine	19	2							2		5		7		3	2					2	19	7.47	3-14	
United Arab Emirates																							9.58	5-14	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	104	45	2		2		3	1	8	2	21	13	15	12	9	12	2	6			46	108	101.52	86-117	
United Republic of Tanzania	10	6		1							1	1	1	2	2	1					5	9	6.79	2-14	
United States of America	313	171	1		1	1	3	2	14	24	37	37	45	52	28	31	13	23			170	312	351.14	298-404	
Uruguay	8	4						1			2		1	1		1		1			4	7	6.68	2-14	
Uzbekistan	1																	2	2		2	4	6.66	2-14	
Vanuatu	1								1													1	5.88	1-14	
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	10	4					1			1	1	1	3	1	2	1	1	1			5	13	9.08	4-14	
Viet Nam	3	1									1		1	1							1	3	8.02	3-14	
Yemen	2										1	1									1	2	6.41	2-14	
Zambia	7	1							1		1		1		1	1	1				1	6	6.15	1-14	
Zimbabwe	13	5									3	2	1	1	4	2					5	13	6.25	1-14	
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>2513</b>	<b>1063</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>423</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>188</b>			<b>1110</b>	<b>2579</b>			
Others																									
Palestine																									
Stateless	2							1						1								2			
Subtotal	2							1						1									2		
<b>Total</b>	<b>2515</b>	<b>1063</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>188</b>			<b>1110</b>	<b>2581</b>			

Source: UN (2005a: 47-53)

## Annex 4

### Geographic distribution of staff at the IMF by developing and industrial countries

Staff	1990		2004 <sup>1</sup>	
	No.	%	No.	%
All staff	1,774	100.0	2,714	100.0
Developing countries	731	41.2	1,187	43.7
Industrial countries	1,043	58.8	1,527	56.3
Total support staff <sup>2</sup>	642	100.0	718	100.0
Developing countries	328	51.1	394	54.9
Industrial countries	314	48.9	324	45.1
Total professional staff <sup>3</sup>	897	100.0	1,633	100.0
Developing countries	343	38.2	682	41.8
Industrial countries	554	61.8	951	58.2
<i>Total economists</i>	529	100.0	1,008	100.0
Developing countries	220	41.6	442	43.8
Industrial countries	309	58.4	566	56.2
<i>Total specialized career streams</i>	368	100.0	625	100.0
Developing countries	123	33.4	240	38.4
Industrial countries	245	66.6	385	61.6
Total managerial staff <sup>4</sup>	235	100.0	363	100.0
Developing countries	60	25.5	111	30.6
Industrial countries	175	74.5	252	69.4
<i>Total economists</i>	184	100.0	293	100.0
Developing countries	54	29.3	91	31.1
Industrial countries	130	70.7	202	68.9
<i>Total specialized career streams</i>	51	100	70	100.0
Developing countries	6	11.8	20	28.6
Industrial countries	45	88.2	50	71.4

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Includes only staff on duty; differs from the number of approved positions; <sup>2</sup> Staff in Grades A1-A8; <sup>3</sup> Staff in Grades A9-A15; <sup>4</sup> Staff in Grades B1-B5.

Source: IMF (2005: 89).

## Annex 5 Salary scale at the United Nations, World Bank, and IMF

Salary scale at the United Nations for the professional and higher categories showing annual gross salaries and net equivalents after application of staff assessment (USD, effective 1 January 2005)

Level	STEPS															
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	
USG	Gross	189952														
	Net D	127970														
	Net S	115166														
ASG	Gross	172860														
	Net D	117373														
	Net S	106285														
D-2	Gross	141974	145065	148156	151248	154340	157431									
	Net D	98224	100140	102057	103974	105891	107807									
	Net S	90236	91854	93466	95072	96674	98269									
D-1	Gross	129405	132119	134832	137547	140261	142974	145689	148403	151116						
	Net D	90431	92114	93796	95479	97162	98844	100527	102210	103892						
	Net S	83587	85050	86509	87965	89418	90867	92312	93755	95194						
P-5	Gross	106368	108679	110987	113295	115605	117913	120223	122532	124842	127150	129458	131768	134077		
	Net D	76148	77581	79012	80443	81875	83306	84738	86170	87602	89033	90464	91896	93328		
	Net S	70742	72014	73282	74550	75815	77077	78338	79596	80852	82106	83358	84607	85855		
P-4	Gross	86211	88303	90423	92650	94679	97106	99335	101563	103792	106018	108247	110474	112703	114931	117160
	Net D	63499	64880	66262	67643	69025	70406	71788	73169	74551	75931	77313	78694	80076	81457	82839
	Net S	59132	60390	61647	62901	64155	65407	66659	67909	69157	70405	71651	72896	74140	75383	76625
P-3	Gross	69779	71715	73656	75589	77530	79467	81402	83342	85280	87217	89156	91161	93226	95287	97350
	Net D	52654	53932	55213	56489	57770	59048	60325	61606	62885	64163	65443	66720	68000	69278	70557
	Net S	49149	50325	51503	52678	53856	55030	56206	57383	58558	59734	60906	62079	63250	64422	65594
P-2	Gross	56465	58056	59643	61344	63077	64809	66542	68273	70008	71742	73473	75209			
	Net D	43655	44800	45943	47087	48231	49374	50518	51660	52805	53950	55092	56238			
	Net S	40947	41985	43020	44057	45092	46130	47184	48234	49289	50341	51392	52447			
P-1	Gross	43831	45358	46883	48413	49938	51464	52992	54519	56043	57571					
	Net D	34558	35658	36756	37857	38955	40054	41154	42254	43351	44451					
	Net S	32599	33612	34625	35638	36650	37662	38676	39676	40672	41668					

D = Rate applicable to staff members with a dependent spouse or child. S = Rate applicable to staff members with no dependent spouse or child. Staff assessment to be used in conjunction with gross base salaries

### A. Staff assessment rates for those with dependants:

Assessable income (USD)	Spouse or a dependent child (%)
First 30000	18
Next 30000	28
NEXT 30000	34
Remaining assessable payments	38

**B. Staff assessment of those without dependants:** equal to the differences between the gross salaries at different grades and steps and the corresponding net salaries at the single rate. Source: The International Civil Service Commission's website: [http://icsc.un.org/sal\\_ss.asp](http://icsc.un.org/sal_ss.asp)

Salary scale of the World Bank (USD, effective 1 July 2004)

**Executive Management Remuneration**

Reflecting the responsibilities of the various management positions, the salary of the President, effective 1 July 2004 was \$302,470. The salaries of the Managing Directors are set within the K range indicated in the table.

**Executive Board Remuneration**

Upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors' Committee on the Remuneration of Executive Directors, the Governors approved the remuneration of Executive Directors and their Alternates effective 1 July 2004, to be as follows: the remuneration of Executive Directors is \$196,730; the remuneration of Alternate Executive Directors is \$170,170.

1. In addition, a supplemental allowance of \$141,290 is paid to cover expenses.
2. No supplemental allowance is paid to Managing Directors.
3. These figures do not apply to the US Executive Director and Alternate Executive Director, who are subject to US congressional salary caps.

Grades	Minimum	Market reference point	Maximum	Representative job title
A	21,000	27,295	35,480	Office assistant
B	27,620	35,910	50,270	Team assistant, information technician
C	31,650	41,150	57,610	Program assistant, information assistant
D	38,180	49,630	69,480	Senior program assistant, information specialists, budget assistant
E	48,620	63,200	88,480	Analyst
F	67,800	88,140	123,400	Professional
G	88,760	115,390	161,550	Senior professional
H	124,150	161,400	217,890	Managers and lead professionals
I	171,200	214,000	256,800	Directors and senior advisors
J	216,790	242,800	279,220	Vice presidents
K	242,500	271,600	282,460	Managing directors and senior vice presidents

Note: Because World Bank Group (WBG) staff, other than US citizens, are usually not required to pay income taxes on their WBG compensation, the salaries are set on a net-of-tax basis, which is generally equivalent to the after-tax take-home pay of the employees of the comparator organizations and firms from which WBG salaries are derived.

Source: World Bank (2006).

Salary scale at the IMF (USD, effective 1 May 2005)

Grade <sup>1</sup>	Range minimum	Range maximum	Illustrative position titles
A1	25,270	37,950	Not applicable (activities at this level have been outsourced)
A2	28,320	42,460	Driver
A3	31,680	47,560	Staff Assistant (clerical)
A4	35,490	53,290	Staff Assistant (beginning secretarial)
A5	39,810	59,710	Staff Assistant (experienced secretarial)
A6	44,480	66,820	Administrative Assistant, other Assistants (for example, Computer Systems, Human Resources, External Relations)
A7	49,890	74,870	Research Assistant, Senior Administrative Assistant, other Senior Assistants (for example, Accounting, Human Resources, External Relations)
A8	55,880	83,880	Senior Administrative Assistant
A9	59,410	89,210	Librarian, Translator, Research Officer, Human Resources Officer, External Relations Officer
A10	68,360	102,560	Accountant, Research Officer, Administrative Officer
A11	75,510	117,810	Economist (Ph.D. Entry level), Attorney, Specialist (for example, Accounting, Computer Systems, Human Resources, External Relations)
A12	87,910	131,930	Economist, Attorney, Specialist (for example, Accounting, Computer Systems, Human Resources, External Relations)
A13	98,500	147,740	Economist, Attorney, Specialist (for example, Accounting, Computer Systems, Human Resources, External Relations)
A14	110,310	165,490	Deputy Division Chief, Senior Economist
A15/B1	124,650	187,050	Division Chief, Deputy Division Chief
B2	143,700	208,520	Division Chief, Advisor
B3	170,770	222,210	Assistant Department Director
B4	199,020	248,760	Deputy Department Director, Senior Advisor
B5	234,350	281,330	Department Director

Notes: Because IMF staff, other than US citizens, are usually not required to pay income taxes on their IMF compensation, the salaries are set on a net-of-tax basis, which is generally equivalent to the after-tax take-home pay of the employees of the public and private sector firms from which IMF salaries are derived.

It should be noted that the salary scale corresponds to staff in Washington, DC, as there are few people posted abroad. From the same source (IMF 2005: 87), it is indicated that the salary structure for senior management as of 1 July 2004, is as follows: Managing Director, USD 376,380 (in addition, a supplemental allowance of USD 67,380 is paid to cover expenses); First Deputy Managing Director, USD 327,290; Deputy Managing Directors, USD 311,700.

<sup>1</sup> Grades A1-A8 are support staff; grades A9-A15 are professional staff; and grades B1-B5 are managerial staff.

Source: IMF (2005: 87).

## Annex 6

### Distribution of staff by gender at the IMF

Staff	1980		1990		2004 <sup>1</sup>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
All staff	1,444	100.0	1,774	100.0	2,714	100.0
Women	676	46.8	827	46.6	1,246	45.9
Men	768	53.2	947	53.4	1,468	54.1
Total support staff <sup>2</sup>	613	100.0	642	100.0	718	100.0
Women	492	80.3	540	84.1	613	85.4
Men	121	19.7	102	15.9	105	14.6
Total professional staff <sup>3</sup>	646	100.0	897	100.0	1,633	100.0
Women	173	26.8	274	30.5	579	35.5
Men	473	73.2	623	69.5	1,054	64.5
<i>Total economists</i>	362	100.0	529	100.0	1,008	100.0
Women	42	11.6	70	13.2	249	24.7
Men	320	88.4	459	86.8	759	75.3
<i>Total specialized career streams</i>	284	100.0	368	100.0	625	100.0
Women	131	46.1	204	55.4	330	52.8
Men	153	53.9	164	44.6	295	47.2
Total managerial staff <sup>4</sup>	185	100.0	235	100.0	363	100.0
Women	11	5.9	13	5.5	54	14.9
Men	174	94.1	222	94.5	309	85.1
<i>Total economists</i>	99	100.0	184	100.0	293	100.0
Women	4	4.0	9	4.9	31	10.6
Men	95	96.0	175	95.1	262	89.4
<i>Total specialized career streams</i>	86	100	51	100.0	70	100.0
Women	7	8.1	4	7.8	23	32.9
Men	79	91.9	47	92.2	47	67.1

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Includes only staff on duty; differs from the number of approved positions; <sup>2</sup> Staff in Grades A1-A8; <sup>3</sup> Staff in Grades A9-A15; <sup>4</sup> Staff in Grades B1-B5.

Source: IMF (2005: 88).

## References

- Allott, Phillip (2003), 'The Emerging International Aristocracy', *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 35, 2, [http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/jilp/issues/35/35\\_2\\_Allott.pdf](http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/jilp/issues/35/35_2_Allott.pdf).
- Association for Human Resources Management in International Organizations (AHRMIO) with the Cranfield School of Management (2004), 'Human Resources Management Practices in International Organizations: On behalf of its organizational membership', Ferney-Voltaire, <http://www.ahrmio.org>.
- Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004), *Rule for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Beigbeder, Yves (1988), *Threats to the International Civil Service*. London: Pinter.
- Beigbeder, Yves (1996), *The Internal Management of United Nations Organizations: The Long Quest for Reform*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1996), *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, transl. Laretta C. Clough. Standford, CA, Polity Press.
- Brewster, Chris and the ICC (2003). *Framework for Human Resources Management: Mobility*. Note by Chris Brewster and comments by the secretariat of the International Civil Service Commission ICS/57/R.4. New York: International Civil Commission, 29 May.
- Chimni, B. S. (2004). 'International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making', *European Journal of International Law*, (15)1.
- Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent (1985), *La Société sans l'Etat: Sur la démocratie en France et en Amérique*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
- Cooker, Chris de (ed.) (1990), *International Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organisations*. Norwell: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Deloitte Consulting LLP (2005), *United Nations Organizational Integrity Survey 2004*, Report prepared by Deloitte Consulting LLP, and contracted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). New York: United Nations.
- Dezalay, Yves (2004), 'Les courtiers de l'international. Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l'impérialisme et missionnaires de l'universel', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* no. 151-2.
- Dezalay, Yves and Bryant Garth (2005), 'Les ONG au service de la mondialisation? Connivence des élites internationalisées' *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June, pp. 30-1.
- Dijkzeul, Dennis (1997), *The Management of Multilateral Organizations*. The Hague, Kluwer Law.
- Economist, The* (2004), 'Meritocracy in America. Ever higher society, ever harder to ascend', 29 December, [http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story\\_id=3518560](http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3518560).
- Federal Government's Human Resources Agency (n.d.), Office of Personnel Management, <http://www.opm.gov/employ/internat/LIST.asp>.

- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2000), 'Legalization and World Politics', *International Organization* (54)3: special issue.
- Héritier, Françoise (1996), *Masculin/Féminin: I La pensée de la différence*. Paris, Odile Jacob.
- Héritier, Françoise (2002), *Masculin/Féminin II: Dissoudre la hiérarchie*. Paris, Odile Jacob.
- Hirschman, Albert (2006), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (2004), 'Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite', *The National Interest* 75, spring.
- IMF (2003), 'Archives of the International Monetary Fund' (December). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, [www.imf.org/external/np/arc/eng/archive.htm](http://www.imf.org/external/np/arc/eng/archive.htm).
- IMF (2005), *Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 2005*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2005/eng/>.
- IMF (2006), *World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inflation* (April). Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.
- Ivanova, Maria (2005), 'Assessing UNEP as Anchor Institution for the Global Environment: Lessons for the UNEO Debate', Working Paper 05/01, New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, <http://www.yale.edu/gegproject/uneo-wp.pdf>.
- Jordan, Robert S. (ed.) (1972), *International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelsky, Karen (2001), *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kofman, Eleonore (1999), 'Female "Birds of Passage" a Decade Later: Gender and Immigration in the European Union', *The International Migration Review* 33, 2.
- Kofman, Eleonore (2000), 'Skilled Female Migrants: Invisible International Migrants in European Migratory Spaces and States Policies', *International Journal of Population Geography* 6, 1.
- Krosney, Herbert (1967), *Careers and Opportunities in International Service*. New York: Dutton.
- Lahti, Leena (2004), *Diversity Annual Report 2003*, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2003/ar03.pdf>.
- Lake, Anthony (ed.) (2000), *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in A Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them*. New York, Little, Brown & Company.
- McLaren, Robert I. (1980), *Civil Servants and Public Policy: A Comparative Study of International Secretariats*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
- Mouritzen, Hans (1990), *The International Civil Service: A Study of Bureaucracy International Organizations*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- OECD (2004), 'Percentage of tertiary qualifications awarded to females, by type of tertiary education and by field of study', in *Education at a Glance 2004*. Paris: OECD.
- Ono, Hiroshi (2004), 'Organizational Structure and Labor Market Stratification: Evidence from Foreign-Owned Firms in Japan', Stockholm: European Institute of Japanese Studies, [http://www.sidos.ch/method/RC28/abstracts/Hiroshi%20Ono\\_2.pdf](http://www.sidos.ch/method/RC28/abstracts/Hiroshi%20Ono_2.pdf).
- Ono, Hiroshi and Nicola Piper (2001), 'Japanese Women Studying Abroad: The Case of the United States', Working Paper 125, Stockholm, the European Institute of Japanese Studies, <http://www.hhs.se/eijs>.
- PLS Ramboll Management (2000), *Comparative Study of the Remuneration of Officials of the European Institutions (99/12/IX.D1). Summary*. Arhus, PLS Ramboll Management, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/implementing/salaries\\_study\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/implementing/salaries_study_en.pdf).
- Rothschild, Emma (2002), *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sen, Amartya (2005), *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Silberman, Bernard S. (1993), *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States and Great Britain*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood (1998), 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship', *The American Journal of International Law*, 92(3).
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2003), *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Udom, Udoh Elijah (2003), 'International Civil Service: Historical development and Potential for the 21st Century', *Public Personnel Management* 32, 1.
- UN (n.d.), 'Who Works are the United Nations?', in *Questions and Answers, Images and Reality*, chapter 6, <http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/ch6/ch6.htm>.
- UN (1984), 'The United Nations archives' (28 December). New York: United Nations, ST/AI/326.
- UN (2002), 'United Nations: Archives and Record Management Section' (March). New York: United Nations, <http://www.un.org/Depts/archives/Researcher%20-%20Info%201%20-%20About%20UN%20Archives.doc>.
- UN (2004), 'Impact of the human resources management reform: Note by the Secretary-General' (24 September). *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, A/59/253*, United Nations: New York.
- UN (2005a), *Composition of the Secretariat: Report of the Secretary-General*. A/60/310, New York: United Nations, 29 August.
- UN (2005b), *Report of the International Civil Service Commission for the year 2005*. A/60/30, New York, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session (supplement number 30), 1 January.

- UNDP (2004), *Human Resources Strategy: Optimizing Performance for People Through People and the Professionalization of Human Resources Practice*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNSpecial* (2005), [http://www.unspecial.org/StaffPictures/report\\_p2b.html](http://www.unspecial.org/StaffPictures/report_p2b.html).
- Vaubel, Roland, Axel Dreher, and Ugurlu Soylu (2003), 'Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis' (December), University of Mannheim, [www.diw-berlin.de/english/produkte/veranstaltungen/epcs/papers/docs/Paper-028.pdf](http://www.diw-berlin.de/english/produkte/veranstaltungen/epcs/papers/docs/Paper-028.pdf).
- Wacquant, Loïc (1996), 'Foreword', in Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, transl. Laretta C. Clough. Stanford, CA, Polity Press.
- Weiss, Thomas G. (1975), *International Bureaucracy: An Analysis of the Operation of Functional and Global International Secretariats*. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books.
- Weiss, Thomas G., Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly (eds) (2005), *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice*, United Nations Intellectual History Project. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- World Bank (2000), *Higher Education in Developing Countries. Peril and Promise*, The Task Force on Higher Education and Society. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank (2002), 'The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information' (June). Washington, DC: World Bank, <http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/disclosure/documents/disclosurepolicy.pdf>.
- World Bank (2006), *World Bank Annual Report 2005*. Washington, DC: World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org>.