Abstract
This paper discusses the development of Korean communities in Japan from their origins in the late nineteenth century through their stabilization following the Second World War. Approaching the developing communities from a spatial perspective, the chapter compares Tokyo and Osaka and shows the connections between the urban environment and development of migrant communities. The chapter shows that the conditions of urban environments are specific to each city and that those distinctions constitute the primary factors in determining the success or failure in the development of migrant communities.

Keywords: zainichi, minorities, Osaka, Tokyo, Tsuruhashi

JEL classification: R1, J7
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.

www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu

UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland

Typescript prepared by Anne Ruohonen at UNU-WIDER

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of any of the views expressed.
1 Introduction

In 1977 Thomas Kessner set out to explain how groups succeeded in integrating into American society through an inspection of Italian and Jewish immigrants to New York between 1880 and 1915. Kessner’s thesis is built partially on Bodnar’s (1985) idea that different migrant groups reach the city with varying levels of preparation for the transition to urban life and success at integration is consequentially tied. Kessner utilizes the city as a control, and utilizes the immigrant communities as the variable in his observations. This paper is an attempt to change Kessner’s methodology and examine the connection of the urban environment with immigrant communities by looking at the same migrant group in two different urban settings. It is hoped that this will show the spectrum of narratives regarding the Korean community, and provide insight into the development of the communities relative to their geographic settlement.

In 1982, Koreans represented 82.6 per cent of all foreign residents in Japan. While their numbers have remained stable over the last two decades, the number of other immigrants has increased so that by the end of 2001 Koreans represented only 35.6 per cent of the foreign resident population (Mervio 2003: 85). This influx of immigrants has kindled interest in understanding how Japan deals with immigrant minorities. While, long considered a homogeneous society, Japan has become the target of many studies aimed at disclosing its multiethnic composition.1 However, many of the studies encompass a multitude of minority groups, and those that focus specifically on the Korean community in Japan address the group monolithically, rather than looking at the individual communities within the Korean minority. This allows for great amounts of data to be collected, but ignores the complexities of researching the interaction of the urban environment and Koreans in Japan.

Rather than one entity that can easily be labelled as Korean residents (zainichi kankokujin/chōsenjin), the Korean population consists of multiple communities. Sometimes the only thing connecting these groups is the fabricated label of zainichi.2 Comprehending the dynamics of these individual communities is paramount to understanding how Korean immigrants entered Japanese society, and the extent they were incorporated into it. No study of migration or the development of identity is accurate unless these communities are examined within the particular historical context specific to them.

---


2 The term zainichi means resident alien and is placed before the migrant’s country of origin to denote foreign status. Thus, Korean residents are known as zainichi kankokujin for those immigrating from South Korea and zainichi chōsenjin for those immigrating from North Korea. Since a large portion of Koreans immigrated before the division of the Korean peninsula, they are often simply termed zainichi.
As Japan becomes increasingly diversified, the need to understand how minority groups evolve and interact with the native population grows. By focusing on the city of Osaka and its Korean population this study shows the community’s unique origins and the conditions that set it apart from the Korean community in Tokyo. This allows further research on immigrant identity and diaspora providing a truer base from which to draw conclusions.

2 Osaka as an industrial center

The distinct character of Osaka compliments the uniqueness of its Korean community. While Tokyo and Kyūshū also have large Korean populations, Osaka continues to have the largest Korean community. This is due to a combination of Osaka’s history and the circumstances under which the Korean community there evolved. A comprehension of the city’s history is vital to understanding why it became an area of Korean migration, and how the Korean community developed.

Osaka has long been an industrial center. Originally called Naniwa, and referred to as ‘Japan’s Kitchen’ in pre-modern times, Osaka’s location allowed it to be the focal point of the rice trade. Although Japan followed a Confucian social order that looked down on commerce and relegated merchants to the lowest tier of the social hierarchy, the movement of rice was a necessity that enabled Osaka to rise up as one of three important urban centers in Japan. While Edo, later to be renamed Tokyo, was the main administrative center of Japan, and Kyoto remained the traditional capital and home of the Imperial family; Osaka became the main center of trade. By 1868 and the shift from the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) to the constitutional monarchy of the Meiji period (1868-1912), Osaka had become the largest commercial center in Japan.

Even before the Tokugawa period had officially come to a close, Japanese society was undergoing severe change. The arrival of Commodore Perry to open Japan to foreign influence in 1853 dramatically increased the already building internal pressures for change as Japan sought new ways to deal with the western presence. Rather than trying to ‘repel the barbarians’, the Japanese adopted a policy of rapid modernization along western lines in order to better protect their interests. What had been largely an agricultural economy throughout the Tokugawa period rapidly industrialized, and by 1902, there were 499,000 workers in Japan’s 8,612 factories. The great majority of these factories were created in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and were

3 For a detailed account of Osaka’s early history please see McClain and Wakita (1999), wherein the authors explain how Osaka came to be the second largest city in Japan. Wakita explains that ‘...merchant initiative--the efforts of individuals to secure their own livelihood--must be taken into account, for without their enterprise and labours all government policies would have ended in naught.’ and ‘Merchant self-management of their own political affairs...became the norm of Osaka during the early modern epoch’ (p. 267). A complete understanding of the character of more contemporary Osaka must be prefaced with a basic comprehension of the region’s origins and development in the larger context of Confucian Japan as seen in Nosco (1997) and Hall and Jansen (1967). Although a detailed discussion of pre-modern Osaka is outside the scope of this project, it is hoped that readers will realize the unique position of Osaka in Japanese society.
centered in the textile industry. Iwaji Honda (1909: 6) noted that ‘…at the present silk has assumed the foremost position of all exports from Japan, so much that both the government and the people are giving every possible attention not only to the encouragement, but also to the betterment of the industry.’ This rapid expansion of production caused migration from rural areas to the urban areas. Osaka, being one of the largest urban areas, and traditionally home to commercial activity, became a center of Japan’s fledgling industrial revolution.

As factories were built, Osaka’s urbanization increased at a fantastic pace. Ranking as possibly the largest urban center in Asia, Osaka became known as the ‘Capital of Smoke’ due to its large concentration of factories. This differed greatly from Japan’s other principal cities, Tokyo and Kyoto which were identified much more with government, academia and culture. As Koreans came to constitute a sizeable percentage of the labourers in Osaka’s factories, the image of the city became tied to their identity as well.

2.1 Tsuruhashi

Tsuruhashi is an area in present-day Ikuno-ku in Osaka city. It lies to the east-south-east of the city center and is the hub of zainichi identity for the area. The area’s geographic development was an integral aspect of its selection by Korean migrants as an epicenter. The industrialization of Tsuruhashi, coincided with the initial arrival of Osaka’s Korean population. There is no doubt that this transitory state of Tsuruhashi provided an excellent environment for the development of insular communities for first-generation immigrants who had no domestic support organizations available to them. It also makes Osaka’s Korean community unique. Other large Korean populations in Japan were fundamentally different in that they were organized with much more structure. Only in Osaka did the transitional conditions of the economy define the geographical boundaries of the Korean community.

3 Political and economic changes in Japan

Japanese imperial expansion played an integral part in the development of both Japan’s and Tsuruhashi’s economy. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Korea was declared a protectorate of the Japanese Empire. This greatly increased the size of the empire, but, unlike the Sino-Japanese War, did not give Japan any quick economic stimulus since no war indemnities were included in the treaty. The war had drained the Japanese economy.

---

4 Hanes (2002). For more information on Japan’s industrial transformation please see Gordon (1985), Hall (1971), and Garon (1987).

5 Tamaki (1982: 156) as found in Hanes (2002). Tamaki continues with the following passage found in an elementary primer: ‘It is only natural that Osaka should be called the Capital of Smoke. Even on a fair day, the sky grows dull as you approach Osaka station by train, making the city appear overcast. There are over eight thousand factories here, large and small. Lined up one after another like trees in a forest, their chimneys belch smoke incessantly. With its diversity of flourishing industries, Osaka is truly Japan’s greatest industrial city.’

6 For a more detailed account of this period please see Okamoto (1970).
and resulted in control of Korea, which was itself undergoing a difficult transition from an increasingly corrupt and inefficient Confucian system to a more capitalistic economy involved in world trade. The Korean peninsula proved to be a difficult area for Japan to control as a protectorate, and in 1910, the peninsula was annexed as a colony.

The First World War acted as a catalyst for increasing industrial growth as European imports declined and Japanese industry raced to fill the void in world production. In the years 1901 to 1913, the number of factories within the city more than tripled and the value of production nearly quadrupled. By war’s end, Osaka’s skyline was darkened by smoke from chemical plants, copper mills and ironworks. A description of Osaka by Hanes (2002: 199) gives some idea of the industrialization going on at the time and its consequences.

Interwar Osaka was ringed by slums, most of them adjacent to the many factories that had been erected near the harbor and along the rivers of the city. Arguably worst hit were the unincorporated districts of Nishinari-gun and Higashinari-gun. Both areas were flush with factories and both experienced a huge influx of industrial labour during the economic boom of the First World War. Nishinari-gun reported a 47 per cent increase in total population, jumping from 170,000 to 250,000, while Higashinari-gun reported a 43 per cent increase, expanding from 140,000 to 200,000.

This urban expansion can be seen against a citywide increase of only 11 per cent. This residential purgatory, as Hanes describes it, was the result of national planning gone awry.

Japanese agriculture was undergoing horrific stresses at the time as well, and the 1918 rice riots, which spread across most urban areas, were also experienced in Osaka. While increasingly urban, the only legislation available to consolidate land was the Arable Land Adjustment Act (Kōchi Seirihō) that had been adopted by the government in 1899. Intended as a measure to consolidate agricultural land for increased productivity, it was implemented by Tsuruhashi in 1919 as a means to prepare the community for urban development. This included updating irrigation and roads, and river improvement. Because the system was designed for agriculture, its roads were never intended for normal auto traffic, and even today, streets in Tsuruhashi are notably narrow. The land adjustment project did allow for the development of the river, ensuring that it would not overflow its banks. This enabled land owners to build permanent structures much closer to the river bank, further aiding in the conversion of land from farming to an urban environment. Coupled with the increasingly urban population this meant that a landowner could increase his profit sevenfold by renting small parcels of land to

---

7 Korea had attempted to avoid western influences and cling to a traditional Confucian social hierarchy determined by birth. This social system was increasingly subject to pressure from both internal and external forces as western missionaries and merchants attempted to gain access to the peninsula. After 1894 Japanese influence increased until the Korean government implemented the Kabo Reforms in 1904 which did away with the hereditary hierarchy. While knowledge of Korea’s transformation is important in understanding emigration to Japan, it is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on this period please see, Haboush and Deuchler (1999), Schmid (2002), and Conroy (1960).

industrial workers rather than farming it. It is against this backdrop that Korean workers first appeared in great numbers.

4 Immigration

During the Edo period, Korea was one of the few foreign governments to have diplomatic relations with Japan. This changed with the coming of the west and the Meiji period, and soon foreigners from many locations were residing in Japan. Statistical reports from 1895 show over 7,000 foreigners in Japan, of which only 12 were Korean (Table 1). Initial immigration was largely based on unequal treaties gained through ‘gunboat diplomacy’ that guaranteed favorable economic conditions and extraterritoriality. westerners in Japan were primarily employed as advisors to Japanese industrial development, or as merchants whose advantageous conditions in Japan served as a base for further exploitation of Chinese markets. Since these advantages were unavailable to Koreans, who were facing encroachments from the west as well, there was little incentive to emigrate to Japan.

It is important to note the influx of western immigration, especially given that before 1855 any westerner found in Japan beyond the confines of the tiny trading post of Dejima was subject to death. This can be compared with the relatively low number of Koreans. The Chinese presence is also notable since it represents approximately half of the total number of foreigners in Japan. While these figures represent a trend in the Meiji (1868-1912) and early Taisho (1912-1928) periods, they only allude to the dramatic changes in immigration patterns between 1919 and 1945.

While western immigration had climbed sharply after Japan opened to commercial trade, it began to decline after the first decade of the twentieth century. Drops in immigration by Europeans and Americans can largely be attributed to two major factors. The first factor behind the decline in western immigration was the First World War. As European interest turned inward, less emphasis was placed on East Asia. In addition, Japanese, who by this time had gained a high level of sufficiency in their trades, were increasingly replacing western advisors employed in Japan to assist in its efforts to modernize. These westerners included military advisors, city planners, doctors, and even educators such as Lafcadio Hearn, who was succeeded by the famous author Natsume Soseki. Increases in Asian immigration can also start to be seen by the quadrupling of Chinese immigration. As China continued to suffer at the hands of the colonial west, many Chinese saw Japan’s modernization as a model to follow. Both Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Korean students came to Japan to study. These students were encouraged by Meiji elites such as Yukichi Fukuzawa, and were initially quite enamored with the Japanese system. Korean immigration was limited in scope and until 1910, Koreans were in every sense a foreign population. This changed when the Empire of Korea was annexed into the Empire of Japan. Thereafter, all Koreans became subjects of the Japanese government.

---

Yukichi Fukuzawa is the founder of Keio University, one of Japan’s premier private universities, and a strong advocate of Korean students. He is reported to have opened up his home to Koreans wishing to study in Japan and worked to ensure their successful studies. Many of his philosophies can be seen in the Kabo Reforms of 1904 and after the fall of the progressive movement in Seoul, many of the refugees fled to Japan where he assisted them. For more on Fukuzawa see Kiyooka (1966).
and classified as ‘Japanese subjects of Korean race’ (Wagner 1951: 9). This is the primary factor of the more than tenfold increase of Koreans in Japan between 1905 and 1913. After annexation, it became much easier for Koreans to enter Japan for study, and many took advantage of educational facilities unavailable on the peninsula.

5 Early Korean immigration

As shown above, Korean immigration began with students, and not until some time after Korea’s annexation did large numbers of immigrants begin to cross into Japan. Much of this immigration can be broken up into occupation and region. In 1910, the largest Korean population in Japan was located in Tokyo, where the majority of Koreans were students. As immigration became easier with annexation, more Koreans seeking employment immigrated and the number of labourers increased. Most of this labour was dispersed throughout the greater Tokyo area however, and the Korean community in Tokyo remained dominated by students well into the 1920s. In the Kansai region, of which Osaka is the largest urban area, Korean labourers were first recruited by the Settsu Cotton Spinning Company of Osaka in 1911, and then recruitment expanded to the Settsu Company’s Akashi factory where 208 Koreans were employed over the next five years (Warren 1994: 72-3). This marked the beginning of Korean immigration to Japan’s factories centered in the Kansai region. The third major area of Korean immigration was the mines of Hokkaido and Kyūshū. These islands on the northern and southern extremes of Japan were sources of coal, which encouraged Korean labour. The Hokkaido Steamship and Colliery Company (Hokutan), which began to recruit Korean miners as early as 1912, had its first six Korean employees work in the Yūbari mine in 1916.

This was soon followed by increases in Korean miners, and by 1918, the company employed 659 Koreans. Successes by northern mining companies prompted Kyūshū mines to employ Korean labourers as well, and by 1917, all but the Miike mine of Kyūshū’s Chikuhō coalfield employed Korean immigrants. Figure 1 makes clear the regional distinctions among Korean labour and exhibits the necessity of addressing each group separately. The type of labour and circumstances surrounding the different communities greatly influenced their development.

The distinctions in region can also be noted by Yukio Takeda’s 1938 listing of factories to employ Korean workers before 1918. Of the 32 factories listed, 22 were within the boundaries of Osaka, Hyōgo and Wakayama prefectures while another 5 factories were just outside the traditional borders of Kansai in Mie prefecture. From the first decades

---

10 Wagner goes on to explain that annexation brought about an end to Korean citizenship, but did not result in Japanese citizenship. Koreans, whether in Japan or Korea were legally treated inferior to Japanese citizens.

11 For a more detailed account of Korean employment in mining see Weiner (1989: 60-2) and Smith (1999).

of the twentieth century, Kansai’s industrial factories began using Korean labour to offset Japanese *dekasegi*, which was plagued by frequent escapism from contracts.  

### 6 Korean immigration in Osaka

In the fifteen years between 1915 and 1930, the number of Koreans in Osaka increased nearly one hundred fold from only 399 in 1915 to 32,806 in 1930. The population jumped to nearly eight times this in the following eight years to a pre-wartime high of 241,619 by 1938. The majority of these immigrants had high hopes when they departed from Korea, but their lives in Japan were far from comfortable. 1926 statistics from the city government show that the majority of the Korean population lived in the Minato-ku and Higashinari-ku. The population density of the barracks style housing was high with individual units as small as two jōšū. The report also shows that the barracks in Ikuno, Kokubun-chō were converted hen houses. It states that although the police had ordered the situation rectified five months previously, Korean immigrants had made the spaces into permanent living quarters. An official in the Social Affairs Bureau of the Osaka City government described Korean immigrants the following way:

> …the great majority of them drift across to Japan without any knowledge of the conditions here, and dreaming of filling their pockets with gold. Their first feelings on arriving in Japan are probably best expressed by the phrase ‘it sounded like paradise, but when I saw it, it was hell.’  

Illiteracy compounded the feelings of despair for new immigrants and a survey of Osaka Prefecture in 1928 revealed that more than 50 per cent of men and 80 per cent of women surveyed had virtually no comprehension of the Japanese language. They were also subject to different pay scales than their Japanese counterparts. The average daily wage for a Japanese cotton spinner was ¥1.47 while a Korean only received ¥1.33. This

---

13 Dekasegi literally translates to one working away from home, and is used for workers who leave their place of residence for employment, usually living in the dormatories of their employer. As workers found the conditions to be difficult it was common for them to escape and flee back to their rural homes. Korean labourers had a more difficult time escaping from the factories and nowhere to go when they did, making them an excellent alternative for Japanese factory owners.


15 Between 3.09 and 3.68 m². This refers to the floor space as determined by the number of tatami mats. These were originally determined regionally and therefore as people gathered to urban areas a mixture of sizes are found. Even in contemporary Japan room sizes are most commonly given in jōšū.

16 Shakai-bu Osaka-shi, Chousa-ka (1927: 5-7, see especially note ‘ヘ’).


was institutionalized, as ethnicity was a determining factor in setting maximum and minimum wages.\textsuperscript{19}

Many of the workers in Japan’s textile mills were women from both Korea and rural Japan. Lured to the factories by the excitement of urban life and consistent work, women signed three to five year contracts to work in Osaka’s factories. The conditions were often much worse than they had anticipated and for most it was a hellish existence. A social advocate and writer at the time describes the wages of female weavers in the following way:

Generally speaking, female operatives do not receive definite amounts of wages, because they are apprentices. They are only to receive bonuses on completion of term, five yen for those with three-year terms, ten or twelve yen for those with five-year terms, and twenty yen for those with seven year terms. However, these [bonuses] turn out to be in name only…. In actual fact, when the female operatives joined the workshop substantial sums of money went to their parents and intermediaries. When they finish their contracts they do not receive even one sen. Some even work half a year or a year after their contracts are finished in order to pay back advance-loans.\textsuperscript{20}

Conditions were poor for Japanese women who often ran away from the factories. Dormitories constructed for female worker’s ‘safety’ were often surrounded by 8-foot high walls and workers were not allowed to venture outside the compound gates. Not allowed out, girls had no choice but to either accept conditions inside the prison-like dormitories or devise a means of escape. Korean labourers, who did not speak the language or have the means to return to the peninsula, were trapped.\textsuperscript{21}

7 Specific origins of Osaka’s Korean immigrants

As stated earlier, the majority of Korean immigrants to Japan migrated from the southern provinces of the peninsula. This applies to Osaka as well. A distinction can be seen, however, from the specific origins of many of Osaka’s resident Koreans. Of the 171,160 Koreans living in Osaka Prefecture in 1934, 37,938 were from the island of Cheju. While this may appear to be a small proportion, it is quite important to understanding the Korean population of Osaka. While Koreans from Cheju Island made up only 9.3 per cent of the Korean population in Japan, they constituted 22.2 per cent of the population of Osaka. Since 75.8 per cent of all immigrants from Cheju Island lived


\textsuperscript{21} For a detailed account of conditions in Japan’s textile factories please see Tsurumi (1990). She does not specifically discuss Korean working conditions, but information from Kim (1982) shows that Korean women faced similar difficulties, although they were often times subject to more severe treatment than their Japanese counterparts. A study of both books is recommended for a deeper knowledge of the subject, which can be discussed only briefly within the confines of this paper.
in Osaka,\textsuperscript{22} they were able to form a community that is unseen in other Korean communities.

There were other factors also that set the immigrants from Cheju Island apart. While the ratio of men to women had always been skewed, immigration from Cheju had an unusual pattern. In the early stages women accounted for only 9 per cent of immigrants. However, as transportation from the island became more affordable, women immigrated in greater numbers. By 1932, women accounted for 44 per cent of immigrants and thereafter the ratio of women to men reached about 1 to 1.\textsuperscript{23} and 88 per cent of Koreans in Osaka were reported to be living as family units by 1939.\textsuperscript{24} The ages of the women is also telling as the highest percentage was from the 26-30 bracket. Considering the relatively young age of marriage, it shows that the women who immigrated from Cheju Island were not young unmarried girls looking for work, but rather wives and mothers. Undoubtedly, this was influenced by the matriarchal structure of Cheju society.\textsuperscript{25} The jobs of many Cheju immigrants were also slightly different. In 1932, while textiles dominated the economy of Kansai, the Ashihama section of Higashinari-ku was heavily laden with chemical and rubber factories wherein 4,758 workers were employed.\textsuperscript{26} Many of these immigrants from Cheju Island came because of direct ferry routes, Osaka factory recruiting efforts and Cheju’s distinct historical situation.\textsuperscript{27} These factors must be examined to understand the Korean community in Osaka.

\textbf{8 Cheju Island}

That many of the Koreans who settled in Osaka originated on Cheju Island is important. While the majority of Korean emigrants were from the southern provinces of Korea, no major Korean community outside of Osaka has such distinctive roots. Scholars who do not give adequate attention to the particular nature of society on the island stand at risk of making incorrect assumptions that adversely affect their research.\textsuperscript{28} Cheju Island lies to the southeast of the Korean peninsula, and is considered to have been an independent entity called ‘Tan’ma’ until the early 12th century. It was then seized by Korea’s Koryŏ dynasty before being subjected to Mongol domination from 1273. The Mongols

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Sugihara (1992: 31-59).
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ryoichi Ishii (1933: 207), as cited in Mitchell (1967: 76-7).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} For additional information on Korean gender roles and the anomaly of Cheju Island see Kim and Choi (1997).
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Osaka-fu, Naimu-bu, Kōmu-ka (1933), cited in Hester (1999: 51).
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Warren (1994: 142). The author also notes that statistics for Cheju Island were included in those of southern Chŏlla Province until after the Second World War when it became a separate provience.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} An example of this is evidenced in correspondence regarding Garver (1962). In correspondence to the editor C. I. Eugene Kim (1963) explains succinctly the inaccuracies of Garver’s article due to his lack of information about the particularities of Cheju society. Kim specifically notes that Cheju is a matriarchal society based on a specialized economy. He also notes that Cheju Island served a a place for political exiles during the Yi dynasty.
\end{itemize}
introduced stockbreeding to supplement the island’s income, which was meager due to mountainous terrain and poor farming capabilities. Used as an area for banished and unwanted members of Korean society during the Chosŏn period (1392-1910) Cheju Island developed a very distinct society. The Cheju dialect, while a form of Korean, is unintelligible to most Koreans, and many of the Confucian principles that dominate other areas of Korean society, have variations on the island. The most obvious and celebrated contradiction to Confucian society is the presence of Haenyo divers which resulted in a matriarchal society rather than the paternal hierarchy favored under normal Confucian pretexts. The predisposition to female employment, and the lowly traditional position of the island in Korean society seem to be factors in the ability of Japanese textile manufacturers to recruit so well from the island. Japanese also introduced market oriented crops such as mikan (Clementine oranges), sweet potatoes, and shiitake mushrooms as means to utilize the island’s few resources, which heightened Japanese influence on the island. Japanese commercial fishermen then set up in the city of Sogwip’o and soon over fished the waters leaving fewer choices open to the Korean population. (Hester 1999: 46-7).

9 Transportation to Osaka from Cheju Island

The ease of transportation between Cheju Island and Osaka was another factor in the high concentration of migrants with similar geographic origins. Unlike the peninsular ports such as Pussan, which were serviced by large ferry companies often run under the state-owned railroad corporation, smaller private companies serviced Cheju Island. This more localized control of transportation was reflected in the actions of Korean immigrants and further shows a unique characteristic of Osaka’s Korean population. The first ferry company, the Amagasaki Steamship Company (Amagasaki Kisen) began direct route ferry service between Osaka and Cheju Island in February 1923. This greatly increased the number of Korean passengers traveling between the two destinations. Conditions on the voyage were not pleasant, (The official passenger capacity was 365 but often as many as 685 people boarded for the trip to Osaka.) and Ye-nyo Yang, a passenger, remembers:

We slept in bunks. They were narrow beds set against a wall like a shelf, with another bed placed above it. They looked like lines of kennels. When the ship was much crowded, I sometimes had to sleep standing

---

29 Haenyo divers are women who dive for the shellfish that are abundant in the waters surrounding the island. Almost all divers are women due to their higher percentage of subcutaneous fat, which insulates them from the cold when diving in the cold water. For more information on Haenyo please see Sandberg (1997).

30 The term cheju in Korean means ‘the district over there’ and reflects its position in Korean society. Sandberg (1997).

31 Sugihara (1992: 32). It is interesting to note that the vessel first used to transport immigrants from Cheju Island to Osaka was the 669 ton No. 1 Kimigayo Maru. Kimigayo is also the name of the song that serves as a Japanese national anthem and is the object of much protest by those favoring a more distinct split from Japanese pre-war symbols.
while aboard the ship. No blankets were furnished. Dogs today may feel more comfortable than we in those days.32

Two years after Amagasaki Kisen began its service between Cheju Island and Osaka, the Korean Shipping Service (Chōsen Yūsen), put the 749-ton Kankyō Maru into service between the two ports.33 This was replaced 2 years later by the 1,033-ton Keijō Maru that operated the line until 1930.

The two companies competed for passengers and common fares were between ¥11 and ¥12.5 when, in 1927, Korean residents of Osaka began to complain of the high fares. They held a meeting at Tennōji Hall in April 1928 demanding that Amagasaki Kisen and Chōsen Yūsen reduce fares. As the meeting ended, the police arrived and took two of the leaders into custody. Many of the nearly 2,000 Koreans present at the meeting began to protest, and by morning, the leaders had been freed. Into this business climate entered Sun-Hum Koh, who organized a small ferry service that chartered the No. 2 Hokkai Maru and began service on December 1, 1928. Unable to compete adequately, his operations were taken over by the Kagoshima Shipping Service in March 1929. The Kagoshima Shipping Service was itself a small company with routes between Okinawa and Osaka. While not able to compete in such a competitive market, the line did influence the culture of Koreans from Cheju by providing exposure to Okinawans on their way to work in the spinning mills, before ceasing operations within the first four years.

Dissatisfied with results from the April 1928 meeting Koreans in both Osaka and on Cheju Island began to contribute to a newly formed Cheju Navigation Union34 that claimed 4,500 members by April 21, 1930. These members paid 30 sen as membership dues and then contributed an additional ¥5 per household to accumulate to approximately ¥6,000. Hiroshi Ota35 then assisted in chartering the 3,000 ton Kōryu Maru which provided passage for a reduced rate of ¥6.50 from November first. After the lease for the Kōryu Maru ran out in March 1931, the Cheju Navigation Union purchased the 1,332-ton Fushiki Maru which let the company continue operations. This incited a price war where passage was gained for as little as ¥3. The Japanese companies offered


33 The Korean Shipping service was a government-subsidized conglomeration of shipping companies such as Nippon Yusen and Osaka Yusen that was originally organized by the Governor General of Korea in 1910 in an effort to increase development on the peninsula. For more on the Korean Shipping Service see Onoda (President of Korea Shipping Service) (1933: 794).

34 This name is recorded differently in various sources. Hester (1999) includes it as the East Asia Steamship Cooperative (Tōa Tsūkō Kumiai) while Sugihara (1992) simply calls it a preparatory association of the Cheju Navigation Union. While differing names are given there is little doubt the accounts are discussing the same organization.

35 Ota was an executive of Zenkyō, a non-state sponsored labour union. Labour unions at the time were increasingly evolving into the ‘company unions’ wherein cooperation between union leaders and corporations is stressed to avoid conflict which is seen as detrimental to both workers and industry. This state sponsored socialism was touted as a prophylactic against the more radical forms of socialism seen in other unions. Korean student organizations in Tokyo were generally associated with the more radical elements of the leftist movements and therefore it is unsurprising that Zenkyō would assist the Cheju Navigation Union. Additionally, Sugihara (1992) notes that the Fushiki Maru’s captain was a member of the seamen’s union who was introduced by leftist activist Ritsuta Noda. For more on Japanese labour relations see Beckmann (1971), Garon (1987), and Gordon (1985).
kickbacks and ran deficits to control the market, but loyalty to the Korean company did not wane. Police eventually began to crack down on the company and it was forced to suspend operations in December 1933 (Hester 1999: 48-9). In 1935, the Ship Safety Standards Law was passed and Chōsen Yūsen found continued operations unprofitable and discontinued service leaving only the Amagasaki Steamship Service’s Kimigayo Maru transporting people between the two ports.

This competition between ferry services did much to drive down the cost of transportation to Osaka and increased the number of immigrants from Cheju Island. At the peak of competition in 1933 over 29,000 people made the trip and Japan’s population of Koreans originating on Cheju Island reached 47,271. The majority of these immigrants stayed in the Kansai region. Against the nearly half million Koreans in Japan this may not appear to be significant, but considering the population of the island was under 200,000 the scope of the migration can be better understood.

10 Ideology of Koreans in Japan

In Beall et al. (forthcoming: introduction chapter), the editors note the resistance to southern immigrants in Mumbai. Campaigns against immigrants are frequent during periods of stress to those in difficult environments, and the Japanese of the early 20th century were no different. As stated in the discussion of transportation between Cheju Island and Osaka, the Korean community in Japan, led by students in Tokyo, was often associated with the political left. The tensions involved between Koreans and Japanese went back at least as far as the 1919 March 1st movement wherein students organized mass uprisings both in Japan and Korea to protest for independence. These uprisings were put down violently and acted as a precursor of Japanese methods of dealing with Korean protest. Richard Mitchell (1976: 32) supplies important context for the Japanese response to social change demanded by the Koreans. He notes:

By the early 1920’s many Japanese saw signs of institutional decay. Because of growing economic and social problems, plus feuds and corruption rampant in parliamentary politics, people were inclined to turn their backs on the emerging political system in favor of a return to the stability they imagined had existed earlier. In other terms, Japan was suffering from too rapid a modernization which led to a state of social disorganization, or anomie, in which large numbers of individuals felt that stable institutional patterns were crumbling and that their own personal stability was in jeopardy.

The March 1st movement was in many respects a turning point in Japanese-Korean relations and had many effects on Koreans in Japan. Until the protests for independence, many Koreans in Japan had been seen as willing subjects of the Emperor. While not considered as sophisticated as Japanese, Koreans were viewed as attempting to bring their country into modernity, with Japanese help. After the protests, Japanese began to

---

36 Sugihara, (1992) p. 45, (Table 2) describes the number of passengers while p. 46 (Table 3) shows the number of Korean residents from Cheju Island in Japan.
view the Koreans as dangerous and subversive. This is particularly a result of the Korean students’ affiliation with radical left-wing groups. Mitchell (1976: 18) notes that in 1920, of 212 Koreans on police blacklists, 151 were students. The image of Koreans in the Kantō area was one of radical anarchism and socialism, and when Premier Hara was assassinated in 1921, the rumor soon spread that he had been killed by a Korean (Mitchell 1976: 26). The relatively small number of students in Osaka and the influence of the immigrants from Cheju Island, who were quite removed from Seoul and Korean politics, acted to further distinguish the Korean community in Osaka.

The distinctions between separate Korean communities can nowhere be seen better than through the tragedy of autumn 1923. Perceptions of the Korean minority in Tokyo cumulated in disaster on Saturday, 1 September 1923, when a tremendous earthquake struck Tokyo killing over 100,000 people. Police were given instructions to control the situation as fires burned throughout the city. Their instructions included the statement that ‘there are, among the Koreans, people who are engaged in arson and other violence.’ Koreans were accused of poisoning the wells and attempting to sabotage bridges. Soon vigilante groups were out attacking Koreans. Yoshiaki Ishiguro’s research on the attacks states that:

During the weeks following the earthquake, the Japanese in the area embarked on a rentless [relentless] ‘hunt’ for Koreans. They used bamboo spears to stab, clubs to beat, and their bare hands to choke Koreans to death….During that week, about 2,000 Koreans in Haneda, 400 on the bank of the Sumida River and 200 in the Kameido Police Station were tortured and murdered. (Ishiguro 1998: 334-5).

No authoritative statistics are available on the number of Koreans killed in the aftermath of the earthquake, but the number of dead ranges from the very low tally of 243 by the Ministry of Justice, to the 6,415 deaths attributed by Sunghak Kim (Allen 1996: 69). This massacre was primarily limited to the Kantō region and was only briefly reported in the Osaka edition of the Asahi newspaper. Koreans in Osaka were not directly affected by the massacre and thus their community evolved differently than the Korean community in Tokyo. Japanese perceptions of Koreans in Tokyo as ideologically radical seem to have set them apart from the pragmatic Koreans in Osaka.

11 Wartime ideological controls

Similar to the rest of Japanese society, Koreans were subject to a variety of social controls during the war years (1931-1945). Increases in war production led to a demand for labour, and immigration from the peninsula increased dramatically. To assist in the supervision of these immigrants the government created a series of organizations to

37 For more information on the March 1st Independence Movement and the leftist traits exhibited by them see Mitchell (1976). His monograph explains in depth the close association of the communist and nationalist movements among Korean students in Japan.


which all Koreans were expected to belong. The formation of support organizations such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) noted in a previous chapter are a common element in minority community development and the Koreans in Japan formed support organizations as well (Baruah forthcoming). As early as 1921, Koreans in Tokyo had formed the Mutual Support Association (Sōaikai) which had grown to include branches throughout Japan. The Osaka branch was set up in 1924 and the same year the government sponsored Concordia Organization (Kyōwakai) was founded. In 1934 the Japan-Korea Harmonization Projects Survey Association (Naisen Yūwa Jigyō Chōsa-kai) was formed and ‘By 1936 there were 679 Korean peace and friendship groups with 78,846 members.’ (Mitchell 1976: 80). Experience with the Friendly Society (Yūaikai), a predecessor to the General Federation of Labour (Sōdōmei), led Japanese officials to view the associations with suspicion. What had started as a movement to promote labour unions was utilized as a vehicle for social change. The government considered many of the Korean self-help organizations fronts for the Korean nationalist and socialist movements. This resulted in the formation of the Concordia Enterprise (Kyōwa Jigyō) in 1936, which was comprised of 37 groups, and many smaller subgroups spread throughout Japan. The Central Concordia Association (Chūō Kyōwakai) was founded in 1939 to administer the smaller groups and act as a control for Koreans coming to Japan (Pyle 1973: 80-1). This consolidation had begun in Osaka in July 1935 when the Osaka Prefecture Kyōwakai, the Sōaikai, and Osaka branches of the Cheju Mutual Assistance Association (Cheju Kyōsai-kai Osaka Shi-bu) were joined in a federation (Hester 1999: 56-7). In December of that year, the Cheju Kyōsai-kai then ceased its operations, leaving the Kyōwakai and Sōaikai as the primary organizations for Korean immigrants in Osaka.

There is no doubt that the Kyōwakai acted as a state sponsored social welfare organization aimed at preventing the spread of more radical forms of socialism. Members were obliged to wear Kyōwakai membership badges and cooperate with police in finding escapees who fled their contracts. It also published language books and a weekly newspaper, the Kyōwa Shimbun, with a circulation of 45,000 copies per week, aimed at integrating the Korean workers into Japanese society and making them ‘good subjects of the Empire.’ (Mitchell 1976: 18). Kyōwakai membership was required for any Korean wishing to immigrate and identity checks were often held. These measures were designed to control the Korean population by providing an approved outlet for their grievances. The success of the Kyōwakai can be seen in the increase of documented disputes and absence of any organized opposition to the government’s policies.

While the principal competition to the Kyōwaikai, the Sōaikai, was disbanded in most areas of Japan, the Osaka branch was allowed to continue operations. This is because the nature of the organization in Osaka was unlike its counterparts in Tokyo or the mining communities of Kyūshū or Hokkaido. While other branches of the Sōaikai were

40 For a more detailed account see Large (1972: xi).

41 The foundation of government-sponsored organizations to address social issues was an integral part of the Japanese social bureaucracy in pre-war Japan. For more on the foundations of the social bureaucracy see Pyle (1973), as well as Garon (1987) and Hanes (2002).

42 Mitchell (1976: 81). The number of Koreans involved in disputes rose to 49,532 between 1939 and 1942.
committed to ideological pursuits, the Osaka branch was fundamentally concerned with finding housing in the densely populated urban districts where most of the Koreans worked. Devoted to practical matters, the Sōaikai demanded its members be ‘model Japanese’ before rendering assistance. This enabled the organization’s continued existence and allowed it to continue providing housing to new immigrants. One report claims that ‘By 1940 the Osaka branch of the Sōaikai had essentially become a branch of the Kyōwaikai’.43 Regardless of the function of other branches of the Sōaikai, the ability of Osaka’s branch to remain functioning is a further example of the unique circumstances surrounding the Korean community therein.

12 The General Mobilization Act and Korean labour

In 1938, the Japanese government passed the General Mobilization Act, which gave the military nearly unlimited power to pursue the war effort in China. The impact of this legislation was felt in all segments of society, and the Korean community was no exception. One of the great debates involving Korean labour of the period centers around the mobilization of Korean labour for Japanese industry. This has been incorrectly termed ‘slave labour’ and ‘forced labour’ by many scholars44 to invoke strong sentiment against the Japanese war machine. Wagner (1951: 26-7) labels Korean workers as contract workers and conscript labour and Mitchell (1976: 84-5) states:

The Koreans, like the rest of the Japanese labour force, were overworked during the last years of the war. It is a mistake, however, to apply the terms ‘slave labour’ or ‘forced labour battalions’ to Korean workers. They were no more mistreated, and in some cases were treated better, than their Japanese fellow workers, who were also conscripted. As the total mobilization program was stepped up, the entire labour force was under great strain, and by the end of the war was quickly becoming exhausted.

Terms such as ‘forced conscription’ are used by Chung and other scholars who try to portray Japanese actions as somehow directed against Koreans. Since by definition conscription, both Japanese and Korean, means ‘enrolled into service by compulsion’45 the redundant addition of the word ‘forced’ serves to do nothing but denote a level of subjugation that was not really there. To the contrary, the government promised political equality, better pay and improved working conditions as incentives for Korean labour. Whether or not the Japanese ever intended to keep their promises is irrelevant. That the government was forced to offer incentives implies a step that would be unnecessary if dealing with a population of ‘slave labourers’. Further evidence of this is seen in documents recently discovered by Tomida and Daniels (1995) that show that the Tokkō


44 The term ‘forced conscription’ to refer to immigration practices between 1938 and 1945 is used by Chung (1984). Hester (1999) uses ‘forced labour migration’ to refer to the same period, as does Fukuoka (2000), Weiner (1994) and Chung and Tipton (1997).

(Special Higher Police, or Thought Police) actively sought to prosecute Japanese citizens found guilty of persecuting Koreans towards the end of the war. It is doubtful that this situation would have occurred if Koreans were considered no more than slave labour.

Regardless of the means by which Koreans reached Japan, the immigrant population soared during the later war years. By 1942, the Korean population of Osaka reached 412,748. This made Osaka the largest Korean population outside of Seoul, Korea’s capital city. However, as the war became more difficult for Japan, Koreans increasingly returned to the peninsula. Limited resources and transportation decreased the need for labour and as allied planes began bombing Japanese industrial complexes, newly arrived Korean immigrants fled from their contracts and returned home. Osaka’s Korean population dropped to 320,000 by 1944 and by war’s end had decreased to fewer than 180,000. Many of the Koreans who chose to stay, had lived substantial portions of their lives in Japan, and had become well integrated into a particular form of Japanese society.

13 Repatriation and a return to Japan

At war’s end there were approximately two million Koreans residing in Japan. Many of these were recent immigrants and they quickly began an exodus to the peninsula. Occupation authorities placed restrictions on the amount of money and goods Koreans could take with them to prevent massive flows of capital from Japan, but this only temporarily slowed the stream of Koreans. U.S. documents show repatriation occurred largely within the period between August 1945 and December 1946 when approximately 1,399,145 Koreans were repatriated through controlled and uncontrolled channels. The Japanese government concluded that there were 611,758 Koreans living in Japan as of November 1948. Many of these were immigrants in the Osaka area who had migrated to Japan early in the colonial period and had built a community that they did not want to leave.

Another reason for the continued existence of the Korean community in Osaka stems from the city’s close ties to Cheju Island. During the latter part of July 1945, Allied leaders met in Potsdam to discuss the situation at the end of hostilities. The outcome


47 Hester (1999: 59).

48 Information taken from Wagner 1951: 96 (Table 4) which includes data from the following sources: USAMGIC, South Korea Intern Government Activities; SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan; Republic of Korea, Statistical Summation; League of Koreans Residing in Japan, cited in USAMGIC, Repatriation, Seoul, Korea 1946, p. 14; Japanese Government, Attorney-General’s Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, cited in Nippon Times, 9 March 1949, p. 4.

49 Wagner 1951: 96. (Table 4 footnote d).

50 At the time, the Soviet Union was not yet at war with Japan, and the Allied forces were in the planning stages for an invasion of the main Japanese islands. The invasion was foreseen as being a
of this meeting resulted in the administration of post-war Korea to be divided between the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south. At war’s end, respective Occupational governments began to prepare Korea for self-rule. However, competing leaders often fought for power and the situation was quite fluid. As Occupation forces proved unable to form a unified government for the country, both the United States and the Soviet Union acted to install leaders sympathetic to their interests. In the south, this came in the form of Syngman Rhee, a Korean who had led a resistance movement against Japan’s colonization from the United States. In the north Kim Il Sung was chosen. Kim had fled to Manchuria and led rebel attacks on Japanese interests in the north. Communists in the south opposed the election of Rhee and formed guerrilla groups to thwart the election. South Korean forces, assisted by U.S. military personnel, engaged the communist resistance and fighting broke out on Cheju Island on April 3, 1948, that decimated the island. Estimates range as high as 80,000 Koreans killed in the massacre. 

51 After the South Korean government’s 3 April 2003 official acknowledgement of the massacre and apology to the relatives of the innocent people killed, it is hoped that information that is more definitive will be forthcoming. For the purposes of this study, the conflict, and its locality of Cheju Island, has a huge impact. In the first sixteen months of the new Korean government, less than 6,000 Koreans were repatriated (Wagner 1951: 84). Although given status as Japanese nationals, not Japanese citizenship, the majority of Korean immigrants made the decision to accept the limitations imposed on them by the Japanese rather than attempt to create an entirely new existence for themselves in a land that would soon be in the grips of a civil war. 

52 It explains why many of the Korean immigrants to Japan choose to stay in Osaka rather than return to Korea. Mun’s (2002) study of the relationship between the April 3rd incident and Osaka’s Korean population explains that once repatriated Koreans fleeing the turmoil of Cheju Island returned to Osaka. This added another element to the particular nature of Osaka’s Korean community which can be explored further as resources are made available.

14 Conclusion

The Korean residents of Tokyo, with their early influence of student radicals, evolved much differently than the labourers of the coalfields who were confined by the turbulent swings in the market and quickly found unionization a means for dealing with the difficult one, and heavy casualties were predicted. In light of this, Allied planners favored Soviet participation in the war and made concessions to gain their involvement.

51 Unfortunately, little has been written about the fighting on Cheju Island. US documents remained classified until recently and provide sketchy information. South Korean documents are still classified. Cumings (1990: 268-70) makes note of the rebellion and its origins. Much confusion over the political nature of ‘People’s Parties’ – Village organizations developed in the absence of national control led American forces to assume these organizations were communist in nature. Subsequently they were put down with great force. There appear to be no monographs in English dealing specifically with the subject, but much information can be found in Chan (1988) and online from links at the following website available as of 7 April 2003: http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/cheju.htm.

52 In Che (2000) the author’s autobiography details the hardships encountered by returning to the peninsula after living in Japan through the war. While outside the confines of this research, it shows the difficulties that must have been known to Koreans in Osaka contemplating a return to Korea.
wretched conditions. Turnover was high in the mines and the nature of the work prevented formation of bonds between labourers. Many from these groups came to Japan as a temporary solution to educational or financial restrictions in Korea. They were mostly men and although primarily from the southern provinces, shared few commonalities of origin.

This can be juxtaposed with the Korean immigrants to Osaka. Koreans in Osaka were less involved in ideological pursuits, and more interested in the pragmatic necessities of life in an industrializing world. They were employed in industry and thus able to form a sense of community with coworkers. Many of the immigrants to Osaka came from Cheju Island where they shared a distinct language and history that set them apart and eased the formation of community. The nature of their community was conducive to families and many older women immigrated. This was in due to the factors including the type of work being done, the role of women in Cheju society from which many of the women came, and inexpensive transportation made possible by immigrant-induced competition among ferry operators. As the Second World War ended, hideous massacres in the name of ideological choice erupted on the island of their origins and the permanence of the Korean community in Osaka was strengthened.

The particular conditions of Japan’s Korean communities have been major factors in its growth and development. Just as exploring the relationship between the Italian and Jewish immigrants to New York provides an abundance of insight into the ideas of migrant preparation and adaption to a new environment, the examination of Koreans in the differing urban environments of Osaka and Tokyo allows for insight into the relationship between the city and those who choose to call it home.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>USA.</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>3,642</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>6,890</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>11,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,114</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>10,388</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>15,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>8,420</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>13,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>2,527*</td>
<td>13,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,787</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>11,867</td>
<td>3,952</td>
<td>21,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>12,046</td>
<td>5,046</td>
<td>22,141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Kantō region includes available statistics for Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures. The Kansai region includes information available for Kyoto, Osaka and Hyōgo prefectures and Kyushū includes statistics for Fukuoka and Nagasaki prefectures.
References


Nihon, Naimushō Keihokyoku (Japan, Ministry of Police Affairs Bureau) (1920).

Nihon, Naimushō Keihokyoku (Japan, Ministry of Police Affairs Bureau) (1925).


Sandberg, L. (1997). ‘Cheju Island’s Haenyo Divers: Traditional Life Facing Modernization’ available online from the Anomalies Project sponsored by the


